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INTRODUC TION
The “Sharing Economy” 
through the Lens of Law
Finn Makela, Derek McKee, and Teresa Scassa
Introduction
I n the last few years, websites and mobile applications permittingthe rental of goods and the provision of services have attracted 
hundreds of millions of users and have had an enormous economic 
impact. The best-known examples of this phenomenon include 
Airbnb (short-term accommodations) and Uber (short car rides). 
These websites and mobile applications (often referred to as “plat-
forms”) rely on their users to offer their own physical and human 
resources to clients. Many of those who offer rentals and services 
through these sites (often referred to as “providers”) do so on a part-
time or casual basis. Many providers seek to generate revenue on the 
basis of existing household assets, such as spare rooms or personal 
vehicles. Because these platforms allow for the more widespread use 
of such assets, they are often collectively identified as parts of the 
“sharing economy.”1  However, as we shall explain below, there is 
considerable debate as to the appropriateness of this label. 
In general, sharing economy platforms provide users with a 
forum for interaction, a standard set of contractual terms, and a 
secure method of payment. They do not themselves own the physi-
cal capital, nor do they directly employ the labour required to pro-
vide the services in question. They typically provide a platform to 
facilitate exchanges and charge a commission on each transaction in 
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return. This online marketplace model is not unique: eBay pioneered 
it in the 1990s for sales of goods. However, the provision of services 
is more complex than the sale of goods; there are more things that 
can go wrong, and higher levels of security and trust are required. 
Sharing economy platforms therefore ask providers and clients to 
rate one another’s performance and rely on these rating systems as 
trust systems and as a form of quality control. Nevertheless, the 
rapid expansion of platforms like Airbnb and Uber has generated 
enormous controversy. Well-publicized cases of vandalism, assault, 
and even murder among platform users suggest that the platforms’ 
screening and trust mechanisms will never be perfect. Controversies 
have also arisen from the platforms’ economic impact. This impact 
is felt most acutely in certain sectors: Uber drivers compete with 
taxi drivers; Airbnb hosts compete with hotels. But the platforms 
are also understood to have broader impacts: Uber is associated 
with a trend toward low-paying, precarious work, whereas Airbnb 
is accused of exacerbating real estate speculation and adversely 
affecting the availability and cost of long-term rental housing. 
While governments in some jurisdictions have attempted to rein 
in the platforms, these companies’ technological infrastructure 
has in some cases allowed them to bypass conventional regulatory 
frameworks, generating accusations of unfair competition as well 
as debates about the merits of existing regulatory regimes). Indeed, 
the platforms blur a number of familiar distinctions, including 
personal versus commercial activity; infrastructure versus content; 
contractual autonomy versus hierarchical control. These ambiguities 
can stymie legal regimes that rely on these distinctions as organiz-
ing principles, including those relating to labour, competition, tax, 
insurance, information, the prohibition of discrimination, as well 
as specialized sectoral regulation. 
It was with a view to exploring these challenges—and potential 
responses to them—that we brought together scholars from across 
Canada and elsewhere for a workshop held at the Université de 
Sherbrooke (accompanied by a public panel discussion at the Grande 
Bibliothèque in Montreal) in January of 2017. The scholars offered a 
rich variety of insights, both in terms of the traditional areas of law 
they brought to bear on the sharing economy and the theoretical 
perspectives that informed their analysis. The workshop papers com-
prise the present volume, and contribute to the ongoing discussions 
on legal regulation of the sharing economy.
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At the time we launched this project, early in 2016, legal schol-
ars were only just beginning to publish research on the sharing econ-
omy.2 As this book goes to press, in 2018, the volume of research has 
substantially increased. Hundreds of articles on the topic have now 
appeared in academic law journals, especially in the United States. 
After an initial period of exuberance, it appears that the debate has 
now matured. The practical and conceptual challenges presented by 
sharing economy platforms are now well recognized.3 At the same 
time, it is recognized that different platforms present different chal-
lenges, and that different jurisdictions might legitimately respond 
to these challenges in different ways. From a singular phenomenon, 
understanding of the sharing economy has expanded to a multi-
faceted inquiry that defies easy categorization.4
The Object of Regulation: Is There Such Thing 
as the “Sharing Economy”?
Platforms like Airbnb and Uber have come to be associated with the 
idea of a sharing economy. We have chosen to use this term in the 
volume’s title because of its widespread recognition. However, we 
enclose it in quotation marks in the title to acknowledge that this is 
an imperfect label. Indeed, there seems to be a general consensus 
that platforms like Airbnb and Uber have little to do with sharing. 
Nevertheless, due to divergent interpretations of the underlying 
economic phenomenon, no consensus has emerged around an alter-
native label.
The term “sharing economy” evokes values of altruism or soli-
darity. Indeed, some authors use this terminology to describe a very 
different phenomenon, that is, attempts to develop more egalitarian, 
communitarian, and ecologically sustainable forms of economic 
organization.5 A related use of this phrase can be found in Yochai 
Benkler’s descriptions of carpooling and distributed computing as 
economic activities organized through sharing.6 Benkler emphasized 
the fact that these forms of economic organization helped to make 
use of underused resources. However, Benkler identified sharing as 
an alternative to the market; an essential feature of his case studies 
was that no money was exchanged.
The association of platforms like Airbnb and Uber with shar-
ing stems from the fact that individuals use the platforms to give 
others access to personal assets that might otherwise sit idle.7 In 
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this light, the platforms may seem to echo Benkler’s case studies. 
However, Airbnb and Uber clearly fall outside Benkler’s definition 
of sharing. The platforms are explicitly commercial, market-driven 
undertakings. Providers are commercially oriented as well; while 
their activities may generate social connections, they also have 
financial goals. Moreover, it has become clear that such platforms 
are not only used to share idle capacity, but that they are used to 
bring new resources to market, as when providers buy secondary 
apartments in order to rent them on Airbnb, or buy new cars in 
order to drive for Uber. Indeed, Uber encourages such investment 
by financing car purchases, and Airbnb does little to discourage it. 
And while physical assets like apartments and cars are an important 
part of the story, human resources—labour—may be just as, if not 
more, important. 
Given the explicitly commercial nature of many platform enter-
prises, the altruism or solidarity associated with the label “sharing 
economy” may be misleading. Some authors attempt to reconcile the 
different uses of this label and to think about how to encourage genu-
ine sharing in a digitally mediated environment.8 Others have aban-
doned the label when writing about platforms like Airbnb and Uber. 
Some authors have proposed expressions that are arguably more 
accurate, such as the “platform economy,”9 “peer platform markets,”10 
or “crowd-based capitalism.”11 However, the latter labels may make 
it difficult to circumscribe the phenomenon at issue. Platforms have 
arguably become a defining feature of twenty-first-century eco-
nomic organization, including not only rental- and service-oriented 
platforms such as Airbnb and Uber, but also others such as Google, 
Facebook, and Amazon.12 Other authors prefer terms that frame the 
platforms’ activities from the perspective of workers (“crowdwork”13 
and “the gig economy”14). Such terms emphasize the role of labour 
rather than that of physical assets. They imply that Uber belongs in 
a category with platforms like Instacart and TaskRabbit that focus 
on pure service delivery. However, the issue of low-paid, precarious 
work is not unique to the digital environment, so a focus on workers 
may shift the focus away from platforms. Finally, others have rejected 
attempts at generalization, insisting instead on the particularities of 
different platforms and the economic sectors in which they operate.15 
It goes without saying that one’s views on the legal issues generated 
by the platforms are likely to be influenced by one’s answers to these 
conceptual questions, and vice versa. 
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The contributors to this volume are similarly troubled by 
the “sharing economy” label. Several contributors also explicitly 
problematize the notion of sharing (Arthurs), pointing out that plat-
forms rely upon the “fundamental falsehood” (Gautrais) that they 
are involved in sharing to do rhetorical “heavy lifting” in policy 
debates (Valverde). While most of the contributors agree that the 
sharing economy has little or nothing to do with genuine sharing, we 
have not sought agreement on a definite concept to which the label 
attaches. Several workshop participants insisted on the specificity 
of individual platforms and warned against using them synecdochi-
cally to stand in for a more general phenomenon. This approach is 
reflected in contributions that concentrate on one or the other of the 
two most well-known platforms: Uber (Kaplinsky, Tucker, Valverde) 
and Airbnb (Sheffi, Tremblay-Huet). Other contributors chose to 
focus on regulators and their techniques (Gautrais, Geist, McKee) 
or on objects of regulation (Ducci, Scassa), using different platforms 
to provide examples of how policy goals are formulated, frustrated, 
achieved, or betrayed. 
These approaches support the view that while specific aspects 
of the sharing economy may pose particular challenges for legal 
regulation and may even incite us to rethink traditional categories, 
it is unlikely that the platforms’ activities are shaping the emergence 
of a new and unified area of law. Indeed, there is no more reason to 
believe that the twenty-first century will be characterized by a “law 
of the sharing economy” than to believe that the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries were characterized by a “law of the horse.”16 What 
we have instead, in this volume, is a set of diverse lenses through 
which we can examine both the sharing economy and its broader 
social impacts, and from which certain key themes emerge.
Technologies of Regulation
Thinking about regulating the sharing economy requires us to con-
sider the various ways in which policy objectives can be achieved 
through regulation. Traditional approaches to this appeal to the 
notion of a toolbox of policy instruments, that is, to different tech-
nologies of regulation.
One such technology is the state licence. Derek McKee’s contri-
bution uses the cases of Uber and Airbnb to explore the contours of 
licensing regimes more generally. Both the taxi and hotel industries 
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have typically been regulated, at least in part, through licensing, 
and platforms that operate in these areas provide an opportunity to 
re-evaluate these regimes and their pathologies. One conclusion that 
flows from this re-evaluation is that licensing is not a single tech-
nique that responds to a predetermined set of problems. Rather, the 
state uses licences for myriad ends with varying degrees of success. 
Furthermore, a licensing regime is not a static solution; over time, it 
generates new problems, some of which may have been unforeseen 
by regulators. Finally, attention to the internal logic of licensing 
allows us to see how platforms themselves act as private licensors; a 
perspective that challenges the view that regulation is the exclusive 
purview of the state.
A licence, according to the definition adopted by McKee, con-
stitutes the conditional permission to engage in activity that would 
otherwise be prohibited. A licensee thus benefits from immunity 
in exchange for complying with the terms of the licence. However, 
licences do not grant third parties rights opposable either to the licen-
sor or the licensee; the distribution and enforcement of rights (and 
correlative duties) obey a different logic.17 In this case, adjudication 
can operate as a mode of regulation. Here again, sharing economy 
platforms provide an occasion to confront our preconceptions. 
As Nofar Sheffi’s contribution documents, platforms may use the 
adjudicative form to avoid state regulation. Airbnb sets up a private 
mechanism of adjudication and enforcement whereby it situates 
itself as the umpire of the competing claims of “hosts” and “guests.” 
This shifts attention from any claims that users may have against 
the platform itself, which—combined with an arbitration clause that 
makes pursuing a claim against Airbnb unrealistic if not impossible 
for most users—insulates it from potential liability. Sheffi questions 
whether such private adjudication (disguised as a form of customer 
service) is necessarily problematic, despite the fact that it provides 
neither the procedural safeguards nor the transparency that char-
acterize state law. On the one hand, her chapter poses the implicit 
question: If the private “court of Airbnb” is cheaper, faster, and more 
accessible than a traditional rental board and if the “litigants” are 
generally more satisfied with the outcomes it generates, then why 
should it be considered any less legitimate? On the other hand, given 
the obvious shortcomings of “Airbnb law,” her chapter incites us to 
interrogate the basis on which we would attribute legitimacy to any 
given legal order.
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Whereas adjudication determines the winners and losers of 
individual disputes, sudden and significant changes in technology, 
political economy, and law can generate entire categories of winners 
and losers. This is the subject of Harry Arthurs’ contribution. Using 
examples from labour market regulation and consumer protection, 
Arthurs shows how sharing economy platforms pose “category prob-
lems” for aspiring regulators. Despite claims to innovation, platforms 
did not create these problems, but exacerbate them, revealing both 
continuity with historical regulatory challenges and the limits of 
traditional approaches. Although “pop-up” or “flash” regulation that 
treats specific pathologies of the sharing economy may provide a 
promising avenue for addressing these problems, their success would 
depend on the capacity of citizens to organize and formulate coher-
ent demands and on the state to be responsive to them. Ultimately 
then, for Arthurs, regulating the sharing economy is not a technical 
problem, but a political one.
Regulating Technology
The ubiquity of digital communications systems, smartphones in 
particular, was a precondition for the emergence of sharing economy 
platforms. Indeed, Uber has consistently sought to avoid regulation 
by claiming that it is neither a taxi company nor an employer, but 
a technology company. Asking how the sharing economy might be 
regulated thus necessarily raises questions about how to regulate 
the technologies upon which they are based.
Vincent Gautrais’ contribution argues that though the tech-
nology used by sharing economy platforms may be disruptive of 
traditional legal concepts, it does not operate in a vacuum. Rather, 
state law contains many resources that may be applied to the plat-
forms’ activities. Thus statutes—supplemented by traditional rules 
of interpretation and by the development of case law—do not cease 
to have effects simply because the technologies we seek to regulate 
were not specifically envisioned by the drafters. On the other hand, 
statutes and case law are not the only sources of law; they interact 
with other sources of normativity, including not only contracts, but 
also industry standards and—since technology is never neutral—even 
algorithms, in a “normative ecology” that bears little resemblance 
to the Kelsenian pyramid of validity. Regulating digital technology 
thus may require new tools of oversight to be mobilized by multiple 
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actors. For instance, documentation and reporting allow for supervi-
sion by contracting parties and consumers, and data retention allows 
for supervision by auditors. These mechanisms and institutions need 
not replace courts and administrative agencies; just as technology 
multiplies sources of normativity, regulatory responses should mul-
tiply opportunities for their oversight.
In order to exercise oversight, one must have access; this is 
especially true of data. By virtue of the very information technology 
that has enabled their meteoric rise, platforms generate vast amounts 
of data in which others may have an interest. When it comes to their 
data, platforms may find themselves in a different position vis-à-vis 
regulation: rather than seeking to avoid it, they may want to mobi-
lize it to protect what they consider to be a strategic business asset. 
Ironically, sharing economy platforms decidedly do not want to share 
their data. As Teresa Scassa explains in her contribution, platforms 
may seek to prevent “opportunistic businesses” from scraping their 
data and using it either to provide tailored services to users of the 
platform or information to competitors. They may also want to 
deprive potential regulators of the information needed to effectively 
regulate. A patchwork of laws is leveraged by platforms to protect 
their data. Although the most obviously applicable legal regime is 
that of intellectual property, notably copyright, Scassa argues that 
exclusively framing the platforms’ data as property risks occluding 
the public interest. 
The Site of Regulation: Local to Global
Recognizing the dual nature of sharing economy platforms fore-
grounds the question of the site of regulation. Considering platforms 
as new vectors for providing traditional services invites the applica-
tion of local law and, in particular, municipal bylaws and regula-
tions. Conversely, understanding platforms as primarily technology 
companies entails the possibility that their activities may be subject 
to global regulatory regimes. The contributions that focus on the 
opposite ends of this spectrum do more than simply argue for the 
applicability of global or local regimes. Rather, they see sharing 
economy platforms as opportunities to reflect on the possibilities 
and limits of the regimes themselves.
Taking the local perspective, Mariana Valverde’s contribution 
shows how Uber’s “cowboy capitalism” approach to regulation takes 
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advantage of historical attributes of municipal governance that make 
it particularly vulnerable to industry capture. Valverde situates taxi 
licensing within the context of municipal business licensing, which 
has its roots in pre-modern governance structures that generally tar-
get marginal economic activities and have not evolved to adequately 
regulate large transnational business enterprises. Thus, despite the 
inherently local nature of the services offered through Uber, we 
ought to be skeptical of the possibility of effective municipal regula-
tion of platforms.
Perhaps, then, global regulation offers a more promising alter-
native. Since many sharing economy platforms operate across 
national borders, one might think that multinational trade regimes 
may contribute to the regulation of their activities. But, here too, we 
may have reason to doubt, as Michael Geist’s contribution demon-
strates. On one hand, the development of bilateral and multilateral 
trade treaties has shown that the global trade regime is also vulner-
able to industry capture. Due to their market and political power, 
incumbent players may be able to influence rules governing new 
technology in ways that disadvantage sharing economy upstarts. On 
the other hand, the increasing focus in global agreements on reduc-
ing non-tariff barriers to trade may hamstring national governments 
in their efforts to regulate technology companies. In both cases, Geist 
argues, global regulation may hinder, rather than enable, national 
regulation of sharing economy platforms in the public interest.
Regulating Markets
Despite their appeal to the concept of sharing, sharing economy 
platforms are clearly engaged in market behaviour. In some sense 
then, any attempt to regulate such platforms is an attempt to regulate 
markets. Yet, it is not always evident what market is the object of 
regulation. Are platforms new entrants in already existing markets 
for services with established players, such as taxis and hotels, or have 
they created entirely new markets? What other conceptions of a mar-
ket could contribute to the regulation of sharing economy platforms?
Eran Kaplinsky’s contribution shows how regulation may not 
only apply to markets, but create them. Though taxi licensing regimes 
were initially conceived of as mechanisms for countering market fail-
ures such as destructive competition and negative externalities, the 
licences (often called “medallions” or “plates”) themselves acquired 
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many of the characteristics of property, creating a secondary market 
with its own problems. New regulations would thus not only affect 
the primary market but could potentially destroy the secondary mar-
ket, with disastrous consequences for licensees who are significantly 
invested therein. Any attempt to reform the licensing regime must 
therefore address the question of compensation for what may amount 
to a regulatory expropriation. As Kaplinksy points out, there are 
good arguments both for compensation and for “letting the chips fall 
where they may.” Furthermore, if compensation is pursued, a coherent 
approach would require a nuanced understanding of both the legal 
forms of different categories of licences, and of their economic effects.
Regulating sharing economy platforms using competition law 
also requires a definition of the relevant market. In his contribution, 
Francesco Ducci explains how sharing economy platforms may be 
understood not only as actors within a market to be regulated but as 
the private regulators of a market. However, whereas states regu-
late markets in pursuit (presumably) of the public interest, sharing 
economy platforms regulate prices—often via algorithms—in order 
to internalize indirect network externalities; that is, to capture the 
value generated by their matchmaking. Platforms thus raise different 
questions for competition law than the traditional service providers 
with whom they are often seen to be in competition (for example, 
taxis and hotels). Yet, despite this difference, Ducci argues that exist-
ing doctrine and case law on so-called two-sided markets address the 
relevant attributes of “sharing economy” platforms and thus provide 
the tools necessary for their regulation.
Regulating Labour
One market in which sharing economy platforms intervene massively 
is the labour market, though their business model depends on obfus-
cating this fact. Rather, platforms hold themselves out to be in the 
business of matching excess capacity with unmet demand. According 
to this story, the Uber “partner” monetizes her vehicle when it is 
not being used for personal transport and the Airbnb “host” does 
likewise with an unused spare room. Capital, not labour, is what is 
ostensibly being “shared” via platforms.
Despite platforms’ claims to innovation, firms have a long his-
tory of externalizing labour costs by situating workers outside of 
their boundaries. In legal terms, this is done by classifying workers 
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as independent contractors rather than employees, a (mis)classifica-
tion that is at the heart of the category problem identified by Harry 
Arthurs. In her contribution to this volume, Marie-Cécile Escande-
Varniol documents the French experience in trying to address the 
difficulties caused by the category problem without calling into 
question the fundamental distinctions upon which it is based. The 
French solution was to adopt an intermediate category, specifically 
designed to apply to “self-employed workers using electronic remote 
connection platforms.” Escande-Varniol argues that the result is 
ambivalent: on one hand, the new category imposes some obligations 
on platforms vis-à-vis workers, while on the other hand, it confirms 
their exclusion from the employee category and from the robust 
protections that it entails.
Legal categories are clearly important, but restricting one’s 
attention to them risks concealing important facets of the political 
economy of production. Eric Tucker’s detailed history of the taxi 
industry in Toronto allows us to see that not all workers are simply 
“employees in disguise.” On the contrary, capturing the value gener-
ated by petty commodity production (or, in the case at hand, petty 
service production) is a distinct mode of labour exploitation. Though 
this mode has often been described as pre-capitalist, it has continued 
to exist alongside the wage relationship in capitalist economies and 
may even become a defining characteristic of the twenty-first-century 
gig economy. Insofar as the traditional categories of employment law 
are the consequence rather than the cause of the wage relationship, 
we ought to be careful about using them as lenses through which to 
apprehend the relations of production. Tucker’s contribution is an 
example of how historical analysis rooted in political economy can 
help us understand how sharing economy platforms function in a 
given industry, which is an important precondition for their effec-
tive regulation.
Notwithstanding their attempts to obscure it, platforms that 
connect users with service providers, like Uber, Deliveroo, and 
TaskRabbit, are clearly in the business of providing labour. This is 
less obvious in the case of Airbnb. Nonetheless, Sabrina Tremblay-
Huet’s contribution shows that behind the appearance of the rental of 
property lies the reality of labour. Like the commodity, the Airbnb 
rental unit is thus “in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in 
metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties.”18 The Airbnb rental 
economy is dependent on labour in two different ways. First, many 
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“hosts” in fact operate as businesses and use workers to clean rooms 
and communicate with “guests.” This shifts employment away from 
the heavily unionized hotel industry to precarious grey-market 
employment. Second—and this is the dominant theme in Tremblay-
Huet’s contribution—even when hosts do the work themselves, it is 
not perceived of as work, since the neoliberal discourse of empower-
ment casts it as entrepreneurship or investment. Thus the “host’s” 
freedom from accountability to a boss who schedules work translates 
into the platform’s freedom from accountability for sick days, over-
time pay, pension contributions and so forth.
Conclusion
Just as there is no distinct phenomenon that is entirely and exclu-
sively captured by the notion of a sharing economy, the contributions 
to this volume demonstrate, by their variety, that there is no single 
regulatory response to the social and economic disruption caused by 
online market platforms. As with any large-scale change, the advent 
of the sharing economy not only raises questions about the objects 
of regulation but invites us to rethink our hypotheses about what 
regulation can accomplish, how, and for whom.
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CHAPTER I




Recent debates about Airbnb, Uber, and similar “sharing”2  plat-forms have generated an apparent consensus. According to 
policy reports published by governmental and intergovernmental 
organizations, the platforms have benefits, but they also pose risks. 
The platforms give consumers access to a wider variety of services at 
lower costs; they also provide a flexible source of income for provid-
ers. However, peer-to-peer rentals and services threaten consumers’ 
safety and privacy; they may also give rise to contractual unfairness. 
Most commentators agree that these problems would be appropri-
ately addressed through some form of regulation. 
What form of regulation? This is where the consensus breaks 
down. Some government authorities have tried to subject platform-
mediated services to rules designed for their analog counterparts, 
such as hotels and taxis. However, proponents of the platforms are 
generally critical of these rules. They claim that “self-regulation” by 
the platforms would be more appropriate. 
This debate over the appropriate form of regulation is compli-
cated by the presence of public licensing regimes. In many places 
around the world, it is illegal to drive a taxi without some form 
of prior authorization. Some jurisdictions also require licences for 
operators of hotels. The platforms achieved their initial success by 
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ignoring such licensing regimes, claiming (more or less plausibly) to 
be exempt from them. 
Debates over the “sharing economy” have therefore brought to 
the fore a set of debates about the merits and demerits of licensing 
as a form of governance. While licensing provides regulators with a 
powerful instrument, licences have also been seen as an overly blunt 
tool—and one that can fall into the wrong hands. Many scholars 
have argued that licensing regimes are likely to generate economic 
inefficiencies, political conflicts of interest, and arbitrary exercises 
of power. In view of these pathologies, some scholars have argued 
that licences would be better replaced with other policy instruments.
While acknowledging these critiques, this chapter emphasizes 
that much depends on the details of licensing regimes. Such regimes 
are highly variable. They can concentrate control in government hands, 
or delegate it to private actors. They can impose major or only minor 
barriers to entry, and they can do so formally or informally. In short, 
the presence or absence of licensing is never an all-or-nothing question.
The recent experience of regulatory responses to sharing 
econom” platforms bears witness to this need for nuance. In response 
to the market disruptions generated by “sharing economy” platforms, 
few governments have dispensed with licensing entirely. Instead, 
they have made adjustments to existing licensing regimes; they have 
also created new licences for platforms and providers. Moreover, even 
if governments eliminate public licensing regimes, the platforms’ 
regulation of service providers who operate through their platforms 
is akin to privately managed licensing. There is no guarantee that 
such a regime will operate in the public interest; indeed, there are 
reasons to suspect it will mainly serve the platforms’ private inter-
ests. The alternative of platform “self-regulation” therefore provides 
no escape from the dilemmas associated with licensing.
The argument proceeds as follows. In section II of the chapter, 
I summarize recent policy discussions undertaken by governments 
and international organizations. These discussions have produced 
an apparent consensus around certain issues, especially the need to 
protect consumers from possible harms. However, they have also 
revealed disagreement around other issues, including the application 
of labour or employment law as well as the potential application of 
competition law. Moreover, policy makers disagree over the proper 
mechanisms for implementing consumer protection goals, especially 
where licensing regimes are present. 
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In section III of the chapter, I take a closer look at licences as 
a legal technology. Licences have a long history; they are also a 
ubiquitous feature of contemporary legal systems. Governments use 
licences to pursue various forms of social and economic regulation. 
Licences are useful to regulators because they provide an effective 
means of enforcing standards. Nevertheless, licensing regimes have 
often been the object of critiques, stemming from economic concerns, 
political concerns, or various combinations of the two. 
In section IV, I examine how these issues have been manifested 
in the context of debates over “sharing economy” platforms, using 
the licensing of hotels and taxis in Quebec as a case study. These 
platforms have encroached on economic sectors historically subject to 
licensing. In response, many jurisdictions have undertaken legislative 
reforms; to clarify the applicability of the older licensing regimes, 
to adapt them to the realities of new, digitally mediated services; or 
to create new, bespoke licensing regimes for the platforms and their 
users. Many governments have effectively implemented some kind 
of compromise, treating incumbents and newcomers differently, rec-
ognizing each as occupying a certain niche in the market. In doing 
so, not only have governments not abolished older licensing regimes, 
they have often created new, separate licensing regimes for the plat-
forms or for providers. These regimes impose barriers to entry and 
they often contain some form of supply management.
In section V, I consider the fact that, in functional terms, the 
platforms operate more or less like private licensing regimes. Even 
without state-imposed licensing, then, the platforms may be perfectly 
capable of replicating the pathologies historically associated with 
licensing regimes: there are tensions between the public interest 
goals that platforms are expected to fulfill and the platforms’ private 
interests; platforms are likely to engage in rent-seeking behaviour, 
and they often behave arbitrarily. The superimposition of a public 
licensing regime for platforms or providers may counter some of 
these tendencies, but it may also reinforce them. 
II. Policy Consensus and Conflict
In the last few years, national and local governments around the 
world have tried to respond to the policy challenges posed by peer 
platform markets, such as Airbnb and Uber. Although responses 
vary from one jurisdiction to another, it is also possible to identify 
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an emerging consensus. This consensus focuses on consumer protec-
tion, understood to include issues of safety, privacy, and contractual 
fairness. It also includes taxation. However, the consensus does not 
extend to the labour issues arising from platform-mediated services, 
nor does it extend to the application of competition law. Finally, 
despite agreement on consumer protection objectives, there is no 
consensus as to how these goals should be achieved. This last dis-
agreement is partly due to the presence of licensing regimes. 
This consensus is on display in a number of policy documents 
published by national governments and international organiza-
tions in 2016. I will review three of these documents in particular: 
a report published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) in June 2016;3 a communication by the 
European Commission (EC), also published in June 2016;4 and finally 
a report by the staff of the United States Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), published in November 2016.5 Of these three reports, the EC’s 
is the only one that purports to represent the official views of the 
organization that published it. Nevertheless, all three reports attempt 
to stake out common ground among a diverse range of participants, 
and all have received some kind of official endorsement.
The OECD report in question was prepared by a consultant, 
Professor Natali Helberger of the University of Amsterdam, and 
provided as a “background report” for the OECD’s “Ministerial 
Meeting on the Digital Economy: Innovation, Growth and Social 
Prosperity” in Cancun in June 2016. The declassified document is 
entitled “Protecting Consumers in Peer Platform Markets: Exploring 
the Issues.” As the title suggests, the report deals exclusively with 
consumer protection issues; it excludes issues of taxation, labour, 
sectoral regulation, and competition. The report proposes that, in 
general, consumer protection laws (such as prohibitions on fraud and 
other deceptive practices) should apply to peer platform markets. It 
identifies a number of issues for discussion, including the reliability 
of the platforms’ own trust mechanisms (such as pre-screening and 
user ratings) and how these interact with more formal kinds of regu-
lation and self-regulation, as well as to what extent platforms should 
be responsible (and legally liable) for the behaviour of their users. 
In June 2016, the EC issued a communication entitled “A 
European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy,” outlining its views 
on the issues.6 In this document, the Commission highlights the eco-
nomic opportunities associated with the new platforms and argues 
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that Europe should not miss out. It also acknowledges a number of 
problems with the platform model, however, including uncertainty 
surrounding application of existing laws (and possible exploitation of 
these ambiguities, to the detriment of the public interest), as well as 
divergent and fragmented regulatory approaches. It notes that under 
European Union (EU) law, market access requirements for providers 
(in effect, licensing requirements) must be non-discriminatory, mini-
mally restrictive, justified, and proportionate. It also notes that under 
the EU’s e-Commerce Directive, platforms that are merely offering an 
intermediation service (and not themselves providing the underly-
ing service) cannot be subject to prior authorization requirements.7 
It also notes issues related to protection of consumers and workers, 
although it mainly focuses on legal ambiguities surrounding these 
issues, without taking a particular stance. 
The last report I will discuss is the FTC staff report, published 
in November 2016, on the basis of a workshop that brought together a 
series of experts in June 2015.8 In this report, the FTC staff deals with 
a wide range of policy issues, although it explicitly excludes ques-
tions of labour as well as questions of discrimination, finding that 
these issues fall under the jurisdiction of other government agencies. 
It calls for a “balanced” approach to regulation, taking into account 
a number of policy priorities such as innovation, competition, and 
consumer protection. 
These policy reports bear witness to a consensus surrounding 
the protection of consumers (and users more generally) in peer-to-
peer marketplaces. There is general agreement that consumer pro-
tection is an important regulatory goal. In a world of peer-to-peer 
rentals and services, consumers need protection from accidents and 
assaults. They also need protection against fraud and other deceptive 
practices. Finally, they need protection against misuse of their per-
sonal information. In the context of the “sharing economy,” consumer 
protection thus refers to the protection of platform users’ safety and 
privacy as well as protection against fraud and other contractual 
abuses. In many cases these concerns apply to users on both sides of 
the transaction—to providers as well as consumers. In some cases, as 
with regard to safety, it is a question of protecting users from other 
users. In other cases, as with privacy, it is a question of protecting 
users from the platforms.
The emerging policy consensus also addresses the question of 
taxes. When the platforms first appeared, taxes were a controversial 
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issue. The platforms initially took the position that, as mere technolog-
ical intermediaries, they were not responsible for any tax obligations 
that might arise from the transactions. But under pressure from tax 
authorities, the platforms have largely conceded this point; in many 
jurisdictions, they have begun to collect and remit taxes directly on 
behalf of providers, and to cooperate with tax authorities in other 
ways.9 In the United States context, Shu-Yi Oei and Diane Ring have 
noted that “sharing economy” services raise enforcement challenges, 
but that they do not really challenge the basic concepts of tax law.10 
This consensus is reflected in the reports I have summarized. The 
OECD report does not address the issue of taxes. However, the EU 
Commission’s communication concludes that platform economy ser-
vices should be subject to the same taxes as other services. The FTC 
staff report notes a consensus that Airbnb hosts should be subject to 
local hotel taxes, but also notes disagreement over the adequacy of 
Airbnb’s tax collection efforts.11 The policy consensus surrounding 
taxation can be seen as reflecting the maturity of “sharing economy” 
economic activities. Governments recognize that platform-based 
services are playing a big role in the economy, and have concluded 
that these services should contribute to public revenue.
However, there are three notable places where the policy 
consensus surrounding peer platform markets breaks down. The 
first area of disagreement has to do with labour. The platforms 
mobilize millions of individual service providers. The platforms 
consider these providers to be independent contractors, and they 
have fought hard against legal challenges aimed at characterizing 
them as employees. Indeed, the independent-contractor designation 
is central to the platforms’ business model. Some commentators argue 
that peer platform markets thus herald “the end of employment” 
and the transition to a new age of entrepreneurship.12 However, as a 
number of commentators have noted, including Harry Arthurs and 
Marie-Cécile Escande-Varniol in this volume, there are significant 
policy concerns surrounding the platforms’ treatment of service 
providers. Providers often work long hours for limited revenue. 
Moreover, their characterization as independent contractors rather 
than as employees brings various disadvantages. It generally means 
that they lack job security; they are precariously employed in the 
“gig economy.” In many jurisdictions, the independent-contractor 
designation also serves to exclude providers from protections, such 
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as minimum wages, workplace accident insurance, and the right to 
bargain collectively.13
The second disputed issue concerns competition. The platforms 
are essentially networks, and they generate network effects. As with a 
telephone network, or Facebook, the platforms’ interest for any given 
user depends on who else joins the network. At the early stages of 
development, platforms face the chicken-or-egg problem of attracting 
a critical mass of users.14 Once the platforms have attained critical 
mass, however, network effects may suffice to pull in everyone else. 
Indeed, the major platforms’ business strategies (and their inves-
tors’ behaviour) are consistent with a winner-take-all competition 
for market share. There are signs that network effects have enabled 
certain platforms to dominate their respective markets.15 This domi-
nance may enable these platforms to hold off competitors and to 
collect rents. 
However, it is not clear how competition law might respond to 
this situation. In competition law, before one can reach a conclusion 
about market power, it is necessary to define the relevant market. 
Even in conventional industries, market definition is a notoriously 
difficult exercise. Competition authorities typically use economic 
tests to determine to what extent similar products are substitutable, 
and within what geographic area, either on the demand side or on the 
supply side. But there is no neutral criterion for determining at what 
point a partially substitutable product constitutes a separate market. 
This is inevitably a value-laden line-drawing exercise.16 
In the context of “sharing economy” platforms, market defini-
tion raises particularly difficult questions. To what extent do the ser-
vices offered through the platforms compete with those of incumbent 
industries? Do taxi drivers and Uber drivers offer basically the same 
service? Or is the different process for obtaining a ride sufficient 
to place them in a separate market? Do Airbnb hosts compete with 
hotels, or are they offering something new? Market definition in the 
“sharing economy” is further complicated by the distinction between 
the platforms’ intermediation services and the services provided 
through the platforms, such as rides and accommodations.17 Are these 
part of a single integrated service, or are they two different kinds of 
services, existing in two different markets? To the extent that they can 
be separated, platforms may be intermediating “two-sided markets.” 
The application of competition law to such markets is unclear.18 
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As Francesco Ducci notes in his contribution to this volume, 
competition law has previously faced similar problems—but that 
doesn’t mean that such problems are easily resolved. Of the reports 
I have discussed, the FTC staff report is the only one to devote sig-
nificant attention to competition issues. The report acknowledges the 
possibility that certain platforms have achieved market dominance. 
However, it avoids taking any particular stance on this issue.
The third area of conflict concerns the means for achieving 
consumer protection objectives. While there is a consensus as to 
these objectives, opinions diverge as to the appropriate mechanism 
for achieving them: whether the platforms can effectively protect 
consumers through their own business practices, or whether state 
regulation is required. The platform companies have often argued 
for the effectiveness of their own bespoke systems of background 
checks, inspections, peer ratings and reviews, insurance, and arbitra-
tion. Some commentators have championed platform self-regulation, 
arguing that the state should only regulate where self-regulation is 
inadequate.19 
The reports I have summarized show no signs of a consensus 
on this issue. The FTC staff report notes disagreement as to what 
standards should apply, or who should set them. It endorses calls for 
a “level playing field,” arguing that the same rules should apply to 
new platforms as to traditional suppliers, although it notes a debate 
over whether rules should be strengthened or relaxed. It devotes 
considerable attention to user ratings and the debate over whether 
these function as an effective mechanism for consumer protection. 
The OECD report identifies a number of issues for discussion, includ-
ing the reliability of the platforms’ own trust mechanisms (such as 
pre-screening and user ratings) and how these interact with more 
formal kinds of regulation and self-regulation, as well as to what 
extent platforms should be responsible (and legally liable) for the 
behaviour of their users. 
The debate over the means for achieving consumer protec-
tion objectives is related to the debate over competition. This link-
age is due to the fact that the major platforms have encroached on 
industries that have historically been subject to licensing regimes: 
taxis and, to a lesser extent, hotels. In these and other industries, 
consensus policy objectives such as safety and contractual fairness 
have often been pursued through the mechanism of licensing. But 
licences, even if merely intended to protect consumers, also have an 
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impact on competition. Indeed, without exploring the issue in depth, 
the OECD noted this relationship in its report:
[…] some consumer protection issues in peer platforms are inex-
tricably linked with competition concerns. For example, provid-
ers of goods and services in regulated sectors of the economy 
often argue that failure to apply existing laws and regulations to 
peer platform markets creates an unfair competitive advantage, 
favouring market entrants at the expense of incumbents who 
may be subject to regulatory structures that often are decades 
old. Conversely, outdated regulations can entrench the status 
quo and protect incumbents from competition by, for example, 
maintaining overly restrictive measures that discourage entry 
by innovative new providers. In addition, peer platform mar-
kets tend to feature “network effects” that may lead to market 
concentration and potential competition issues.20
The presence of licensing regimes therefore drives another set of 
cracks through the consumer protection consensus. If they are 
going to protect consumers, governments and legislators must 
decide whether to do this within the framework of existing licensing 
regimes or through some other mechanism. In order to understand 
what is at stake in these choices, it is worth taking a closer look at 
licences as a policy instrument. 
III. Public Licensing Regimes
Licences are a ubiquitous yet poorly understood feature of contem-
porary law and governance. Governments use licences to pursue 
an enormous variety of policy objectives. The details of licensing 
regimes are just as varied. Nevertheless, licensing regimes have 
also been the object of strident critiques. Critics have alleged that 
such regimes give rise to arbitrary exercises of power, that they are 
economically inefficient, and that they serve the private interests of 
particular groups rather than the public interest.
A number of authors have noted the ubiquity of licensing 
regimes and their application to a wide range of subject matters, 
ranging from drilling for oil to keeping a dog.21 Typical objects of 
licensing regimes include professions, other occupations and com-
mercial activities, the marketing of certain products, and certain uses 
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of land.22 Official terminology varies, with some licences labelled 
as permits, approvals, authorizations, and so on (or, in the case of 
taxis, plates or medallions); in this paper, I use “licence” as a generic 
category.
A licence is best defined in functional terms. Issalys and 
Lemieux describe a licence as “a permission, often subject to condi-
tions, given by a government authority to a natural or legal person, 
to carry out an act or to exercise an activity that would otherwise 
be illegal”23 [author’s translation]. In this chapter, I have chosen to 
adopt Issalys and Lemieux’s definition because it succinctly expresses 
common-sense understandings of licences in Canada and in related 
legal systems.
This definition specifies that the underlying activity would be 
illegal without authorization. This requirement serves to distinguish 
licences from other legal forms, such as contracts or corporate orga-
nization, in which the state recognizes (and agrees to enforce) certain 
private arrangements that would nevertheless be legal even in the 
absence of state approval. Marriage belongs to the same category: 
although many jurisdictions retain the formality of a “marriage 
licence,” one can enter into a conjugal relationship without one. The 
fact that licences are mandatory also serves to distinguish licences 
from certification schemes, which may confer advantages on those 
who comply with their terms, but are legally optional.24
The definition I have adopted is largely functional. However, it 
also contains a formal element in its reference to government author-
ity. This term links licences to the exercise of public power. Although 
the concept of a “licence” plays a prominent role in private law (and 
by extension, in intellectual property law), the “licence” granted by a 
possessor of property is excluded from the definition. Moreover, this 
definition excludes private certification schemes that operate without 
a formal grant of state authority, even when they effectively serve 
to control access to a particular activity, as is the case with many 
sports associations.25 However, as I shall argue in section V, below, 
such private arrangements may closely resemble public licensing 
regimes in functional terms.  
The power to issue public licences may nevertheless be conferred 
upon various kinds of authorities. Licences may be issued by govern-
ment departments or by arm’s-length agencies. As Mariana Valverde 
has noted, licensing may be a preferred technique of local authori-
ties in Canada and in other countries where municipal powers have 
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evolved from pre-modern modes of governance.26 Licensing powers 
may also be delegated to private organizations, as occurs most typi-
cally when professional associations act as self-governing bodies. 
When licensing is delegated to private entities, it may operate 
as a form of co-regulation or self-regulation, with a governmental 
authority setting general objectives, and a private body authorized to 
develop these goals into detailed requirements. Such self-regulatory 
arrangements may be seen as more efficient than top-down, govern-
mental command-and-control arrangements. In principle, they allow 
regulated entities to make use of their knowledge and expertise in 
order to determine the most cost-effective way of complying with 
public standards.27 In addition, under such self-regulatory arrange-
ments, the costs of running the regime may be borne by the regulated 
industry or profession, through the payment of fees, rather than 
imposed on taxpayers.
Not only the identity of the issuer but also the design features of 
licensing regimes may vary considerably. Licences may be issued for 
an indeterminate period, or they may be subject to periodic renewal. 
Licences may be free, or they may be subject to fees. The fees may be 
calculated to cover the costs of running the licensing regime. Licences 
may attach to particular individuals (as with driver’s licences or with 
professional qualifications), or they may be transferable. Licences 
may be issued to anyone who asks, or they may require the applicant 
to prove compliance with certain standards.28 Licensees may or may 
not be subject to ongoing testing or inspection to ensure that they 
continue to meet these standards. The licensing regime may also 
be coupled with a system for price regulation, in which licensees 
agree to market their services only at prescribed rates. The licensing 
regime may or may not set a limit on the total number of licences 
issued, or delimit geographic areas in which licensees can exercise 
their activities; to the extent that it does so, it may come to resemble 
a public franchise or a quota system.29 In practice, high standards for 
licensing may also implicitly function as quantitative restrictions, as 
with London’s “knowledge” requirement for cab drivers.30
In addition to these variable design features, licences can also 
have various formal legal characterizations. In some cases, especially 
where licences are transferable, they may be treated as a form of 
property.31 In other cases, especially with regard to public franchises, 
the relation between the issuing authority and the licensee may take 
the form of a contract.32 
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Licensing regimes nevertheless have certain features in com-
mon. By definition, licences involve authorization for some activity, 
often subject to conditions. A standard feature of licences, then, is 
the possibility of suspension or revocation should the licensee fail to 
respect the conditions. Performance of the activity without the licence 
may be punishable with more directly coercive sanctions, including 
fines or imprisonment. Licences therefore provide regulators with a 
“big stick”: even if licences are rarely revoked, the mere threat of such 
a severe sanction may induce licensees to cooperate. Authors such as 
Ayres and Braithwaite have therefore endorsed the use of licensing 
as part of a “pyramid of enforcement strategies.”33
Licensing may serve multiple purposes. Licences are typically 
associated with the enforcement of standards for quality or safety. 
The prior verifications required to obtain or renew a licence may be 
seen as a way of preventing accidents or frauds. All kinds of licences, 
from professional qualifications to aircraft safety certificates, are typi-
cally justified on such public interest grounds. As I have noted, the 
standards associated with licensing may be coupled with implicit or 
explicit quantitative restrictions. Such restrictions are usually justified 
as ways of limiting negative externalities (such as pollution) or fore-
stalling wasteful competition (in situations that approximate natural 
monopolies). In addition, licensing regimes may have other primary 
or secondary purposes. In some cases, the licence mechanism mainly 
serves to raise revenue: it is an indirect tax. In other cases, the informa-
tion gathering and surveillance associated with licences may become 
ends in themselves, contributing to techniques of social control.34 
It is important to note that licences are only one possible way 
of enforcing standards, and that other policy instruments might be 
more or less able to achieve the same goals. Alternatives include 
prohibitions backed by penalties (perhaps backed by powers of 
investigation); tort liability; taxes; subsidies; government contracting; 
information and propaganda; or public ownership and management. 
Indeed, in many circumstances, licences are used in combination 
with some of these other instruments. For example, the goal of road 
safety is achieved not only through the licensing of drivers but also 
through speed limits, criminal prohibitions on drunk driving, manu-
facturing standards for cars, public ownership and maintenance of 
highways, awareness campaigns that warn of risks, and so on.35 
Given the power of licences and their application to so many 
areas of governance, licences have attracted certain critiques. Four 
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major strands of critique can be identified. The first strand, associated 
with liberal values of individual freedom and the rule of law, stresses 
the enormous power associated with licensing and its potential for 
abuse. In his 1964 article “The New Property,” Charles Reich iden-
tified licensing (alongside grants, benefits, services, employment, 
procurement contracts, and so on) as a form of “government largess” 
that was playing an ever greater role in modern society.36 Reich 
highlighted the fact that licences could often be refused or revoked 
arbitrarily, on the basis of prejudices or political biases, and that 
those subject to such decisions often had little access to procedural 
protections. In Canada, similar concerns emerged from the case of 
Roncarelli v Duplessis, after the premier of Quebec had a restaurateur’s 
liquor licence revoked in retaliation for the latter’s support for the 
distribution of “seditious” literature by Jehovah’s Witnesses.37 
In order to overcome official arbitrariness in licensing decisions, 
critics such as Reich have looked to administrative law, arguing for 
substantive limits on refusals and revocations, procedural protec-
tions, such as the right to a hearing, and an obligation for licensing 
authorities to offer reasons for their decisions. Indeed, since the 1970s, 
administrative law in some jurisdictions has evolved in such a way 
as to respond to these critiques. In Canada, relevant developments 
include the sidelining of the distinction between administrative and 
quasi-judicial decisions and the recognition of a generalized duty of 
fairness in administrative decision-making.38 Relevant developments 
also include judicial review of the reasonableness of discretionary 
decisions and the recognition that administrative authorities may 
(under some circumstances) have a duty to provide reasons for their 
decisions.39 In Quebec, the legislature has codified licence holders’ 
and applicants’ rights to be heard as well as licensing authorities’ 
duty to give reasons.40 Nevertheless, the procedural protections asso-
ciated with licensing regimes are nowhere near as strong as those 
associated, for example, with criminal law. Although the common 
law provides a default set of procedural principles, it is generally 
open to legislatures to derogate from these requirements.41
A second strand of critique is closely related to this first strand, 
but focuses on licences that restrict the use of private property, such 
as building permits and pollution controls. For libertarian critics of 
the administrative state like Richard Epstein, such licences consti-
tute another form of government overreach, and should be severely 
curtailed.42
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   29 18-11-08   08:42
 30 LAW AND THE “SHARING ECONOMY”
The third strand of criticism comes from economists, who are 
wary of the inefficiencies associated with licensing. Where licens-
ing regimes restrict the use of private property, they may be seen 
as hindrances to development, diminishing the general welfare.43 
Alternatively, where licences restrict particular economic activities, 
they may be seen as imposing barriers to market entry, limiting 
supply.44 Depending on the dynamics of the market, such regimes 
may generate higher prices for consumers and corresponding rents 
for licence-holding producers. These effects are most likely exacer-
bated when authorities place explicit quantitative restrictions on the 
number of licences. Some economic analysts argue that (voluntary) 
certification schemes could substitute for licensing regimes in many 
circumstances. Such regimes could arguably be used to uphold stan-
dards, providing consumers with reliable information about quality 
and safety, while lowering barriers to market entry.45
A fourth strand of critique, associated with public choice theory, 
focuses on the politics as well as the distributive effects of licensing. 
This fourth strand of critique is often coupled with the third strand—
the critique of economic inefficiency. Noting the cartel-like effects of 
licensing regimes, public choice critics have argued that such regimes 
serve the private interests of licence holders more than they serve 
the public interest.46 Such critics argue that licensing regimes have a 
regressive impact on distribution, by limiting the supply available to 
consumers and enabling licence holders to extract rents. These crit-
ics also argue that the existence of many licensing regimes can best 
be explained in terms of regulatory capture: the regulated industry 
manages to exert a disproportionate influence over the authority 
meant to regulate it. The exercise of licensing powers by private enti-
ties, such as professional bodies, may be seen as the ultimate form 
of regulatory capture. 
These four strands of critique are not mutually exclusive. 
Indeed, the fourth strand combines elements of the third strand, 
and may borrow from the first and second strands as well. In the 
worst-case scenario, licensing regimes may be seen as the exercise of 
coercive state powers, serving private or bureaucratic interests at the 
expense of the general welfare, and often exercised in an arbitrary 
or capricious manner. To the extent that these charges are accurate, 
licensing regimes have a lot to answer for. 
Nevertheless, even those who are critical of licensing regimes 
acknowledge that they may serve legitimate public purposes. Epstein 
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admits that “we cannot (and should not) strive for a permit-free 
society.”47 From an economic standpoint, Anthony Ogus identifies 
cases where licensing helps to provide private actors with relevant 
information, to reduce externalities, to paternalistically protect 
individuals from the poor choices they might otherwise make, or 
to implement a distributive policy.48 The persistence of licensing 
regimes therefore cannot be wholly explained in terms of interest 
group politics. In economic terms, whether the benefits of licensing 
regimes outweigh their costs is likely to depend on the circum-
stances. Moreover, when undertaking such a cost-benefit analysis, 
one must consider the fact that alternative policy instruments would 
also have costs as well as benefits.49 In addition, where tradable 
licences are already in place and have acquired a significant value, 
the dilution or elimination of these licences raises important distribu-
tive concerns—as Eran Kaplinsky highlights in his contribution to 
this volume.
Finally, it is important to recall that licensing regimes often 
serve multiple purposes, which may not be easily separated. If a 
licensing regime is dismantled, it may not be easy to find an appro-
priate substitute. Moreover, even if one can conceive of an alternative, 
this does not mean that it will be easy to implement: one must keep 
in mind that there are limits to human beings’ capacity for collective 
organization.50 In particular, policy makers never start with a blank 
slate; they often face the challenge of creating new systems of gover-
nance out of old ones that have outlived their usefulness. However, 
these older systems of governance may also help define the ends that 
are deemed to be worth pursuing.51 Licences are therefore destined to 
remain part of the regulatory apparatus of the administrative state, 
at least for the foreseeable future. 
IV. Public Licensing Regimes and the Arrival of “Sharing 
Economy” Platforms
The arrival of “sharing economy” platforms has created dilemmas 
for policy makers, especially with regard to licensing regimes. 
Many such platforms encourage individuals to undertake economic 
activities that have historically been subject to licensing. How should 
legislators and governments respond? In this section, I illustrate 
the complexity of these dilemmas through a study of hotel and taxi 
licensing in the province of Quebec. These examples demonstrate 
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that when licensing regimes are challenged, legislators may respond 
in a number of ways. These responses include modifying existing 
regimes or creating new ones. These solutions may help mitigate 
the problems associated with older licensing regimes, but they may 
also create new problems, including new barriers to entry and new 
concentrations of market power.
In Quebec, “establishments providing accommodation to tour-
ists in return for payment” are subject to a mandatory classification 
system.52 Anyone operating such an establishment must first obtain 
a classification certificate, which means that the system is, in effect, 
a licensing regime. Although legislation empowers the minister of 
tourism to issue certificates, the minister has delegated the manage-
ment of the system to an industry association, the Corporation de 
l’industrie touristique du Québec (CITQ).53 To obtain a classification 
certificate, one must apply to the CITQ. If the CITQ approves, it 
issues the certificate, with a rating from zero to five stars, along with 
a physical sign, which must be prominently displayed at the main 
entrance to the establishment. The CITQ also conducts inspections to 
verify that certificate holders maintain quality standards appropriate 
to their classification. Certificate holders must pay an annual fee to 
the CITQ (starting at $247.78 in 2017).54 The Act establishes significant 
fines (starting at $2,500) for anyone operating a tourist accommoda-
tion establishment without a certificate.55 
Taxis, in Quebec, are subject to three different kinds of licences: 
owners’ permits,56 drivers’ permits,57 and intermediaries’ permits.58 
Owners’ permits are issued by a provincial arm’s-length agency, 
the Commission des transports (which also sets taxi fares).59 The 
Commission also issues intermediaries’ permits for places outside 
Montreal. Drivers’ permits, outside Montreal, are issued by the Société 
de l’assurance automobile du Québec (SAAQ), the provincial motor 
vehicle regulator and insurer. In Montreal, a municipal arm’s-length 
agency, the Bureau du taxi, is responsible for issuing drivers’ permits as 
well as intermediaries’ permits. Four out of eleven seats on this agen-
cy’s board are reserved for industry representatives. It is an offence 
to offer taxi transportation services without an owner’s and a driver’s 
permit,60 and it is an offence to provide taxi advertising, dispatching, 
or similar services in certain areas without an intermediary’s permit.61 
The licensing regime for taxis clearly establishes barriers to 
market entry for would-be providers. Owner’s permits (equivalent to 
other jurisdictions’ plates or medallions), are subject to quantitative 
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restrictions. Although the Commission stopped issuing transferable 
owner’s permits in 2000, permits issued before November 15, 2000, 
are fully transferable; they can be bought, sold, and leased. According 
to media reports, some owner’s permits for Montreal were traded for 
over $200,000, prior to the arrival of Uber.62 The high cost of owner’s 
permits means that many drivers must either lease these from permit 
owners or borrow heavily in order to purchase one for themselves.63 
Driver’s permits, for their part, are subject to examinations64 and 
police background checks.65 Drivers must also be sufficiently fluent 
in French.66 In some locations, a prospective driver must also com-
plete a training course.67 
With regard to hotels, the CITQ’s classification certificates are 
not subject to such quantitative restrictions. Nevertheless, fees and 
bureaucratic processes are likely to discourage those who might have 
entered the short-term rental market on a casual basis.
It is important to recognize that barriers to entry are not just a 
product of these licensing regimes themselves, but also of the way 
these regimes interact with other systems of public and private 
regulation. For example, under the CITQ’s classification scheme, 
municipalities may veto applications for tourist accommodation 
establishments located in their territory if they consider that the pro-
posal would be inconsistent with their zoning bylaws.68 Such bylaws 
may restrict tourist accommodation establishments to commercial 
areas or impose separation distances between such establishments.69 
In addition, the CITQ’s classification scheme intersects with the 
legal regime for rental property. Quebec tenants must obtain their 
landlord’s approval before subleasing.70 In 2016, Quebec’s rental hous-
ing tribunal, the Régie du logement, made it clear that this provision 
applies to short-term Airbnb rentals.71 Shortly thereafter, the same 
tribunal authorized a number of landlords to evict tenants who had 
been subleasing their apartments on Airbnb without permission.72
In the case of taxis, the sectoral licensing regime intersects with 
the general licensing regime for drivers and vehicles. In Quebec, the 
SAAQ is responsible for testing all drivers, registering all vehicles, 
and managing a public system of insurance for driving-related 
injuries. Taxi drivers in Quebec must not only have regular drivers’ 
licences, they must have higher, commercial-grade licences, known 
as “Class 4C.”73 In order to obtain such a licence, the driver must 
undergo a medical examination, have his or her vision checked, and 
pass a written test.74
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When “sharing economy” platforms like Airbnb and Uber 
arrive on the scene, lawmakers in jurisdictions with licensing regimes 
like Quebec’s have faced a set of interconnected normative questions. 
First, should platform-based service providers be subject to the exist-
ing licensing regimes, or should they be exempt? Second, should 
existing licensing regimes be preserved, or does the arrival of the 
platforms mean that they should be modified or even dismantled? 
In Quebec, the government’s initial response (beginning in 
2014) was that the existing regimes should apply to these new ser-
vices. In 2015, the Quebec legislature reformed the Act Respecting 
Tourist Accommodation Establishments and its accompanying regula-
tions in order to provide for more inspectors and to toughen the 
penalties for unlicensed establishments.75 The minister of tourism 
explained the reform as part of a crackdown on “illegal hotels.”76 
The Quebec government took a similar line in response to Uber. The 
minister of transport emphasized that Uber drivers’ activities were 
illegal.77 In 2015 and 2016, the Bureau du taxi of Montreal seized 
hundreds of vehicles from Uber drivers.78 Defenders of the existing 
licensing regimes, especially those in the conventional taxi industry, 
accused Uber and its drivers of unfair competition and launched 
a class action against Uber.79 Tax authorities also targeted Uber’s 
Quebec offices for investigation, leading to protracted litigation.80
The new platforms and their defenders generally responded 
to these attacks in two ways. On one hand, they dodged the legal 
questions, claiming that the informal, digitally mediated nature of 
the activities undertaken by their providers somehow fell outside 
the existing licensing regimes.81 On the other hand, they mounted 
a full-throated critique of existing licensing regimes. In the case of 
Uber, they argued that taxi licensing was a thing of the past, and that 
Uber represented the future.82 They described the taxi industry as a 
legalized cartel, extracting rents and providing mediocre services to 
the public.83 In effect, these arguments turned the “unfair competi-
tion” argument on its head: the platforms and their allies presented 
themselves as the true champions of a competitive marketplace. 
In fact, the government’s defence of the existing licensing 
regimes was not absolute. The government showed a willingness to 
compromise. With regard to tourist accommodations, the govern-
ment issued a regulation specifying that the classification scheme 
only applies to spaces that are offered for rent, for periods of thirty-
one days or less, “on a regular basis.”84 The Ministry of Tourism 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   34 18-11-08   08:42
 Peer Platform Markets and Licensing Regimes 35
subsequently issued an interpretation bulletin stipulating that “a 
regular basis” means anything more than once per year.85 
In the case of taxis, the government sent mixed political sig-
nals. In January 2016, the minister of transport, who had taken a 
hard line against Uber, was replaced with a minister who was seen 
as more conciliatory.86 Taxi authorities continued to seize vehicles, 
and the new minister was loudly critical of Uber. Nevertheless, the 
government stopped short of shutting down Uber altogether. The 
government discussed measures that would truly have prevented 
Uber from functioning—such as suspending the driver’s licences of 
Uber drivers—but never undertook such measures.87 Uber continued 
to operate in Quebec, and remained popular. 
Such mitigated responses show that the initial questions I have 
identified—whether or not to subject the new platforms and provid-
ers to existing regimes, and whether or not to dismantle the existing 
regimes—are not in fact all-or-nothing questions. Regulators may 
decide to compromise with regard to one, the other, or both. Such 
compromises may be achieved on a somewhat improvised basis, 
as in Quebec, or they may be more carefully planned. For example, 
regulators may decide to retain the existing licensing regime, but 
nevertheless set a threshold that allows some platform-based provid-
ers to legally operate without a licence. Alternatively, regulators may 
apply the same licensing requirements to everyone, but nevertheless 
lighten these requirements to accommodate platform-based provid-
ers. Finally, regulators may simultaneously lighten the licensing 
requirements and exempt some providers from their application. 
These possibilities suggest that the initial questions I identified might 
be reformulated as follows: first, to what extent should platform-based 
service providers be subject to the existing licensing regimes, and 
to what extent should they be exempt? Second, to what extent should 
existing licensing regimes be preserved, and to what extent should 
they be modified? 
The answers to these questions will help to define the boundar-
ies between different markets (or market segments) and to determine 
respective barriers to entry. They will inevitably have an impact on 
competition and market power. If a low threshold is established 
for the applicability of the licensing regime, or if the requirements 
associated with licensing remain high, this will work to the advan-
tage of incumbents and may hinder the market entry of platforms 
and platform-based providers. If a high threshold is established for 
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applicability or if the requirements associated with licensing are sig-
nificantly lowered, this will weaken incumbents and make it easier 
for the platforms to launch. 
The approaches I have discussed so far involve either subjecting 
incumbents and newcomers to the prevailing regime or exempting 
at least some newcomers from such a regime. However, legislators 
in some other jurisdictions have taken another track, creating new 
kinds of licences for platform-based service providers. Legislators 
in some jurisdictions have begun to regulate Airbnb hosts using the 
mechanism of licences, as with San Francisco’s Short-Term Rental 
Registry88 and Amsterdam’s “Private Holiday Rental” law.89 Some 
jurisdictions have required Uber drivers to obtain special licences, 
distinct from taxi licences.90 The creation of separate licensing 
regimes for platform-based providers involves a departure from 
the “level playing field” idea, invoked both in defence of and as an 
attack on existing licensing regimes. It means treating platform-based 
services differently. Such licensing regimes also impose a degree 
of formality on platform-based services, in tension with the casual 
ethos the platforms have promoted. Nevertheless, under considerable 
public pressure, the platforms have accepted such requirements in 
many jurisdictions. 
In the design of these new licensing regimes for platform-based 
providers, governments have generally eschewed quantity-limited, 
tradable licences, recognizing how such licences have the potential 
to disproportionately serve private interests.91 Nevertheless, the 
new licensing regimes still impose barriers to entry. Indeed, in some 
cases, these regimes contain measures that seem designed to limit 
supply. One example of supply management can be seen in expen-
sive licensing fees for platform-based providers.92 Another example 
is found in the placing of limits, or ceilings, on providers’ activity, 
such as weekly limits on Uber drivers’ hours,93 or annual limits on 
short-term rentals.94 
Whether or not the effort to restrict supply is intentional, sepa-
rate licensing regimes for platform-based providers have the effect 
of drawing boundaries between different market segments.95 As 
with thresholds that exempt some providers from licensing require-
ments, the impact on competition and market power will depend 
on the details. Lax licensing regimes for providers will work to the 
advantage of the platforms. Restrictive licensing regimes, if enforced, 
may amount to bans. 
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Not only have some jurisdictions established separate licensing 
regimes for providers, some have established such regimes for the 
platforms themselves. California was a pioneer in this regard, with 
its 2013 certification of Uber and Lyft as “transportation network 
companies” (TNCs).96 Such licensing regimes allow the state to 
control entry into the market for intermediation services. They also 
enable the state to delegate certain regulatory tasks to platforms, 
making the platforms responsible for ensuring that their drivers 
respect certain standards. As Katrina Wyman argues, there is little 
indication that such licensing regimes reflect evidence-based consid-
eration of optimal regulatory design. In many cases, such regimes 
are the outcomes of negotiations between governments and platform 
companies, and there is evidence of regulatory capture: for example, 
through the requirement that the platforms pay significant licensing 
fees (sometimes in the hundreds of thousands of dollars), which will 
make it more difficult for new platforms to compete.97
In Quebec, the government has yet to create any novel licensing 
category for platforms or for providers in either the hotel or the taxi 
sectors. Instead, in each sector, it has nominally attempted to retain 
the notion of a level playing field and a single regulatory regime. 
Nevertheless, in the case of Uber drivers, it has created something 
akin to a separate licensing regime, at least on a temporary basis. In 
September 2016, the government agreed that, on an experimental basis 
for one year, Uber drivers could operate without traditional taxi own-
ers’ permits. In exchange, Uber would pay the government a per-ride 
fee, to be funnelled towards the modernization of the taxi industry.98 
This fee starts at 90 cents per ride, if Uber drivers in the province are 
collectively on the road for less than 50,000 hours in a given week; over 
50,000 hours, the fee is $1.10 per ride; it goes up to $1.26 per ride if Uber 
drivers in the province are on the road for more than 100,000 hours in a 
given week. Uber must also pay the government an additional 7 cents 
per ride “to take into account the insurance costs incurred in the taxi 
industry.” The agreement also requires Uber to set its minimum fare at 
$3.45, the same base fare established for taxis by the Commission des 
transports. Uber must also apply for a taxi intermediary’s permit. In 
some respects, the agreement is akin to granting Uber a certain num-
ber of taxi owner’s permits, albeit on per-hour rather than a per-vehicle 
basis. However, Uber drivers can only solicit passengers through the 
Uber smartphone application; unlike incumbent taxis, they may not 
pick up passengers who simply hail them on the street.99
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The agreement between the government and Uber also imposes 
certain conditions on Uber drivers. Uber is responsible for carrying 
out background checks on its drivers and making sure that vehicles 
are properly registered, inspected, and insured. Uber drivers must 
hold commercial-grade drivers’ licences. The entente between the 
government and Uber clearly provides some advantages to Uber 
drivers: it sets aside the greatest barrier to entry in the taxi market—
the requirement of an owner’s permit—and allows drivers to oper-
ate legally. But it also subjects them to new licensing requirements, 
negotiated between Uber and the government behind closed doors. 
And the enforcement of these requirements is in the hands of Uber, 
rather than those of a government agency. 
The arrival of “sharing economy” platforms has therefore not 
necessarily led to the dismantling of licensing regimes. Nor, in their 
responses to these platforms, have policy makers necessarily estab-
lished a “level playing field” for incumbents and newcomers. Instead, 
many government authorities have, through their design of licensing 
regimes, effectively, carved up the market between incumbents and 
newcomers. And in doing so, they have in some cases delegated a 
certain amount of regulatory authority to the platforms. 
V. The Platforms as Private Licensing Regimes
For some commentators on the “sharing economy,” peer platform 
markets provide an alternative to state licensing as a way of ensur-
ing safety, privacy, and contractual fairness. The platforms are in a 
position to supervise the conduct of providers and to discipline them 
if they fail to meet certain standards. However, in carrying out these 
functions, platforms may function more or less like private licensing 
regimes. And as private licensing regimes, the platforms may repro-
duce the pathologies associated with publicly mandated licensing. 
They may place providers in a precarious position, and they are 
unlikely to operate in the public interest. These pathologies are only 
reinforced when the state formally delegates regulatory authority to 
the platforms through a public system of platform licensing. 
Platforms such as Airbnb and Uber are generally considered 
private actors. In their original form, such platforms did not pur-
port to exercise any regulatory authority delegated by the state. 
Instead, they developed software programs (protected by copyright 
law) and they used private law—contract law—to grant access to 
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this intellectual property. Providers and consumers who use these 
platforms’ software enter into licensing agreements, consenting to 
use the software according to the stipulated terms and conditions. 
However, the word “licence” is used here in a sense borrowed from 
property law, distinguishable from the administrative licensing 
regimes I have described. Because they rely on the mechanisms of 
private law, the platforms do not qualify as licensing regimes under 
the definition I have employed. 
Nevertheless, such platforms operate in ways that mirror the 
operation of licensing regimes. In order to provide services through 
a platform, one must obtain the prior authorization of the platform 
company. Such authorization may be granted lightly, or it may be 
subject to tests, inspections, and background checks. Moreover, those 
who obtain this authorization are subject to ongoing monitoring. The 
platform collects data on every transaction; in the case of Uber, it can 
monitor the geographic location of its users. In some cases, providers 
may be subject to periodic inspections. In other cases, user ratings, 
reviews, and complaint mechanisms may perform a similar function. 
The platforms retain the discretion to banish providers who fail to 
meet their expectations. 
In many respects, then, the platforms resemble private regula-
tory systems. Verifications and monitoring are used to ensure com-
pliance with quality and safety standards. Uber sets a maximum age 
for its vehicles, and requires vehicles to undergo regular inspections. 
Uber once boasted that its drivers were subject to an “industry lead-
ing” system of background checks (a claim that it later renounced 
under the pressure of a class-action lawsuit).100 Even more funda-
mentally, elements of the platforms’ software make certain deceptive 
business practices less likely. These elements include the fact that 
payment must pass through the platform. In the case of Uber, they 
also include the standardization of fares (and the regulation of routes 
taken by drivers). Such mechanisms are praised by certain business 
authors for fostering the trust that encourages consumers to enter 
into online transactions.101 
Of course, it is generally acknowledged that the platforms’ 
regulatory regimes are not self-contained systems, and that they 
operate in tandem with state regulatory regimes. For example, the 
safety of an Airbnb rental depends in part on the application of 
building safety standards, which are not monitored by Airbnb but 
rather by other public and private actors. Uber requires its drivers to 
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hold drivers’ licences, issued by public authorities. Although Uber 
conducts its own driver background checks in some cities, in other 
places, public authorities have insisted on carrying out their own 
background checks on Uber drivers.102 In some places, Uber has even 
agreed to make access to its platform conditional on the obtaining 
of a sector-specific licence issued by a state authority. For example, 
Uber initially operated with licensed limousines or other luxury 
vehicles, and this is still the case in some jurisdictions.103 Moreover, 
as discussed in the previous section, the platforms have sometimes 
accepted the imposition of a distinct licensing regime for platform-
based providers. 
Of course, the platforms differ from public licensing regimes 
in certain respects as well. Most importantly, while the platforms 
control access to their own software, they do not necessarily control 
access to the industry or the economic sector in question. In prin-
ciple, they may face competition from other platforms. One might 
therefore argue that it is possible for providers to enter the market 
without having access to the platforms. 
However, the competition faced by the platforms may be more 
apparent than real. In practice, network effects may bar competing 
platforms from entering the market. Other factors may reinforce 
these dynamics as well. A platform’s possession of data generated 
by millions of repeated uses may enable it to refine its algorithms in 
such a way that competitors will not be able to replicate.104 Together, 
these effects may provide some platforms with an effective monopoly 
on intermediation services in a given sector, controlling entry for 
would-be providers—and functioning as an all but mandatory licens-
ing regime. 
In fact, with their recent legislative changes, some jurisdictions 
have formalized the platforms’ role as licensing regimes, officially 
delegating to the platforms the power to issue a public licence. This is 
the case notably in the state of Massachusetts, where a statute legaliz-
ing TNCs was enacted in 2016.105 The statute establishes a mandatory 
system of “transportation network driver certificates.” The statute 
specifies the requirements for the issuance of these certificates (for 
example, the driver must be at least twenty-one years of age, have 
an appropriately registered vehicle and insurance, satisfy require-
ments related to criminal background and driving records, and so 
on). However, the TNC is responsible for issuing the certificate.106 
In Massachusetts, public authorities have effectively taken control 
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of the private licensing regime, but then formally delegated control 
of this regime back to the platform, in a manner that parallels older 
systems of professional licensing. 
But even in the absence of such formalization, the platforms, as 
private licensing regimes, may exhibit many of the pathologies typi-
cally associated with publicly mandated licensing regimes—and in 
some cases, they may be worse. Publicly mandated licensing regimes 
must at least maintain a pretence of operating in the public interest. 
The platforms have no such pressure. 
The clearest way in which platforms may serve their own 
private interests at the expense of the public interest is through the 
extraction of rents—the exercise of market power.107 Extraction of 
rents by the platforms may be masked by the fact that the platforms 
often provide low prices for consumers. However, such low prices 
do not necessarily mean that the platforms lack market power. It 
seems likely that, in keeping with a two-sided market strategy, the 
platforms are extracting rents from one group in order to subsidize 
participation by another group.108 Acting as intermediaries, the 
platforms may charge high prices on one side of the market in order 
to offer low prices on the other side. While passengers may find 
Uber relatively cheap, Uber extracts a large portion of the fare—as 
high as 30 per cent in some places.109 In effect, Uber extracts rents by 
charging drivers a high price for its intermediation service. To the 
extent that Uber faces competition (from taxis, or from other platform 
companies such as Lyft), it may have to keep fares low in order to 
attract passengers. But this dynamic certainly works to the detriment 
of drivers, and therefore raises distributive concerns. 
The two-sided market dynamic also implies that rent-seeking 
need not be coupled with limits on supply. In effect, if platforms are 
competing for market share on one side of the market (passengers), 
it may be in their interest to increase supply on the other side of the 
market as much as possible (drivers). It is in Uber’s interest to have 
more drivers on the road at any given time in order to reduce pas-
senger wait times, whereas for drivers, such increased supply means 
more downtime spent waiting for rides.110 Moreover, Uber’s optimal 
number of drivers on the road may not correspond to the social 
optimum, when one takes into account externalities such as traffic 
congestion, accidents, and pollution. In short, supply management 
by platforms may be inefficient.
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The tension between the platforms’ private interests and the 
public interest has also been revealed through subtler issues in regu-
latory design. For example, should Uber drivers be required to submit 
to background checks by a public authority, or can Uber be relied 
upon to carry out its own background checks? Such background 
checks serve Uber’s interests as well as the public interest. However, 
Uber may have an interest in carrying out such checks more strictly 
or more leniently than the public interest would warrant, depending 
on its profit-making objectives.111 
The platforms’ control of a private licensing regime may give 
rise to arbitrary exercises of power. The platforms retain the discre-
tion to banish providers who fail to meet their standards. They may 
exercise this discretion fairly or unfairly. In the case of Uber drivers, 
there has been considerable scrutiny of the fact that drivers are ban-
ished when their star rating falls below a certain level.112 Continued 
access to the platform therefore depends on customer satisfaction; 
however, it may also depend on customers’ whims and prejudices. 
Just as importantly, providers have raised concerns about the plat-
form companies’ unilateral modifications of their terms and condi-
tions, which can have an enormous impact on providers’ work.113
Finally, the shift from public to private licensing regimes does 
not obviate concerns about regulatory capture. Indeed, by displacing 
public licensing regimes and purporting to exercise licensing func-
tions themselves, the platforms may be understood as having devised 
a more effective form of regulatory capture. The fact that TNCs have 
accepted for themselves public licensing arrangements that will serve 
as bars to potential competitors add to these suspicions of regulatory 
capture.114 The platforms must cooperate with public officials when 
necessary to head off political opposition. But the day-to-day opera-
tion of the system is entirely under their control. 
In short, the platforms should not be seen as easy deregula-
tory substitutes for ossified licensing regimes. Instead, it must be 
recognized that the platforms operate as private licensing regimes. 
The platforms are able to reproduce some of the advantages of 
public licensing regimes, but they are also perfectly capable of 
reproducing these regimes’ disadvantages. If state-imposed barriers 
to entry are eliminated, platform-imposed barriers may take their 
place. Eliminating or weakening existing licensing regimes so as to 
reduce barriers to entry does not necessarily eliminate the problem 
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of barriers to entry. It may simply amount to a delegation of barriers 
to entry, shifting them from public into private hands.
The recognition that platforms may function as private licensing 
regimes makes it necessary to revisit the analysis, set out earlier, of 
the new public licensing regimes that have been designed for these 
platforms and their providers. It must be acknowledged that such 
arrangements effectively establish mixed public-private licensing 
regimes, in which private actors (the platforms) are asked to imple-
ment public interest goals, but in which these public requirements 
will conflict to some extent with their private interests. If providers 
are subject to distinct licensing regimes, this means that their entry 
into the market is subject to both public and private controls (those 
of the platform). If the platforms themselves are subject to licensing, 
this amounts to a formal delegation of regulatory authority to these 
platforms, albeit subject to public oversight.
But just as importantly, this recognition makes it clear that the 
absence of a public licensing regime for platforms or providers does 
not make it possible to avoid such issues as barriers to entry, market 
power, or arbitrariness. If the state eschews licensing, platform “self-
regulation” may reproduce these same dynamics. The question is 
not whether to address these issues, but who should address them, 
when, where, and how.
VI. Conclusion
The arrival of peer platform markets has placed a harsh spotlight on 
publicly enacted licensing regimes. In this stark glare, the advantages 
as well as the disadvantages of such regimes have become even more 
apparent. Nevertheless, governments have found it impossible to 
dispense with licensing. Although some governments have modified 
licensing regimes in order to make way for the platforms, others have 
toughened or even multiplied these regimes, creating new licences 
for platform-based services. In addition, where governments have 
accepted the platforms’ claims to be exempt from licensing, they 
have often done so because of the platforms’ ability to mimic the 
functions of public licensing regimes. As private licensing regimes, 
however, the platforms not only reproduce the successes of public 
licensing regimes but also their many failures. 
Licensing regimes need to be carefully examined, not only 
in order to determine whether they provide effective means of 
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protecting consumers, but also to determine whether they respond 
effectively to concerns about efficiency, distribution, and power. As 
the foregoing analysis makes clear, however, the distinction between 
formal public licensing and ostensibly private, contractual arrange-
ments will provide little guidance in this regard. Private entities are 
perfectly capable of generating modes of governance that resemble 
licensing regimes. Moreover, public regulation may end up modify-
ing or simply reinforcing these arrangements. Regulatory responses 
to the “sharing economy” must take into account such interactions 
between public and private arrangements.
Notes
 1. Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Université de Sherbrooke. I would 
like to thank the participants at the workshop as well as Geneviève 
Cartier, Katrina Wyman, and an anonymous reviewer for comments 
on previous drafts. Mistakes are mine.
 2. I have chosen to place “sharing” in quotation marks when referring to 
Airbnb, Uber, and similar platforms, in recognition of the fact that 
these are profit-making enterprises. For an explanation of the distinc-
tion between markets and sharing as modes of economic organization, 
see Yochai Benkler, “Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the 
Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production” (2004) 
114 Yale LJ 273.
 3. OECD, Committee on Consumer Policy, Protecting Consumers in Peer Platform 
Markets: Exploring the Issues, Background Report for Ministerial Panel 3.1, 
Doc No DSTI/CP(2015)4/FINAL (OECD, 2016), online: <http://www.oecd.
org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DSTI/CP(2015)4/
FINAL&docLanguage=En> [OECD].
 4. EC, Commission, A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy (Brussels: 
EC, 2016), online: <http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/16881> 
[European Commission]. 
 5. US, Federal Trade Commission, The “Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing 
Platforms, Participants & Regulators (A Federal Trade Commission Staff 
Report, 2016), online: <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
reports/sharing-economy-issues-facing-platforms-participants-
regulators-federal-trade-commission-staff/p151200_ftc_staff_report_
on_the_sharing_economy.pdf> [Federal Trade Commission].
 6. European Commission, supra note 4.
 7. The issue of whether Uber qualifies as an “information society service,” 
immune from prior authorization requirements, subsequently came 
to the fore in the case of Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v Uber Systems 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   44 18-11-08   08:42
 Peer Platform Markets and Licensing Regimes 45
Spain SL, before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In May 2017, 
EU Advocate General Maciej Szpunar issued his opinion in the case, 
holding that Uber’s electronic intermediation is inseparable from the 
transportation service offered by its drivers. Uber therefore consti-
tutes a comprehensive transportation service and can be subject to 
national licensing regimes. See Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, 
Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain SL (11 May 2017), 
Barcelona C-434/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:364 (Comm Ct No 3, Barcelona, 
Spain), online: CVRIA <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=190593&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&-
mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=611658>. At the time of 
writing, the ECJ had yet to render its judgment in the case. 
 8. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 5. The title page contains this dis-
claimer: “This staff report represents the views of the FTC staff and does 
not necessarily represent the views of the Commission or any individual 
Commissioner. The Commission, however, has voted to authorize the 
staff to issue this staff report.”
 9. See e.g. Karl Rettino-Parazelli, “Québec promet d’en «faire plus» pour 
encadrer Airbnb,” Le Devoir (30 August 2017), online: <http://www.
ledevoir.com/politique/quebec/506807/quebec-et-airbnb-s-entendent-
sur-une-taxe-d-hebergement> (discussing Airbnb’s agreement to begin 
collecting a 3.5 per cent lodging tax in Québec). 
 10. Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M Ring, “Can Sharing Be Taxed?” (2016) 93 Wash 
UL Rev 989. 
 11. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 5 at 89. 
 12. Arun Sundararajan, The Sharing Economy: The End of Employment and the 
Rise of Crowd-Based Capitalism (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2016).
 13. See Brishen Rogers, “Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: 
Getting Back to Basics” (2016) 10 Harv L & Pol’y Rev 479. 
 14. See Michael L Katz & Carl Shapiro, “Systems Competition and Network 
Effects” (1994) 8:2 J Econ Perspect 93. 
 15. See K Sabeel Rahman, “Curbing the New Corporate Power,” Boston 
Review (4 May 2015), online: <http://bostonreview.net/forum/k-sabeel- 
rahman-curbing-new-corporate-power>.
 16. See Louis Kaplow, “Why (Ever) Define Markets?” (2010) 124 Harv L Rev 
437.
 17. See Federal Trade Commission, supra note 5. 
 18. See David S Evans, “The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform 
Markets” (2003) 20 Yale J Reg 325; Julian Wright, “One-Sided Logic in 
Two-Sided Markets” (2004) 3:1 Rev Network Econ 44. 
 19. See e.g. Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, “Self-Regulation and 
Innovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy” (2015) 82 U Chicago 
L Rev Dialogue 116; Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell & Adam 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   45 18-11-08   08:42
 46 LAW AND THE “SHARING ECONOMY”
Thierer, “The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: 
The Case for Policy Change” (2015) 8 J Bus Entrepreneurship & L 529.
20. OECD, supra note 3 at 8. 
 21. See e.g. Glanville Williams, “Control by Licensing” (1967) 20:1 Curr Leg 
Probl 81.
 22. See Anthony I Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994) at 214–42.
 23. Pierre Issalys & Denis Lemieux, L’action gouvernementale : Précis de droit 
des institutions administratives, 3rd ed (Cowansville, QC: Éditions Yvon 
Blais, 2009) at 916. 
 24. Ibid at 215.
 25. See e.g. McInnes v Onslow Fane, [1978] 1 WLR 1520, 3 All ER 211 (Ch).
 26. Mariana Valverde, Everyday Law on the Street: City Governance in an Age 
of Diversity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).
 27. See Orly Lobel, “The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought” (2004) 89 Minn L Rev 342. 
 28. For an extended treatment of this distinction, see Eric Bibert & JB 
Ruhl, “The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of 
Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State” (2014) 64 Duke LJ 133 
(distinguishing between “general” and “specific” permits, largely in 
the context of environmental regulation and land-use planning).
 29. Some authors have distinguished licences, used to enforce standards, 
from public franchises, meant to restrict competition by imposing 
quantitative restrictions. See Ogus, supra note 22 at 214. I would argue 
that it is too difficult to draw a distinction between the two, and that 
there are many hybrid examples—as in the case of taxis. I therefore 
include public franchises within my definition of licences.
 30. Jody Rosen, “The Knowledge, London’s Legendary Taxi-Driver Test, 
Puts Up a Fight in the Age of GPS,” T: The New York Times Style Magazine 
(10 November 2014), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/t-
magazine/london-taxi-test-knowledge.html?_r=0>. 
 31. See Saulnier (Receiver of) v Saulnier, 2008 SCC 58; see also Katrina Miriam 
Wyman, “Problematic Private Property: The Case of New York Taxicab 
Medallions” (2013) 30 Yale J Reg 125; Christopher Essert, “Property in 
Licences and the Law of Things” (2014) 59 McGill LJ 559. 
 32. See Québec (Société de l’assurance automobile) v Cyr, 2008 SCC 13.
 33. Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 35-36.
 34. See Mariana Valverde, “Police Science, British Style: Pub Licensing and 
Knowledges of Urban Disorder” (2003) 32:2 Econ & Soc’y 234.
 35. Compare Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 8th ed (Austin: 
Wolters Kluwer, 2011) at 489.
 36. Charles A Reich, “The New Property” (1964) 73 Yale LJ 733.
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   46 18-11-08   08:42
 Peer Platform Markets and Licensing Regimes 47
 37. Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, SCJ No 1.
 38. See Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk (Regional Municipality) Commissioners of 
Police, [1979] 1 SCR 311, [1978] 3 ACWS 185; see also Martineau v Matsqui 
Institution, [1980] 1 SCR 602, [1979] SCJ No 121 at para 62. 
 39. See Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 
817; SCJ No 39.
 40. See Act Respecting Administrative Justice, CQLR c J-3, ss 5, 8.
 41. See Ocean Port Hotel Ltd v British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor 
Control and Licensing Branch), 2001 SCC 52.
 42. Richard A Epstein, “The Permit Power Meets the Constitution” (1995) 
81 Iowa L Rev 407. 
 43. Ibid.
 44. See e.g. Thomas G Moore, “The Purposes of Licensing” (1961) 4 JL 
& Econ 93; Shirley Svorny, “Licensing, Market Entry Regulation” in 
Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds, Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics, Volume III: The Regulation of Contracts (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 2000) 296.
 45. See Ogus, supra note 22 at 216–17.
 46. See e.g. George J Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation” (1971) 
2:1 Bell J Econ & Manage Sci 3.
 47. Epstein, supra note 42 at 407.
 48. Ogus, supra note 22. 
 49. See Neil Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, 
Economics, and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
 50. See Lon L Fuller, “Means and Ends” in Kenneth I Winston, ed, The 
Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L Fuller, revised ed 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) 61. 
 51. See Roderick A Macdonald, “The Swiss Army Knife of Governance” 
in Pearl Eliadis, Margaret M Hill & Michael Howlett, eds, Designing 
Government: From Instruments to Governance (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2005) 203.
 52. Act Respecting Tourist Accommodation Establishments, CQLR c E-14.2, s 1. 
 53. The statute expressly empowers the minister to delegate his or her 
powers with regard to the “issue, suspension or cancellation of 
classification certificates.” See ibid, s 14.1.
 54. Corporation de l’industrie touristique du Québec, “Frais annuels 
d’attestation,” online: <http://citq.qc.ca/fr/fraisattestation.php>.
 55. Act Respecting Tourist Accommodation Establishments, supra note 52, s 37(8).
 56. Act Respecting Transportation Services by Taxi, CQLR c S-6.01, ss 4-23.
 57. Ibid, ss 24-31.
 58. Ibid, ss 32-34.
 59. Until 2016, the Commission des transports also established the number 
of owner’s permits for particular geographical areas; in 2016, the 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   47 18-11-08   08:42
 48 LAW AND THE “SHARING ECONOMY”
government (e.g. the cabinet) assumed this power directly. See ibid, s 
5.1. 
 60. Ibid, s 117.
 61. Ibid, s 118.
 62. See Tristan Péloquin, “La chute de la valeur des permis de taxi se 
confirme,” La Presse (7 December 2016), online: <http://www.lapresse.ca/
actualites/grand-montreal/201612/06/01-5048800-la-chute-de-la-valeur-
des-permis-de-taxi-se-confirme.php>. 
 63. See Claude Turcotte, “L’industrie du taxi ne roule pas sur l’or, mais…,” 
Le Devoir (30 August 2010), online: <http://www.ledevoir.com/economie/
actualites-economiques/295262/l-industrie-du-taxi-ne-roule-pas-sur-l-
or-mais>.
 64. Act Respecting Transportation Services by Taxi, supra note 56, s 26(1).
 65. Ibid, ss 26(2)–(4), 31.1-31.2; Taxi Transportation Regulation, CQLR c S-6.01, 
r 3, ss 4(5), 21.1–21.3.
 66. Taxi Transportation Regulation, supra note 65, s 4(4).
 67. Act Respecting Transportation Services by Taxi, supra note 56, s 27. See also 
City of Montréal, by-law No RCG 10-009, Règlement sur le transport par 
taxi, s 70 (Montréal requires new taxi drivers to undergo 150 hours of 
training). 
 68. Act Respecting Tourist Accommodation Establishments, supra note 52, s 6.1.
 69. See e.g. Arrondissement Ville-Marie, by-law No 01-282, Codification 
administrative du règlement d’urbanisme (6 March 2017), s 136(8).
 70. Civil Code of Québec, CQLR c CCQ-1991, art 1870. 
 71. See 9177-2541 Québec Inc c Li, 2016 QCRDL 8129.
 72. See Côté c Pilon, 2016 QCRDL 18913; Ngo c Arakaki Inc, 2016 QCRDL 21172. 
Moreover, 2015 legislative amendments make landlords liable for their 
tenants’ regulatory offences, unless they can prove they exercised due 
diligence to avoid the offence. See Act Respecting Tourist Accommodation 
Establishments, supra note 52, s 41.1. In effect, landlords are obliged to 
ensure that their tenants are complying with the licensing regime.
 73. Taxi Transportation Regulation, supra note 65, s 4(3).
 74. Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec, “Obtenir un permis 
de conduire,” online: <https://saaq.gouv.qc.ca/permis-de-conduire/
obtenir-permis/taxi-limousine-classe-4c>.
 75. Québec, National Assembly, Bill 67: An Act Mainly to Improve the 
Regulation of Tourist Accommodation and to Define a New System of 
Governance as Regards International Promotion, 41st Leg, 1st Sess, Vol 44, 
No 118 (first reading, 22 October 2015).
 76. Québec, National Assembly, “Point de presse de Mme Dominique 
Vien, ministre du Tourisme” by Dominique Vien (2015), online: <http://
www.assnat.qc.ca/fr/actualites-salle-presse/conferences-points-presse/
ConferencePointPresse-25417.html> [Vien]. 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   48 18-11-08   08:42
 Peer Platform Markets and Licensing Regimes 49
 77. Pierre-André Normandin, “Le ministre Poëti veut freiner UberX,” La 
Presse+ (13 December 2014), online: <http://plus.lapresse.ca/screens/
d5212508-29a5-469e-8a6e-701f05275812%7C_0.html>. 
 78. Tristan Péloquin, “Saisies de véhicules Uber: le Bureau du taxi ‘perplexe’ 
devant de nombreux cas,” La Presse (25 February 2016), online: <http://
www.lapresse.ca/actualites/201602/25/01-4954452-saisies-de-vehicules-
uber-le-bureau-du-taxi-perplexe-devant-de-nombreux-cas.php>.
 79. Jean-Paul c Uber Technologies Inc, 2017 QCCS 164.
 80. Uber Canada Inc c Québec (Agence du Revenu), 2016 QCCS 2158 [Uber 
Canada Inc].
 81. See Marco Bélair-Cirino, “Uber défie Québec,” Le Devoir (19 February 
2016), online: <http://www.ledevoir.com/non-classe/463477/uber-
defie-quebec>. Such a claim may have been plausible in some other 
jurisdictions. See e.g. Toronto (City of) v Uber Canada Inc, 2015 ONSC 3572. 
However, in Quebec, in the case of Uber, this claim was absurd: Uber 
drivers clearly fall within Quebec’s legislative definition of “taxi.” See 
Act Respecting Transportation Services by Taxi, supra note 56, s 2(3); see 
also Uber Canada Inc, supra note 80 at paras 193-204.
 82. Françoise Bertrand, “L’industrie du taxi a un cadre réglementaire 




 83. Denis Lessard & Tristan Péloquin, “Tir groupé contre le système de 
permis,” La Presse+ (24 February 2016), online: <http://plus.lapresse.ca/
screens/29e61708-1711-454b-ac4f-0f8e7e41c11a%7C_0.html>.
 84. Regulation Respecting Tourist Accommodation Establishments, CQLR 
c E-14.2, r 1, s 1. Prior to 2015, tourist accommodation establishments that 
were only offered for rent “on an occasional basis” were exempt from 
Quebec’s classification scheme. When it undertook its 2015 reform of 
the legislation, the government promised to clarify this rule. See Vien, 
supra note 76.
 85. Québec, Tourisme Québec, “Guide d’interprétation de la loi et du 
règlement sur les établissements d’hébergement touristique,” (Gou-
vernement du Québec, 2017), online: <http://www.tourisme.gouv.
qc.ca/programmes-services/hebergement/guide-interpretation.html>. 
It was subsequently reported that enterprising Airbnb hosts had found 
that they could circumvent the classification scheme by offering their 
rooms and apartments only for periods of more than thirty-one days, 
then subsequently negotiating with potential guests for shorter stays. 
See Philippe Orfali, “La loi anti-Airbnb est aisément contournée,” Le 
Devoir (17 August 2016), online: <http://www.ledevoir.com/societe/
actualites-en-societe/477891/la-loi-anti-airbnb-est-aisement-contournee>. 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   49 18-11-08   08:42
 50 LAW AND THE “SHARING ECONOMY”
 86. Pierre Saint-Arnaud, “Robert Poëti n’avait pas la même vision d’Uber 




 87. See Simon Boivin, “Daoust envisage la suspension du permis des 
chauffeurs d’Uber,” Le Soleil (23 February 2016), online: <https://
w w w.lesolei l .com/ac t ua l ite/daoust- envisage-la-suspension-
du-p e r m i s - de s - c h au f f e u r s - du b e r - b3179 f 7c 8182 a 25c 3 f 7 f 39
82f7039547>. 
 88. San Francisco, Office of Short-Term Rentals, “Office of Short-Term Rental 
Registry & FAQs,” online: <http://sf-planning.org/office-short-term-
rental-registry-faqs> [Short-Term Rental FAQs].
 89. “Private Holiday Rental: What You Should Know,” online: I Amsterdam 
<http://www.iamsterdam.com/en/visiting/plan-your-trip/where-to-stay/
private-holiday-rental> [Private Holiday Rental].
 90. See e.g. City of Edmonton, by-law No 17400, Vehicle for Hire (27 June 
2017), s 2(2)(n) (“private transportation provider”); Toronto, City 




 91. See Katrina Wyman, “The Novelty of TNC Regulation” in Nestor 
Davidson, Michèle Finck & John Infranca, eds, The Cambridge Handbook 
of the Law of the Sharing Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) [forthcoming in 2018, draft on file with author]. 
 92. See Annalise Klingbeil, “Uber Tells Calgary Drivers to Get a Class 
4 Licence Ahead of Possible Relaunch,” Calgary Herald (28 July 2016), 
online: <http://calgaryherald.com/news/local-news/uber-tells-calgary-
drivers-to-get-a-class-4-licence-ahead-of-possible-relaunch>. 
 93. See e.g. Hara Associates Inc, “Framework for Choice: Discussion Paper 
to Inform and Support Vehicles-for-Hire Dialogue” (10 October 2015), 
online: City of Vancouver <http://vancouver.ca/files/cov/hara-report-
framework-for-choice.pdf>.
 94. Short-Term Rental FAQs, supra note 88; Private Holiday Rental, supra 
note 89. Although it does not belong to a licensing regime and thus falls 
outside the scope of this study, New York’s requirement that Airbnb 
hosts be physically present performs a similar supply-limiting function. 
See New York State, “Multiple Dwelling Law,” online: <https://www1.
nyc.gov/assets/buildings/pdf/MultipleDwellingLaw.pdf>; see also James 
Dobbins, “How to Host on Airbnb Legally,” The New York Times (7 April 
2017), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/realestate/how-to-
host-on-airbnb-legally.html?_r=0>. The same is true of Berlin’s restriction 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   50 18-11-08   08:42
 Peer Platform Markets and Licensing Regimes 51
of Airbnb rentals to portions of apartments. See Philip Oltermann, 
“Berlin Ban on Airbnb Short-Term Rentals Upheld by City Court,” 
The Guardian (8 June 2016), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2016/jun/08/berlin-ban-airbnb-short-term-rentals-upheld-
city-court>; Feargus O’Sullivan, “The City with the World’s Toughest 
Anti-Airbnb Laws,” CityLab (1 December 2016), online: <https://www.
citylab.com/equity/2016/12/berlin-has-the-worlds-toughest-anti-airbnb-
laws-are-they-working/509024>.
 95. It is worth noting that the question of whether or not incumbents and 
newcomers should be subject to the same rules cannot be resolved sim-
ply by asking whether they participate in the same market. The answer 
to this question is bound to depend on how broadly or narrowly one 
defines the concept of “market”; it raises all of the market definition 
problems that are familiar from competition law. Moreover, attempting 
to answer the question in this way will give rise to a circularity. The 
extent to which incumbents and platforms belong to the same or dif-
ferent markets depends in part on the roles that the law assigns them.
 96. State of California, Public Utilities Commission, “Transportation 
Network Companies,” online: <http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.
aspx?id=787>. Wyman notes that forty-eight American states now have 
equivalent legislation. See Wyman, supra note 91.
 97. Wyman, supra note 91.
 98. Louis-Samuel Perron, “Québec rend publique son entente avec Uber,” 
La Presse (9 September 2016), online: <http://www.lapresse.ca/actualites/
politique/politique-quebecoise/201609/09/01-5018739-quebec-rend-pu-
blique-son-entente-avec-uber.php>.
 99. Québec, Ministre des Transports, de la Mobilité durable et de 
l’Électrification des transports, “Entente” (Québec, 2016), online: 
<https://www.transports.gouv.qc.ca/fr/salle-de-presse/nouvelles/
Documents/2016-09-09/entente-uber.pdf>.
 100. See Mike Isaac, “Uber Settles Suit Over Driver Background Checks,” 
The New York Times (7 April 2016), online: <https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/04/08/technology/uber-settles-suit-over-driver-background-
checks.html>. 
 101. Sundararajan, supra note 12.
 102. See Adam Vaccaro & Dan Adams, “Thousands of Current Uber, Lyft 
Drivers Fail New Background Checks,” The Boston Globe (5 April 
2017), online: <https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/04/05/
uber-lyf t-r ide-ha i l i ng-dr ivers-fa i l-new-background-checks/
aX3pQy6Q0pJvbtKZKw9fON/story.html>.
 103. See e.g. Jean-Baptiste Jacquin, “Le Conseil constitutionnel confirme 
l’illégalité du service Uberpop en France,” Le Monde (22 September 
2015), online: <www.lemonde.fr/economie/art icle/2015/09/22/
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   51 18-11-08   08:42
 52 LAW AND THE “SHARING ECONOMY”
web-eco-uberpop-decision-conseil-constitutionnel_4767302_3234.
html#ohUqpBJ4Y2VCqY2K.99>.
 104. See Cédric Argenton & Jens Prüfer, “Search Engine Competition with 
Network Externalities” (2012) 8 J Comp L & Econ 73. 
 105. Code of Massachusetts Regulations, c 159A½, §3.
 106. Ibid, §4. 
 107. The concept of market power comes from competition law, where it 
refers to a monopolist’s ability to raise prices above those that would 
prevail under competitive conditions. See OECD, Glossary of Industrial 
Organisation Economics and Competition Law, compiled by RS Khemani 
& DM Shapiro, (1993), online: <http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sec-
tors/2376087.pdf>. In Canadian competition law, market power has 
been defined as “the power to behave relatively independently of the 
market.” See Canada v Nova Scotia (Pharmaceutical Society), [1992] 2 SCR 
606, SCJ No 67.
 108. In economics, a two-sided market is said to exist where an intermediary 
facilitates transactions between two distinct groups, such as buyers and 
sellers. In order to succeed, the intermediary must attract participants 
on both sides of the market: buyers will only be interested if there are 
enough sellers, and vice versa. Some have suggested the analogy of a 
heterosexual nightclub or dating website, in which men will only be 
attracted if there are sufficient women, and vice versa. See Wright, supra 
note 18. While network effects work on both sides of the market, they may 
be stronger on one side than the other. The platform may therefore be 
able to extract greater revenue from one side of the market than the other; 
indeed, it may find itself taking revenue from one side of the market to 
subsidize participation on the other side. See Bernard Caillaud & Bruno 
Jullien, “Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermediation Service 
Providers” (2003) 34:2 Rand J Econ 309; Mark Armstrong, “Competition 
in Two-Sided Markets” (2006) 37:3 Rand J Econ 668; Marc Rysman, “The 
Economics of Two-Sided Markets” (2009) 23:3 J Econ Perspect 125.
 109. Douglas MacMillan, “Uber Tests 30% Fee, Its Highest Yet,” The Wall 
Street Journal (18 May 2015), online: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/
uber-tests-30-fee-its-highest-yet-1431989126>.
 110. See Noam Scheiber, “How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its 
Drivers’ Buttons,” The New York Times (2 April 2017), online: <https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/uber-drivers- 
psychological-tricks.html>. 
 111. See Vaccaro & Adams, supra note 102.
 112. See Georgia Wilkins, “Dumped Uber Driver Pleads for Explanation,” 
The Sydney Morning Herald (21 May 2016), online: <http://www.smh.com.
au/business/consumer-affairs/dumped-uber-driver-pleads-for-explan-
ation-20160519-goz0dl.html>. 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   52 18-11-08   08:42
 Peer Platform Markets and Licensing Regimes 53
 113. See Alan Feuer, “Uber Drivers Up Against the App,” The New York 
Times (19 February 2016), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/
nyregion/uber-drivers-up-against-the-app.html>.
 114. See Wyman, supra note 91.
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   53 18-11-08   08:42
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   54 18-11-08   08:42
 Page left blank intentionally
CHAPTER I I
The False Promise 
of the Sharing Economy
Harry Arthurs1
I. Introduction: A Historical Perspective 
on the Sharing Economy
Automation ended the drudgery of industrial production and heralded the advent of the “leisure society”; deregulation liber-
ated us from markets distorted by entrenched, rent-seeking “special 
interests”; globalization freed us from the drag of protectionism and 
set in motion the beneficial forces of “natural advantage”; the share-
holder society gave us all a stake in the success of finance capital; our 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms entrenched the principles of equality; 
the new public administration taught slimmed-down governments to 
govern “smarter”; and widespread adoption of social media enabled 
the “spontaneous” mobilization of grassroots social movements. But 
workers are working longer hours in less secure and less well-paid 
jobs; corporate economic and political power grows apace; offshore 
competition has stripped many jobs out of the economy; social and 
economic inequality are on the rise; businesses large and small 
violate financial, labour, and environmental regulations frequently 
and with apparent impunity; and citizens are subject to intrusive 
surveillance and sporadic abuse by spammers, scammers, and state 
security organizations. And now the sharing economy, which—we 
are told—will “empower” consumers, challenge corporate concen-
tration, diminish the wasteful use of resources, and enable us to 
integrate our working and non-working lives, however, suits us best. 
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Will we never learn to look beyond the attractive packaging in which 
transformative or disruptive change often comes wrapped? To make 
a sensible calculation of whether such change can or will deliver the 
benefits its proponents and popularizers promise? To assess whether 
those benefits will likely outweigh the harms transformation and 
disruption are sure to cause? 
The contemporary experiences briefly referenced above remind 
us that far-reaching changes in political economy, legal-institutional 
arrangements, and technology are almost certain to create losers as 
well as winners. Historical evidence points in the same direction. 
There was once a “sharing economy” worthy of the name, an economy 
in which resources actually were widely held and used in common. 
The result—inevitably, many economists and environmentalists 
contend2—was “the tragedy of the commons,” the depletion of com-
munally owned resources because no one owner was specifically 
responsible for their conservation. But the evidence points in a differ-
ent direction. The actual experience of resource-based communities 
around the world demonstrates that common ownership does not lead 
to economic or environmental catastrophe.3 Moreover, the “tragedy 
of the commons” thesis is wrenched out of its political context. As E. 
P. Thompson convincingly demonstrated, the rural economy of early-
modern England was destroyed not because communities failed to 
take proper measures to conserve their shared resources, but because 
those resources were snatched away by the Whig magnates.4 These 
powerful political operators seized common lands under cover of 
acts of Parliament, physically enclosed them to exclude the peasants 
who for generations had worked them, suppressed the “natural” or 
customary law that regulated the use of communal lands, and enlisted 
the criminal law and the state judiciary to effectively expunge “shar-
ing” from the lexicon of England’s eighteenth-century peasantry. 
Nor is the tragedy of the commons, as described by Thompson, 
a long-ago wrong done to people in a faraway country of which we 
know nothing. It bears an uncanny resemblance to the sad history of 
Canada’s Aboriginal peoples who were stripped of their communal 
lands and resources by the deployment of state law and state coer-
cive power in aid of the private interests of non-Aboriginal settlers. 
And it is a cautionary tale for our own time, recently rehearsed by 
the rapacious post-Communist oligarchs who, aided by a corrupt 
state, appropriated what was once (at least in theory) “the people’s 
common property.”5 
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This is not to say that sharing is impossible in an advanced 
capitalist economy. The postwar corporatist welfare state was the 
sharing economy writ large: workers were implicitly offered a sig-
nificant increase in employment benefits, social goods, and political 
power, in exchange for which they implicitly agreed to participate 
in the development of a mixed market economy.6 Alas, the postwar 
welfare state reached its high-water mark in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and seems almost everywhere to be receding. By contrast, the highly 
successful worker-owned Mondragón cooperatives offer a model of 
the sharing economy writ small.7 So too do other experiments in 
shared market organization and enterprise governance: credit unions, 
producer-run agricultural marketing schemes, and housing co-ops,8 
and so too does employee representation on corporate boards.9 But 
these experiments are becoming less popular and less numerous, 
while those that survive are increasingly pressured to abandon their 
founding principles. None of them, ironically, has a place in the new 
sharing economy.
Of course, it would be impossible to persuade people of the 
attractions of our current sharing economy, if that economy never 
delivered on its promises, and if it produced no winners, only losers. 
Indeed, the sharing economy can boast of many successes.10 New 
communications technologies and business strategies do actually—as 
promised—help people who need expensive tools or appliances to 
acquire them cheaply second-hand, facilitate the rental of holiday 
accommodation, enable cars and bicycles to be hired conveniently by 
sequential short-term users and, notoriously, permit urban travellers 
to book private automobile transportation between any two points 
online on short notice and at attractive rates. 
So who wins and who loses in the sharing economy? The win-
ners are largely the proprietors of the new technologies and architects 
of the new service models that characterize the sharing economy.11 
However, consumers have often gained as well, to the extent that 
they are provided with goods and services at lower prices as well as 
greater choice and convenience.12 The losers are those whose interests 
are imbricated in long-established markets which have been desta-
bilized by the advent of the sharing economy: participants in the 
supply chains that support those markets;13 consumers who, though 
benefiting from lower prices, are often unsuspectingly exposed to 
new risks;14 workers whose employment prospects in traditional 
enterprises have been radically diminished;15 and a new cohort of 
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operatives enrolled in the legally ambiguous and economically risky 
work relationships that make possible the consumer choice and lower 
prices delivered by the sharing economy. 
Thus, the sharing economy presents problems in many markets, 
many domains of public policy, and many juridical fields. Attempts 
have been made, and others proposed, to resolve these problems by 
the creative interpretation, tweaking, or extension of existing laws 
or the enactment of new ones. These attempts, I will argue, may 
provide some relief to some “losers” some of the time; but they are 
unlikely to generate the breadth, depth, or durability of systemic 
reforms needed to ensure that our political economy is one in which 
fair “sharing” occurs, not the “shearing” of some of its members for 
the enrichment of others. 
II. Labour Market Regulation in the Sharing Economy
Workers are often identified as one of the major “loser” groups 
under the new “sharing” dispensation. The usual riposte of labour 
lawyers is to categorize their plight as a “category problem,”16 a mis-
characterization of subordinate or dependent workers as indepen-
dent contractors rather than as the employees of so-called platform 
providers of work opportunities who are in fact, and should be in 
law, employers.17 In a closely linked approach, some have proposed 
the creation of a new designation that deems dependent contrac-
tors or autonomous workers to be employees or endows them with 
rights similar to those enjoyed by employees.18 In either case, the 
new legal category would effectively provide most workers in the 
sharing economy with the right to bargain collectively, with pro-
tection under labour standards legislation and employment-based 
benefit schemes, and with access to the state-provided social safety 
net. Presumably, this category correction would also bring most 
sharing economy workers—though not technically employees at 
common law—within the protection of recent Supreme Court deci-
sions requiring employers to adhere to standards of good faith and 
procedural fairness in their workplace relations.19 Finally, it would 
also ensure that putative employers will be bound by the contrac-
tual undertakings of the workers who bear these new designations, 
made vicariously liable for their torts and held accountable for their 
regulatory transgressions.
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Moreover, there are undoubted attractions to resolving work-
place disputes and labour market controversies by characterizing 
them as a category problem. An authoritative court ruling that 
expanded the statutory or common law definition of “employment” 
to include the typically attenuated workplace relations of the sharing 
economy would resolve a difficult political controversy quickly and 
definitively. Indeed, a British employment tribunal has recently made 
such a ruling,20 although it has yet to undergo scrutiny by a higher 
court. A legislative amendment could accomplish the same result, 
albeit with a greater expenditure of political capital and undimin-
ished exposure to judicial revisionism. This latter approach has been 
used in Canada since the 1970s, when many jurisdictions amended 
their labour relations acts to provide access to collective bargaining 
for dependent contractors who would otherwise have been denied 
it.21 If “dependent contractor” has acquired too settled and narrow a 
meaning, it might be replaced by a new term, such as “autonomous 
worker”22 or “operative,” to be defined as “anyone providing services 
to a client, customer or consumer directly or pursuant to a contract, 
custom or understanding with a labour market intermediary, or with 
the intervention or assistance of a labour market intermediary.” A 
definition of “labour market intermediary” would clearly be neces-
sary as well, but it would include the platform providers that play a 
central role in the sharing economy. However, my aim is not to advo-
cate for any particular form of words but rather to demonstrate that it 
may be preferable (and technically possible) to create new categories 
of protected workers, rather than try to hammer the square peg of 
employment into the round hole of the sharing economy.
Both the judicial and the legislative resolution of the category 
problem have their advantages. Both would, in principle, not only 
benefit workers currently denied the protection of labour statutes 
but also relieve pressure on “true employees” whose rights and 
entitlements have been undercut by the “dis-employed” victims of 
the sharing economy. But both have their limitations as well. It is 
by no means clear that restoring dis-employed workers to employee 
status or its functional equivalent would have the desired effects 
in the long term.23 Employment in general is not what it used to 
be. The standard employment relationship—and the edifice of pro-
tections and entitlements built upon it—is available to fewer and 
fewer workers.24 Precarious, non-standard and self-employment 
are growing apace. The workplace has been “fissured” (“fracked” 
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would be a better descriptor).25 Large segments of the workforce can 
look forward only to gigs26 or zero-hour contracts,27 not to regularly 
scheduled work assignments around which they can organize their 
personal lives, and their financial and civic commitments.28 Nor does 
even constitutionally guaranteed access to collective bargaining29 
automatically empower either employees or dis-employed workers.30 
Unionization has fallen to historically low levels for many reasons, 
including globalization, technological change, employer resistance, 
and antipathy or indifference to unions by the general public and/or 
workers themselves.31 Nor does access to something approximating 
employment status ensure that workers will actually be protected 
by labour standards, workers’ compensation, or unemployment 
insurance legislation: in some jurisdictions, coverage is contracting 
even for conventional employees,32 benefits are being reduced,33 
and enforcement is faltering.34 Nor, finally, does the one-size-fits-all 
nature of most labour legislation necessarily provide the kind of flex-
ibility needed to respond to the myriad forms of workplace relations 
thrown up by the sharing economy. 
III. Non-Labour Market Regulation 
Workers are not the only potential losers in the sharing economy. 
Uber passengers may be at risk because drivers are poorly trained, 
insufficiently insured, or of bad character; tourists may experience 
loss because Airbnb accommodations are falsely advertised, harbour 
unsuspected health hazards, or facilitate antisocial behaviour by 
hosts; purchasers of tools acquired through an online sharing facility 
may find that they are stolen or not fit for purpose; Zipcar users may 
find that vehicles are less readily available than they are supposed to 
be. Of course, consumers confront similar risks in more conventional, 
non-sharing transactions, but at least they can seek recourse under 
well-established common law and statutory rules, in almost all cases 
against the real, ultimate and deep-pocketed corporate provider of 
defective goods or services.35 Moreover, in many sectors of the econ-
omy, regulators pre-empt threats to consumer interests by establish-
ing detailed standards to which vendors and service providers must 
conform, by restricting access to the market to licensed providers, by 
promoting fair, safe, and honest trade practices through educational 
programs and proactive audits, and by terminating the right of dis-
honest or incompetent providers to participate in the market.36 
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In technical terms, the issue for consumers may resemble that 
confronting workers: Are the new sharing economy abuses cap-
tured by the obsolete language of statutes or common law doctrines 
designed to protect consumers in more conventional, pre-sharing 
markets? If the answer is negative—if, say, renters of Airbnb accom-
modation are not eligible to recover from their host under existing 
legislation governing damage to the goods or person of hotel guests, 
or if Airbnb itself has no financial responsibility for such loss—an 
intense debate is likely to ensue. Should consumers be deprived of 
the benefits they admittedly enjoy in the sharing economy so that 
they can be protected by legislation that imposes costs on vendors 
and suppliers? 
Nor are workers and consumers the only victims of predation. 
The well-documented Uber controversy reminds us that the sharing 
economy puts at risk conventional businesses and the investment 
and work opportunities they provide.37 Taxi companies have heavy 
capital investments in the vehicles they own or lease. They must 
maintain their fleet, ensure that it meets municipal licensing stan-
dards, purchase licences, train, oversee and insure their drivers and 
meet other costs that Uber shifts onto its “non-employee” operatives. 
In some cities, worse yet, individual drivers (many of whom come 
from immigrant communities) own their own cars and licences, and 
operate through dispatch services provided by the major taxi compa-
nies. While arrangements for these owner-operator/micro-investors 
in many respects resemble those that subsist between Uber and its 
drivers, the latter do not have to bear the significant cost of a taxi 
licence, they do not have to comply with onerous municipal regula-
tions, and they enjoy the benefits of Uber’s innovative marketing 
strategies. In short, the interests of all participants in the conventional 
taxi industry—and in the communities dependent on it for sustenance 
or service—are put at risk by Uber. Similarly, Airbnb seems to be 
disrupting the hospitality industry, to the prejudice of established 
stakeholders including hotel owners and operators, hotel employees 
(some of whom are unionized), and suppliers of ancillary goods and 
services.38 There is some suggestion that it is also affecting the real 
estate market, as investors turn vacant apartments and houses into 
year-round “sharing” accommodation, with noticeable consequences 
for the neighbourhoods in which they are located.39 
And finally, the emergence of the sharing economy may under-
mine important public policies. I cite two examples. First, there is a 
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real possibility (and some evidence)40 that once organizations like 
Uber destroy their competitors and achieve dominance or monopoly 
in a particular market, they will lower the compensation paid to their 
operatives, raise their prices to consumers, and cease to provide inno-
vative services. In short, they may engage in the kind of anti-social 
behaviour that competition laws are designed to prevent. However, it 
is by no means clear that competition laws, as presently drafted and 
administered, will prevent such behaviour. And second, a significant 
part of government revenue comes from conventional payroll and 
sales taxes that are efficiently levied at source; however, the altered 
character of many transactions in the sharing economy may mean 
that those transactions will have to be taxed by less efficient means, 
or that they will escape taxation altogether. 
IV. Regulating the Sharing Economy
I have suggested several approaches to the resolution of the category 
problem, which would bring workers, consumers and others within 
the purview of existing regulatory schemes. However it is doubtful 
that this will suffice to counter the powerful array of technological, 
market, cultural, legal, and political strategies that are currently 
disempowering workers and putting consumers, businesses, and 
public interests at risk. To cite one example, the forms of relation-
ship between autonomous workers or operatives and market inter-
mediaries are as varied as the technology that functionally enables 
them, and are likely to have a similarly brief shelf life. Consequently, 
regulatory policies and the instruments designed to implement 
them should be not only custom-built but also easily reconfigured. 
Enabling the banking and portability of benefits, for example, 
becomes a policy priority given that many workers cannot expect to 
be employed in any given enterprise for extended periods of time. 
Employers who provide undertime as well as overtime premium pay 
to gig workers might be allowed to buy themselves flexibility under 
working time regulations. Fixing all labour market intermediaries 
with primary or exclusive responsibility for wages and working 
conditions may be a better strategy in some circumstances than des-
ignating temporary employment agencies as joint employers. Such a 
situation-, sector-, or enterprise-specific approach to labour standards 
would require effective vehicles for worker voice and regulatory 
oversight, neither of which currently exist in a format likely to work 
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well in the sharing economy. Consequently, a flexible system would 
have to be constructed from the ground up.
History reminds us that such a project is technically feasible. 
The U.S. National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 193341—the 
centrepiece of Roosevelt’s New Deal—provided for consultative 
processes leading to the adoption of detailed industry-specific codes 
of conduct, which were to be given legal force and effect through 
executive orders, regulations, or binding agreements, all of which 
can be adopted initially and updated more rapidly than conventional 
legislation.42 True, the NIRA was declared unconstitutional on the 
grounds that it violated the division and separation of powers,43 a 
fate that might be avoided by more careful drafting and/or a shift 
in judicial thinking. Nonetheless, the NIRA’s legacy has survived 
in the form of statutes that, eight decades later, continue to regulate 
work relations in America.44 (Canada adopted its own version of the 
NIRA with approximately similar consequences.)45 And not just work 
relations: the NIRA, and companion statutes, applied as well to a 
wide range of business practices, consumer transactions, agricultural 
markets, pipelines and public works, and provided a means of gen-
erating rapid, context-specific responses to perceived market failures 
and abuses. Conceivably, some such approach could be employed to 
deal with non-labour instantiations of the sharing economy. Indeed, 
there is a certain policy logic in treating work-related and non-work 
relationships in similar fashion, to the extent that they involve similar 
asymmetries of wealth and power.46 
In sum, it is technically possible not only to solve the category 
problem but also to design flexible “pop-up” or “flash” regulatory 
regimes suitable for rapid deployment in the sharing economy. But 
what is technically feasible is unlikely to be politically achievable. 
The architects of the sharing economy own not only innovative 
software and efficient delivery systems, but financial capital, legal 
technology, and, especially, political influence. Or to put the matter 
differently, workers and consumers in the sharing economy have 
been stripped of their protections and entitlements intentionally, not 
by accident. Regulation in the sharing economy is thus ultimately a 
political issue, not a category issue or an issue of regulatory design. 
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V. Conclusion: The Political Economy of “Sharing”
What are the legitimate goals of public policy in structuring the 
market for goods and services, and what are the appropriate instru-
ments by which to achieve them? Does the state have a responsibility 
to maintain existing market structures and the regulatory regimes 
that constitute them in order to protect the sunk investments and 
future prospects of existing market participants? Does the state have 
a responsibility to shape the emergence of new market institutions 
and processes, or to suppress them altogether, in order to ensure 
that those institutions do not subvert some higher-order version of 
the public good? If the state does have such responsibilities, does it 
have the capacity to discharge them? And if it has that capacity, what 
price are we prepared to pay in terms of foregone benefits or delayed 
“progress” in order to ensure that the new sharing economy serves 
society’s values rather than undermines them?
These questions, I acknowledge, have an anachronistic ring to 
them. They assume that the aspirations of a polity may amount to 
something more than and different from the sum of the individual 
interests and desires of its citizens; and they imply that markets 
are neither decreed by nature nor the default instrument by which 
the public interest can be reliably addressed. Those assumptions—
my assumptions—are less widely accepted than they used to be. 
Nonetheless, the questions that I have identified must be taken 
seriously. 
Of course, they will be answered in different ways by people 
of different persuasions. Even ardent neoliberals generally accept 
that the state has a legitimate interest in suppressing practices that 
endanger capitalism itself or threaten the integrity of markets. 
Neoliberals of a somewhat more pragmatic inclination concede as 
well that governments must intervene in markets from time to time 
in order to regain or retain the confidence of outraged consumers 
(who are also potential outraged voters). Neoliberals of both persua-
sions, however, prefer that such interventions should be symbolic or 
at most reflexive, so that the state at best merely admonishes market 
actors or at worst mandates them to regulate themselves. Advocates 
of a more robust approach once favoured the deployment of regula-
tory strategies that were first introduced by states during the early 
years of the Industrial Revolution, that were famously adopted by 
administrative agencies during the New Deal and World War II eras, 
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and that have been used more recently with good effect to enforce 
public safety, human rights, and environmental policies. Confidence 
in these strategies, however, has waned in the face of evidence that 
they often not only fail to deliver their promised outcomes, but 
sometimes turn out to be both costly and counterproductive. Alas, 
new approaches to regulation—“the renew deal,” “smart regulation,” 
“the new public administration,” or “reflexive law”47—have turned 
out to be no more effective than the old regulatory technologies (and 
possibly less so), and the state’s capacity to protect the public interest 
remains at a low ebb.48 And there it is likely to remain for the near 
future for complex reasons. 
The paradigmatic social structures and economic relationships 
on which existing regulatory schemes are based have been dissolv-
ing. The end of the “standard employment contract,”49 the “fissuring” 
of workplaces,50 the rise of the “precariat”:51 all of these are steps 
along the way to the so-called sharing or gig economy in which work 
relations are so fleeting, clouded in ambiguity, and often poorly paid 
that workers find it difficult to develop their skills, sustain family 
life, save for retirement, or find time or energy for civic or cultural 
activities. This transformation in work relations is clearly related—as 
both cause and effect—to the demise of labour as an industrial and 
political force, as a sociological descriptor, and as an important focus 
of public policy.52 In place of labour (or workers) at the centre of our 
political economy, we now find consumers whose demand for cheap 
and easily accessible goods and services drives public policy deci-
sions in fields as diverse as trade, fiscal policy, and transportation. 
Further, this shift has produced a new political dynamic. 
Working-class voters have drifted away from progressive or social 
democratic parties to parties of the populist right that emphasize 
national, ethno-cultural, or taxpayer (rather than class) solidarity, 
such as the Front National and Alternative für Deutschland, the 
Trumpistas, and the UK Independence Party. Corporations have 
learned to pose as friends of the working class, or to persuade its 
erstwhile members that their primary identity is as consumers, rather 
than as producers. An astonishing example of this can be seen in a 
Walmart advertisement that ran in the progressive New York Review of 
Books, in 2005, claiming that the company’s lower retail prices (made 
possible, the advertisement all but boasts, by keeping Walmart wages 
below union rates) demonstrate that it “acts as a bargaining agent 
for [middle- and lower-class] families—achieving on their behalf 
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a negotiating power they would never have on their own.”53 Even 
authentic consumer advocates have largely succumbed to “globaliza-
tion of the mind,” a transnational consensus that free markets offer 
consumers better outcomes than well-regulated markets or public 
enterprise.54 
Finally, a widespread conviction has developed—even among 
many who would rather think otherwise—that resistance to the 
sharing economy is futile, that technology will always trump regu-
lation. Indeed, technology seems to generate its own imperatives. 
New techniques of production and service delivery, new modalities 
of communication and transportation, new means of data collection 
and decision-making by algorithm have transformed contemporary 
capitalism in many ways from the creation of global value chains 
to formulaic trading in capital markets to everyday tasks of human 
resources management. In principle, human agents still make deci-
sions about whether and how to deploy new technologies; in prin-
ciple, human agents are still subject to social controls; but in practice 
it seems to be the case that if technology can be harnessed to displace 
human agents or disrupt social controls, it will. 
In short, there is at present neither an aroused political con-
stituency nor a coherent intellectual movement that might mobilize 
support for the New Deal model of pop-up regulation that I have pro-
posed as an antidote to the dislocation and distress being caused to 
workers and others by the sharing economy. What is likely to happen? 
One possibility is that capitalism itself will falter or fail,55 and 
with it the geo-political, financial, sociological and technological 
architecture that makes the sharing economy possible or (some say) 
inevitable. If so, if we find ourselves in what Daniel Rogers calls 
“the intellectual economy of catastrophe,” we will be experiencing 
something like the profound social disjuncture that gave rise to the 
New Deal, the NIRA and other institutional innovations of the time.56 
In such circumstances, it may become possible to convince experts, 
policy-makers, voters, and governments that intensive regulation 
of labour and/or consumer markets is needed to save capitalism 
from itself. Or, in the alternative, after a period of uncertainty and 
experimentation, the sharing economy may deliver on its promises 
to both workers and consumers without being forced to do so by the 
state. Resilient new forms of work relations may emerge to replace 
those that have become sclerotic; new institutional architecture and 
industrial technologies may facilitate a better equilibrium between 
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production and consumption such that people will somehow be able 
to maintain a decent standard of living even without standard jobs as 
we came to know them in the mid-twentieth century. In both cases, 
the catalyst is likely to be mobilization by the sharing economy’s 
“losers”: local Luddite-type workplace disruptions, appeals to pub-
lic opinion and the forging of alliances with community groups, 
sporadic recourse to hard law remedies, soft law experiments in the 
democratization of workplace governance, as well as demands for 
state regulation of working conditions and for a renewed safety net 
for vulnerable workers and the unemployed. And in both scenarios, 
hopefully, the ultimate outcome will be the forging of a new social 
contract, formal in the first scenario, amorphous in the second, but 
fragile in both. There may be other scenarios, but no sensible person 
would wish to contemplate them. 
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CHAPTER I I I
The Fast to the Furious
Nofar Sheffi1 
T his is the story of my dear friend Jeanne, an ordinary traveller who was transformed overnight from an Airbnb guest into a 
bedbug host. Human beings, after all, are not the only creatures 
seeking accommodation. Fresh off the boat, after having spent only 
one night in the dream New York apartment she had booked through 
Airbnb, Jeanne woke up to a nightmare. Dreams, it dawned on her, 
can be fantastically good but also frighteningly bad. What would you 
have done in her place? Waking up in a foreign country, with what 
seems like an allergic reaction, no local phone number, neither family 
nor friends. Are these bed bug bites or not? Are such bites potentially 
dangerous? Are you experiencing an allergic reaction? Should you 
seek medical attention? Should you take any medication? Who else 
should you contact? How do you get rid of bed bugs? Should you 
confront your Airbnb host? Should you leave the property? What are 
the potential consequences of doing so? What are your options, and 
how much will each cost? Should you temporarily book a hotel room? 
Should you try to locate alternative accommodation for the duration 
of your planned stay? Would that even be possible on such short 
notice? Could you recover the cost of alternative accommodation? 
Could you recover the expense of dry cleaning all your belongings? 
Could you recover the cost of any new luggage you need to buy? Just 
put yourself in Jeanne’s bedbug-infested shoes. 
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I. Law in Scrolls, Law in Emails
Our story takes place in a heteroglot universe governed by a multi-
plicity of jurisdictions. Yet, legal scholars would most likely make 
sense of, or ascribe legal meaning to our case, from an empire state 
of mind, from the vantage point of state jurisdiction, or by identify-
ing—using traditional, state-centered legal principles and doctrines—
the controlling law and appropriate fora. They would likely begin 
by studying the terms of the bilateral agreement signed between 
Jeanne and her “host,” terms that were largely dictated by the home 
sharing platform. They would proceed to scroll down the lengthy 
Terms of Service agreement (the “ToS agreement” or “the Terms”) 
that Jeanne (a resident of France) had entered with Airbnb Ireland.2 
Pursuant to section 21.3 of this contract of adhesion, they would likely 
note that all of the Terms should be interpreted in accordance with 
Irish law and the consumer protection regulations of France, Jeanne’s 
country of residence, and that Jeanne agreed to submit any dispute 
between her and Airbnb to “the non-exclusive jurisdiction” of the 
Irish courts.3 Referring to section 16, they may caution that Airbnb’s 
service is provided without warranty of any kind, either expressed 
or implied. Referencing section 17, they would perhaps point out 
that, as Jeanne is a resident of the European Union, Airbnb is liable 
only under statutory provisions for intent and gross negligence, and 
for any negligent breaches of essential contractual obligations by 
the company, its “legal representatives, directors, or other vicarious 
agents.” Citing section 17, they would note that “the same applies […] 
in case of a culpable injury to life, limb, or health.”
Few legal “scrollers”4 would pay attention to the large but 
almost invisible dispute resolution mechanisms operated by Airbnb. 
Certainly, many would instruct Jeanne to contact Airbnb’s Customer 
Service. However, how many of those who would recommend this 
course of action would conceive of this service as a mechanism of 
dispute resolution? Airbnb’s role as a dispute processor has received 
very little legal or media attention.5 Instead, citing the company’s 
deafness or mishandling of a specific complaint as a ground for fil-
ing a claim with the relevant state institution, or sharing the story 
on social media,6 critics have rather focused on Airbnb’s obligations 
as a service provider. Although much attention has been directed 
at the alleged mass-circumvention of business-licensing regulation; 
bypassing of planning law; and tax evasion, avoidance, and shifting, 
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very little consideration, if any, has been given to private law issues 
arising between Airbnb users.7 In more recent years, following 
the increasing allegations of discrimination by Airbnb hosts, and 
the filing of a putative class-action suit against Airbnb under the 
Civil Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act, the arbitration clause, and 
class-action waiver, which are included in all agreements signed 
between Airbnb and residents of the United States, have received 
some attention. In late 2016, the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia granted Airbnb’s motion to compel arbitration 
and stay litigation, holding that the arbitration clause is applicable 
to discrimination suits and is enforceable.8 This holding has opened 
the door to further debates over a variety of issues, such as the inclu-
sion of arbitration provisions in online adhesion contracts and the 
submission of discrimination and civil rights claims to arbitration.9 
Indeed, only a handful of private disputes (between Airbnb 
users and between Airbnb and its users) ever become public, let alone 
reach the courts. Moreover, hard data on the size and inner workings 
of the internal dispute resolution mechanisms operated by the pri-
vate company are difficult to obtain. As of August 2017, on any given 
night, an average of two million people stayed in an Airbnb listing.10 
The platform currently has nearly five million listings, which span 
81,000 cities across 191 countries. Most recently valued at $31 bil-
lion, the platform serviced around 100 million guests in 2017.11 It is, 
however, worth considering how many of these interactions end on a 
sour note. How many disagreements or disputes arise between users? 
How many dissatisfied users turn to Airbnb for help? What kind 
of complaints do they lodge? How are complaints handled and by 
whom? In a 2016 interview, the global head of the Airbnb Customer 
Experience (CX) Department reported that, in any given week, her 
department alone deals with over 180,000 “customer interactions,” 
and that during the summer months her agents’ workload doubles 
in volume.12 Despite the large share of “customer interactions” and 
“unmatched expectations,”13 Airbnb continues to grow and, as recent 
surveys indicate, has strong favourability ratings by travelers.14 More 
concretely, the Airbnb Engineering Department reports in its blog 
that intervention through customer support reduces the likelihood 
that guests who have encountered a “negative experience” will not 
use the service again from 26 per cent to less than 6 per cent.15
Yet where is the gate of Airbnb’s domain? How can it be 
accessed? Which law governs the dispute between Jeanne and her 
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host, and the way in which it would be processed? Only intrepid 
scrollers, who would scroll down the lengthy ToS agreement, 
would identify its most pertinent stipulations: section 9.5. ”In cer-
tain circumstances,” the section stipulates, “Airbnb may decide, 
in its sole discretion, that it is necessary to cancel a confirmed 
booking and make appropriate refund and payout decisions. This 
may be,” it specifies, “for reasons set forth in Airbnb’s Extenuating 
Circumstances Policy or (i) where Airbnb believes in good faith, 
while taking the legitimate interests of both parties into account, 
this is necessary to avoid significant harm to Airbnb, other Members, 
third parties or property, or (ii) for any of the reasons set out in 
these Terms.” Section 9.6 further establishes that “[i]f a Guest suf-
fers a Travel Issue pursuant to the Guest Refund Policy, Airbnb may 
determine, in its sole discretion, to refund the Guest part or all of the 
Total Fees in accordance with the Guest Refund Policy.” Do any of 
these sections apply to Jeanne’s case, our dedicated scrollers would 
likely wonder? What are the “Extenuating Circumstances Policy” 
and “Guest Refund Policy”? Where can they be found and what are 
their provisions? What is a “Travel Issue”? Would Jeanne be con-
sidered as “suffering” one? What is the procedure for submitting a 
request for a refund? Does Airbnb offer Jeanne any remedy other 
than a refund? A quick search would reveal that at least twelve 
additional terms and policies are “incorporated by reference” into 
the ToS agreement: the Payments Terms of Service (the “Payments 
Terms”), the Privacy Policy, the Copyright Policy, the Host Guarantee 
Terms and Conditions (the “Host Guarantee Terms”), the Gift Card 
Terms and Conditions, the Airbnb Experiences: Guest Release and 
Waiver, the Cookie Policy, the Nondiscrimination Policy, the Content 
Policy, the Extenuating Circumstances Policy, the Extortion Policy, 
and the most relevant—the Guest Refund Policy. A careful web 
search would additionally reveal that, only recently, Airbnb fur-
ther announced the publication of its Standards and Expectations, 
a “single framework” gathering together the principles that guide 
the making of “enforcement decisions.”16 Reflecting what Airbnb 
hosts and guests “view as acceptable conduct and behavior,”17 
Airbnb explains, these “guidelines are an expression of the shared 
values of the Airbnb community.”18 Their publication is intended 
to help users, such as Jeanne’s host, better understand what are 
Airbnb’s expectations “from the people who are part of the Airbnb 
community.”19
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Overall, Airbnb’s terms and policies provide users seeking 
redress with six types of recourse. A first type of procedure is initi-
ated when a host or guest cancels a confirmed booking. When listing 
their property, hosts choose among three standardized cancellation 
policies (Flexible, Moderate, and Strict). The selected policy will 
apply to all reservations for less than twenty-eight nights; to all 
reservations of twenty-eight nights or more a fourth, fixed cancel-
lation policy applies (Long Term).20 In accordance with section 9.2 
of the ToS agreement and in conjunction with section 10.2.1 of the 
Payments Terms, if a guest cancels a confirmed booking either prior 
to, or after arriving at the accommodation, Airbnb will immediately 
refund the guest the sums specified in the applicable cancellation 
policy (sums that are withheld by Airbnb for the first twenty-four 
hours after check-in) and initiate a “Payout” of any portion of the fees 
due to the host under it.21 Pursuant to section 9.3 of the Terms and 
section 10.2.2 of the Payments Terms, if a host cancels a confirmed 
booking, Airbnb Payments will refund the total fees to the guest 
“within a commercially reasonable time of the cancellation.”22 It is 
important to clarify that, after a booking is cancelled, neither guests 
nor hosts are required to take any further actions; acting on behalf of 
both the host and the guest, Airbnb Payments immediately steps in, 
automatically initiating and effectuating all refunds and payouts due 
pursuant to the selected cancellation policy and the Terms. In case 
of host cancellation, Airbnb will also offer alternative accommoda-
tion suggestions to the guest. Hosts that cancel a confirmed booking 
may be subject to additional sanctions, including a cancellation fee, 
publication of an automated review on their listing informing other 
Airbnb users that they have withdrawn from a confirmed booking, 
and blocking their calendar for the dates of the cancelled booking, 
which prevents them from offering their space to other Airbnb users 
during this time.23
To hosts who suffer damage to their property, Airbnb offers two 
types of recourse. The first procedure is outlined in section 11 of the 
ToS agreement and section 12 of the Payments Terms. In accordance 
with section 7.2.2 of the Terms, Airbnb allows hosts to add a security 
deposit to their listing. Hosts can then claim all or part of the deposit 
to compensate for any damage done to their property. According 
to the Airbnb Help Center, such a claim must be submitted within 
fourteen days of a guest’s check- out date or before the next guest 
checks in, whichever is earlier.24 To submit a “Damage Claim,” hosts 
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must first contact their guest through the Airbnb Resolution Center. If 
the guest agrees to pay the requested amount, Airbnb Payments will 
collect the agreed-upon sum and send it to the host. According to the 
Airbnb Help Center, this takes between five to seven business days.25 
If the guest declines or does not respond within seventy-two hours, 
the host is given the opportunity to “escalate” the Damage Claim to 
Airbnb. After giving the guest an opportunity to respond, Airbnb 
will decide if the guest is responsible for the alleged damage, a deci-
sion made at Airbnb’s sole discretion.26 If the guest is found liable, 
Airbnb will collect the sum and transfer it to the host. According to 
Airbnb, the majority of security deposit claims are resolved within 
one week.27 Another mode of redress for property damage is pro-
vided in the Host Guarantee Terms, which cover damage that exceeds 
the security deposit or when no security deposit is in place.28 Before 
directly involving Airbnb, but via Airbnb’s Resolution Center, a host 
must contact the guest with their complaint. If the parties are unable 
to reach an agreement within seventy-two hours,29 the host may file 
an “Airbnb Host Guarantee Payment Request Form” (the “Form”). 
The process must be initiated either within fourteen days from 
the check-out date or before the next guest checks in, whichever is 
earlier, and the Form must be filed within thirty days after the loss 
was incurred. Airbnb “strive[s] to resolve most cases within a week 
of submission,”30 and “will use commercially reasonable efforts to 
complete processing” of a Host Guarantee Payment Request Form 
within three months after receipt of all required documents and 
information.31
A fourth procedure is outlined in section 9.7 of the ToS agree-
ment and section 9 of the Payments Terms. By facilitating the trans-
fer of agreed-upon sums through its Resolution Center, Airbnb 
encourages users to “resolve issues on their own.”32 According to 
the Airbnb Help Center, the possibility of submitting a “Resolution 
Center Request” is available only in the first sixty days following 
a checkout, with the agreement of both parties.33 In these cases, as 
established in section 9 of the Payments Terms, Airbnb acts merely 
as a “limited payment collection agent,” transferring agreed-upon 
amounts. The section further establishes that, by agreeing to use 
the Center, both parties acknowledge that they, and not Airbnb, are 
responsible for performing their respective obligations, that Airbnb 
is not party to their agreements, and that Airbnb is immune from all 
liability arising from or related to use of its services. 
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A fifth approach is outlined in section 9.5 of the Terms, per-
mitting Airbnb to cancel any reservation, override the cancellation 
policy selected by the host, make refund decisions, and waive the 
host cancellation penalties.  “In certain circumstances,” the section 
reads, “Airbnb may decide, in its sole discretion, that it is necessary 
to cancel a confirmed booking and make appropriate refund and 
payout decisions.” “This may be,” the section details, “for reasons 
set forth in Airbnb’s Extenuating Circumstances Policy or (i) where 
Airbnb believes in good faith, while taking the legitimate interests 
of both parties into account, this is necessary to avoid significant 
harm to Airbnb, other Members, third parties or property, or (ii) for 
any of the reasons set out in these Terms.” “Incorporated by refer-
ence” into the ToS agreement, the terms of Airbnb’s Extenuating 
Circumstances Policy are not published alongside it. Anchoring 
Airbnb’s sole discretion to override other policies (in cases of 
unexpected death, serious illness, significant natural disasters 
or weather incidents, urgent travel restrictions or severe security 
advisories, endemic diseases declared by a credible national or 
international authority, severe property damage or unforeseen 
maintenance issues, and the like), they are rather published in the 
Airbnb Help Center.34 Claims under the Extenuating Circumstances 
Policy can only be considered after a reservation has been cancelled, 
and should “generally” be submitted no later than fourteen days 
from the original check-in date.35 
Lastly, the Guest Refund Policy, which ostensibly covers 
Jeanne’s situation, “help[s] protect guests from things like last-minute 
host cancellations, lock-outs, and listings that are misrepresented, 
unsanitary, or lacking in promised amenities or items.”36 The Policy’s 
core provisions read as follows:
1. Travel Issue
A “Travel Issue” means any one of the following:
(a) the Host of the Accommodation (i) cancels a booking 
shortly before the scheduled start of the booking, or (ii) fails 
to provide the Guest with the reasonable ability to access the 
Accommodation (e.g. does not provide the keys and/or a secu-
rity code).
(b) the Listing’s description or depiction of the Accommodation 
is materially inaccurate with respect to:
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• the size of the Accommodation (e.g., number and size of the 
bedroom, bathroom and/or kitchen or other rooms),
• whether the booking for the Accommodation is for an entire 
home, private room or shared room, and whether another 
party, including the Host, is staying at the Accommodation 
during the booking,
• special amenities or features represented in the Listing are 
not provided or do not function, such as decks, pools, hot 
tubs, bathrooms (toilet/shower/bathtub), kitchen (sink/stove/
refrigerator or major other appliances), and electrical, heating 
or air condition systems, or
• the physical location of the Accommodation (proximity).
(c) at the start of the Guest’s booking, the Accommodation: (i) is 
not generally clean and sanitary (ii) contains safety or health 
hazards that would be reasonably expected to adversely affect 
the Guest’s stay at the Accommodation in Airbnb’s judgment, 
(iii) does not contain clean bedding and bathroom towels avail-
able for the Guest’s use, or (iv) has vermin or contains pets not 
disclosed in the Listing.
2. The Guest Refund Policy
If you are a Guest and suffer a Travel Issue, we agree, at our 
discretion, to either (i) reimburse you up to the amount paid by 
you through the Airbnb Platform (“Total Fees”) depending on 
the nature of the Travel Issue suffered, or (ii) use our reasonable 
efforts to find and book you another Accommodation for any 
unused nights left in your booking which is reasonably compa-
rable to the Accommodation described in your original booking 
in terms of size, rooms, features and quality. All determinations 
of Airbnb with respect to the Guest Refund Policy, including 
without limitation the size of any refund and the comparability 
of alternate Accommodations, shall be in Airbnb’s discretion, 
and final and binding on the Guests and Hosts.
3. Conditions to Claim a Travel Issue
To submit a valid claim for a Travel Issue and receive the ben-
efits with respect to your booking, you are required to meet 
each of the following conditions:
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(a) you must be the Guest that booked the Accommodation;
(b) you must bring the Travel Issue to our attention in writing 
or via telephone and provide us with information (including 
photographs or other evidence) about the Accommodation and 
the circumstances of the Travel Issue within 24 hours after the 
later of (i) the start of your booking or (ii) you discover the exis-
tence of the Travel Issue, and must respond to any requests by 
us for additional information or cooperation on the Travel Issue;
(c) you must not have directly or indirectly caused the Travel 
Issue (through your action, omission or negligence); and
(d) unless Airbnb advises you that the Travel Issue cannot be 
remediated, you must have used reasonable efforts to try to 
remedy the circumstances of the Travel Issue with the Host 
prior to making a claim for a Travel Issue.
4. Minimum Quality Standards, Host Responsibilities and 
Reimbursement to Guest
4.1 If you are a Host, you are responsible for ensuring that 
the Accommodations you list on the Airbnb Platform meet 
minimum quality standards regarding access, adequacy of 
the Listing description, safety, cleanliness, and do not pres-
ent a Guest with Travel Issues. During a Guest’s stay at an 
Accommodation, Hosts should be available, or make a third 
party available, in order to try, in good faith, to resolve any 
Guest issues.
4.2 If you are a Host, and if (i) Airbnb determines that a Guest 
has suffered a Travel Issue related to an Accommodation listed 
by you and (ii) Airbnb either reimburses that Guest (up to their 
Total Fees) or provides an alternative Accommodation to the 
Guest, you agree to reimburse Airbnb up to the amount paid 
by Airbnb within 30 days of Airbnb’s request. If the Guest is 
relocated to an alternative Accommodation, you also agree to 
reimburse Airbnb for reasonable additional costs incurred to 
relocate the Guest. You authorize Airbnb Payments to collect 
any amounts owed to Airbnb by reducing your Payout or as 
otherwise permitted pursuant to the Payments Terms.
4.3 As a Host, you understand that the rights of Guests 
under this Guest Refund Policy will supersede your selected 
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cancellation policy. If you dispute the Travel Issue, you may 
notify us in writing or via telephone and provide us with 
information (including photographs or other evidence) disput-
ing the claims regarding the Travel Issue, provided you must 
have used reasonable and good faith efforts to try to remedy 
the Travel Issue with the Guest prior to disputing the Travel 
Issue claim.37
From the perspective of the traditional private law scrollership, 
Jeanne’s experience likely presents her with a “Travel Issue,” as 
defined in section 1(c)(iv) of the Policy. Pursuant to sections 2 and 3 
of the Policy, Jeanne could submit, within twenty-four hours from the 
start of her reservation, or after discovering that the accommodation 
is infested with bed bugs, a claim for a “Travel Issue” in writing or 
via telephone. This must, however, be only after using “reasonable 
efforts” to try to remedy the circumstances with her host. In her 
claim, Jeanne could request the service to refund the amount she paid 
her host through the platform, and to use its “reasonable efforts” to 
find and book her “reasonably comparable” accommodation for the 
remainder of her three-month stay. 
Alas, which “reasonable efforts” to “try to remedy the circum-
stances” is Jeanne obliged to take prior to calling Airbnb? What 
efforts would Airbnb deem to be “reasonable”? What would consti-
tute “reasonably comparable” “in terms of size, rooms, features and 
quality”? And for which of the “additional costs” incurred by Airbnb 
at its sole discretion to relocate Jeanne to the alternative accommoda-
tion could her host be found responsible? Scrolling the Airbnb terms 
and policies, the Airbnb law “in books”38 would nonetheless only 
send us on a search for a more powerful system of laws by refer-
ence to which their meaning can be decoded. But where should our 
quest to reach this earlier, higher, universal, or more specific law, to 
discover the meaning of these texts, lead us? To the gate of which 
jurisdiction should we come praying for admittance?39 In accordance 
with which “controlling law,” to put the question in doctrinal terms, 
should our Policy be interpreted? In accordance with “Irish Law,” as 
section 21.3 of the Policy directs us, or the Airbnb law “in action,”40 
as socio-legal scholars do? Taking a different path, this chapter 
considers a singular story as doorway to the law. It tells the story 
of one ordinary Airbnb user, who like Franz Kafka’s “man from the 
country,” found herself before the gates of the law.41 
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Why stories, you may ask, why a story? Airbnb’s domain is heav-
ily guarded, and very little concrete information about its architecture, 
policies, protocols and processes is accessible. The only opening, the 
only opportunity to catch a glimpse into the interior of the massive 
dispute-processing mechanisms operated by Airbnb is afforded 
momentarily to those for whom a gate was especially made, to ordi-
nary end-users who, like our Jeanne, arrive before it to submit a claim 
or be judged. Even those singular users who appear before Airbnb, as 
will soon be revealed, are being barred from entering Airbnb’s domain, 
are being made to wait at its gate for a decision, a decision that is to be 
made behind closed doors at Airbnb’s sole discretion.42 My telling of 
Jeanne’s story, however, is intended not to merely reveal the invisibility 
of Airbnb’s immense apparatus, its secretiveness and its inaccessibil-
ity. Just like Franz Kafka’s “Before the Law,” I would like to suggest, 
Jeanne’s story imposes on us, the guardians of the law, an interpretive 
imperative to process and judge. Like Kafka’s parable, Jeanne’s story 
summons us before the same law by reference to which we seek to 
judge it, adjuring us to reflect on that which we so reverently represent. 
II. JusToS Accused
The domain of Airbnb is unintelligible, inaccessible, and secretive. 
Its architecture is enacted using incomprehensible programming 
languages, jargons that an ordinary end-user cannot possibly grasp, a 
secret that “a cast pretends to possess by delegation,”43 a “secret that 
has to be kept well, nothing either present or presentable.”44 Airbnb 
users do not even have the “right to touch”45 this cryptic text, a well-
kept trade secret to which very few, if any, have full or even limited 
access to.46 In accordance with section 14 of the ToS agreement, 
“Members” agree not to “avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, impair, 
descramble, or otherwise attempt to circumvent any technological 
measure” implemented by Airbnb to protect the platform. “Members” 
further undertake the obligation not to “take any action that dam-
ages or adversely affects, or could damage or adversely affect the 
performance or proper functioning of the Airbnb Platform,” as well 
as not to use “any robots, spider, crawler, scraper or other automated 
means or processes to access, collect data or other content from or 
otherwise interact with the Airbnb Platform.”
To continue my invocation of Derrida’s reading of Kafka’s 
“Before the Law,” Airbnb’s  coded architecture, terms and policies, 
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and all other texts contained in the website are “original texts.”47 
Despite their essential unreadability, their “form presents itself as 
a kind of personal identity entitled to absolute respect,”48 and it is 
forbidden to change, disfigure, or touch them.49 Pursuant to section 
14, Airbnb has the “right to investigate and prosecute” violations of 
any of the Terms, including any infringement upon, violation of, or 
disfiguring of these texts, and “may take a range of actions” against 
any user who changes even one word or alters even one sentence of 
them. Section 14 prohibits any mirroring or framing of the source 
code forming the platform and any of the content published in the 
site. As part of it, users also undertake the contractual obligation 
not to “dilute, tarnish or otherwise harm the Airbnb brand in any 
way,” as well as not to “attempt to decipher, decompile, disassemble 
or reverse engineer any of the software used to provide the Airbnb 
Platform.”
The structure of the Airbnb apparatus, the architecture of its 
palaces, the design of its internal processes, and grounds for decision 
are all similarly inaccessible. Data on the internal structure of the 
organization is scarce, and the limited information that does exist 
must be painstakingly gathered from a multiplicity of non-tradi-
tional sources—LinkedIn profiles, technology blogs and podcasts, 
interviews, the Airbnb blog, and others. All interactions between 
“Members” and the law governing disputes between them are medi-
ated via one of the over two hundred and fifty agents, “manning the 
phones and doing Chat and email,”50 a member of the Airbnb Trust 
and Safety team or the CX department. Called “crewbies,” mem-
bers of the former are responsible “for all online and offline fraud 
and safety concerns, including but not limited to account security, 
property damage, safety concerns, and user trust.”51 Known as the 
“Aircorps,” the latter is “responsible for escalated customer cases that 
begin online, but exist in the offline world,” including “monetary 
and personality disputes, last minute cancellations, VIP rebookings, 
and ‘outside the box’ mediation for violations in Airbnb Terms of 
Use.”52 Airbnb “Members,” to rephrase, are never in the presence of 
the law governing their disputes with others, and are never imme-
diately before it, rather, they enter into relations “only with the law’s 
representatives, its examples, its guardians.”53 All decisions are 
reached behind closed doors, and are transmitted to users in cryptic 
language by Airbnb representatives guarding the gate that the law 
made only for them. Dan Weber, the founder of AirbnbHell.com, a 
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website dedicated to warning “potential hosts and guests about the 
dangers and risks associated with using the Airbnb service,”54 recalls 
the story of his trial and judgment, the Kafkaesque experience that 
led him to launch the website:
I had been a successful and enthusiastic Airbnb Host for almost 
a year when a young European couple in their mid 20’s booked 
one of my rooms for a 6-month reservation, a very long stay by 
Airbnb standards. I welcomed them into my rental unit, and 
spent time with them socially on a few occasions during their 
stay as they were trying to learn their way around Los Angeles. 
My wife even sold them her used car well below blue-book 
value, just to help them out as they seemed like a nice young 
couple and they clearly didn’t have a lot of money. Everything 
was going fine… until the couple left in the middle of the night 
without saying a word two nights before their 6-month reserva-
tion was scheduled to come to an end. I was surprised by that 
fact alone, but I was even more shocked when I received a notice 
from Airbnb saying that the couple had filed a complaint about 
me and they claimed there were mice in the condo! It should be 
noted that I had over 40 perfect reviews from previous guests 
at this point, and there most certainly were no mice anywhere 
on my property. According to Airbnb, their ‘standard policy’ 
when a guest claimed rodents were in the house was to refund 
50 percent of the entire reservation, in this case almost $3,000 
USD for 3 months of renting one of my bedrooms in Los Angeles, 
California.
I immediately tried to contact Airbnb to dispute this obviously 
fraudulent claim, but I was passed around from one customer 
service agent to another, none of them able to give me any 
explanation better than ‘this is our policy’. I was furious. After 
about 2 weeks of calling and emailing various Airbnb reps, I 
finally reached a ‘manager’ who provided me with a copy of 
the scammers’ complaint including a photo of a mouse they 
had sent. My rebuttal included written testimony from another 
guest who was staying in the condo at the same time, stating 
that there were no mice or signs of any other pests in the house. 
Thanks to the wonders of google image search, I was even able 
to find the exact same mouse photo that the couple had used to 
file their complaint… it was originally posted on a blog TWO 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   85 18-11-08   08:42
 86 LAW AND THE “SHARING ECONOMY”
YEARS EARLIER! I sent all of this documentation to Airbnb and 
asked them to consider my many positive reviews, and that their 
‘policy’ to refund 50% of a guest’s entire reservation for a simple 
(obviously fraudulent) claim was crazy. Another week went by 
without my claim being addressed. Airbnb kept my last payment 
from the European scammers’ reservation, as well as money 
from my next few guests, so in total I had lost almost $3,000.
After about 3 weeks of this frustration I finally had enough. 
My last message to the manager at Airbnb was ‘Go ahead and 
keep my money. I’m going to cost your company more money 
than you have cost me!’ That was when I launched AirbnbHell.
com – I felt that others needed to be warned.55
The law is silent, and of it nothing but its common name is said to 
our very own Joseph K.56 Guardian after guardian nevertheless 
assures him that there is some “standard policy,” which is not there 
but which exists.57 The singular and unique gate that Airbnb made 
only for him remains open throughout and is never closed on him; 
however, a final judgment never arrives. The doorkeepers that watch 
over this “theater of the invisible”58 adjourn, defer, evade, and divert 
him. “What is delayed,” as Derrida observes, “is not this or that 
experience, the access to some enjoyment or to some supreme good, 
the possession or penetration of something or somebody. What is 
deferred forever till death is entry into the law itself, which is noth-
ing other than that which dictates the delay.”59 What is deferred till 
death is knowledge of the “standard policy”—deferred till social and 
economic death. The story of our very own Joseph K ends with an act 
of social and economic suicide, the deletion of his Airbnb account, 
with a self-imposed exile from the lucrative “sharing economy.” 
The inaccessibility of Airbnb’s domain, of its terms, policies, 
palaces, codes, and processes is, to conclude, yet another instantiation 
of what Derrida calls “the essentially inaccessible character of the 
law, [… of] the fact that a ‘first sight’ of it is always refused.”60 The 
law purports to apply universally and impartially to all, to be readily 
accessible at all times and to everyone, to be known by everyone, to 
be readable. Nevertheless, as Derrida suggests, to protect and pre-
serve its autonomy and authority, the law must precisely frustrate 
any narrated attempt to capture its meaning, to gain insight into its 
essence, to tell its story; it must deny access to its domain, knowledge 
of it and participation in it.61 Doomed to be denied entrance, to be 
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discounted as “concerning only circumstances, events external to the 
law and, at best, the modes of its revelation,”62 stories like those of 
Jeanne and AirbnbHell.com’s founder (just as Kafka’s parable) instead 
enact or expose the law’s essential inaccessibility and structure of 
referentiality, the paradoxical logic of boundaries. The framing of 
each story creates an opening, an opportunity to access the law’s 
essence, a portal into its domain. But, at the same time that it creates 
an opening, the unique door made by each story also serves as a 
barrier, drawing a line that cannot be crossed, protecting an essence 
that cannot be accessed. The framing of the door turns the law hid-
den behind it into a secret, something that remains inaccessible, an 
insight that cannot be gained.63 By insisting that the law “should 
be accessible at all times and to everyone,”64 on the law’s generality 
and universality, it is the story itself that transforms the law into a 
secret, into that which will forever be obscured and inaccessible. It 
is the story itself that, by placing us in front of a portal that it itself 
comports, an internal boundary opening on nothing, reveals the 
law’s essential structure of referentiality.65
In one of his lesser-known articles, socio-legal scholar Gunther 
Teubner invites us to imagine that Kafka’s protagonist “is not the 
human individual who has been delivered up to the force of institu-
tionalised legalism, [… rather] the individual legal procedure itself, 
or more generally the decision-making practice of the legal process, in 
all the confusion of life, that stands before its own law.”66 Modern 
law’s claim of autonomy and universality, constant deployment of 
abstract categories, and inexorable compulsion to juridify all prob-
lems of the world are precisely, Teubner suggests, what sends it on 
a desperate search for an earlier, universal, higher or more specific 
law by which it can make its decisions.67 The legal discourse that 
seeks to assure itself of its law is tormented by nightmares that are 
different from those experienced by an individual who, appearing 
before the judicial system, is exposed to its arbitrariness.68 Precisely 
because it can only reflect on itself with the aid of the categories 
which it itself declared universal, the law becomes subjected to the 
torment of self-examination, and thus caught up in the paradoxes 
of self-reference. This, Teubner concludes, “is the fundamental 
paradox of the Law, which in response to the question as to its 
foundation does not get a clear yes or a clear no, but an almost 
mocking interchange between positive and negative value of a 
viable justification.”69
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It is the paradox inherent in the law’s sense of “justice,” of 
what makes a dispute resolution mechanism “just” or “fair,” of what 
makes one institutional design better or worse than others, that this 
chapter attempts to gain insight into. Would Jeanne’s situation be 
any different had she woken up with bed bugs in a traditional hotel 
room? If so, how? Would she have benefited from a procedurally 
and more substantively “just” institutional design had she lodged 
elsewhere, outside of Airbnb’s domain? Would that alternative 
jurisdiction have offered her a “fairer” legal procedure? Would 
that procedure have produced a “better” outcome? What makes the 
Airbnb dispute resolution mechanism either “superior” or “inferior” 
to the mechanisms offered by the “controlling law”? What would 
allow us to judge that Jeanne’s “Before the Law” is a story of either 
“justice” or “injustice”? 
Before returning to Jeanne’s story, it is important to note that 
this chapter leaves aside the eternal question: What is law? It goes 
beyond investigating the legal quality of this invisible and inacces-
sible dispute resolution mechanism, searching for that which makes 
laws of its terms, policies, and decisions, the being-law of these. It 
is further important to highlight that the goal of this chapter tran-
scends merely exposing Airbnb’s “law in action,” the inner workings 
of the sophisticated dispositif operated by the home sharing service, 
its ideological dimensions, and the distributive implications of the 
various decisions conveyed by the guardians stationed before it. 
Furthermore, the aim is neither to evaluate by reference to one or 
another pre-existing private law system or a certain ideal Airbnb dis-
pute resolution mechanism, nor place it on one or another point along 
some spectrum. Any such endeavour would, necessarily, require a 
subscription to, or focus on, a specific idea or ideal by reference to 
which a binary distinction—between “fair” and “unfair,” “legitimate” 
and “illegitimate,” “just” and “unjust,” “good” and “bad,” “better” 
or “worse,” or “more” or “less”—could be drawn. In this respect, 
this chapter also avoids arguing for institutional reforms, making 
any policy recommendation, or producing a definitive conclusion as 
to who should process private disputes, and how such mechanisms 
should be designed. It neither commends nor condemns Airbnb’s 
mechanism of dispute processing. It does not call upon traditional 
jurisdictions—state, municipalities, or transnational bodies—to 
intervene or regulate. It does not suggest the introduction of a new 
transnational regulator. Rather, the following telling of Jeanne’s story 
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is intended to incite a reflection on the intuitions and assumptions 
with which we approach “law stories”70 and the principles by which 
we judge mechanisms of dispute processing.
III. Before the Law
Before the law, “on the front lines,”71 stands Jason from the Airbnb 
Trust and Safety department. To this “crisis manager”72 there comes 
an end-user praying for admittance to the law. “Hello!” she cries on 
the other side of the phone line. “Is there anybody in there?” “Come 
on now,” he replies soothingly. “I hear you’re feeling down.” And 
after listening to her plea, he assures her, “Well, I can ease your 
pain and get you on your feet again.” “Relax,” he continues, “I’ll 
need some information first.” “Just the basic facts,” he reassures 
her. “Can you show me where it hurts?” After receiving pictures of 
the alleged bedbug bites, he writes her with a medical diagnosis, a 
written confirmation of his promise to reimburse her for up to $30 
for a meal, and a short explanation of the crux of their phone con-
versation—his ruling.
Hello [Jeanne],
This is Jason from Airbnb again.
This email is just a quick follow up from our phone conversa-
tion earlier.
I have received the photos of [… your] bites and I can confirm 
that these are from bed bugs. I will be canceling this reservation 
on the hosts behalf and will be refunding you in full. As we 
discussed the original payment will be held in Airbnb’s system 
initially and will be transferred directly to a new reservation. As 
the original reservation was for 3 months I will be looking for 
a shorter reservation at first and then we can attempt to rebook 
you for the rest of the reservation later.
For now I have promised to reimburse you for up to $30 USD for 
a meal while I begin to reach out to other hosts in NYC.
Thank you for your call and I will be in touch.
Best regards,
Jason73
Throughout their phone conversations, Jason gives Jeanne advice on 
how to get rid of bed bugs. Not only is the first time that she has ever 
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had to deal with an infestation, nor does she know of anyone who 
ever has. Hell, up until that very morning, she was not even aware 
that she is allergic to bed bugs. In shock, she follows Jason’s instruc-
tions, one after the other. Two hours pass by and Jason, who is still 
searching for alternative accommodation for the next three months, 
books Jeanne a hotel room for the night. “Hello Jeanne,” he writes 
with an update, “This is Jason from Airbnb again.” “I have booked 
you for one night into The Aloft Harlem as the Astor unfortunately 
no longer had availability by the time I actually tried to book you 
into it. As I said previously if you need to take a cab to the Hotel I 
will gladly reimburse for the cost.” 
After giving her the hotel’s address and phone number, he again 
reassures her: “I will continue to reach out to other hosts in the area 
tonight, so just rest easy Jeanne!” After settling into the hotel room 
he booked for her, she sends him an email, just to update him and 
to thank him for being there for her during her long and trying day.
Dear Jason,
You are great. I am in the hotel, so I am fine. I threw to the 
garbage all my belongings that have been in contact with the 
bed of bedbugs. I will go tomorrow to the laundry for all my 
other clothes, that I packed for now in a new bag (I also threw 
my suitcase). Do you have other advices? I hope my clothes will 
not be contaminated by bedbugs. Maybe we should wait a bit 
more and keep me in the hotel before risking to contaminate 
another place? This is really terrible, in only one night my body 
is covered with bites. Hopefully I took my medicines against my 
allergies and it’s a bit better now, but still, I am all red.




It is 1:00 a.m. in New York, 10:00 p.m. in San Francisco. Jason’s shift 
is coming to an end, and he sends Jeanne an email, in English and 
French, just to let her know, “I want to make sure you feel supported 
here,” he explains. “[P]lease know,” he reassures her, “that a colleague 
will be in touch very shortly!” “In the meantime, if there’s any other 
information you’d like to make sure we have, you can reply here and 
let us know.” 
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Five hours pass. It is slightly after 6:00 a.m. in New York, and 
3:00 a.m. in San Francisco. Jeanne receives a long message; it’s in 
French and from Hakima, a member of the Airbnb CX department, 
the “keepers of a magical customer experience.”74 
Bonjour [Jeanne], 
J’espère que vous allez bien. Je m’appelle Hakima et je suis une respon-
sable faisant partie de l’équipe Trip Experience à Airbnb. Je viens de 
prendre connaissance de votre dossier et je suis sincèrement désolée de 
la situation que vous avez rencontrée après avoir passée une première 
nuit chez [Lily]. J’imagine qu’avoir un réveil de la sorte n’a pas du [sic] 
être agréable.”*
After expressing her sympathy, Hakima proceeds to explain to Jeanne 
that her three-month reservation has been modified to last only the 
one night. 
“[E]n effet,” she notes, “je constate que vous avez quitté le logement 
la nuit après votre arrivée et il était bien sure [sic] hors de question 
que vous y restiez dans ces conditions.”** 
“Même si officiellement maintenant la réservation ne dure qu’une 
nuit,” she clarifies, “nous vous avons entièrement remboursé [sic], 
même pour la nuit passé [sic] dans le logement.”*** 
* The cited message was sent in French. On the necessity and impossibil-
ity of translation, see Jacques Derrida, “Des tours de Babel” in Peggy 
Kamuf & Elizabeth Rottenberg, eds, Psyche: Inventions of the Other Volume 
I (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007) 191. [Hello Jeanne, I 
hope you are doing well. My name is Hakima and I am a member of 
the Trip Experience team at Airbnb. I have just reviewed your file and 
I am truly sorry for the situation that you encountered after your first 
night at [Lily’s]. I imagine that it was an unpleasant way to wake up.] 
All the translations are from the author.
** [Indeed, I see that you left the night after your arrival and it was evi-
dently out of the question for you to stay under such conditions.]
*** [Though the reservation is now officially for just one night, we 
fully reimbursed you, even for the night that you spent in the 
accommodation.]
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After providing Jeanne with the details of the reimbursement already 
in place by Airbnb, she proceeds to explain why, for the time being, 
Jeanne cannot be relocated to alternative accommodation. “[N]’aurons 
[sic] pas confirmation que vos affaires ayant pu être en contact avec les 
punaises de lit soit nettoyées,”**** she apologizes. “After you receive the 
invoice for the dry cleaning,” she requests, “please send it to me by 
email, and I will take care of your reimbursement.” Hakima con-
cludes her long message with an adjournment, a cryptic prolongation 
of Jeanne’s forced stay in a hotel, a deferral of her relocation to an 
alternative accommodation:
Concernant le séjour à l’hôtel, il semble que le paiement est [sic] été 
validé par Airbnb pour la nuit passée, si vous décidez de rester à l›hôte 
[sic] ce soir ou les jours suivants, nous ne pourrons malheureusement 
prendre en charge le coup [sic] de la réservation à l’hôtel.*****
Jeanne wakes up to find Hakima’s message in her email inbox. 
Although slightly confused by the vague wording of the last para-
graph, she understands that Airbnb will neither book her accom-
modation nor reimburse her for her prolonged stay in the hotel, a 
stay that was booked by Airbnb only the day before, and that cannot 
end until Airbnb itself decides so. In desperate search of a lifeline, 
she attempts to contact the only person she can think of, the guard-
ian with the human, friendly face, the person that “had her back”75 
the day before, the doorkeeper to whom she has already formed an 
attachment. Replying to the only email address she has, response@
airbnb.com, she writes:
Dear Jason,
Thank you for your answer. Again, you’ve been amazing, you 
are the best crisis-manager ever!
I had a rather worrying answer from Hakima France. She said 
that Airbnb cannot find me a solution/a place to stay for tonight. 
**** [Until we have confirmation that any belongings that may have been 
in contact with the bedbugs have been cleaned.
***** With regard to your stay at the hotel, it looks like the payment has 
been validated by Airbnb for last night. If you decide to stay at the hotel 
tonight or the following days, unfortunately, we won’t be able to take 
care of the costs of the hotel reservation.
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I will go to the laundry today to wash my stuff and buy new 
clothes, I can send you the receipt. Is it possible to stay another 
night in the hotel, or to find a airbnb?
I have to stress that I just arrived in New York and I don’t know 
anybody here. Plus I am a student, so I don’t have a lot of money. 
I cannot afford to pay by myself another night to the hotel. I 
already had to pay to buy new clothes as I threw up all clothes 
that have been in contact with the infected bed. 
I also have to stress that it is a very disturbing situation for me: 
I am allergic, so I am covered by red bites, even in my face!!!!!!!! 
I couldn’t sleep last night because I was so stressed, and because 
all the bites were itching. Hopefully I had my medicines from 
France, but still. I really need you to help me find a sustainable 
and durable solution to my problem: I need a place to sleep for 
tonight!
Thanks again for your help,
[Jeanne]
The phone-a-friend lifeline, Jeanne soon realizes, can be used only 
once. These are the rules of the game.76 How naïve of her to think 
that Jason was real, a friend, a human friend. For although he was 
the face of Airbnb, Jason had no human face; his voice and words 
touched her, but it was not a human touch.77 He is but one of many, 
and for him she was only one of many. Jason was stationed on the 
border between her and the law, but it was not her that he was there 
to guard. Even though he too was standing outside the domain of 
the law, he was not on her side. Even though he stood with his back 
to the law, facing her, it was the law that he had guarded all along, 
it is from her that he guarded it. 
One short hour after Jeanne had written to Jason, she received 
an email from Hakima, “the case manager on this case for now,” 
writing to teach her this valuable lesson, explaining to her “the way 
it’s going to work.” “I’m going to write you in English as this seems 
to be your preferred way of written communication,” she sarcasti-
cally begins, as if in acknowledgement of the limits of language, of 
its self-referentiality. “I’m sorry that Jason promised you something 
we couldn’t guarantee,” she continues, stepping into her role as an 
empathetic guardian, the new “Jason.” Her message not only delays 
Jeanne’s relocation to a reasonably comparable accommodation, but 
once again obstructs entry to the law itself:
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Hello [Jeanne],
I’m going to write you in English as this seems to be your pre-
ferred way of written communication.
I’m sorry that Jason promised you something we couldn’t 
guarantee.
Because it’s bed bugs we can’t risk any contamination for safety 
reason, that is why for the moment we can’t assist you to rebook 
a listing on Airbnb, however when you are able to provide clear 
documentation that all your belongings have been treated for 
bed bugs we can start the process to assist you, and I’ll be more 
than happy to assist you myself as I’m the case manager on this 
case for now.
So right now, I want to confirm that exceptionally, I’ll offer a 
refund of an hotel stay of up to 150$ for tonight. 
The way it’s going to work is that you can book the hotel of your 
choosing on your own, and then send me the receipt by reply-
ing to this email.
As soon as I receive it, I’ll refund you of up to 150$, as mentioned 
above.
To process to this hotel refund, you will need to add a payout 
method, you can add it by clicking on the link: https://www.
airbnb.com/users/payout_preferences/3029474.
Then as soon as I received documentation from you confirming 
that all your belongings have been cleaned, I’ll refund you up 
to 100$ on the laundry cost.
As for the rebooking, just to clarify, we are more than willing 
to assist you, but we have to receive documentation confirming 
your belongings are free of bed bugs.
I know and understand that you don’t have a lot of money on 
your that is why I’m offering you those courtesy refund on 
Airbnb’s behalf and that those refund will be sent to you as 
soon as we have documentation and that you have added a 
payout method.
Also I want to confirm once again that the payment of the res-
ervation with [… Lily] was fully refunded to you.
I hope this is more clear, but if I wasn’t feel free to let me know 
and I’ll be getting back to you as soon as possible.
Thanks [sic] you.
Hakima
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After receiving a much-needed clarification and a much more 
detailed explanation, Jeanne replies to Hakima that she will stay 
in the same hotel. Otherwise, she explains, she will not have time 
to get her remaining belongings dry-cleaned, buy new clothes and 
luggage, and go to the university to meet professors and complete 
all administrative requirements. “I am waiting for the dry cleaner 
to be open, and I get back to you as soon as I have the receipt,” she 
promises before thanking Hakima “again” for her help. Hakima 
replies promptly. “Hi Jeanne, I’ll keep an eye on your case and will 
be awaiting for your documentation,” she reassures her. “I wish you 
well this afternoon for your trip to your new University. :)” 
Before long, Jeanne realizes that Airbnb probably did not pay 
the full rate for her hotel room, which is actually $250 per night. Being 
a student, she obviously cannot afford paying the $100 difference. It 
also dawns on her that finding a hotel room in New York for under 
$150 a night is an almost impossible task. In distress, she writes to 
Hakima again, requesting help finding a hotel room close to her uni-
versity. Hakima denies her request, without ever citing the basis for 
her refusal. “I’m sorry for the situation you are in,” she apologizes, 
“however, we won’t be able to book a night in the hotel for you.” “We 
did it as a courtesy yesterday,” she explains, “but it won’t be possible 
again for today.” “As I explained to you earlier,” she reiterates for the 
third time, “if you book a hotel for tonight I am more than happy to 
refund you up to 150$ when you send us the receipt.” “I know this 
is not the best situation and we are here to help,” she concedes, “but 
in this situation there’s unfortunately a limit to what we can do.” 
What precisely is this “situation,” Jeanne is left to figure out. 
What is this “limit” of which Hakima speaks, how it was defined, 
and by whom, she will never know. Which law dictated the decision 
conveyed by Hakima? Jeanne is left to wonder. “Let me know if you 
have any question,” Hakima defers almost mockingly, leaving our 
distressed and mystified Jeanne with more questions than answers, 
sending her, and us as the readers of her story, on a journey to the 
origin of the law by which Hakima made her decision. 
Hours pass by—how time flies when you are having a hell 
of a time! Eventually, Jeanne has all the documentation to send to 
Hakima, proof that she no longer poses a health and safety threat to 
the Airbnb community. She, like the bed bugs that failed to make her 
their home, relocates to an alternative accommodation, to the home 
of a new and, hopefully, more accommodating host. 
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IV. Revolving Doors
How would jurists react to and evaluate Jeanne’s story? With which 
common intuitions would the members of the epistemic community 
of the law approach it? How quick would they be to judge? Would 
they take the side of the stodgy civil justice system, or would they 
be dazzled by the swiftness, efficiency, and responsiveness of this 
alternative to state institutions? Would they resort to the idea of 
“access to justice,” the notion of “procedural transparency,”78 or the 
“law of standing”?79 Would they frame the story through the lens 
of civil procedure, or as a market regulation issue? What would be 
their ruling? 
The most striking aspect of Airbnb’s processing of Jeanne’s 
dispute with her host is its swiftness. How would jurists consider 
it? Is time on Airbnb’s side, or is it on the side of the traditional state 
court system? Is it of the essence, or is the administration of jus-
tice through law—just as the abstract norms that purport to guide 
the law’s ostensibly autonomous and objective processes—largely 
unaffected by it? To what extent is time of the essence, and of what 
essence is it? “Justice delayed is justice denied” goes the common 
legal adage, whose originator is a secret of the past. The contradic-
tion inherent in this recited maxim is exposed through Jeanne’s 
story. Contemplating the role of time in the context of her story, it 
must be considered whether it is even possible to deliver immediate 
justice, and what constitutes a “delay”? Can justice through law be 
obtained without delay? Is some degree of delay therefore desirable? 
The paradoxicality of this celebrated maxim is beautifully exposed 
through Martin Luther King’s inspiring and inciting “Letter from 
a Birmingham Jail.” In response to claims that his actions were 
“untimely,” and suggestions that he should have given the new city 
administration of Birmingham time to act, he writes:
[f]or years now I have heard the word “Wait!” It rings in the 
ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This “Wait” has 
almost always meant “‘Never.” We must come to see, with one 
of our distinguished jurists, that “justice too long delayed is 
justice denied.”80
The last two sentences of King’s reply confront two opposing positions 
on the relation between justice and time. In the first, King restates the 
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conventional formulation of the adage, which suggests that to delay 
is to deny access to justice. The ensuing sentence positions itself as 
opposition to the previous: “[w]e must come to see,” King subtly refor-
mulates the maxim, that “justice too long delayed is justice denied.”81 
Writing from jail the story of his trial and judgment by the law, by his 
adversaries and by his friends, King does not turn his back on this 
revered principle; rather, he insists on its universality and precisely 
on its timelessness. However, while writing on its timelessness, his 
narrative works to penetrate justice’s atemporal realm, to introduce 
a dimension of time into it. Justice should be considered denied, 
King’s letter suggests, only when it is served with excessive delay. 
The accessibility of the Airbnb dispute resolution processes and of 
the state civil justice system should be assessed not by reference to 
time alone, but by reference to the reasonable or optimal length of a 
dispute resolution procedure. Was the swiftness of Jeanne’s process 
reasonable? Is speed necessarily optimal? Would state courts have 
processed Jeanne’s dispute within a (more) reasonable period of time, 
had she turned to them? Paradoxically, this claim and the questions 
it elicits are themselves a form of an adjournment; they send us on 
a quest for a higher law, a law of delay, a criterion against which we 
could judge a “delay” as “excessive” or “reasonable.”
The swiftness with which Airbnb carries out its processes 
further raises the traditional jurisprudential problem of discretion. 
What is the scope of Jason and Hakima’s discretionary power? What 
effect does a tight time limit have on discretion? Does pressure to 
make a quick decision result in a more mechanical application of 
rules or overreliance on intuition? Is it more or less likely to produce 
“accurate” determinations? Is it more or less likely to yield “just” out-
comes? What would be an optimal timeframe to exercise judgment?82 
Given the type of disputes processed by Airbnb, is the swiftness of 
its procedures less of a concern? Given the commercial context, is it 
more of a concern? The problem of discretion subsequently evokes 
the question of what makes state-employed judges more impartial 
or qualified decision-makers than Jason and Hakima? And who are 
Jason and Hakima, we may ask, and what are their credentials? Who 
should be given the authority to interpret the law, to determine the 
meaning of a legal text? Who should be authorized to judge the actions 
of Jeanne’s host as either “acceptable” or “unacceptable,” “reasonable” 
or “unreasonable”? Alas, we hit yet another roadblock, delayed once 
again.
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It is not just a question of time, others would likely stress. Other 
concerns, should also be taken into account when assessing Airbnb’s 
processes in the context of Jeanne’s story. A quicker procedure, they 
would caution, is not necessarily a more accessible one. To be con-
sidered accessible, a dispute resolution mechanism should provide 
more than a quick response. It must also produce just results and 
fair treatment. It must be easily understood by its users, responsive 
to their needs, adequately resourced, and well-organized.83 Does the 
Airbnb dispute resolution apparatus meet these criteria? Do any of the 
traditional civil justice systems, to which the Airbnb customer support 
service is being compared, satisfy them? Is it possible to achieve all of 
these objectives simultaneously? Which of these systems under con-
sideration comes closest to meeting these goals? Do the millstones of 
the state civil justice system grind more finely, precisely because they 
turn more slowly? Alas, we arrive before yet another gate, of another 
law, deferred, struggling to compose a conclusive list of criteria that 
is additionally prioritized by the relative value of each item.
Time is money, many would likely point out in an attempt 
to get the discussion back on track. Much like the cases that reach 
small-claims courts, disputes between Airbnb users are relatively 
straightforward, and generally do not involve large sums of money. 
Airbnb users are not given a separate charge for services provided 
by the Airbnb dispute processing apparatus; rather, as is explained 
by the Airbnb Help Center, these costs are covered by service fees 
charged to guests on booking confirmation.84 As they are not repre-
sented, neither do users pay attorneys’ fees. Procedures are simpli-
fied, arbiter-led (as opposed to adversarial), and informal. Decisions 
are reached and enforced quickly, and all communication is in simple 
language devoid of legal jargon. Moreover, it is not necessary for 
Airbnb users to wait until the end of their vacation to make a claim. 
Airbnb’s customer service is available 24/7, providing instant guid-
ance and relief. Speedy and responsive justice, the argument goes, 
is a more certain justice. In this process, Jeanne was not subjected 
to the prolonged apprehension typically suffered while anticipat-
ing a future court ruling. Airbnb immediately notified her that her 
booking had been cancelled and instructed her to leave the infested 
accommodation. Jeanne did not have to assess which of her options a 
court might find “reasonable” to mitigate her damages, or for which 
of the expenses she incurred she might later be compensated. She 
was immediately sent to a hotel, although temporarily, helped to 
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find comparable alternative accommodation, instructed to throw 
away all of her belongings that had been in direct contact with bed 
bugs, requested to have all of her remaining clothing dry cleaned, 
and encouraged to take a taxi to her hotel. The substantial cost of 
all each of these actions was borne by Airbnb, and when incurred 
by Jeanne, she was quickly reimbursed. However, as suggested by 
both critical evaluations of the relationship between access to justice 
and small claims courts and critical race theory’s challenge to the 
assumption that informal dispute resolution mechanisms are more 
accessible than formal ones,85 swift, less-costly, simplified, and more 
informal procedures led by a fact-finding, activist adjudicator do not 
necessarily enhance access to either courts or “justice.” A conclu-
sion that is reinforced, as some might observe, by Airbnb’s efforts to 
divert (discrimination) claims from state courts to arbitration, and 
by recurring claims by hosts that Airbnb’s decisions systematically 
favour guests over hosts.86 Alas, we are summoned to appear before 
another law, sent on a journey to find its origin: What is “justice”? 
What is meant by “access”? And to what extent does “access” relate 
to “justice”?
Moreover, as the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General 
explains, a favourable judgment does not guarantee payment. “Some 
people,” the ministry observes, “think that when the trial is over 
and the judge’s decision is made or a default judgment is obtained, 
the successful party […] will automatically be paid […] and that is 
the end of the case. Obtaining a judgment,” they caution, “is some-
times just the beginning for both parties.”87 Indeed, often costly and 
time-consuming steps are required to collect a favourable judgment, 
especially a foreign one. Moreover, in many jurisdictions, to request 
enforcement of a foreign judgment, a writ of execution or garnish-
ment, an additional legal process is required. Airbnb users are for-
tunate to bypass this added delay and barrier to justice. Although 
Jeanne was charged in full the moment her host confirmed her 
booking, payment was held by Airbnb until twenty-four hours after 
check-in. This hold, as Airbnb explains, gives both parties “time to 
make sure that everything is as expected.”88 Within hours of receiv-
ing Jeanne’s claim for a “Travel Issue,” Airbnb accepted her claim 
and effectuated her refund. Jeanne’s story is not exceptional. The ToS 
agreement and Payments Terms grant Airbnb extensive authority to 
enforce its judgments; refunds and reimbursements are effectuated 
immediately and in many cases automatically. 
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The relative ease and speed of judgment and enforcement, some 
would likely remind us, do come at a price. What’s done is done, they 
might caution, referring to the Kafkaesque experience of AirbnbHell.
com’s founder. Once judgments are made and enforced it becomes 
much more complicated to review, and even more so, reverse them. 
Given the disincentive to reverse decisions and order the return of 
sums that have already been paid, does not the passage of time reduce 
the probability of judicial mistakes, guaranteeing better outcomes? 
In this context, the “in books” finality of Airbnb’s decisions and the 
speed of their enforcement further raises concerns about the lack of 
a formal, internal appellate procedure. In practice, however, as the 
story of AirbnbHell.com’s founder reveals, Airbnb’s door remains 
forever open, and its representatives never turn dissatisfied users 
away, rather inviting them to submit decisions for review or to talk 
to a “manager.”89 Moreover, as a resident of France, Jeanne could have 
challenged any of Airbnb’s decisions in an Irish court or any court 
of competent jurisdiction. As a resident of the Unites States, her host 
could have initiated arbitration, which would have been conducted in 
the location of her choice; she could have also elected to participate by 
phone, video conference, or, for claims under $25,000, by the submis-
sion of documents.90 Alas, we arrive before yet another law, appealing 
for admittance, desiring knowledge of the essence and the scope of 
the “right of appeal.” Is the possibility of taking one state court’s deci-
sion to another state court for review more consistent with the right 
of appeal than the possibility of referring a dispute to arbitration by 
a third party? What is the value of that right and how essential is it? 
The past, some might retort, should be left in the past, and the sooner 
it is left there the better. Whether favourable or not, a swift and final 
decision can enable disputants to close the door on their trying epi-
sode and start a new chapter. Are the psychological costs of a swift 
process, experienced as Kafkaesque, necessarily lower than those 
of a long process with favourable outcomes? Would the founder of 
AirbnbHell.com have been more satisfied had he been subjected to a 
lengthier and more formal process, regardless of the outcome? 
State law, some would likely conclude, offers disputants like 
Jeanne too little, too late. Considering the financial costs of obtaining 
a lawyer, litigating and collecting, considering also Jeanne’s limited 
resources, the nature of her dispute and the prospects of a lengthy 
multinational litigation against a wealthier party, and considering 
the international context, questions of jurisdiction, and the potential 
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need to prove and litigate under Irish law, would Jeanne have even 
bothered to ask for legal advice or to take her case to court? Indeed, it 
should be considered whether the disputes arbitrated by Airbnb are 
the kinds of disputes that reach state courts, including small-claims 
courts. How many of the disputes arbitrated by Airbnb might have 
entered formal legal institutions, had the Airbnb Resolution Center 
not been available to them? Moreover, as the recent decision to compel 
arbitration of discrimination claims suggests, what does the state civil 
justice system even offer disputants such as Jeanne? Are its procedures 
“fairer” or more “efficient,” and in what sense? Do they produce more 
“just” or “efficient” outcomes, and in what sense? Does, to conclude, 
access to courts necessarily enhance access to justice?
Rivalry between the hotel industry and Airbnb is often depicted 
as a conflict between a stodgy incumbent and a disruptive newcomer. 
The relation between Airbnb and the state can also be framed in the 
same way. Would jurists be quick to adopt this neoliberal rhetoric 
of competition? Are we indeed facing a confrontation between two 
“competing sovereigns,”91 an appearance of two laws before each 
other? If so, in accordance with which law should we resolve the dis-
pute? Before the gate of which jurisdiction should we summon both 
to make a determination? Alternatively, might the gate to Airbnb’s 
domain be merely the first of two doors, a passageway towards 
the gate of another, more powerful law, that of state jurisdiction? 
By positioning state jurisdiction above that of Airbnb, the juridical 
rhetoric of hierarchy could give rise to a different set of questions 
and another series of delays. Taking the perspective of the state and 
assuming their traditional position as guardians, legal scrollers 
would likely read Jeanne’s story as a summoning of Airbnb’s legal 
personality before state law. Some would perhaps examine Airbnb’s 
compliance with existing regulation, embarking on an impossible 
quest to determine the controlling law and discover its meaning. 
Others might adopt a “centrifugal perspective,”92 setting Jeanne’s 
story “in the shadow” of state law,93 studying both the “bargaining 
chips”94 and “regulatory endowments”95 that the state had conferred 
on her and on Airbnb. Highlighting the distributive or economic 
implications of existing regulations, their likely conclusion would 
send them on a desperate search for a higher law, a principle of social 
justice by which the existing economic conditions could be judged, 
and an argument for reform made. Considering Jeanne’s story from 
the perspective of the state, it might further be read as a narrative 
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of accessibility and the growing movement towards alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR). Providing a quicker, cheaper, flexible 
and specialized redress for a large number of otherwise unresolved 
minor disputes, does this alternative to the traditional process ren-
der civil justice more accessible? Should the state embrace it for its 
potential to divert minor cases from overburdened state courts, thus 
avoiding costly trials at the public’s expense, and ultimately reduc-
ing public expenditure? Can, however, existing models of ADR or 
online dispute resolution (ODR) be used to describe and analyze 
the immense apparatus operated by Airbnb and similar platform 
owners?96 Airbnb’s exclusive jurisdiction as the dispute processor is 
established not by an agreement between Jeanne and her host, but 
in the separate agreements that each signed with Airbnb. In accor-
dance with section 22.3 of the Terms, these agreements do not confer 
rights or remedies on third parties. Can we say that Jeanne’s dispute 
was resolved through “arbitration” or “mediation”? Should Airbnb’s 
dispute processing mechanism be conceptualized or recognized as a 
new method of ADR or ODR? Would such a move enhance or restrict 
access to “justice?” Is “justice” ever really accessible?
V. Conclusion 
It is with many questions that I would like to close the door on this 
investigation. Although imposing a series of delays upon our attempt 
to make legal sense of the story of Jeanne, Airbnb and the “sharing 
economy,” I have hopefully incited deeper reflection on our most 
basic intuitions and presuppositions on the possibility of “justice 
through law.” Indeed, as any process of reflective examination, the 
search for a law by which we can judge Jeanne’s story is bound to 
impose many delays. From its place of hiding, the law for which we 
search is destined to obscure, defer, and adjourn, rendering evermore 
irresistible the attempt to uncover its essence and meaning. What is 
the value of embarking on a never-ending quest towards the non-
existent? Perhaps it is Kafka himself, an insurance clerk, who spent 
his days as the doorkeeper to the law, protecting the non-existent, 
who his protagonist, a man from the country, had been observing all 
along. Perhaps “Before the Law” is not the story of a man from the 
country, but of the doorkeeper who spends his days with his back 
to the law, never turning to look through the open gate he himself 
guards, never seeking admittance to the law. Perhaps it is not the 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   102 18-11-08   08:42
 The Fast to the Furious 103
story of a man delayed entrance, but of a doorkeeper using a man 
from the country as a mirror, observing a reflection of himself and 
of what lies hidden behind him. Perhaps it is to us, his fellow guard-
ians of the law, that Kafka was writing to, adjuring us to examine 
ourselves through the eyes of the man from the country, to reflect 
ourselves on the questions he frames, on what it is that we so rever-
ently guard, to conclude with a question in place of a statement. 
Notes
 1. In dedication to Gunther Teubner. Thank you for teaching me the value of 
“productive misreading,” and thank you for encouraging me to embark 
on a journey in search of my own law.
 2. In accordance with the preamble to the ToS agreement, residents of the 
United States enter into agreement with Airbnb, Inc; residents of the 
People’s Republic of China who use the service to book or list accommo-
dation in China contract with Airbnb Internet (Beijing) Co, Ltd (Airbnb 
China); and all other users enter into agreement with Airbnb Ireland UC 
(Airbnb Ireland). 
 3. Section 21.1 of the Terms stipulates that all contracts signed with Airbnb 
Inc will be interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of 
California and the United States; section 21.2 establishes that contracts 
with Airbnb China will be governed by the laws of China; and section 
21.3 stipulates that all agreements made with Airbnb Ireland will be 
interpreted in accordance with Irish law and the consumer protection 
regulations of the user’s country of residence. Section 19 of the Terms 
contains an arbitration clause and class-action waiver that applies to all 
disputes with Airbnb Inc and any action brought against Airbnb in the 
United States. As part of section 21.2, parties to agreement with Airbnb 
Inc consent (unless otherwise agreed upon by both parties) to bring all 
claims excluded from the Arbitration Agreement in section 19 in state 
or federal court in San Francisco, California. In accordance with section 
21.2, residents of China agree to submit any dispute with Airbnb China 
to the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
for arbitration in Beijing. Lastly, as part of section 21.3, consumers agree to 
submit disputes with Airbnb Ireland to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Irish courts; businesses agree to submit to their exclusive jurisdiction. 
Consumers further agree to bring judicial proceedings against Airbnb 
Ireland only in a court located in Ireland or a court with jurisdiction in 
their place of residence. As part of section 21.3, Airbnb Ireland agrees to 
enforce any of its rights against consumers (as opposed to businesses) 
only in the courts of the jurisdiction in which they reside.
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York Times (14 August 2015), online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/15/
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 6. See e.g. Erik Larson & Andrew M Harris, “Airbnb Sued, Accused of 
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 7. Several recent articles consider mostly liability issues, applying the tra-
ditional conceptual framework of state law or calling for the introduc-
tion of new state or municipal regulation. See e.g. Chad Marzen et al., 
“The New Sharing Economy: The Role of Property, Tort, and Contract 
Law for Managing the Airbnb Model” (2016–2017) 13 NYU J L & Bus 
295; Talia G. Loucks, “Travelers Beware: Tort Liability in the Sharing 
Economy” (2014–2015) 10 Wash J L Tech & Arts 329. In the law and 
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between members of “virtual worlds.” See e.g. Mia Consalvo, Cheating: 
Gaining Advantage in Videogames (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009) at 
142; F Gregory Lastowka, Virtual Justice (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2010) at 97–100. In this context, several virtual-worlds scholars 
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have studied the dispute processing mechanisms (as well as property 
and contract systems) developed by the members themselves. See espe-
cially Jennifer L Mnookin, “Virtual(ly) Law: The Emergence of Law in 
LambdaMOO” in Peter Ludlow, ed, Crypto Anarchy, Cyberstates, and 
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PART I I
REGULATING TECHNOLOGY
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CHAPTER IV




T echnological Neutrality: Hogwash! This brief chapter will not elaborate on the nature of disruptive technology. Neither will it 
express an opinion on its merits,2 or on issues of disruption that arise 
when faced with controlled markets, where organized and protected 
monopolies have been profoundly affected.3 Instead, it will deal with 
the normative environment within which this innovation is currently 
developing—an environment that is necessarily shaped not only by 
the technology itself, but also by the sheer speed of its evolution. 
More precisely, it will take for granted that technology has a major 
impact on our way of operating. Technology—let us make no bones 
about it—is not neutral.4 It infiltrates our lives with myriad effects on 
power relations. Such issues are therefore worthy of consideration 
and integration into the controls that the law, conceived globally as 
formal and informal norms, seeks to implement. Thus, law is a tool 
for the management of power relations. In keeping with the image 
of scales, the law weighs; it weighs in. But technology, due to the 
changes that it brings, far too frequently creates an extraordinary 
opportunity for calling into question the very principles and scales 
that have taken centuries to crystallize. 
Disruptive Technology. Implicit in the notion of the “sharing econ-
omy” is a minor anodyne dimension, as well as a major dimension 
that is just as untrue. As concerns the former, it is anodyne because 
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sharing is seen as a good thing. Like apple pie, one cannot possibly 
be against it. And as concerns the latter, there is also a fundamental 
falsehood that certain of these companies “share,” when, in fact, they 
operate through a formidable unilateral retention of information. To 
be precise, they retain the information shared by others, about others. 
In fact, this notion of sharing as understood in the context of projects 
of limited size, such as those which happily flourish in municipalities 
everywhere,5 is incompatible with megastructures such as Uber and 
Airbnb. On the contrary, the latter companies are the poster children 
of retention. Such issues of retention first surface in the contract, which 
emphasizes the ownership of data,6 and this in spite of the natural 
suspicion that should arise when faced with such an appropriation 
of personal information. A lack of transparency is also at play in the 
manner in which the algorithms are programmed, despite the degree 
of accountability that is increasingly required in this respect.7 
Revolution/Evolution. This equilibrium is all the more difficult 
to attain where technology becomes infused with emotion; when 
faced with the “technomagic”8 frequently associated with technol-
ogy—frequently perceived as either eminently dangerous or highly 
lifesaving—it is important to take a calm look at the “revolution”9 
that we face. For while we certainly observe a “factual” revolution, 
with technology creating technological and economic upheaval,10 it 
is met by a normative “toolbox” that has both merit and tradition. 
Strongly creative, the law remains a marvellous means: capable of 
evolution, of adaptation. When faced with this technological revolu-
tion, the law may perhaps simply give rise to an evolution in terms 
of which traditional tools are considered to be sufficiently effective. 
This is a debate as old as the law, as old as the Internet itself. Since its 
very beginnings, the Internet has given rise to questions regarding 
the best way of managing this new reality.11 
Normative Porosity. But to return to the sharing economy: many 
consider that because of its technological upheavals the sharing econ-
omy has created a legal vacuum without precedent. This is incorrect. 
It often is the case that those who invoke the notion of a legal vacuum 
are the ones who consider that the law only works against them.12 
Quite to the contrary, there is not only a broad variety of applicable 
laws but also an increased need for them. Hence norms should not 
be considered through the narrow lens of formal norms that (directly 
or indirectly) derive from the state; normativity should be grasped 
pluralistically, with frequent interactions between the various levels 
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of normativity. Apart from formal texts, this also obviously includes 
a contractual structure with its own set of particularities, but also 
that which I like to call individual normativity,13 namely internal 
company documentation that details a certain level of requirements. 
Yet neither contracts nor internal company documentation entail 
real control. Essentially, few contracts have been analyzed by the 
courts—and even this jurisprudence has difficulties in assessing 
such (frequently technical) commercial texts. 
Normative Pervasiveness. Contrary to popular thought, we 
therefore have a broad range of normative tools. Among them, four 
contribute to the development of an ecosystem of norms—an over-
lapping, intersecting ecology. The Kelsinian pyramid has reached its 
limits; a more plural, more global, vision is needed. But beyond this 
so-called ecosystem that needs to be described in quantitative terms, 
it is also important that it be evaluated, as several of these norms are 
not truly effective. Indeed, while certain formal norms manage, in 
spite of their flaws, to harness the activities that are linked to the 
sharing economy (section II), other contractual or individual norms 
have some limitations, meaning that they are not always able to 
control the activities of Uber, Airbnb, and the other platforms that 
form the subject matter of this study (section III). Accordingly, it is 
an overview of these legal tools that will be presented below. 
II. Formal Norms under Oversight
It is a natural reflex: when technology raises new problems, let us 
pass a law! Paradoxically, issues relating to the sharing economy are 
quite easily dealt with by judges applying existing law. The law in 
its traditional guise applies even though specific features are absent. 
i. The Relative Effectiveness of Laws
Much can be said about the numerous14 laws that come into play in 
the regulation of the sharing economy. With regard to the situation in 
Quebec, there is, of course, the issue relating to the specific and tem-
poral law that was imposed on Uber. A law that is not quite one: this 
text, called an “agreement,” does not have the generality that is typi-
cally associated with the law.15 Nonetheless, originating from a gov-
ernment institution, this text created quite a stir in September 2016, 
and was made public, meaning that it could be subjected to analysis. 
The same goes for the texts relating to short-term accommodation.16 
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1. Law and Technology: Limits
The Law Questioned. Naturally, laws raise questions far beyond the 
power relations that they introduce, in terms of which some actors 
receive rights while the rights of others are limited. It is often the 
case that those who are faced with new laws are not content to see 
their rights trampled upon nor their prerogatives threatened. This 
is not where the question arises for present purposes, as it is beyond 
my field of expertise. Instead, the legal enquiry envisaged relates to 
the two following elements. 
First, governments all too often adopt “communication” laws 
which have as a core objective to demonstrate to the population that 
the government acts and that it performs its sovereign role of dis-
tributing interests. Thus, as Professor Atias emphasizes, the Act is 
a communication tool to which “the name of a discoverer might be 
attached.”17 As it happens, this objective of the law is manifest in the 
Quebec agreement relating to Uber where the text establishes general 
principles with which the company must comply. Thus, in addition 
to clearly identified obligations, the text also details extremely vague 
objectives such as transparency, innovation, and privacy. While the 
Act is prescriptive, it is therefore also somewhat idealistic in that it 
deems itself able to effect profound changes in power relations. What 
conceit. The same goes for the Act Respecting Tourist Accommodation 
Establishments,18 which, while identifying some specific obligations to 
be met, does not appear to place great value on the controls exercised 
by the administrative authorities.19 
Partial Laws. Second, immense areas are completely left by the 
wayside. Still speaking of Uber, the text essentially targets two kinds 
of power relations: on the one hand, the relation “Uber/Quebec State”; 
on the other, that of “Uber/Taxi Industry.” With regards to the former, 
the monetary aspects have been developed with great precision. A 
fiscal agreement is appended to the text, which provides for fees in 
similar detail.20 Some public safety and public interest considerations 
are also present; 21 not much more. Concerning the latter, as far as 
the relation to the taxi industry is concerned, a dividing up of the 
respective territories is proposed, with a heavy reliance on technol-
ogy: telephonic services and the streets are taxis’ domain—Uber is 
limited to online solicitation.22 That being said, many shortcomings 
and issues remain outside the ambit of the text. Admittedly, there 
are other laws and multiple legal texts that will likely apply to Uber. 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   118 18-11-08   08:42
 The Normative Ecology of Disruptive Technology 119
Nonetheless, the following matters remain opaque: What about the 
right to privacy?23 What about the risks of discrimination inher-
ent in the choice of clients or of drivers? The law of the platform24 
asserts itself; individual normativity should not only be envisaged 
but should above all give rise to real control.25 None of these norms 
are considered in the slightest in the agreement with Uber. 
2. Law and Technology: Mastering the Limits
The Law and Its Ability to Act. The above being said, while one may 
criticize the law, the fact remains that it works. Contrary to many 
an Internet service, the sharing economy frequently—and specifi-
cally in the case of the ones that are best known (UberX; Airbnb)—is 
very much a physical reality. In the case of these frequent examples, 
it must be underlined that they amount to a real service of physi-
cal transport, and to a real service of physical accommodation. 
Hence, this is not an instance of the eternal non-application of the 
law brought about by the international dimensions of relations. In 
fact, it is indeed Uber Canada that is the contracting party to agree-
ments initiated by the government, both with regards to operating 
modalities26 and fiscal compliance,27 which enhances the “domestic” 
nature of the Act. Similarly, insofar as Airbnb in its various forms is 
concerned, the Act Respecting Tourist Accommodation Establishments,28 
like the Regulations Respecting Tourist Accommodation Establishments29 
applies to the whole of Quebec. The governmental response is espe-
cially specific, constituting proof that the authorities have tackled 
the “Airbnb issue” head-on, the Ministère du Tourisme having gone 
so far as to furnish the public with an interpretative guide.30 In these 
two cases the government has elected to authorize. The use of these 
platforms is accordingly allowed, subject to compliance with condi-
tions that do not appear—when compared to other jurisdictions31—
particularly onerous. 
ii. The Effectiveness of Jurisprudence
Jurisprudence and Adapting to New Developments. While new laws could 
apply to new developments, they nevertheless have some shortcom-
ings that I believe are important to identify.32 In certain respects the 
old law is sometimes more effective than the new,33 and the legisla-
tive reflex is often to hold back in relation to new issues.34 As one 
author puts it, “it is urgent to wait.”35 Indeed, this is what the Airbnb 
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litigation has demonstrated.36 This balancing, therefore, involves 
recourse to a judge. 
Interpretation. In Canada, the interpretation of legislation is 
taught as a mandatory course in the majority of law faculties. Far 
be it for me to try and summarize this complex subject matter 
in a few lines. Simply put, and beyond the three interpretative 
approaches that are generally identified (formerly “literal, teleologi-
cal, contextual”37 and nowadays, rather, “text, context and subject”),38 
it seems likely that some are by nature more applicable than others, 
depending on the circumstances. Depending on the situation, and 
linked to the digital environment, I have previously drawn distinc-
tions39 based on the hypotheses40 that, on the one hand, the law under 
interpretation plays a more “mechanical”41 role, or, on the other 
hand, that it carries out a further evaluation of the issues at hand, 
which requires a higher level of complexity.42 Divided along these 
lines, I believe it is possible to identify that the teleological approach 
is prevalent in the first instance and the contextual approach in the 
second. By way of illustration, it seems likely that the jurisprudence 
in the Airbnb dispute has relatively straightforward objectives, the 
transposition of which into the digital world seems relatively easy 
to effectuate.43 
It is impossible to produce a comprehensive account of all the 
jurisprudence that finds application in this context. This is because 
the courts already have a sustained response, despite the relative 
newness of the economic models. Hence this chapter is restricted to 
two hypotheses. The first is that a local response emerging from the 
province of Quebec is concerned with the jurisprudential reaction 
to the phenomenon of Airbnb-type accommodations. The second is 
more global, as it analyzes the general contractual disqualification 
by the courts that gives rise to the fact that Uber drivers might fall 
within the domain of labour law.
1. The Effectiveness of Jurisprudence in the Airbnb Dispute
Airbnb vis-à-vis the Régie de logement. With the emergence of shared 
accommodation, a series of cases have illustrated the great capac-
ity of jurisprudence to adapt. While it is possible to locate disputes 
in Quebec regarding the relationship between the state and these 
“renters,”44 several, in fact, concern landlords and tenants, since this 
subletting of short duration effectively changes the deal made in the 
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original contract. Without entering unduly into this, one realizes 
that judicial interpretation can easily take place by applying the old 
texts to these new situations. In essence, the tenant who sublets his 
apartment through Airbnb is obliged to advise his landlord of this 
fact and to obtain the landlord’s consent.45 Hence, a landlord may 
repudiate the contract when a tenant has contravened article 1870 
of the Quebec Civil Code (CCQ) that requires the landlord’s consent 
to an act of subletting.46 In addition, the landlord will be able to 
repudiate on the basis that the tenant has changed the destination 
of the leased property by subletting it to a third party, and will be 
entitled to compensation for damages.47 Once again, in many respects 
the “old texts” such as the CCQ are easier to interpret than the new 
ones such as the Act Respecting Tourist Accommodation Establishments, 
which poses difficulties both in relation to its interpretation48 and 
its application.49 
2. The Effectiveness of Jurisprudence in the Uber Dispute
Uber and the Status of Drivers. A further illustration of the relative 
effectiveness of the traditional rules is to be found in the applica-
tion of labour law to this multinational entity. First, an extensive 
debate has occurred in several jurisdictions over whether the drivers 
can be considered as employees in spite of contractual stipulations 
that clearly set out their status as independent contractors. More 
often than not, the judicial response has been to set aside the con-
tract—as was the case, for instance, in California,50 London,51 and in 
Switzerland.52 Second, several courts have modified the contractual 
qualification that the multinational is not considered to be a taxi 
company but rather a software company.53 Therefore, contractual 
attempts to extract themselves from intensely regulated domains 
have not functioned very well in many instances. 
Interpretation. It thus appears that the legal complacency of 
which some complain, 54 in light of the development of disruptive 
technology, has by no means been established. Of course, by nature 
the law is slow to react, and it takes time before the rules will be 
plainly applicable. Quite simply, whether through qualification or 
through the creation of new categories of workers,55 jurisprudence 
constitutes a marvellous tool for adapting the facts to the law—as 
indeed the Airbnb example demonstrates. 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   121 18-11-08   08:42
 122 LAW AND THE “SHARING ECONOMY”
II. Norms in Search of Oversight 
Traditional normative tools work. They have their deficiencies, espe-
cially in the case of statutes, but they work. That said, they are often 
insufficient. For reasons of complexity, laws cannot specify certain 
types of obligations in too much detail. Being general and impersonal, 
they cannot always define with the necessary finesse what exactly 
the parties in question should respect. Among the normative tools 
that can sometimes go further, there are contracts and what I like 
to call “individual normativity.” Contracts naturally include those 
of adhesion (standard form contracts) that the platforms impose on 
their users. In order to limit the scope of the analysis, the focus here 
is on contracts between Uber and its drivers and passengers, as well 
as those between the landlords and tenants of Airbnb. But then there 
are the norms that the platforms self-proclaim: these establish their 
level of diligence in relation to privacy rights, security, and the choice 
of algorithms that occasionally are loaded with discrimination and 
bias.56 These rules, much like the contracts, do not give rise to mean-
ingful legal oversight. Due to their technicality, a significant degree 
of laissez-faire, their newness, and the changing nature of the data, 
legal interpreters are not very prompt in their analysis of these tools. 
Here we have a real normative gap57—certainly not a vacuum, but a 
zone that passes under the radar. And yet these norms are quite real, 
even though they operate in relative autonomy. This autonomy must 
be subjected to oversight.58 Each of these categories of (i.) individual 
norms and contracts (ii.) will now be considered more closely. 
i. The Quest to Oversee Individual Normativity
In one of his works, the philosopher Bernard Stiegler advances that, 
in the digital sphere, data poses at once the problem and the solu-
tion, the disease and the remedy. Similar to Pharmakon in Greek 
thought,59 this normative production that originates from the actors 
themselves disposes, on one hand, a real capacity to regulate, but on 
the other, these rules do not lead in practice to any oversight. Hence, 
individual normativity is essentially the solution that has almost 
unanimously been proposed in multiple domains of law and technol-
ogy, particularly in several legal texts; however, this approach gives 
rise to very weak legal oversight. It is expected that such oversight 
will become more rigorous in years to come. 
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1. Delegated Individual Normativity 
Generalization of Individual Normativity. This increase is undoubt-
edly linked to the fact that contemporary society gives rise to ever 
more complexity. To put it in ancient law terms: in order to manage 
this complexity, it is preferable to consider the law as a process, as 
presented by Plato, rather than a substantial principle, proposed by 
Aristotle in his writings. Indeed, the quest for legal objectification 
can no longer simply proceed through general substantive principles 
such as “adequate” security, “reasonable” management, and so on, 
but increasingly requires that the law be proceduralized, which may 
lead to an a posteriori assessment. This could be undertaken in isola-
tion by judges who would accordingly evaluate whether the docu-
ments in question are based on “rational justifications,” as Jacques 
Lenoble puts it.60 
Documentation. When faced with the complexity of factual situ-
ations, one often sees laws requiring actors to document their prac-
tices. Whether this is in the domain of privacy61 (where the notion 
of accountability has made incredible strides since the beginning of 
2010) or in the domain of security62 (where the same process is evi-
dent), it is clear that this is an olive branch for the actors themselves. 
They accordingly should develop the documentation in question by 
basing themselves directly on either formal norms (laws or regula-
tions) or (most likely) on “community” norms derived from commer-
cial associations or national and international standardization bodies. 
Thus, sharing economy companies are expected to demonstrate more 
transparency when it comes to their use of the data that is at the core 
of their business model. This calls for management with oversight: 
a standard should be proposed and an oversight entity identified. 
Moreover, many of the older digital companies have followed this 
approach: for instance, in 2011 Facebook negotiated an agreement 
with the United States Federal Trade Commission under which the 
company undertook to open up its books.63 This generalized form 
of oversight is operationalized by the implementation of an audit 
procedure. 
Audit of Activities. We are therefore witnessing the generaliza-
tion of a process-based approach in every shape and form,64 and that 
takes shape in Michael Power’s world-famous book, The Audit Society: 
Ritual of Verification, in which he documents a significant increase 
of this practice.65 Despite the lack of a definition,66 the models vary 
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over time; originally conceived of as a means of detecting fraud, in 
the twentieth century the audit was focussed more on getting an 
overview of the state of play.67 However, while the public still sees 
this role as a protective one, this is not the case in practice,68 where 
auditors are apprehensive that this will give rise to too extensive 
liability.69 Audit therefore has an inherently dark side in spite of the 
alleged quest for objectification. Auditors sometimes recognize the 
lack of clarity, even the doubts, that arise with regards to effective-
ness, even more so given the fact that big investments are often the 
order of the day. They acknowledge being the bearers of “comfort”70 
rather than of evidence. In sum, as Power argues, internal audits 
will soon eclipse external audits, and the distinction between them 
will become extremely vague. Internal auditors will play a role in 
matters of regulation and internal oversight will be outsourced to 
external agencies.71
Specific Cases in the Sharing Economy. Insofar as the sharing 
economy is concerned, there are multiple hypotheses wherein this 
normative solution would appear to be unavoidable. First, we know 
that companies abuse consumer data that they source ubiquitously. 
Admittedly, privacy laws apply, but these only indicate a general 
duty of “responsibility,”72 of accountability. Hence—and this goes 
beyond data that is forwarded due to state mandates73—we need to 
know more about the use to which such data is put by the company 
itself, whether the data derives from drivers or clients, landlords or 
lodgers. Second, the same goes for the scant oversight that exists in 
respect of the calculations effected by algorithms and their impacts 
in terms of discrimination. Here, again, there is not a legal vacuum at 
play but rather ignorance of the way in which to apply general prin-
ciples as recognized by human rights legislation. In both instances, 
the problems appear by accident, because of an inquest, or due to a 
leak by a former employee. 
2. Individual Normativity in Search of Oversight
Two Kinds of Individual Normativity. In order to address these short-
comings, and to ensure the improved oversight of such activities, 
it is important to illustrate how such individual normativity might 
occur. Two main hypotheses may be made in this regard. The first 
concerns the internal documents with which the company directs in 
sufficient detail that which the law cannot do directly. In fact, such 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   124 18-11-08   08:42
 The Normative Ecology of Disruptive Technology 125
commercial structures are characterized by a plurality of policies 
and procedures, and there is no doubt that these can bring about a 
high level of turnaround in the conduct of the actors involved (be 
they drivers or landlords). Second, and even more insidiously, the 
increased use of algorithmic calculation methods points to the likeli-
hood of neutrality and of a level of technicality that greatly reduces 
or eliminates the need for judicial oversight. However, nothing could 
be further from the truth.
Documentary Normativity. Initially I did not take an a priori 
negative view regarding the drafting of documents based on infor-
mal benchmarks, frequently originating either from commercial 
associations or from associations where the industry has a say. In 
fact, there undoubtedly is no other way. But the fact remains that it 
is necessary to press for a thorough thinking-through of both the 
document’s drafting process and the benchmarks on which it will be 
based. And a multitude of voices are challenging this firm but very 
little thought-through tendency of norm imposition.74 The important 
observation to be made here is that we are unfortunately at present 
very far from it, as much due to the “industry of norms” as to the 
“norms of industry”75 themselves. 
Deficient Normativity. To begin with, deficiencies arise in respect 
of the financial context within which such norms are drafted. All 
too often the norms “flourish,” in the words of Thibault Daudigeos, 
creating a multiplicity that is characterized by confusion.76 We are 
faced with a veritable “bazaar” of norms77 where, on the one hand, 
it is not known when and why government requires recourse to 
such norms,78 and, on the other, it is in the interests of certain orga-
nizations to “sell” theirs. This excessive profusion that needs to be 
analyzed is all the more problematic because certification and advice 
services are directly dependent on the norms in question. 
Normativity at a Cost. In the second instance, in addition to this 
normative multiplicity, there is an openness that is inherent to law, in 
that there is the need for law to be accessible and available to all who 
wish to navigate it. This seems very remote to someone who has had 
to pay 150 Swiss francs for a set of ISO norms. It is problematic, to say 
the least, that one cannot dispose of such “norms” freely, when legal 
doctrine acknowledges beyond a shadow of a doubt the “values” 
that are of importance, and instructs to take them seriously.79 Such 
norms are thus “techniques,” but they are not only that; they also 
constitute norms with a real political reach that are aimed at both 
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things and persons.80 This is all the more so in the case of copyright 
laws, which are completely ridiculous and where the online sale 
process is very far removed from the best practices that these laws 
are supposed to uphold.81
Algorithmic Normativity. The second hypothesis mentioned above 
relates to the choices effected by the industry itself, both in terms 
of complex algorithmic calculations as well as strictly commercial 
decisions. Thus, by way of example, it has been observed that Uber’s 
rate-fixing system is flexible and can be adjusted in terms of neigh-
bourhood and the relationship between supply and demand. Hence, 
there are peak times (surge pricing)82 that provide drivers with a 
higher rate of remuneration.83 On the one hand, the drivers do not 
always have access to all the information that the company has at its 
disposal, and, on the other hand, the company sometimes transmits 
messages to drivers that encourage them to work during specific time 
periods, while the forecasted traffic volumes are not necessarily very 
reliable. A real information symmetry is accordingly needed. The 
same goes for the rating system for drivers whose apparent “neutral-
ity” still needs to be considered. In essence, the calculation methods 
remain nebulous for the main persons involved.84
Zone of Tolerance. In spite of this reflex, which first made its 
appearance at the beginning of the digital era,85 the purported “legal 
vacuum” was soon discarded.86 To the contrary, we instead see an 
explosion of law, with new rules being added to the old. Yet, while 
I consider the use of the “vacuum” expression to be erroneous, it 
cannot be ignored that some areas of normativity remain under 
the half-hearted oversight of the law. Of this what I call “individual 
normativity” is a good example. In fact, whereas this mode of regu-
lation remains fundamentally new, because the mode of regulation 
has become generalized, I have not yet sufficiently evaluated the 
extent of the change and jurists have not yet sufficiently considered 
the domain that needs to be overseen. Although they bear differ-
ent titles, the same propositions can be found with regards to the 
quest for improved transparency of algorithmic calculations,87 for a 
decrease in informational asymmetry,88 for greater accountability,89 
in the need for more diligent processes,90 as well as in the notion of 
“platform loyalty.”91 While there thus is relative unanimity on the 
need for greater oversight—in fact, there has been for a long,92 long,93 
time—what form should such oversight take? What means could be 
put into place to ensure that lack of transparency loses ground? 
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Development of Tools for Oversight. Insofar as this issue is con-
cerned, the tools are well known. They are documentary, technologi-
cal, and legal. First, in managerial contexts, as previously discussed, 
both an explosion of individual documents and of oversight by 
skilled persons (via internal or external audits) can be observed. 
Despite the previous generalization, such solutions are not a cure-
all. Documentation certainly contains clearer objectives, thanks to 
technical norms that detail the obligations to be respected. In fact, 
audits, aside from their cost, are limited in terms of effectiveness. 
Documentary deficiencies have been measured in financial security 
matters,94 as well as in the particular instance of electronic voting.95 
Second, there is a completely natural reflex towards a more techno-
logical solution. In this context, authors propose a range of solutions 
for purposes of ensuring oversight if desired. One that stands out 
is software testing, which makes it possible to measure potential 
biases associated with particular algorithms. Another is cryptologic 
captures that freeze the informatics tools under analysis in time.96 In 
all of these cases such means nevertheless contain deficiencies. One 
of them, of a politico-economic nature, is that the testing is generally 
done by an agency, a “certification body.” This means that although 
the managerial solution rests on the shoulders of the company, the 
technological approach appears rather to require the intervention of 
an entity that closes in on a function usually fulfilled by the state.97 
This is no innocent distinction: oversight takes on a different centre 
of gravity. And this brings us to a third pathway: judicial oversight. 
In view of the area’s newness and its inherent complexity, there has 
not yet been a real appropriation of this oversight, if not by the law, 
then at least by the judiciary. Thus, there still is scope for improve-
ment in the courts’ reception of this normativity. While jurisprudence 
has the marvellous ability to adapt itself to the circumstances, judges 
are hindered by the inherent complexity of the subject matter, the 
references to technical norms,98 and the frequent interventions by 
expert witnesses. There is a discrepancy at work. The ties between 
law and technique need strengthening. We will have no other choice 
but to promote a new lex electronica;99 a new lex informatica.100
ii. The Quest to Control Contractual Normativity
The contract, a pillar of commerce, is a very flexible legal tool. With 
a few exceptions, it takes no specific form, with consent sufficing to 
conclude one.101 Bolstered by this flexibility, Canadian jurisprudence 
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has given a generous interpretation to contractual performance in 
the digital context, and laws—especially those pertaining to consum-
ers—have established procedures that are easy to comply with.102 
This decrease in legal oversight has led industry to adopt contractual 
practices that would appear to be contestable. These are practices 
that deserve more stringent legal oversight that is more attuned to 
the first principles that prevail in contract law. 
1. Contractual Normativity as Pervasive and Deficient
Drafting Difficulties. The “standard” contracts that are currently 
flourishing on Internet platforms, such as those used in the sharing 
economy, present another example of normative omnipresence in 
this context. Once again, claims are made of a legal vacuum when, 
in effect, it is overfull. This is a contractual pathology103 if ever there 
was one. A simple look at the Uber and Airbnb contracts induces 
amazement and hand-wringing because of their undue length, the 
contracts being respectively sixteen104 and seventy-five105 pages in 
length. In addition to being long, they are vague106 and too often 
subject to interpretation. Moreover, the texts are crammed full of 
hypertext links—which serves to further increase their length.107 
We are therefore witnessing true contractual pathologies, both 
with regard to the usage conditions and the protection of personal 
information. This means that there is a “cost”108 for the members-
consumers that largely outweighs the potential advantages.109 This 
is a cost that even diligent consumers who read the clauses do not 
manage to reduce in practice.110
Difficulties in Indicating Consent. But that is not all: such deficien-
cies appear not only in the drafting of the contract but also in the 
way in which the parties indicate their consent. Various behaviour 
patterns have been developed, and several among them have been 
interpreted by the courts. Thus “click wraps” (clicking on an icon) 
are generally deemed to provide more protection to the member than 
“browse wrap” (entering into a contract by reason of the mere pres-
ence of a contract on the site that engages the user). This certainly is 
better, but how very little. Indeed, an American author demonstrates 
that the fact that the user is given the opportunity to click on such 
an icon basically changes nothing in terms of awareness of the con-
tractual content.111 The entire process is designed to be quick, and 
the consumers do not read, nor do they want to read.
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General Acknowledgement of the Deficient Form of Electronic 
Contracts. In spite of the aforementioned pathologies, a fairly lax 
judicial tendency can be observed when it comes to admitting them. 
In Canada, the flagship case is undoubtedly Dell Computer,112 where 
the Supreme Court, in July 2007, refused to consider a long and ver-
bose contract as being incomprehensible113 or otherwise abusive.114 
More specifically, the judges ruled that such violations had not 
been demonstrated. Even though the respondents’ reasoning was 
essentially quite weak, the court did not dare take the leap towards 
increased oversight of online contracts. The free-for-all approach 
that globally characterizes contractual practice was therefore con-
doned. The “old” American case that modified the cases preceding 
it,115 ProCD v Zeidenberg,116 was followed. Consent in contract, once 
mythologized, thus became decorative.117 And what a pity!118 The 
effect of this condonation has been to extol the status quo. No need 
to improve contracts; the debate on the notion of “plain English”119 
that took place in the 1970s was buried, although the jurisprudence 
occasionally sees rare instances of reminiscence.120 
Conceptual Difficulties Relating to the Status of “Consent.” There 
is thus a jurisprudential tendency to weaken the place of “consent” 
within contracts. In fact, while the principle of consent remains one 
of the conditions for entering into a valid contract,121 consent is now 
relatively easy to demonstrate—even if this is known to be completely 
illusory in practice. In North America, autonomy of will, without 
being formally challenged, is diluted on two levels. As we have previ-
ously seen, this flexible understanding is confirmed both in the com-
munication of the contractual information and in the way in which 
consent is manifested. Condemning this practice, and this change 
of an important paradigm, Mark Lemley observes that “[t]oday, by 
contrast, more and more courts and commentators seem willing to 
accept the idea that if a business writes a document and calls it a 
contract, courts will enforce it as a contract even if no one agrees 
to it.”122 An erosion can thus be observed: “The idea of voluntary 
willingness first decayed into consent, then into assent, then into the 
mere possibility or opportunity for assent, then to merely fictional 
assent, then to mere efficient rearrangement of entitlements without 
any consent or assent.”123 This erosion is all the more contradictory 
when one considers that these contracts continue to repeat that the 
member has read and understood the incomprehensible provisions.124
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2. Contractual Normativity in Search of Oversight 
When it comes to potential pathways for increased oversight of the 
contracts under discussion, they present themselves in two dimen-
sions: form and substance. 
Potential Pathways to Overseeing the Contractual Form. In contracts 
put forward by disruptive technology companies, as is the case with 
the rest of electronic commerce, it appears imperative that a real 
“contractual marketing”125 be put forward. It is therefore important to 
draft the contract’s content bearing in mind that it will not be read by 
the consumer if it keeps being presented in standard format. Drafting 
efforts that may have been suggested in the past, based on the use 
of colours or distinct characters,126 are poor stopgaps, a Band-Aid 
on a wooden leg. Rather, a complete redraft needs to be considered. 
Apart from their length, the contracts should be integrated in the 
purchase process, meaning that they are part of it in the same way 
as the choice of product. It is an astonishing fact that on Internet 
sites it is only contracts that are designed with the objective of not 
informing. Everywhere else the objective is to retain the customer’s 
interest; when it comes to online contracts, the position is the oppo-
site. In this informational context, and because of the fact that con-
sent is being reconsidered, the possibility for increasing consumer 
understanding of contracts is limited only by the creativity of the 
lawyers. A first step might be to insert images, such as pictograms, 
each of which represents a different clause.127 Next, why not render 
the contract accessible in audio format? In an era where the number of 
functional illiterates approaches 50 per cent, it is not inconceivable to 
vocally “translate” the contract. The digital environment makes this 
process possible, and there is no doubt that such a solution would 
of itself affect the length, the majority of current contracts not being 
capable of being read in a reasonable time. Then, there is scope for 
categorizing contracts: they could differ on the basis of the prod-
ucts sold, the profile of the purchaser, the consumer’s geographical 
location, and so on. Finally, and without claiming to be exhaustive, 
the reinforcement of consent could also manifest itself through the 
individualization of the contract: the names of the parties could be 
inserted into the contract. The idea behind this is that the consumer 
would feel more involved if he or she saw his or her name appear, 
and would therefore consider the contractual obligations to be more 
closely associated to his or her person. 
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Administrative Oversight. That said, we saw that judicial over-
sight—especially in the Dell matter—has been minimalist. This is why 
alternative solutions in the form of contractual oversight practises 
have been suggested in the literature. One of the most commonly 
proposed solutions is to ensure that a dedicated government agency 
could, at an early stage, sift out “unconscionable”128 clauses. While 
this solution works in the United States in other domains, strongly 
flavoured as being a public policy measure—for instance concerning 
mortgage loans—I consider it too complex to extend to an economic 
sector of such a cross-cutting nature as disruptive technology. In 
fact, digital technology constitutes a tool and the electronic contract 
cannot be confined to a sector. This renders it difficult to bundle prac-
tices. As well, this is a matter of culture, and the integration of state 
agencies is not a common reflex in North America. Hence, notwith-
standing their undeniable benefits and their real achievements,129 
the French130 or Israeli131 solutions would not appear to be easily 
transposable onto other continents. 
Potential Pathways to Overseeing Contractual Substance. But beyond 
the form of these digital contracts, it would seem that salvation is 
likely to lie in oversight of substance rather than form. Llewellyn, the 
great architect of the United States codification around 1960, claimed 
that the judicial system fulfills this contractual oversight function in 
circumstances where it is practically impossible to consent to clauses: 
Instead of thinking about “assent” to boiler-plate clauses, we can 
recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at 
all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few 
dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but 
one thing more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a spe-
cific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may 
have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable 
meaning of the dickered terms.132 
This solution has, moreover, been integrated in certain statutory 
texts.133 But beyond the wisdom inherent in this formula, it should 
be noted that this traditional mode of oversight does not operate in 
an optimal manner. In fact, as we have seen, there are few decisions 
that sanction contractual practices. In Canada, the Dell Computer 
decision has served to illustrate the judges’ refusal to perform this 
oversight role,134 legal security being given preference over consumer 
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interests.135 Neither has this oversight role been emphasized in the 
new legislative provisions pertaining to electronic consumer con-
tracts that nevertheless aimed to strengthen the need for contractual 
information.136
Jurisprudential Hope? Still, despite this somewhat despondent 
discourse, the question arises whether there is not perhaps reason for 
hope. Indeed, on 23 June 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered 
an important decision that has tempered contractual omnipotence, 
Douez v Facebook.137 In an admittedly divided decision, the majority 
went in an unexpected direction in ruling that there were substan-
tial grounds for not upholding a choice of forum clause in favour of 
Californian law with the District Court of Santa Clara as the court 
of competent jurisdiction.138 Thus the majority considered that 
while such clauses are usually valid, a series of arguments weighed 
in favour of a reversal. Among them there was first and foremost 
the fact that this was in a consumer context.139 This justification is 
remarkable, for there is no discussion on this point: it is self-evident 
and the decision notes that a consumer context is involved,140 even 
though the Facebook contract is offered free of charge. The lack of 
discussion is intriguing, although this position appears to be com-
pletely justified. It remains novel, in the sense that some older deci-
sions have suggested the converse.141 The consequence is that this 
relationship comprises an inherent fragility, one that is emphasized 
and multiplied by the development of the Internet142 but also by the 
fact that the users are not really in a situation where they have the 
freedom to choose something else.143 This is therefore a major deci-
sion in the sense that it introduces a case with an individualistic 
approach to contracts, even if this is limited to a specific question 
pertaining to choice of forum. It is an approach that Justice Abella 
would undoubtedly be keen to extend beyond the present question.144
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CHAPTER V
Information Law in the Platform 
Economy: Ownership, Control, 
and Reuse of Platform Data
Teresa Scassa1
I. Introduction
The platform (or sharing) economy business model is defined by Katz as having “(A) an online intermediary that (B) acts as a market 
for P2P services and (C) facilitates exchanges by lowering transaction 
costs.”2 Scholars such as Lobel talk about the platforms “transforming 
the service economy, allowing greater access to offline exchanges for 
lower prices.”3 Although the platform economy has already generated 
considerable scholarly interest, much of the legal literature to this point 
has focused upon regulatory issues,4 taxation,5 and issues relating to 
employment law,6 consumer protection,7 and discrimination.8
This chapter considers platform economy companies in terms of 
the data they collect and generate. The data that are the stock-in-trade 
of these companies is considered—both by the companies and under 
current legal regimes, to be proprietary to them. Under a proprietary 
model, the companies can control who can access and use the data, 
and for what purposes.9 As Kitchin notes, companies can also control 
what subsets of data they make available when they choose to do 
so.10 Yet digital data cannot be so easily owned or controlled—nor 
should it necessarily be. As this chapter will demonstrate, publicly 
accessible platform data is of significant interest to a broad range of 
both commercial and non-commercial users, including government, 
civil-society actors, researchers and other businesses. The data, 
therefore, have both private and public dimensions. 
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This chapter uses Airbnb as a case study in order to explore 
the application of existing information law frameworks to publicly 
accessible data in the platform economy and to identify areas where 
courts must take into account its public interest dimensions. Unlike 
some platform companies, Airbnb must necessarily make a consider-
able amount of its data accessible on its website in order to facilitate 
the desired transactions between hosts and guests for short-term 
rental accommodation.11 These data are commercially valuable to 
Airbnb; they are also of use or value to a range of different actors. 
This chapter begins by developing a legal typology for the kinds of 
Airbnb data that are contributed by users and generated through 
use of the platform. In section III, it considers the data “ecosystem” 
that has evolved around Airbnb data. It looks at different categories 
of users of both publicly accessible and confidential Airbnb data. 
While these two sections consider both the data and actors in broad 
terms, the remainder of the chapter focuses more narrowly on the 
category of publicly accessible Airbnb data and on the actors who 
engage in “scraping” this data. Section IV considers Airbnb’s Terms 
of Service to explore the claims made by the company with respect to 
ownership, use, and control of its data. Section V examines the legal 
frameworks that protect data, and that protect the public interest with 
respect to publicly available private sector data. While the main focus 
of this section is on copyright law, the law relating to confidential 
information, contracts, and trespass to chattels is also discussed.
The consideration of these various issues in the context of the 
platform economy suggests that there is something particular about 
this context. Many of the issues are not exclusive to the platform 
economy. Nevertheless, the size of platforms such as Airbnb, their 
global reach and local dominance make this context of particular 
interest. Platform companies such as Airbnb can have significant 
local and public impacts, affecting incumbent industries, municipal 
regulation, public tax revenues, and even urban quality of life. Their 
reliance on huge volumes of data and the relevance of this data to 
understanding and addressing the public impacts of such companies 
create interesting tensions around access to and control over this 
data. Thus, while some of the legal issues considered in this chapter 
arise in other contexts as well, the focus here is upon data ecosystems 
within the platform economy and the particular public policy chal-
lenges they present for the interpretation and application of laws as 
they pertain to data.
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II. A Legal Typology of Airbnb Data
Airbnb is a platform that allows the pairing of those seeking to rent 
short-term accommodation with those who have available space to 
rent. It does so on a global level. According to Airbnb, it operates in 
over 191 countries and over 65,000 cities. It claims to offer over three 
million listings worldwide, and to having provided accommodation 
for over 150 million travellers.12 As Sabrina Tremblay-Huet explains 
in her chapter in this volume, while the “myth” of Airbnb is that it 
allows ordinary individuals to monetize extra space in their homes, 
the reality is that Airbnb’s hosts are increasingly commercially ori-
ented, and a growing number offer whole units instead of shared 
accommodation.
The large volume of data collected or generated by Airbnb can 
be categorized in a number of different ways. Such categorizations 
are useful in that they can point to differences in how data may be 
treated under law; they are not mutually exclusive. For example, 
personal information can be either confidential data or public data, 
depending on how it is treated by the company. Similarly, not all 
personal information is collected directly from the individual; much 
personal information can be collected through the tracking of indi-
vidual activities on the site.
The first dichotomy distinguishes between confidential and 
public data. As noted earlier, in order to operate its service, Airbnb 
must make a considerable amount of information publicly accessible 
via its website. This is its “public data.” Airbnb relies on this data to 
connect those who have short-term accommodation to rent (hosts) 
and those who are seeking short-term accommodation (guests). Its 
platform offers hosts and guests the opportunity to share information 
about themselves and about available rental units in order to facilitate 
rental agreements. A host, for example, will provide a description 
of the property, typically with photographs, as well as availability, 
location, price, and any relevant features or limitations. Hosts also 
provide some information about themselves. Guests must create 
profiles through the Airbnb registration process and can include 
photographs and other personal information. Profiles may also be 
linked to Facebook or Google accounts. Guests also provide content 
in the form of comments and reviews of rented accommodations, 
and hosts may review guests. These reviews are part of the “trust 
system” that enables a company like Airbnb to achieve the volume of 
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business that it does.13 While a great deal of the public-facing content 
is provided by users, this information and the manner in which it is 
shared are shaped by the policies and templates used by Airbnb. In 
addition, some public-facing content may be provided in conjunction 
with Airbnb. For example, Airbnb offers a “verified photographs” 
service through which hosts can have their properties photographed 
by Airbnb representatives. These photos are then presented in the 
listings as having been verified by Airbnb.14 The process is designed 
to increase user trust that the accommodations offered for rent are 
as they appear in the photographs.
In addition to its public data, Airbnb also collects and generates 
a considerable amount of confidential commercial information. This 
includes some of the data contributed (both directly and indirectly)15 
by Airbnb users, as well as data collected, derived or generated from 
the company’s operations.16 For example, at the time of registration, 
Airbnb asks for scanned identification documents for the purposes 
of verifying user identities as part of their Verified ID program.17 It 
also collects information about users’ activities on the site, includ-
ing what units they make available to rent as well as the dates and 
frequency of activities. It collects transaction-related data. Airbnb 
will also collect data from social networking sites to which a user 
has provided access. In addition to data provided to Airbnb by its 
members, Airbnb collects data through the tracking of usage of its 
site through logs and cookies. It also amasses a variety of personal 
and other data from users of its mobile app, including location infor-
mation.18 Airbnb collects data from its other contacts with users, 
including service or assistance requests, complaints, and disputes 
regarding rented accommodations.19 Where an Airbnb user links his 
or her account to Facebook or Google Plus, Airbnb will have access to 
some of the information contained in user accounts on those social 
networking sites.20 Any of this information that is not published on 
the website is treated as confidential information.21 
The second dichotomy divides the data collected by Airbnb 
into the categories of personal and non-personal information. The 
distinction is relevant in the context of privacy or data protection 
laws. Data protection laws impose obligations on companies to pro-
tect that which is defined as “personal information.”22 Information 
that is non-personal falls outside of the scope of such laws. Typically, 
personal information is defined as information about identifiable 
individuals.23 This includes specific data such as names and other 
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unique identifiers. However, information about identifiable individu-
als includes any information that can lead to their identification, even 
if no unique identifier makes this connection plain at the outset.24 An 
age linked to a postal code, for example, can lead to the identifica-
tion of a specific individual.25 In combination, this would constitute 
information about an identifiable individual. 
The Airbnb website collects a significant amount of personal 
information from individuals, whether directly or indirectly. This 
includes the type of personal information needed for registration 
and transaction purposes, as well as information about rental prop-
erties, vacation times or preferences, and profile information. It 
may also include information shared by the user from other linked 
social media sites, and includes tracking and profiling data. Personal 
information also includes users’ reviews of properties and ratings 
for hosts and renters. 
Airbnb also deals in aggregate and de-identified data about its 
users. These latter categories, so long as reidentification is not pos-
sible, constitute non-personal information. Non-personal informa-
tion includes data derived from Airbnb site usage and can include 
information about markets, prices, occupancy, peak travel periods 
and destinations, and so on. As Airbnb notes in its privacy policy, 
it may “share aggregated information (information about our users 
that we combine together so that it no longer identifies or references 
an individual user) and non-personally identifiable information for 
industry and market analysis, demographic profiling, marketing and 
advertising and other business purposes.”26
The third dichotomy distinguishes between raw and processed 
data. Raw data is simply data that has been collected through some 
means, and that has yet to be processed. Processed data is that which 
has been sorted, analyzed, compiled, or categorized in some way. As 
will be seen in the discussion of the Airbnb data “ecosystem,” a sig-
nificant proportion of users of Airbnb data are interested in raw data 
extracted from the site in bulk for the purposes of analytics—whether 
commercial or non-commercial. The distinction between raw and 
processed data is important from an intellectual property point of 
view. Copyright law does not protect raw, unprocessed data. These 
data are considered to be in the public domain,27 although copyright 
law will protect an original compilation of data. There are interesting 
questions around whether some processed data (especially where the 
output is not strictly factual, as is the case with predictive or profiling 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   153 18-11-08   08:42
 154 LAW AND THE “SHARING ECONOMY”
data) may themselves be considered original works and not simply 
compilations.28 The more processed the data, the greater the likeli-
hood that it can be protected under copyright law. The distinction 
between raw and processed data may therefore also be significant in 
a copyright fair dealing analysis, since data extracted in bulk for the 
purposes of analytics will also eventually become processed data—
something that may be recognized as a new and independent work.
III. The Airbnb Data Ecosystem
The data collected by Airbnb are enormous in quantity and variety. 
These data are of interest and value to a significant number of dif-
ferent users. In this part of the chapter, these users, their means 
of accessing the data, and the uses to which they put the data are 
described. Table I below provides an overview of what is referred 
to as the Airbnb data “ecosystem.” The variety of users, uses and 
means of accessing the data are extremely interesting in an evolving 
data society. While Airbnb considers its data to be proprietary, the 
discussion of the ecosystem reveals significant private and public 
interests in the data.
Table I: Airbnb Data “Ecosystem” 
Data Users Uses
Public Data
Airbnb hosts and guests Sharing/renting short-term accommodations
Civil-society organizations Supporting activism through data collection 
and analysis
Researchers Carrying out research on Airbnb, its 
activities, and impacts
Journalists Investigating/reporting on Airbnb, its 
activities, and its impacts
Opportunistic businesses Performing data analytics services to clients, 
investigative services
Confidential Data
Regulators Carrying out regulatory activities (taxation, 
health and safety, urban planning)
Law enforcement Criminal investigations, national security
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i. Public Data
The public portions of Airbnb’s website contain a trove of data that 
is of interest to a broad range of users. These users access data from 
the site in a number of different ways. One of these is simply through 
browsing the site and examining the information on public display. 
Others extract data from Airbnb’s website by copying it on a small 
scale (downloads or printouts of particular pages, or screen shots). 
Still others use software tools to “scrape” large quantities of data 
from the site. Scraping has been described as “using computer soft-
ware to ‘crawl’ an online data source to identify data of interest and 
then extract data from that source.”29 Other users may generate new 
data through research methods that involve interactions with hosts or 
guests.30 The categories of users are discussed below, with examples 
provided of some of the uses to which they put Airbnb data. 
Airbnb hosts and guests are the primary audience for the 
Airbnb platform. In fact, the platform is designed to enable those 
seeking rentals to find suitable available accommodations at their tar-
get destination. Hosts and guests register with the site, and they are 
permitted to browse the site and to use it to reserve accommodation 
or to leave feedback. Hosts and guests generally have no particular 
interest in extracting data from the site. They have accounts, and the 
data relevant to their renting activities is stored in their accounts or 
communicated to them by other means as part of the operation of 
the platform.
Civil-society organizations, particularly those with an interest 
in affordable housing and shortages in long-term accommodation, 
have been known to scrape Airbnb data. For example, advocate Tom 
Slee openly discusses scraping Airbnb data on his website, and pro-
vides a link to his code.31 He scrapes Airbnb data in order to produce 
reports that he makes available for use in public policy discussions. 
He also provides visualizations (charts, tables, and maps) of Airbnb 
listings around the world.32 Slee also makes his code used for scrap-
ing data publicly available. Slee states on his website that “[t]he 
listings are provided as a contribution to the debates that surround 
Airbnb and its effects on the places where it operates.”33 Another 
civil-society website, InsideAirbnb.com, operated by Murray Cox, 
offers Airbnb data, commentary, and analysis. Cox states that “[b]y 
analyzing publicly available information about a city’s Airbnb’s list-
ings, Inside Airbnb provides filters and key metrics so you can see 
how Airbnb is being used to compete with the residential housing 
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market.”34 Issues of interest to civil-society actors include the avail-
ability of affordable housing, and the impact on neighborhoods of 
widespread, extended short-term rentals.35
Researchers also have an interest in Airbnb data, again for a 
wide range of reasons, including those that relate to research for 
urban planning, social justice, and the sharing economy more gen-
erally. Researchers may scrape their own data, or they may use data 
scraped by others. For example, graduate student Iain Majoribanks 
used scraped Airbnb data from Inside Airbnb to conduct a study of 
the impact of the service on the Vancouver market for long-term rental 
accommodation.36 Another graduate student, Karen Sawatzky, scraped 
Airbnb data in order to carry out similar research on the Vancouver 
rental market.37 Other researchers have used Airbnb data to study 
the incidence of discrimination in the renting of Airbnb units.38 In 
this latter example, the researchers used the website to gather their 
own data; they signed in as users, researched available properties, 
and made contact with potential hosts with inquiries about rentals.39 
This is an example of a combination of making use of available Airbnb 
data about hosts and properties and creating new data (research data) 
through interactions with hosts using the platform.
Journalists may also scrape data in order to better understand 
the activities or impacts of Airbnb. For example, the San Francisco 
Chronicle has used scraped data in a story on Airbnb’s impact.40 The 
travel industry news site Skift also used scraped data in a study of 
the impact of Airbnb in New York City.41 Journalists may also use 
data scraped by others, such as the civil-society groups noted above, 
or data made available in published studies commissioned by oth-
ers. They may also engage directly in data scraping. Data scraping 
by journalists is described as a way to gather large amounts of data 
for newspaper stories.42 From a journalist’s perspective, the data 
is already publicly available and thus open for investigation and 
inquiry. Scraping merely facilitates that process.43
“Opportunistic” businesses also make use of data that they 
extract from Airbnb’s website. These businesses rely upon the exis-
tence of Airbnb and offer services that are directly or indirectly 
related to it. Note that this category does not include any companies 
that use Airbnb data to compete directly with Airbnb; rather, these 
companies offer a range of services that are distinct from or comple-
mentary to those offered by Airbnb. In some cases, these businesses 
provide services that may undermine Airbnb (such as services that 
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detect illegal hosts); in other cases, they may use data in ways that 
adversely impact Airbnb (such as, for example, demonstrating nega-
tive impacts of Airbnb rentals on urban housing situations). 
Perhaps the best-known opportunistic company is Airdna. 
Airdna, which operates through a website at airdna.co, offers a broad 
range of “data services.” According to their site, “Airdna presents 
market reports and other data products that feature occupancy rates, 
seasonal demand, and revenue generated by short-term rentals. This 
information—once only available to corporate hotel chains—is now 
accessible to the everyday homeowner and real estate investor.”44 
The company provides “market summary reports,” a “pricing co-
pilot” tool to provide supply and demand data on short-term rental 
accommodations in particular markets, market intelligence reports, 
and property performance data. Its clients include lodging analysts, 
tourism agencies, academics, realtors, Airbnb hosts and potential 
hosts.45 The data used by Airdna to drive its analysis is sourced from 
Airbnb’s website. The company states that “Airdna analytics and 
reports are based on Airbnb data gathered from information publicly 
available on the Airbnb website.”46 This claim implies that the data 
is legally obtained, although the terms of use of Airbnb prohibit 
the scraping of data, its extraction by any technological means, and 
its use for any commercial purposes.47 Airdna is also linked to the 
spinoff company Rentingyourplace.com,48 which offers consulting 
services for prospective Airbnb hosts.
Other businesses that draw on Airbnb data include Beyond 
Pricing.49 This company offers Airbnb hosts services that assist them 
in managing the pricing of multiple Airbnb listings. They claim: 
“Our pricing algorithm updates your rates every day according to 
real-time demand, so we’ll automatically post the best rate for your 
weekends.”50 They also make recommendations as to other fees such 
as cleaning charges and fees for extra guests. The service requires 
hosts to allow Beyond Pricing to have access to their Airbnb accounts 
“to collect real-time information about your listing and to automati-
cally update prices on your calendar every day.”51 Beyond Pricing 
does not state as explicitly as Airdna that it relies upon Airbnb data, 
but this reliance can be inferred from numerous references to its 
algorithms on its website. These algorithms, designed to predict 
periods of peak demand in order to drive pricing, take into account 
a great deal of data from different sources, but one of these sources is 
definitely Airbnb.52 Similar companies include SmartHost,53 (which 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   157 18-11-08   08:42
 158 LAW AND THE “SHARING ECONOMY”
provides a range of analytics services to hosts on Airbnb, VRBO, 
and similar sites), Everbooked54 (which offers similar services and 
explicitly indicates that it uses Airbnb data in its analytics), and 
PriceLabs55 (which also offers data analytics in support of short-term 
rental pricing, although it is not explicit about whether it relies upon 
Airbnb data).
A related category of businesses that may use scraped data 
from Airbnb includes consulting companies that may work for clients 
with various interests in Airbnb data. For example, in order to better 
understand the impact of Airbnb in Vancouver, the City of Vancouver 
hired a consulting company that scraped data in order to produce 
its report.56 Newspapers have commissioned consulting companies 
to scrape data for their stories on Airbnb.57
Another category of businesses that relies upon Airbnb data 
are those that offer services to condominium boards or the owners 
of rental buildings who wish to identify residents or tenants who 
may be renting their units as short-term accommodation in violation 
of their condominium agreements or leases. These may be private 
detectives whose services include determining when units have been 
illegally rented.58 Their data-gathering methods may be as simple 
as browsing the site for leads on which they follow up. Other busi-
nesses are emerging that offer detection services tailored specifically 
to the sharing economy. These include Building Snitch,59 a company 
that uses automated search tools (robots) to trawl listings to detect 
illegal rentals.60
ii. Confidential Data
Gaining access to Airbnb’s confidential data or confidential com-
mercial information is much more difficult than accessing public 
data, and indeed, legal access is limited to those outsiders who are 
able to obtain a subpoena or court order. Court orders can be used 
by governments and private litigants to gain access to Airbnb data 
for a variety of purposes. Court orders may be used to obtain either 
public or private Airbnb data (or both). For example, if data is needed 
for the purposes of law enforcement, scraped data may be inadequate 
as it is necessary to link rental information to individuals and their 
contact information. The questionable legality of data scraping may 
also make scraped data unsuitable for law enforcement purposes. 
Where some or all of the data sought from Airbnb is confidential, a 
court order is essential to access the data.
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In the case of governments, the data may be relevant for pur-
poses that include the enforcement of provincial/national laws or 
regulations, or the pursuit of criminal or national security investiga-
tions involving Airbnb hosts or guests. Following criticism by the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation for its failure to provide transpar-
ency reports,61 Airbnb released its first such report in September 
2016.62 The report reveals that in the first six months of 2016, Airbnb 
received 188 law enforcement requests and provided data in response 
to eighty-two of these.63 
Government officials and regulators may also be interested in 
data for the purposes of urban planning, to address or understand 
housing market issues, to regulate or decide how to regulate short-
term accommodation rentals, or to impose or enforce the collection 
of hotel taxes and income taxes. While the data that is most likely 
to be of interest to regulators is confidential data that is not part of 
the public-facing content, scraped public-facing data may also be of 
some use—particularly for broader planning purposes, and for the 
purposes of understanding Airbnb impacts. Governments do not 
necessarily scrape their own data. Some may rely on data scraped by 
civil-society groups. Others contract with consultants for studies of 
the local impact of Airbnb. As noted above, these consultants may in 
turn scrape data from Airbnb’s website.64 Scraped data may also be 
useful to governments in attempting to identify where subpoenaed 
data might be necessary, or as a point of comparison to assess the 
quality of data obtained under subpoenas or other releases.65
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Table II provides an overview of the different ways in which 
different participants in the Airbnb data ecosystem access the data 
that they use. The question mark for “regulatory” requirements is 
used in the case of researchers, journalists, and civil-society groups. 
These groups would almost certainly access data that are submitted 
to governments as part of regulatory and permitting requirements 
if such data were available either through access to information 
requests or as open data. However, where Airbnb operates outside 
of the regulatory frameworks for short-term rental accommodation, 
data are not available through these avenues. For these groups, such 
data are primarily available through scraping activities.
IV. Airbnb’s Terms of Service 
It is commonplace now for commercial websites to provide links 
to their Terms of Service (TOS). The role of such terms is to set the 
parameters of what is considered to be acceptable use of the website. 
Courts have shown considerable deference to these TOS, and increas-
ingly they are found to be binding on users of such sites. This section 
examines Airbnb’s TOS, while the following section considers some 
of the legal issues raised by data scraping activities.
Although it is possible to search Airbnb’s listings without reg-
istering as a host or guest, it is impossible to book accommodations 
without having registered. However, anyone who uses the site (not just 
hosts and guests) is considered by Airbnb to be bound by the TOS.66 
A link to Airbnb’s TOS is found at the bottom right-hand corner of the 
home page and in the same location on every other page on the site. 
Hosts and guests are also provided with links to the TOS and other 
policies at the point of registration, with notice being provided in the 
following terms: “By signing up, I agree to Airbnb’s Terms of Service, 
Nondiscrimination Policy, Payments Terms of Service, Privacy Policy, 
Guest Refund Policy, and Host Guarantee Terms.” Hyperlinks are 
provided to each of the relevant policies.
The Airbnb user agreement addresses only the publicly acces-
sible data that can be found on its site, and it describes this data as 
content. Airbnb’s TOS distinguish between three types of content:
5.1 Airbnb may, at its sole discretion, enable Members to (i) 
create, upload, post, send, receive and store content, such as 
text, photos, audio, video, or other materials and information 
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on or through the Airbnb Platform (“Member Content”); 
and (ii) access and view Member Content and any content 
that Airbnb itself makes available on or through the Airbnb 
Platform, including proprietary Airbnb content and any content 
licensed or authorized for use by or through Airbnb from a third 
party (“Airbnb Content” and together with Member Content, 
“Collective Content”).67
Airbnb asserts copyright in Airbnb content.68 Although Airbnb does 
not claim copyright in content contributed by members,69 nor asks 
for an assignment of copyright in this material, Airbnb does acquire 
a perpetual, non-exclusive worldwide licence to use and disseminate 
this content.70 
Airbnb offers a limited, non-exclusive, non-transferable licence 
to its members, and to any other visitors to the site, to access and 
view Airbnb Content, as well as any Member Content to which a 
user has been granted access. The licence is solely for personal and 
non-commercial purposes.71 Permitted uses of the data are therefore 
extremely limited. In fact, the TOS specifically deny permission to a 
broad range of potential uses of the site’s content. For example, users 
may not “copy, adapt, modify, prepare derivative works of, distribute, 
license, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, 
broadcast or otherwise exploit the Airbnb Platform or Collective 
Content […].”72
Airbnb uses its TOS to impose additional restrictions on the 
extraction of its content.73 The TOS specifically address (and prohibit) 
the scraping and harvesting of data from the website.74 Manual or 
automated scraping is prohibited.75 Further, it is prohibited to “use, 
copy, adapt, modify, prepare derivative works of, distribute, license, 
sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, broadcast 
or otherwise exploit the Airbnb Platform or Collective Content […].”76 
In case this is not sufficiently clear, the TOS specifically provide that 
a user will not “use the Airbnb Platform or Collective Content for 
any commercial or other purposes that are not expressly permitted 
by these Terms.”77 The TOS also provide that there is to be no cir-
cumvention of any technological protection measures that are put in 
place to protect Airbnb or member content. Article 14.1 specifically 
states that users shall not “avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, impair, 
descramble, or otherwise attempt to circumvent any technological 
measure implemented by Airbnb or any of Airbnb’s providers or any 
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other third party to protect the Airbnb Platform.”78 Airbnb retains a 
number of different options for responding to violations of its TOS. 
For example, breach of the terms entitles Airbnb to deactivate user 
accounts or to ban users from the site.79 Airbnb also reserves the right 
to take legal action against those who engage in unauthorized activi-
ties. As will be discussed in section V below, there are a number of 
different legal recourses that may be available to Airbnb to protect 
the rights it asserts in its data.
Table III:  Data and Airbnb Terms of Service
Terms of Service
Copyright is asserted in Airbnb “collective” content 
No scraping or harvesting of data from the site is permitted whether manually 
or by automated means
No right to copy, access, or use data for purposes not expressly permitted; 
permitted purposes are to “access” and “view”
No circumvention of technological protection measures
No creation of derivative works, no distribution, licensing, or sale of content
Airbnb essentially has three versions of its TOS, depending 
upon the place of residence of the contracting users. The versions 
are substantively similar, but each includes a choice of law clause, 
and a forum selection clause. For United States residents, the TOS 
are to be interpreted according to the laws of California.80 Airbnb 
has established a binding arbitration process for any disputes arising 
out of the TOS and involving United States residents.81 This would 
seem to encompass disputes regarding the improper use of data on 
the site, including copyright infringement actions and actions related 
to breach of the terms around scraping data, although Airbnb also 
reserves the right to apply to the courts for injunctions to prevent 
the infringement of intellectual property (IP) rights.82 In addition, 
the parties have the right to seek injunctive relief in the specified 
courts in order to prevent ongoing or future violations of their IP 
rights.83 Disputes governed by Chinese law are subject to manda-
tory binding arbitration by the China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission in Beijing. However, this does not 
limit the right of Airbnb to apply for injunctive relief to any court of 
competent jurisdiction.84 For disputes between Airbnb and residents 
of countries other than China or the United States, the law governing 
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the TOS is Irish law, and disputes are subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Irish courts. Nevertheless, Airbnb, in bringing an action against 
a user of its site may choose between the Irish courts and the courts 
of the country in which the defendant is resident.85 This is pragmatic 
enough; an Irish court might not wish to take jurisdiction over a 
defendant located in a foreign country in relation to acts he or she 
carried out while resident of that country. Further, even though 
the law of the contract is Irish law, a defendant located in another 
country who has, for example, allegedly breached Airbnb’s copyright 
could be sued for breach of contract (governed by Irish law) as well 
as breach of copyright (governed by the laws of the jurisdiction in 
which the infringement took place). Disputes relating to other bod-
ies of law including privacy or torts are similarly complex in terms 
of choice of law issues.
As has been noted above, the scraping of data from Airbnb’s 
website is carried out by many different actors for many different 
purposes, both commercial and non-commercial. There is no record 
of Airbnb’s enforcement of its rights in this regard under its TOS,86 
although this does not mean it does not take place.87 Article 22.5 of 
the TOS provides that “[t]he failure of Airbnb to enforce any right 
or provision of these Terms will not constitute a waiver of future 
enforcement of that right or provision.”
V. Legal Framework
As the overview of the Airbnb data ecosystem makes clear, there 
are a broad range of users of Airbnb’s publicly accessible data, and 
many of the users of these data are either not directly competing or 
are non-commercial actors. Yet, as seen in section III, Airbnb’s TOS 
place significant contractual restrictions on the use of its publicly 
available data, asserting extremely broad rights of control. The result 
is that private control over publicly accessible data may not serve the 
public interest. As Kitchin notes, “[t]he fact that socially and cultur-
ally rich big data are largely in the hands of private interests means 
that, at present, computational social science and digital humanities 
research is not necessarily easy to do in practice.”88
In this part of the chapter, we consider the legal frameworks 
or infrastructure that provides support to the claims asserted in 
the TOS. We also consider the extent to which the legal framework 
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is adapted to take into consideration the public interest in access to 
and use of these data.
Airbnb’s TOS constitute a contract, and breach of the contract is 
actionable as described in the TOS and outlined above. In addition, 
copyright law provides independent and/or complementary protec-
tion for Airbnb data. Copyright law has also expanded in recent years 
to provide protection against the circumvention of technological 
protection measures. These areas of law and the challenges with 
their application to Airbnb data are discussed below.
As noted earlier, the international nature of the Airbnb plat-
form as well as its complex corporate structure make choice of law 
issues complex and raise interesting and debatable issues around 
the appropriate and applicable law. The focus in this chapter is on 
Canadian law, although many of the legal principles are similar in 
the United States. Indeed, United States law is also discussed where 
relevant, as there is often relatively little case law on some of the 
novel and emerging technology law issues that are relevant here. 
The goal of this section is to provide an overview of the elements 
of the legal framework that can be invoked by Airbnb to protect its 
rights in its data.
i. Contract Law
Airbnb’s TOS constitute a contract that is meant to bind users of its 
site. In considering the enforceability of Internet TOS, courts have 
distinguished between so-called browse-wrap contracts (where a 
user is considered bound where they continue to use a website after 
being given notice of TOS)89 and click-wrap contracts (where a user 
must click to indicate their agreement with the TOS).90 Not surpris-
ingly, click-wrap contracts are on more solid legal footing, but even 
browse-wrap contracts have been upheld by the courts. 
A key issue for the enforceability of online TOS is whether users 
have been given appropriate notice of the terms and whether there 
is clear assent.91 Users of the Airbnb website who become members 
(hosts or guests) are presented with specific notice of the TOS and 
other policies at the point of registration, and are asked to click to 
indicate their awareness of these and their agreement to be bound. 
This is almost certainly sufficient notice.92 While there may be sepa-
rate issues as to whether particular terms are enforceable in specific 
jurisdictions, where notice of terms is provided in this way, the 
contract will bind the parties. Other visitors to the site—for example, 
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users who have not registered—do not click to agree to the TOS. For 
this category of users, the TOS are part of a browse-wrap agreement. 
Whether a user of the Airbnb website who is not required to 
click to agree to the TOS is still bound by them may depend on the 
surrounding circumstances. In Century 21, the court summarized the 
relevant considerations in browse-wrap cases in these terms:
the law of contract requires that the offer and its terms be 
brought to the attention of the user, be available for review and 
be in some manner accepted by the user. Such an analysis turns 
on the prominence the site gives to the proposed Terms of Use 
and the notice that the user has respecting what they are agree-
ing to once they have accepted the offer. To establish a binding 
contract consideration will also be given to whether the user is 
an individual consumer or a commercial entity and in addition 
a one-time user or a frequent user of the site.93
On the issue of notice, a relevant consideration is how easy it is for 
users to locate the TOS. For example, in the United States case of 
Cvent v. Eventbrite94 the court dismissed a breach of contract argu-
ment regarding the TOS because it found that the TOS for the Cvent 
site were difficult to find, and did not require users to click their 
acceptance of the terms at any point, or to indicate that they had 
read or agreed to the terms.95 The ease with which the terms may be 
located, and their presence, for example, at the bottom of each page 
of the site visited, may be factors that support a finding that the user 
had effective notice of the terms.96 
A finding that there has been acceptance of TOS in browse-wrap 
cases is made more complicated since there is no obvious clicking of 
a button to indicate agreement. Courts have ruled that assent can be 
found in a website visitor’s decision to continue past the home page to 
view the deeper pages within the site. In Century 21, the court stated: 
“The act of browsing past the initial page of the website or search-
ing the site is conduct indicating agreement with the Terms of Use 
if those terms are provided with sufficient notice, are available for 
review prior to acceptance, and clearly state that proceeding further 
is acceptance of the terms.”97
Another relevant consideration in terms of the enforceability 
of particular terms or the enforceability of browse-wrap or even 
click-wrap contracts is the sophistication, status, or experience of the 
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user.98 A business competitor may be presumed to know that compa-
nies in the same field use terms of service, and so may be considered 
to be aware of not only the existence of the TOS on a competitor’s 
website but of their likely content.99 If the user is an ordinary con-
sumer, courts may be less inclined to find that a browse-wrap agree-
ment is enforceable if it is not properly brought to the consumer’s 
attention.100 However, ordinary online consumers are now more 
experienced than they were in the early days of the Internet, and 
courts may be prepared to assume that Internet users expect that the 
websites they visit will have TOS. This may lead courts to consider 
site website users to be bound by those terms. 
Those seeking to scrape Airbnb do not need to become mem-
bers, and the robots do not scrape behind a login interface. However, 
scrapers will have needed to visit and browse the site in order to 
program their robots, raising the issue of whether the browse-wrap 
agreement is engaged. A court might well consider a web scraper 
to be both technologically savvy and familiar with the layout of the 
targeted website. Thus, in such cases, the scraper is more likely to be 
considered bound by the TOS.101 
Typically, an action for breach of contract requires damages to be 
established, although an injunction may also be available where ongo-
ing breaches are possible.102 Although in cases where non-commercial 
scraping is at issue, it may seem that the plaintiff will have suffered 
no commercial losses, but damages may still be available for the costs 
incurred in trying to prevent the scraping activity, including the costs 
of staff time.103 In addition, a court may award nominal damages 
where other proof of damage is limited.104 While it is likely that the 
non-commercial nature of some scraping activities may be a factor in 
a court’s assessment of damages for breach of TOS, the risk of litiga-
tion expenses, an award of costs, and even modest damages may be 
a sufficient deterrent for those who scrape data for non-commercial 
purposes that serve the public interest. It is important to remember 
as well that differences in economic power can make non-commercial 
users easily deterred by cease-and-desist letters.105 
The question of whether a user is bound by website TOS is 
relevant not just to determining whether there is recourse for breach 
of contract. As will be seen in the discussion in the next section, 
whether a user is bound by TOS may be a factor in assessing fair 
dealing as a defence to copyright infringement.
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ii. Copyright Law
Copyright law protects original works of authorship. In order to suc-
ceed in a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff will first have 
to show that she has a valid copyright in the work. This will involve 
establishing that the work in question qualifies as a work under the 
Copyright Act, that it is original, and that the plaintiff holds the rights 
to the work.106 The plaintiff will also have to show that the defendant 
exercised one of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder without 
consent or justification.107 The exclusive rights include the right to 
reproduce all or a substantial part of a work, to create adaptations, 
as well as the right to communicate the work to the public by tele-
communications, and the right to authorize these activities, among 
other rights.108
Copyright law protects literary, dramatic, musical, and artis-
tic works.109 Compilations, whether of data or of a combination of 
other works, are also capable of protection as works in their own 
right.110 The Airbnb website as a whole is likely a multimedia work—
a compilation consisting of literary works (text) and artistic works 
(photos, graphic design, and the like), as well as data. Some of the 
elements of the compilation are also independently protectable as 
works. These would include photographs, text, drawings, logos, 
graphic design, and so on. The Airbnb TOS provide that hosts and 
guests retain copyright in those works that they upload to the site. 
However, Airbnb would be the owner of the copyright in the com-
pilation as a whole.
Works must also be “original” for copyright to subsist.111 While 
the threshold for originality may vary slightly from one jurisdic-
tion to another, for the most part it is a relatively low threshold. 
Originality in copyright law does not have a qualitative dimen-
sion—there is no assessment of the work’s original contribution to 
the state of knowledge or literature.112 Originality typically means 
that the work has not been copied, and that it displays some mani-
festation of human intellect. In the United States this is referred to 
as a “spark” of creativity; in Canada this is an “exercise of skill and 
judgment.”113 In either case, the threshold is low. Airbnb’s website as 
a multimedia work reflects original choices in terms of the selection 
and arrangement of its elements.
Airbnb asserts intellectual property rights over “Airbnb 
Content” although its claim is more ambiguous in relation to 
what it calls “Collective Content.”114 The “Collective Content” is a 
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compilation composed of a variety of elements, some of which are 
considered proprietary to Airbnb, and some of which may be the 
intellectual property of their contributors. This Collective Content 
may also include data that are considered to be in the public domain. 
The Airbnb Content is similarly a compilation, although it is more 
likely to be a combination of elements contributed by Airbnb itself.
Some things cannot be protected under copyright law. For 
example, copyright law does not protect ideas in the abstract, only 
original expressions of ideas.115 Copyright law also does not protect 
facts. As a result, facts are considered to be in the public domain.116 
The rationale for this may vary somewhat. Some courts consider 
facts to be incapable of authorship, as they are copied from the world 
around us.117 Others raise public policy considerations.118 Copyright 
law is meant to support and encourage innovation; providing a 
monopoly to a party over factual material is more likely to hinder 
than to stimulate innovation. Of course, issues around facts are not 
straightforward. It has been argued that some facts are authored (for 
example, facts about characters or events in literary works or televi-
sion shows).119 Issues have also been raised regarding the extent to 
which data that is the output of analytics, such as predictions or pro-
filing data, are authored as well.120 Nevertheless, even if facts cannot 
be protected on their own, they can be protected in compiled form. 
In Geophysical Services Inc. v. Encana Corp.,121 the court found that 
compilations of both raw and processed data are capable of copyright 
protection. In the case of processed data, there may be substantial 
skill and judgment in the processing.122 The court acknowledged 
that depending upon the skill and judgment of the person or persons 
involved in the processing, the processing of the same data or similar 
purposes might lead to different outputs. 
Because the authorship in a compilation consists of selecting 
and arranging those elements which form part of the compilation, 
the originality of a compilation is assessed in terms of the skill or 
judgment that goes into the selection or arrangement, and not the 
originality of the underlying elements.123 Thus, in a compilation of 
data, the data themselves are considered to be in the public domain; 
what is protected is any original selection or arrangement of the 
data.124 Where what is extracted from the Airbnb site is data, there is 
only an infringement of copyright if what has been extracted is a sub-
stantial part of an original selection or arrangement of those data.125
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As noted above, the concept of originality draws on the notion 
of authorship, as the spark of creativity or skill and judgment 
required to create the work must come from a human author. In the 
case of compilations of data, the spark, or skill and judgment, may be 
found in the choices around what data to select and include and how 
to arrange or present it.126 Where data is scraped, its presentation (or 
arrangement) is rarely copied (scraping extracts the content rather 
than creating a visual facsimile). Nevertheless, it might be possible 
to argue that scraping still extracts a substantial part of the original 
selection of Airbnb content, to the extent that the presence of those 
data on the site reflects Airbnb’s choices as to what to include in its 
compilation.127 
Where the data extracted through scraping includes other 
parts of the multimedia compilation that are copyright protected 
works in their own right, there can be a breach of copyright in the 
individual works, notwithstanding the outcome of any dispute over 
infringement of the compilation itself.128 Thus, for example, scraping 
that includes photographs from the website might violate individual 
copyrights in photographs owned by those who uploaded them to 
the site.129
Although copyright law offers some basis for protection for 
Airbnb’s website and their contents, it is a relatively porous protec-
tion. Only a substantial taking is copyright infringement; thus, the 
extraction of an insignificant quantity of the selection or arrange-
ment of the factual material would not be infringing. Someone who 
reproduced all of the data on Airbnb’s website would have copied the 
entire selection of data, but scraping tools are typically configured 
to scrape only certain categories of data, thus creating their own 
selections of the underlying data.130 These selections of data reflect, 
in their own right, independent exercise of skill and judgment.
The above discussion raises the possibility that a platform 
company such as Airbnb could argue that its copyright in its original 
selection of data on its website is infringed by scraping activities. Yet 
it would be equally possible to find that there is no substantial taking 
of that selection, particularly where scraping takes only a subset of 
data. Unfortunately for scrapers, substantial taking generally requires 
a case-by-case assessment. Thus, while it might be possible to contest 
either the existence or the scope of Airbnb’s copyright interests in 
its compiled data/information, this would likely be an uphill battle 
against a well-resourced and motivated party. 
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1. Fair Dealing/Fair Use
While copyright law provides a means for Airbnb to assert control 
over its data, copyright law also contains important users’ rights, 
such as fair dealing (or, in the United States, fair use). Where the fair 
dealing or fair use defence applies, uses of the work which would 
otherwise be infringing are considered justified. The scope of fair 
dealing or fair use is therefore important here, as such rights may 
actually permit a variety of different uses of Airbnb data. 
In Canada, fair dealing must be for one of the purposes set 
out in the Copyright Act. These include research or private study, 
education, parody or satire, news reporting, and criticism or com-
mentary.131 In the United States, by contrast, fair use purposes are 
open-ended.132 In addition to being for a permitted purpose, the 
dealing must also be “fair.” In CCH Canadian v. Law Society of Upper 
Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada identified six criteria that 
can be used in assessing the fairness of any dealing with a work. 
These are: the purpose of the dealing, the character of the dealing, 
the amount of the dealing, alternatives to the dealing, the nature of 
the work, and the effect of the dealing on the work.133 In the United 
States, four criteria for assessing fair use are set out in the legislation: 
the purpose and character of the use; the nature of the copyrighted 
work; the amount and substantiality of the portion taken; and the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for the original.134 There 
is therefore a considerable amount of overlap between the concepts 
of fair use and fair dealing, although United States courts have been 
more open to recognizing the freedom of expression values embed-
ded in the fair use exception.135
Although the purpose of the dealing must fit within one of the 
statutory categories of fair dealing in Canada, courts will also con-
sider other dimensions of “purpose” in assessing whether the dealing 
was fair. Thus, for example, it may be relevant to consider whether 
the dealing with a work was to create a new work or to transform 
the original. Where this is the case, it may support a finding of fair 
use in the United States. The situation is less clear in Canada, where 
the courts have yet to build a strong link between transformative 
uses and fair dealing. Nevertheless, transformation may still be a 
relevant consideration.136 The degree of transformation may also 
be significant.137 However, simple repackaging or republication of 
content from the original work is less likely to be fair.138 Whether a 
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use is for commercial or non-commercial purposes is also a relative 
consideration; non-commercial uses are more likely to be considered 
fair,139 although the commercial/non-commercial distinction is not 
determinative.140 It is also the case that “a use that generates value 
for the ‘broader public interest’ weighs in favor of fair use.”141
In the United States Meltwater case, data scraped from the plain-
tiff’s site were essentially repackaged and sold. It was news content 
that was provided to Meltwater’s subscribers. The fact that the plain-
tiffs and defendants were in competition—at least to some extent—
proved relevant to the analysis. The court noted that Meltwater did 
not add its own commentary or insight to the material it circulated to 
its subscribers. It characterized Meltwater as intending “to serve as a 
substitute for AP’s [Associated Press] news service.”142 In Meltwater, 
the content scraped from the AP websites was considered “the fruit 
of AP’s labor,” which was extracted for Meltwater’s profit and used in 
a manner that competed directly with AP’s business (which included 
licensing access to its database to news aggregators).143
Unlike the situation in Meltwater, Airbnb’s data is a by-product 
of its main operations. There is no competition from the scrapers 
discussed in this chapter with Airbnb’s main business (short-term 
rental accommodation). Some of the opportunistic businesses that 
scrape Airbnb data do not compete with Airbnb. Some offer analytic 
services to their customers144 that actually support or encourage their 
customers to continue using Airbnb. However, in some cases, these 
analytics services may compete with Airbnb’s own analytic services. 
Further, there is a potential market for Airbnb in licensing its data 
to analytics companies. Thus, it is not entirely clear that there is 
no impact from these activities on Airbnb’s ability to economically 
exploit its compilation of public data. As for the researchers and civil-
society groups that scrape Airbnb data, they principally do so for 
non-commercial purposes, and they may provide value-added ana-
lytics or commentary. In some cases, they may also provide scraped 
data to other users.145 Such uses are more likely to be considered fair, 
as they are non-commercial, non-competing, and transformative. 
They are also a form of critical speech.
The second fair dealing criterion identified by the Supreme 
Court of Canada is the character of the dealing. This involves 
considering how the work is dealt with by the defendant. It may 
take into account how many copies are made, how widely they are 
disseminated, whether they are destroyed once their purpose has 
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been served, or whether the dealing is consistent with accepted 
standards.146 In theory, the “character of the dealing” may also take 
into account whether the access to the work was legitimate or not. 
For example, whether data is scraped from a website that uses the 
robot exclusion standard147 might be relevant to the character of the 
dealing. This has been found to be a relevant consideration in the fair 
use balance in the United States in a few cases.148 Nevertheless, mak-
ing a copyright owner’s consent relevant to a fair dealing analysis is 
clearly problematic. In the Canadian Century 21 case, it was argued 
that the defendant’s refusal to comply with the robot exclusion 
standard was a relevant consideration in assessing fair dealing. The 
court cautioned against making a copyright owner’s consent to fair 
dealing a consideration, noting that it is the nature of fair dealing 
that it often takes place in contexts where copyright owners might 
otherwise refuse to permit uses of their works.149
The amount and substantiality of what has been copied is a 
further consideration in the fair dealing analysis. Courts will con-
sider this from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives.150 
Essentially, a use will be fair when the defendant takes no more than 
what they need to take.151 There is no magic formula from a quan-
titative perspective. In some circumstances it may be fair dealing 
to copy the entire work; in others circumstances taking a relatively 
small portion may not be fair use, particularly if that small portion 
is qualitatively central to the work.152 In the case of transformative 
works such as parody, it may be essential to capture a significant 
portion of the copyright protected work.153 Where the work at issue 
is a compilation of data, it is important to keep the focus on that 
part which is capable of copyright protection: the expression in 
such a compilation is found in the selection or arrangement of the 
data.154 Taking a quantitatively significant amount of data may not 
be infringing at all, if there is no substantial taking of the original 
selection or arrangement of the data. Even if there is some taking of 
the original selection or arrangement, it is the substantiality of the 
taking of the selection or arrangement that must be assessed for the 
purposes of fair use, and not the volume of data taken. In Century 
21, in considering the amount of the dealing, the court also took into 
account the fact that the defendant’s robots made repeat visits to the 
site to extract updated data.
The fair dealing analysis also requires a consideration of 
alternatives to the dealing. Thus, for example, it may be relevant to 
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consider whether there is “a non-copyrighted equivalent of the work 
that could have been used instead of the copyrighted work.”155 If 
Airbnb made some of its data available—for example, by providing 
downloadable datasets—it might be argued that data scraping would 
be much less likely to be considered fair dealing. However, such an 
approach must be considered with caution. There might still be rea-
sons to scrape data, including to acquire data with different param-
eters, or to verify the accuracy of the data being provided. In Century 
21, the court found that since the real-estate companies whose content 
was scraped by the defendant company already made their content 
available to the public over the Internet, it was not fair dealing for 
the defendant to scrape this data in order to produce its competing 
website. In other words, legitimately visiting the realtor’s website 
to view the data was a reasonable alternative to scraping. However, 
where Airbnb data is scraped for the purposes of data analytics, the 
scrapers are, for the most part, creating content, products, or services 
that are distinct from those available on the Airbnb website.156
The nature of the copyright protected work is also a key con-
sideration in a fair use analysis. The Supreme Court of Canada has 
identified whether a work is published or unpublished as a relevant 
consideration.157 The fact that scraped Airbnb data is publicly acces-
sible may therefore be a factor supporting a finding of fair dealing, 
although such an argument might be counterbalanced by the fact that 
a human being could not easily reproduce the level of data extraction 
carried out by technologically assisted scraping. In other words, the 
data is made publicly accessible to humans, not to machines. This is 
supported by the site’s TOS, which specifically prohibit scraping. In 
the United States, in considering the nature of the work, the court 
may also take into account whether the copyright protected work is 
expressive or creative, or whether it is predominantly factual. The 
latter category of works is further from the core of what is meant to 
be protected under copyright law.158 A compilation of data is further 
from the core of copyright protection, because the data themselves 
are in the public domain. Their selection and arrangement can be 
very easily transformed by those who use the data for other pur-
poses. For example, a selection and arrangement that aims to facilitate 
short-term rentals is different from a selection and arrangement that 
attempts to understand the impact of Airbnb on the market for long-
term accommodation. As a result, the reuse of data in these contexts 
may be more conducive to a fair dealing defence. 
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The final criterion in both a fair dealing and a fair use analysis 
is the effect of the use of the work by the defendant on the potential 
market for or value of the work. Use of a work to compete with the 
plaintiff’s work is less likely to be fair.159 If, for example, Airbnb is in 
the practice of licensing its data for use by others in analytics or for 
research, then it becomes much more difficult to argue that scraping 
data for these purposes is fair dealing.160 On the other hand, courts 
in both the United States and Canada have cautioned that the pos-
sibility of paying for a licence to access a work does not automatically 
preclude a fair dealing/fair use argument.161 In addition, it might be 
that even if Airbnb provided options to license data or to download 
some datasets for free, some users might still feel a need to scrape 
data if they wished to verify or challenge the data being provided. 
Such a use might still be considered fair. Courts are more likely to 
find transformative uses to be fair,162 whereas uses that create a sub-
stitute for the original are less likely to be considered fair.163
The disclaimers on the Inside Airbnb website state: “This 
site claims ‘fair use’ of any information compiled in producing a 
non-commercial derivation to allow public analysis, discussion 
and community benefit.”164 If Inside Airbnb is based in the United 
States, its fair use claims may well be supportable. In any event, in 
the United States there might be a finding that there is no copyright 
infringement. Only data is scraped, not other protected copyright 
expression. It is scraped according to Inside Airbnb’s own selection, 
and it is processed by Inside Airbnb to produce its own datasets and 
analyses. Arguably Inside Airbnb has taken nothing that is protected 
by copyright. Even if the contrary is found, Inside Airbnb’s use of 
the scraped material is transformative, non-commercial, and in the 
public interest. This would seem to be an entirely appropriate result.
The situation in Canada might be more precarious, although 
there is absolutely no public policy reason why it should be. There is 
relatively little case law on copyright infringement of compilations of 
facts, but what little there is reveals a tendency to favour the initial 
compiler. Assuming that a court found that the scraping of Airbnb 
data was substantial taking from Airbnb’s original compilation, a 
fair dealing defence would be more challenging to make out. This is 
because Canadian fair dealing law does not recognize transformative 
uses as an independent basis for finding fair dealing. While Airbnb’s 
scraping of data could be considered to be for the purpose of research 
or private study, there is uncertainty as to whether Canadian courts 
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would find that a dealing that required the breach of TOS could be 
fair. For example, in 1395804 Ontario Ltd. (c.o.b. Blacklock’s Reporter) v. 
Canadian Vintners’ Association,165 the court stated: “it is patently clear 
that unless you have obtained the material legally, you cannot avail 
yourself of the defence of fair dealing for the purpose of education, 
criticism or review.”166 While this is a small claims court decision 
and should be given relatively little weight, it does reveal a tendency 
that could be problematic. 
These issues highlight a need for a robust and principled 
approach when it comes to issues of copyright infringement and 
fair dealing involving the scraping of data from publicly accessible 
websites. Where the use is non-commercial and serves the public 
interest—particularly when it engages freedom of expression values 
such as critical speech—copyright law should not pose a barrier. 
What is more challenging is the situation of the so-called 
opportunistic businesses. This element of the Airbnb data eco-
system is an interesting one. In many cases, the businesses do not 
compete directly with Airbnb, and they build new business models 
based on data analytics that combine publicly accessible and open 
data from a variety of sources. These are arguably transformative 
uses of the data, and although commercial, they are not directly 
competing. The question is whether copyright law should accom-
modate such uses. To do so is arguably to adapt to the emerging 
dynamics of a big data economy. How and under what terms and 
conditions companies should be allowed to limit access to and use 
of their publicly accessible data is an interesting question; it may 
be that copyright law does not provide the best framework for 
managing these issues.
2. Technological Protection Measures/Rights Management 
Information
Section 41.1(1) of the Canadian Copyright Act, added by amendments 
in 2012, provides that “No person shall (a) circumvent a technologi-
cal protection measure within the meaning of paragraph (a) of the 
definition technological protection measure in section 41.” The 
definition of a technological protection measure is 
any effective technology, device or component that, in the ordi-
nary course of its operation,
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   175 18-11-08   08:42
 176 LAW AND THE “SHARING ECONOMY”
(a) controls access to a work, to a performer’s performance fixed 
in a sound recording or to a sound recording and whose use is 
authorized by the copyright owner; or
(b) restricts the doing — with respect to a work, to a performer’s 
performance fixed in a sound recording or to a sound record-
ing — of any act referred to in section 3, 15 or 18 and any act for 
which remuneration is payable under section 19. 
According to this provision technological protection measures 
(TPMs) may either control access to works or may restrict certain 
uses of the works. The equivalent provision in the United States 
Copyright Act states that “[n]o person shall circumvent a techno-
logical measure that effectively controls access to a work protected 
under this title.”167 While the United States legislation makes some 
provision to allow for research activities or other forms of fair use 
to take place with respect to works protected by digital locks,168 the 
Canadian Copyright Act contains no such exception, and the defini-
tion of an “effective technological protection measure” has recently 
been given an extremely broad interpretation. In Nintendo of America 
Inc. v. King,169 one of the few cases thus far to interpret Canada’s 
new anti-circumvention provisions, the court stated: “The open-
ended language of this definition reflects Parliament’s intention to 
empower copyright owners to protect their business models with 
any technological tool at their disposal.”170 The court found that in 
the case of TPMs that provide access control, these “do not need to 
employ any barrier to copying in order to be ‘effective.’”171 In other 
words, where there are access controls, it is not necessary for a TPM 
to “encrypt […], scrambl[e] or [accomplish] some ‘other transformation 
of the work.’”172 In the United States, courts have interpreted the anti-
circumvention provisions with a bit more nuance, perhaps because 
of the wording of the statute, which expressly addresses concerns 
over fair use by providing that “Nothing in this section shall affect 
rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, 
including fair use, under this title.”173 This is interesting because it 
suggests that the fact that a TPM has been circumvented would not 
factor into a fair use analysis.174 By contrast, in Canada, it might well 
be that a court would consider the circumvention of a TPM to militate 
against a finding of fair dealing.175
The anti-circumvention provisions are breached where there 
has been circumvention of an effective technological protection 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   176 18-11-08   08:42
 Information Law in the Platform Economy 177
measure. The concept of “circumvention” is therefore also relevant. 
In one of the few Canadian cases interpreting the anti-circumvention 
provisions, the court found that when the defendant asked a sub-
scriber to a paywalled service to send them a copy of an article, this 
amounted to circumvention of the paywall by the defendant.176 In 
Nintendo, the court found that the definition of “circumvent” can 
include “anything else that otherwise avoids, bypasses, removes, 
deactivates, or impairs the technological protection measure.”177 
Scraping cases therefore raise the question of whether the robot 
exclusion standard can constitute an “effective technological protec-
tion measure.” If it can, then presumably scraping a website that uses 
this standard will likely constitute circumvention. Entities that do not 
wish to have their websites searched by mechanical agents (robots, 
crawlers, spiders, and the like) can use the “robot exclusion header,” 
or robots.txt file, to indicate that they do not wish this to take place. 
In eBay v. Bidder’s Edge178 the court described a “robot exclusion 
header” as “a message, sent to computers programmed to detect and 
respond to such headers, that eBay does not permit unauthorized 
robotic activity.”179 In Meltwater, the court stated: 
Robots.txt protocol, also known as the Robot Exclusion Standard, 
was designed by industry groups to instruct cooperating web 
crawlers not to access all or part of a website that is publicly view-
able. If a website owner uses the robots.txt file to give instructions 
about its site to web crawlers, and a crawler honors the instruc-
tion, then the crawler should not visit any pages on the website.180 
For the exclusion to work, the programmer of the robot must have 
coded the robot to read the robots.txt data file, and to comply with 
its directives. 
The actual robots.txt file is described as “a simple text file 
placed in the root directory of the server that one wants to protect.”181 
The file can be coded so as to stop all robots, or it can be coded to 
permit certain ones. It can block indexing of all content or only of 
certain categories of content. It has been described as a method that 
“offers an opportunity to control access to information and control 
server load.”182 The robots exclusion protocol, although widely used, 
is not a formal standard. 
It is as yet unclear whether the “robot exclusion header” con-
stitutes a TPM the circumvention of which would independently 
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constitute a violation of copyright law. As noted by Lundblad, if it 
were considered to be a TPM, “it follows that disobeying the robots.
txt file would constitute illegal circumvention.”183 Lundblad is 
undecided on the issue. While acknowledging the possibility that 
it might be considered a TPM, he also notes that “the robots exclu-
sion standard seeks to prevent acts relating not to a specified set of 
works, but rather to a repository of works (if the Web site is not seen 
as a unitary work).”184 Where a website is seen as a unitary work—
a multimedia work, or a compilation—the issue of circumvention 
remains. Lundblad suggests that the robots.txt file is more like a “no 
trespassing” sign than it is like a lock on a door.185 
In a rare case considering this issue, a United States court 
stated:
No court has found that a robots.txt file universally consti-
tutes a “technological measure effectively controll[ing] access” 
under the DMCA. The protocol by itself is not analogous to 
digital password protection or encryption. However, in this 
case, when all systems involved in processing requests via the 
Wayback Machine are operating properly, the placement of a 
correct robots.txt file on Healthcare Advocates’ current website 
does work to block users from accessing archived screenshots 
of its website. (Pl’s Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. F, Expert Report 
of Edward Felton at 10). The only way to gain access would be 
for Healthcare Advocates to remove the robots.txt file from its 
website, and only the website owner can remove the robots.
txt file. Thus, in this situation, the robots.txt file qualifies as 
a technological measure effectively controlling access to the 
archived copyrighted images of Healthcare Advocates. This 
finding should not be interpreted as a finding that a robots.txt 
file universally qualifies as a technological measure that controls 
access to copyrighted works under the DMCA.186
In this case, the files in question were stored in the Wayback 
Machine. Because the plaintiff’s website was protected by a robots.
txt protocol, the policy of the Wayback Machine was to block public 
access to the archived images. However, at the date of the defendant’s 
access request, the Wayback Machine systems, which normally 
checked for the robots.txt file and blocked access, were down, and 
the defendant was able to gain access to the documents. The facts are 
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therefore quite specific to this case. In this instance, the presence of 
the robots.txt protocol combined with the functioning of the Wayback 
Machine should have operated in combination to effectively block 
access to the content. This case cannot, therefore, be interpreted as 
finding that the robots.txt protocol, on its own, is an effective TPM 
under United States law. However, it does suggest that it is at least 
arguable that it meets those criteria in some cases.
A secondary question might be whether the robot exclu-
sion standard constitutes an effective TPM.187 After all, it is easily 
bypassed. In fact, a programmer has to take affirmative steps to 
program his or her bots to recognize and read robots.txt file before 
the measure can be effective. As Jasiewicz notes, the use of the robots 
exclusion protocol does not physically prevent robots from accessing 
and crawling a site.188 The robots.txt file simply serves to “notify the 
robot of the site owner’s wishes.”189
In addition to making the circumvention of TPM actionable, the 
Copyright Act also provides that it is actionable to make available or 
to disseminate the means to circumvent TPM. It should be noted that 
some of those who scrape data in the public interest share their code 
for scraping data so that others can either learn from this code or 
use it to scrape their own data. Civil-society actor Tom Slee does this 
for the code he uses to scrape Airbnb data. There is clearly a public 
interest in this type of exchange of information and tools to assist in 
the carrying out of research using publicly accessible data. Overall, 
the potential ramifications for the public interest of finding that the 
robots exclusion standard is a TPM are such that courts should steer 
well away from such a finding.
iii.  Trespass to Chattels 
Copyright law addresses data scraping in terms of the protection 
of rights in the underlying compilation of data. Yet the mechanical 
extraction of data from a website can also impact the stability and 
performance of the server on which the data is hosted. This is so 
whether the data is extracted through an authorized application 
programming interface190 or through unauthorized scraping prac-
tices. Whether there are such impacts may depend on the number 
of different robots engaged in extracting data at any given time; the 
volume of data scraped by these robots; and the capacity of the serv-
ers on which the data is hosted.
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   179 18-11-08   08:42
 180 LAW AND THE “SHARING ECONOMY”
A few cases, predominantly from the United States, have con-
sidered whether data scraping may constitute a form of trespass to 
chattels. The tort of trespass to chattels involves improperly interfer-
ing with the lawful possession of the server, and not the data itself.191 
In this sense, therefore, the trespass to chattels action is not directly 
linked to protecting the data, and any trespass is not to the data itself. 
Nevertheless, by making actionable the activity of scraping because 
of its impact on the server on which the data is stored, the recourse 
could be used as a means of shielding the data from extraction. Such 
arguments focus on the impact on the server.
Trespass to chattels requires an interference with the plain-
tiff’s possession of a chattel, in this case a server or servers.192 Such 
actions have had limited success in the United States and even less in 
Canada. In the first place, for the action to succeed, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that they were in possession of the chattel (the server) at 
the time of the trespass. In Century 21, the court found that the plain-
tiff paid for hosting space on servers owned by another company. 
Thus it could not assert trespass to chattels because it lacked physical 
possession of the servers. The reasoning in this case highlights some 
of the challenges with relying on this tort action.
In addition to the issue of possession, a court must be will-
ing to find that data scraping is a trespass. In Century 21, the court 
observed that it was “not at all clear” that electronic access to a 
computer server was sufficiently “physical” to amount to a trespass. 
It may be that access without impact will lack the physical element 
required. Thus, for example, if the scraping activity has no discern-
ible impact on the proper functioning of the servers, it may simply 
not be actionable.193
Early cases in the United States breathed some life into the tort 
as it applied in the digital context. For example, in eBay v. Bidder’s 
Edge194 a United States court found scraping activities to constitute 
trespass to chattels. In doing so, it rejected the argument that there 
could be no trespass since the plaintiff’s website was publicly acces-
sible. The court noted that “eBay’s servers are private property, 
conditional access to which eBay grants the public. eBay does not 
generally permit the type of automated access made by BE [Bidder’s 
Edge, Inc.].”195 The trespass was to the private servers; the publicly 
accessible character of the data was not material. The decision has 
had relatively little traction, however, and trespass to chattels has not 
become mainstream, nor has it been embraced in Canada.
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If the digital trespass paradigm is accepted, the use of the robots 
exclusion standard might reinforce the idea that data scraping is a 
trespass.196 In other words, the robots.txt file conveys acceptable use 
conditions digitally to robots programmed by others and that visit 
the site. In this sense, it is like a no-trespassing sign—or perhaps 
more accurately, a set of instructions provided to those who come to 
the metaphorical gate. If the robot ignores the robots.txt file, it has 
breached these digital terms of use, and its entry is a trespass.
One of the problems with an action in trespass to chattels is 
that it relies on a fairly absolutist notion of property rights. If there 
is a trespass—an interference with the possessory right—then there 
is liability. It does not depend on the trespass being on such a scale 
that harm is caused. In a context where the scraping of publicly 
accessible data can be carried out in the public interest, trespass to 
chattels risks prioritizing private rights over that public interest. If 
trespass to chattels is to be accepted as a recourse that offers some 
protection against excessive use of a server, there must also be excep-
tions for access to and extraction of publicly accessible data where 
there is no discernable adverse impact. Alternatively, recourse might 
only be available for reckless or malicious acts. The public interest 
dimensions and the competing considerations suggest that if any 
legal recourse is required, this is an area better left to the legislature.
VI. Conclusion
Platform companies such as Airbnb host a significant amount of 
data on publicly accessible websites. While this data is necessary 
for the operation of their service, it has interest and importance for 
other users as well. Perhaps most importantly, because of the hugely 
disruptive effects of Airbnb in some cities, the data has significant 
public interest for those seeking to document, understand, and 
address these impacts.
While companies often frame data issues in terms of private 
property rights (whether rights in tangible or intangible property), 
this chapter has questioned the appropriateness of this paradigm, 
or, has argued for, at the very least, an approach that creates robust 
space for uses in the public interest. Thus, the protection afforded to 
compilations of data under copyright law should not be interpreted 
so broadly as to overly extend rights in data, and copyright excep-
tions such as fair dealing should create a robust space for uses in the 
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public interest broadly defined. At the same time, TPM provisions 
in copyright law should not be interpreted in such a way as to cre-
ate unnecessary barriers to using publicly accessible data. Finally, 
recourses such as trespass to chattels in the digital context should be 
strictly limited so as not to create unnecessary and even detrimental 
barriers to access to and use of publicly accessible data.
The public interest is easy to identify in some contexts. For 
example, the use of data for research or advocacy purposes is gener-
ally considered to serve the public interest. However, in our rapidly 
evolving big data society, the public interest should also be consid-
ered broadly. This chapter has shown how there may be a rich array 
of opportunistic commercial users of publicly accessible data. And, 
while such uses may raise their own public policy challenges, the 
fact remains that strict property rights-based approaches to publicly 
available data might have impacts that adversely affect the public 
interest in innovation and competition. This is particularly the case 
in the evolving big data environment. 
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CHAPTER V I
Urban Cowboy E-Capitalism Meets 
Dysfunctional Municipal Policy-
Making: What the Uber Story Tells Us 
about Canadian Local Governance
Mariana Valverde1
I. Introduction 
Municipal officials’ struggles to develop workable and fair poli-cies to regulate Airbnb and Uber, in Canada and elsewhere, 
show that local regulatory systems and, just as important, customary 
regulatory approaches have been stretched to the breaking point 
by what I here call “urban cowboy e-capitalism.” That e-capitalism 
poses regulatory difficulties for many domains and levels of govern-
ment is well known. But this chapter focuses on the conflicts, and 
the eventual policies to manage those conflicts, that have arisen in 
Canada as one particularly aggressive, cowboy-like, e-capitalist firm, 
Uber, suddenly disrupted a regulatory field traditionally governed 
by cities under their business licensing powers. 
Uber is considered by many as a corporate outlier due to its 
extreme unwillingness to accept regulation or work collaboratively 
with governments. But as I will show, even if Uber’s civic behaviour 
is unusual, cities’ regulatory dilemmas in regard to Uber clearly 
expose the underlying systemic weaknesses of regulatory approaches 
that municipalities have long taken for granted. These approaches are 
not well known or well researched; the fact that the urban is a scale 
and a jurisdiction with distinct governance traditions and peculiari-
ties, as I have shown in detail elsewhere, is not widely appreciated.2 
An economist might not want to single out e-corporations occu-
pying a traditionally urban regulatory space from those operating 
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at other scales. But socio-legal scholarship finds it useful to differ-
entiate companies such as Facebook, which have contributed to the 
creation of new social and legal spaces, from companies that oper-
ate in a venerable jurisdictional space that has plenty of rules and 
norms, but is characterized by structural weaknesses: the municipal 
regulatory space.3  And as Eric Tucker’s contribution in this volume 
shows, commercial/passenger driving has been central to municipal 
business regulation for a very long time.  
After briefly recounting some highlights of Uber’s defiant law-
breaking career, focusing mainly though not exclusively on Canada, 
I will then describe a range of regulatory regimes—or ongoing 
regulatory efforts that may or may not evolve into settled regimes. 
Comparing Toronto, Edmonton, and Ottawa to the situation in British 
Columbia and Quebec, we will see that if provinces wholly vacate the 
regulatory space, municipalities face grave difficulties in devising 
regulatory measures to minimize the risks posed by urban cowboy 
e-capitalism. In other words, Uber’s story reveals much about the 
structural fractures and limitations of local governance.
II. Preliminaries: Defining the Object of Regulation 
Much confusion has been generated by the phrase “the sharing 
economy.” Electronic platforms and applications can indeed enable 
peer-to-peer transactions—horizontal transactions previously con-
fined to newspaper want ads and notes posted on local (physical) 
bulletin boards. As a recent study by the Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives (CCPA) shows, those horizontal, typically one-off 
transactions, which have always existed but can now benefit from 
electronic tools, do constitute a “sharing economy,” one that is not 
new but is expanding in size and visibility due to developments in 
cyberspace.4 
Sharing economies, electronically mediated or not, have often 
operated on the margins of the law, and local as well as provincial 
authorities have long tolerated activities such as informal handyman 
work and unlicensed babysitting. Regulators have sometimes tried to 
draw a legal line above which an activity ought to be regulated and/
or taxed, for example, by differentiating babysitting from daycare 
services, or defining where carpooling ends and where commercial 
driving for others begins.5 It is not always possible or advisable to 
try to provide hard-and-fast legal definitions that separate the legal 
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from the illegal (or from the perhaps larger category of the a-legal or 
semi-legal)—as practical experience with any number of municipal 
policy areas, for example, around basement apartments and rooming 
houses, shows.6 
The CCPA cogently argues that it is very important to dis-
tinguish the sharing economy that has always existed but is now 
growing in size and efficiency from a rather different economy 
whose logic is actually the opposite of sharing—what they call “the 
on-demand service economy.”7 In this realm, corporations, often 
quite large, capitalize on today’s ample pools of precarious labour 
by developing electronic platforms so that consumers can access 
on-demand services provided by workers (typically not formal 
employees) who are linked to customers only through the propri-
etary business application, not directly, and who usually provide 
their own capital (for example, an apartment for Airbnb, or a car for 
Uber). For instance, Kijiji is a platform that enables two people who 
don’t know one another to engage in peer-to-peer exchanges that do 
not provide regular employment income; and Kijiji does not set prices 
for goods, nor does it develop a continuing, hierarchical relationship 
with people who use the application. By contrast, Uber sets prices in 
advance, and it exercises extensive and continuous surveillance over 
both clients and workers, sometimes forcing drivers or customers 
off the platform. Uber transactions are thus not peer-to-peer (as a 
number of international court decisions, most recently by an advocate 
general at the Court of Justice of the European Union, have found).8 
The labour and employment dimensions of this type of corporation 
are explored in this volume by Harry Arthurs and Eric Tucker; here, I 
focus on regulatory and especially licensing rules, since my expertise 
lies in local governance and municipal bylaws.
Focusing on what the Uber story can teach us about municipal 
governance is best done by drawing comparisons with regulatory 
efforts at other scales. While Uber’s law-breaking acts across jurisdic-
tions are similar, as explained in the following section, regulatory 
responses have been rather different, and here jurisdiction plays a 
key role. Beginning with a brief look at the Canadian provinces that 
have taken responsibility for the problems caused by Uber (British 
Columbia and Quebec)—however unsuccessfully at least as of this 
writing—we will then take a detour through Europe, where nation-
states have played a much larger role than in North America. Only 
then will we return to Canadian cities. 
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The conclusion will use the Uber legalization story to reflect on 
the importance of scale and jurisdiction in regulatory policy work, 
business licensing in particular. In Canada, where unlike in most of 
Europe the federal government would not and could not wade into 
any matters traditionally regarded as local and municipal, for consti-
tutional reasons of long standing, it has become crystal clear, I will 
argue, that only provinces can develop and enforce proper regula-
tions governing Uber and similar transportation companies. Or, in 
the alternative, provinces need to support municipal governments 
that want and need policy muscle. The fact that the policy process 
appears, in mid-2017, to be stalled in both British Columbia and 
Quebec is perhaps not a great advertisement for provincial jurisdic-
tion in this area; but, in the long run, only provincial governments 
have the regulatory capacity, the fiscal tools, and the data-gathering 
resources that are required. Cities are currently sadly lacking in all 
three departments. 
The on-demand service economy poses regulatory challenges 
at all levels; but cities are peculiarly unsuited to meeting these chal-
lenges, especially when urban spaces are suddenly invaded by very 
large, deep-pocketed transnational corporations wielding sophis-
ticated databases and applications, and enjoying worldwide name 
recognition and top-notch public relations expertise.
III. Law-Breaking on a Grand Scale 
Showing an odd disregard for legality, the majority of scholarly 
articles on Uber and similar businesses are written as if Uber had 
found a juridical terra nullius and built a business on it, John Locke–
like. Law and economics professors who write about “the platform 
economy” and “the gig economy” tend to assume the point of view 
of a convenience-seeking consumer—rather than the standpoint of 
public policy—and proceed to document, for instance, the relative 
efficiency of Uber versus taxis, waxing enthusiasm about innovation 
and suggesting regulations that amount to industry capture.9
Neoliberal perspectives, which only consider individual con-
sumer convenience and/or overall market efficiency, excluding 
not only worker standpoints but also public policy logics, are not 
limited to law and economics publications. In Toronto, the city 
staff’s own detailed and thoughtful reports on Uber legalization 
weighed all perspectives carefully; but instead of relying on these, 
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an external consultant report was commissioned and produced for 
the City of Toronto by the MaRS Solutions Lab. That a chapter in 
the MaRS report is entitled “Sharing in Transportation”10 is the first 
clue about its bias; the second clue is the glowing praise lavished 
on “today’s entrepreneurs.”11 After listing a variety of regulatory 
challenges posed by commercial platforms providing services 
without the use of employment contracts, the authors exclaim, “[e]
nter entrepreneurs!”12—as if entrepreneurs were not responsible for 
the very problems to which solutions are being sought. Remarkably, 
despite being commissioned by the City of Toronto, the report re-
describes Uber’s systematic and defiant law-breaking as “opportuni-
ties to reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens.”13
In keeping with this pro-business bias, Uber’s notorious cow-
boy practices have been frequently attributed to the personality 
of its founder and, until his resignation in June 2017, CEO, Travis 
Kalanick—rather than to the nature of corporations in general or 
even this corporation in particular.
On its part, media coverage—which tends to be produced by 
the largely white, well-educated, younger Canadians who are the 
heaviest users of Uber and similar applications (as the CCPA report 
cited above documents)—has occasionally exposed Uber’s exploita-
tion of its drivers and the heavy lobbying of politicians; but Uber’s 
long career of law-breaking is often presented as an understandable 
response by entrepreneurs frustrated by an antiquated and inflexible 
system of taxi licensing. By contrast, taxi drivers, who in Canadian 
cities are overwhelmingly racialized men, often recent immigrants, 
have had great difficulty obtaining positive and informed media 
coverage. 
Uber has also managed to generate biased Google search 
results. Typing “Uber + Vancouver” into Google in early 2017, several 
times over several days, consistently produced a list headed by five or 
six Uber websites, including one recruiting drivers—even though the 
company was banned in Vancouver at that time. To find more neutral 
information, not to mention blog posts by Uber drivers document-
ing exploitation, one would have had to scroll down very far. This is 
replicated for other cities, where Google users see, at the top of the 
search, not only the usual corporate website, but a number of other 
items that look as if they are not corporate communications but turn 
out to be (such as explanations as to how to become an Uber driver, 
not marked as “sponsored content”). 
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Uber likes to attribute its success to innovation, although 
whether its algorithms and applications are in fact technically 
innovative (compared to similar tools developed by others) cannot 
be known, given the corporate blanket of secrecy, as described by 
Teresa Scassa in her contribution to this volume. In any case, techni-
cal wizardry, while probably necessary, is not a sufficient condition 
of corporate success, as the dot.com crash amply showed. The fact is 
that, in city after city, Uber actually achieved rapid success (and in 
fact achieved a near-total monopoly) by entering the market with-
out even a nod to the rule of law, openly ignoring all local business 
licensing rules and municipal as well as provincial and federal tax 
law,14 while simultaneously manipulating both prices and driver 
incentives to drive out any competitors. Lyft provides competition to 
Uber in many American cities, but Lyft does not operate in Canada. 
Hailo was an application developed in Toronto in order to speed up 
and rationalize taxi services, but it seems to have been driven into 
the ground by Uber. Illegal businesses do exist in most sectors, often 
persisting for a long period, but achieving monopoly status while 
remaining wholly illegal is extremely unusual, if not unique.
How was this open and continued law-breaking possible? 
Comparing Uber with comparable forms of illegality may be help-
ful. A lone marginal entrepreneur using his vehicle as an illegal taxi 
might be able to make a living by illegally picking up passengers at 
airports and train stations, but he has no access to marketing and 
advertising resources—so he cannot change public perceptions of 
what he does, even in jurisdictions where the public may well be 
unhappy with existing taxi provisions (as has long been the case in 
the Vancouver area). By contrast, by virtue of size, elaborate market-
ing, and lobbying on an unprecedented scale, Uber’s cowboy e-capi-
talists worked both social media and mainstream media to develop a 
fan base that could be quickly mobilized to secure a positive on-line 
presence. In Toronto, the chief lobbyist for Uber was none other than 
David Plouffe, who successfully ran Obama’s re-election campaign, 
and City Hall journalists reported upwards of one hundred Uber 
lobbyists working during 2014–2016.15
The unusual volume and sophistication of Uber’s lobbying 
was noted in Toronto and in other cities by City Hall press gallery 
members and councillors who opposed Uber; but, in Toronto and 
Edmonton in particular, some councillors, and to an extent Toronto 
Mayor John Tory, turned a blind eye or even condoned Uber’s 
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law-breaking. The day Uber obtained legalization in Toronto, on 
extremely favourable terms, Mayor John Tory, instead of speaking the 
language of public policy and regulation, declared that “[t]he public 
wants to have choices, and they should have choices.”16 
In Toronto and Ottawa, mayors and councillors reported getting 
hundreds or thousands of emails asking for Uber to be legalized. It 
is impossible to tell if these were actual emails sent by individual 
satisfied customers or fake, automated emails—a distinct possibility 
given Uber’s command of algorithms—but local politicians treated 
the emails as genuine. Uber then used its marketplace profile to push 
for either no regulation at all or for extremely favourable regulatory 
terms. 
Against all precedent, Uber continued to operate in breach of 
the law, even when favourable rules were in the offing. In a story 
with parallels around the country, Calgary Mayor Naheed Nenshi 
said: “I’m a bit baffled that they [Uber] launched when the insur-
ance product is just a few months away […]. Our friends at Uber 
have known for many, many months that they’ve got an insurance 
problem […].”17
Meanwhile, in Ottawa, where the city council showed a bit more 
backbone, an enforcement blitz aimed at fining unlicensed Uber driv-
ers gave rise to an Uber corporate response—cited by CBC News as 
a legitimate comment—to the effect that “[c]ostly [municipal] sting 
operations, […] seek to protect a monopoly […].”18 This kind of com-
ment underlines the weak legitimacy of traditional city rules about 
taxis and vehicles for hire. If a booze can had been raided and fined, 
it is doubtful CBC News would have given the bootlegger’s views on 
breaking provincial liquor law such respect. 
Similarly in Alberta, when after a long period of law-breaking 
Uber was, without any penalty, rewarded by municipal legalization, 
on condition Uber drivers obtain commercial driving licences (at their 
own expense), the Uber representative complained that legalization 
would result in “less flexible earning opportunities […].”19 Again, 
if transposed to a provincially regulated domain, such as beer and 
wine sales, environmental rules, or drivers licences, the claim that 
businesses are entitled to the “flexible earning opportunities” associ-
ated with an absence of regulation would not go very far.
Uber’s law-breaking has gone far beyond operating commercial 
vehicles in breach of taxi rules. A group of disgruntled employees 
revealed to the New York Times that Uber had used its algorithm 
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expertise to build a special software program specifically designed 
to fool and foil any municipal inspectors (anywhere) that might be 
trying to identify and fine illegally operating vehicles. This program, 
known as “Greyball,” enabled the corporation to send real-looking 
but actually false data to the Uber application of anyone suspected of 
being a municipal employee. The very tools of law enforcement (city 
workers’ smartphones) were thus hacked by the suspect (Uber). Uber’s 
Greyball program was even able to cancel any ride requests made by 
such users— “essentially Greyballing them as city officials.”20 
Claiming that municipal inspectors were the law breakers, not 
the law enforcers, because they were “misusing” the application in 
contravention of the private law unilaterally set out in its terms of 
service, Uber initially said: “[t]his program [Greyball] denies ride 
requests to users who are violating our terms of service [… by col-
luding] with officials on secret ‘stings’ meant to entrap drivers.”21 
More recently, Uber appears to be softening its stance, at least in 
public; but the corporate belief that a private terms of service agree-
ment trumps public policy rules may remain (especially given parallel 
developments in private law-making, as Nofar Sheffi’s chapter in this 
volume documents in regard to Airbnb).
Throughout Uber’s epic law-breaking campaign, the rhetoric of 
the “sharing economy” had to do heavy lifting, since illegality this 
blatant, and at such a scale, is unprecedented. As mentioned at the 
outset, cities in the advanced capitalist world as well as in the Global 
South have always had an underground, illegal economy, especially 
in personal or home services. But the illegal informal economy is 
generally kept within certain boundaries—as in the established dis-
tinction between neighbourhood babysitters and daycare centres—or 
else it is limited in time—as in the bootlegging that came to an abrupt 
end with the repeal of Prohibition. To my knowledge, Canadian legal 
history does not furnish any historical equivalent to the ex post facto 
legalization, without any consequences or sanctions of Uber.
IV. Municipal Jurisdiction in Business Licensing: A Primer 
The most important feature of municipal business licensing in 
Canada, and to a large extent also in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, is the fact that major corporations are almost completely 
exempt from local regulation and local taxes. Ontario is perhaps 
at the extreme in this regard: unlike in the United States and some 
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parts of Canada, Ontario cities cannot levy a hotel room tax, although 
this will likely change as an indirect result of Toronto’s rather feeble 
efforts to put limits on Airbnb short-term rentals. Similarly, Ontario 
cities cannot in any way tax or regulate the trucking firms whose 
heavy-duty vehicles wear out their roads and create congestion. 
Along the same lines, the bank buildings that dominate the down-
town Toronto skyline are only counted and regulated as buildings, 
not as businesses. The height and density of the buildings need 
municipal permission, as do any illuminated signs placed on them, 
and the owners do pay property tax; but the banking business pro-
vides no direct revenue and is indeed invisible, legally, to the city.
While Ontario cities may be at the low-end of the spectrum 
of local legal powers, there is no doubt that, in the present as in the 
past, cities’ business-regulation energies are devoted almost com-
pletely to the micromanagement of small entrepreneurs: food-truck 
operators, shop owners, restaurant owners, street vendors, and last 
but not least, taxi drivers. And it is taxi drivers—not the taxi plate 
(medallion) owners or the owners of brokerages and dispatching 
firms—who bear the brunt of regulation. Until 2017, would-be Toronto 
taxi drivers had to pay for a seventeen-day training course and had 
to comply with onerous and expensive rules (for example, frequent 
vehicle inspections at city garages); and as in other cities, fares were 
fixed by the city, with no discounts or “surge prices” allowed, and 
no allowance for changing gasoline prices. About half of Toronto’s 
drivers own their vehicles, but the other half (about 5,000, though the 
numbers are probably dropping as a result of Uber) have to work for 
several hours each day to pay rent on the vehicle, as well as gas and 
insurance, before they can start to make any money. The situation 
is similar in other cities: it is common for a handful of people, often 
ex-drivers, to accumulate a few taxi plates, and live as rentiers on the 
proceeds of renting the plates to working drivers.22 
Limiting the number of taxi plates has long been the centerpiece 
of municipal taxi licensing systems, in Toronto as in other North 
American cities. Until the arrival of Uber, the cap on plates meant 
that the market value of plates could be as high as several hundred 
thousand dollars—though some cities, including Toronto, were mak-
ing efforts to encourage owner-driven taxis and discourage rentier 
taxi capitalism.23 At other scales, businesses are certainly regulated 
in a variety of ways (zoning restrictions and building codes, for 
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example), but putting caps on numbers is not a common technique 
in contemporary economic policy. 
The cap on plate numbers suggests that municipal taxi licensing 
may have more in common with ancient guild regulations, designed 
to prevent too many labourers and apprentices from becoming masters 
and business owners, than with contemporary capitalism. While the 
arrival of Uber made taxi drivers around the country, and indeed the 
world, suddenly rise to defend municipal licensing against cowboy 
challenges, the irony is that, prior to Uber, taxi drivers were the most 
severe critics of the system—one that had long provided them with 
lower than minimum wage incomes and subjected them to a great 
deal of surveillance and discipline from municipal inspectors.
To put the Uber question in its proper legal context, it needs 
to be noted that while taxi licensing may well be the most extreme 
example of municipal micromanagement of micro-entrepreneurs, it is 
not completely unique. Food-truck operators and hot-dog vendors 
have been micromanaged, often right out of business, by the same 
city officials and in the same manner. In general, one can say that 
municipal business licensing—which has deep historical roots in 
the detailed “police regulations” that in pre-capitalist cities sought 
to control access to trades and limit market exchanges—has never 
undergone a modernist overhaul.24 Today, in many sectors and 
in many cities, consumer demand for variety and for new types of 
goods and services goes unmet (as Toronto’s minuscule food-truck 
economy demonstrates); licensing is often seen as a privilege, not a 
right; onerous conditions are attached to the licence; and municipal 
inspectors often enforce old-fashioned and not particularly rational 
rules just because they are there, not because any harm is being done. 
In addition, municipal licensing, as a branch of local govern-
ment, does not draw the well-educated civil servants who popu-
late departments such as economic development, planning, public 
health, and transit. And at the political level, licensing ranks pretty 
low on council’s hierarchy. Even in Canada’s largest city, business 
licensing issues have long been neglected by politicians, with policy 
often monopolized by a single councillor with deep connections 
to a particular group of small-time owner/capitalists. Rational risk 
management and flexible regulation have transformed other areas of 
municipal jurisdiction (such as public health and, in some instances, 
planning), but remain largely foreign to municipal licensing and 
standards departments.
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In sum, then: while municipal business licensing is undoubt-
edly at the pre-modern extreme of the spectrum of modes of gov-
erning urban risks, the logics by which such regulations have long 
functioned are unlikely to be easily reformed, since they are deeply 
rooted in a long history of local business micromanagement—the 
governing tradition known in the United States as “the police power 
of the state.”25 And while other areas of municipal governance have 
become more evidence-based and more attuned to governing risks 
rather than enforcing coercive rules, business licensing generally 
remains unmodernized.
V. Provincial Interventions: British Columbia and Quebec 
The Lower Mainland, British Columbia’s most urbanized area, 
is not politically organized in a way that would support sensible 
municipal regulation of commercial driving: the City of Vancouver 
is a small legal island in a sea of suburban municipalities. Since the 
2010 Vancouver Olympics, a few light rail lines—built with federal 
and provincial funds—have revolutionized life for some localities; 
but reliance on private cars remains a key feature of life in the Lower 
Mainland. The conditions were thus ripe for Uber to set up shop 
there.
Initially, around 2012, the Vancouver City Council banned 
Uber,26 on the grounds that it was in breach of city taxi rules. Uber 
then mounted an expensive public relations campaign. The campaign 
did not target the Vancouver City Council alone, however, since Uber 
managers knew that a very large market existed outside city limits, in 
the vast areas not well served by public transit. Very soon this cam-
paign became part of the larger political battle pitting the then ruling 
Liberals (more akin to Conservatives elsewhere in Canada) against 
the opposition social democratic party (the NDP). Transposing the 
fight about Uber regulation to the provincial arena—in contrast to 
Ontario, where the province has studiously avoided entering the 
fray—and doing so in the lead-up to an election campaign, completely 
changed the stakes.
Aware of the jurisdictional specificity of Canadian provin-
cial governments, Uber was able to hire, as their chief British 
Columbia lobbyist, well-known Canadian Conservative public rela-
tions strategist Dimitri Pantazopoulos, who had previously worked 
for none other than British Columbia Liberal Premier Christy Clark.27 
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Choosing to make Uber legalization into an election issue, provincial 
Transport Minister Peter Fassbender took the problem away from 
municipalities like Vancouver and used the province’s power to 
override and trump local bylaws and issue a proposed set of rules.28 
The rules imposed a few requirements—but as in the rest of Canada, 
these requirements mainly fall on Uber drivers, not on the company. 
It is drivers who (if the rules continue to be implemented) will need 
to acquire a commercial driving licence, pass a safe driving record 
check, pay for a criminal record check, and have their vehicles regu-
larly inspected. If these or similar rules prevail in British Columbia’s 
politically uncertain times, Uber drivers would thus have to incur 
new costs—but they would not have to turn over a few cents per ride 
to the city, as is the case in many other cities.
In the Lower Mainland, the number of taxi licences had long 
been capped despite surging demand—a manoeuvre that taxi drivers 
felt was designed precisely to create a market for Uber even while 
it remained banned. During the spring 2017 election campaign, the 
Liberals promised to “[address] the provincial taxi shortage,”29 inti-
mating that Uber was the solution.
The NDP  has been siding with licensed taxi drivers—mainly 
racialized men, South Asian for the most part, living in the key sub-
urban ridings around Vancouver. An NDP government, if it succeeds 
in holding on to provincial power in the wake of a June 2017 election 
that created no clear majority but did bring the Liberals down (at least 
temporarily), will likely support existing taxi drivers. However, Uber 
may ultimately be legalized as well—though there is little doubt it 
would be subject to regulation, and probably regulations that are 
more driver-friendly rather than corporate-friendly, and that impose 
some kind of fee on Uber rides.
Whatever happens in British Columbia, it is important to 
recall, more generally, that in the Canadian system provinces can 
always take back any of the powers that are traditionally delegated 
to municipalities, including business licensing and taxi licensing. 
Provincial powers have also been used in Quebec, and so it is to this 
province we now turn.
In Quebec, Uber first appeared as a market player posing 
regulatory problems in the City of Montreal. But as was the case in 
British Columbia, the issue was quickly shifted to the scale of the 
province, in regard to policy, though municipalities remained in 
control of enforcement—with Montreal setting a Canadian precedent 
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by impounding hundreds of Uber cars. Uber’s public relations talent 
managed to find a silver lining in this rather dire situation. However, 
as management chose to pay the fees required to release the cars, 
the corporation then disseminated numerous stories featuring 
drivers expressing deep gratitude for having been “rescued” by the 
company. Clearly, Uber had concluded that continuing to provide 
illegal services was important enough, in terms of sustaining and 
increasing its market, to justify spending corporate money paying 
the drivers’ fines. Indeed, at the time, Uber sent messages to all 
the people who had signed up to drive for it, stating that “[f]or the 
moment, you can continue driving as an Uber Quebec partner-driver 
as usual”30—even though a provincial law had specifically banned 
services like Uber. 
Eventually Quebec developed province-wide rules to legalize 
Uber, though only by way of a one-year pilot project. Quebec’s regu-
latory traditions, which are more social democratic and pro-labour 
than is the case in other Canadian provinces, were clearly visible in 
the proposed new rules. Quebec Uber drivers will need to acquire 
a commercial driving licence; Uber’s surge pricing is controlled in 
emergency situations; and fees amounting to about a dollar per ride 
have to be paid, with the proceeds being used to improve the taxi 
industry. In general, Uber has not been forced to provide accessible 
vehicles for disabled passengers, unlike taxi companies, so perhaps 
the funds will be used to transform or buy accessible taxis. Other 
Canadian cities have also imposed a per-ride fee, but this ranges 
between six to thirty cents, not around one dollar as in Quebec. 
However, a key point is that while more onerous than other regimes, 
what the Quebec pilot project has in common with the rules devel-
oped municipally and in British Columbia is that the new regulations 
are mainly burdens on drivers and would-be drivers—not on the 
highly profitable company. 
However, the regulatory process in Quebec is unsettled in two 
ways. First, as already mentioned, Quebec’s regulatory scheme was 
not enacted as permanent rules, as is the case elsewhere, but rather 
as a pilot project valid only for a year and subject to review. Second, 
legalizing Uber went hand in hand (as was the case in Toronto, for 
example) with loosening the rules previously governing taxi drivers 
and taxi driver licences. But in June 2017, the taxi industry walked out 
of the ongoing talks to “modernize” the taxi licensing rules. It would 
be logical to foresee that this boycott of the policy process by the taxi 
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industry will have an effect on the political scene when the one-year 
Uber pilot project concludes, but what effect exactly, one cannot say.
Whatever happens, what is clear from events thus far, and 
from what Canadian political scientists have long documented about 
provincial jurisdiction generally, is that provinces have more than 
sufficient legal powers and enforcement tools to exercise considerable 
pressure on cowboy capitalism in the service sector, whether they 
choose to use these powers or not.
This means, in my view, that provincial rather than municipal 
governments are the appropriate site for devising regulations for 
sectors that present new technical or economic features and that, 
perhaps most importantly, feature extremely powerful foreign cor-
porations, transnational behemoths that have little or no precedent 
in the long history of municipal business regulation. It is not a coin-
cidence that in the United States the best example of Uber regulations 
that are not unfair to taxi drivers is found not in a municipality but 
in the state of California, where the state-wide utilities commission 
has taken responsibility for regulating transportation network com-
panies, demanding not only vehicle inspections and driver training 
but also commercial insurance.31 The brief discussion of Ottawa, 
Edmonton, and Toronto that concludes the chapter will provide 
further evidence for this claim about the right scale/jurisdiction for 
transnational e-capitalism, especially its cowboy variety. But first we 
will take a brief detour through legal proceedings that could have a 
major impact on regulatory strategies across many borders—future 
policies as well as existing ones.
VI. Defining the Nature of Uber 
An appeal by Uber to the European Court of Justice, challenging a 
Barcelona business tribunal’s decision to the effect that Uber was ille-
gally breaching municipal taxi rules, may have a far-reaching impact. 
The reason is that this case, instead of being fought on administra-
tive law technicalities, as one might have expected given the forum 
and the type of law, revolves around a key substantive question. Is 
Uber, as it claims, merely a platform, an electronic entity that should 
be allowed to innovate and spread across borders with the help of 
the European Union’s information technology policy? Or is Uber a 
transportation company, whose real business is rides provided on a 
commercial basis?32 
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European Union member states are divided. The Netherlands 
is siding with Uber—since it is the jurisdiction where Uber has its 
base for all non-American business (though few Canadian custom-
ers appear to have noticed that the terms and conditions they must 
accept include having to go to Dutch courts if they want to sue Uber). 
Ireland is on Uber’s side as well, not surprisingly since it is the 
European home of Google, Twitter, Facebook, and Airbnb. However, 
the Spanish government (which generally opposes anything that the 
City of Barcelona does, for ideological reasons) weighed in to sup-
port the regulated taxi industry against Uber—as did several other 
European countries including Italy, France, Belgium, and Denmark. 
In France, the situation is compounded by the fact that Uber driv-
ers have organized against the company to demand better pay and 
working hours that more closely resemble the French standard of 
thirty-five hours per week.
On May 11, 2017, EU Advocate General Maciej Szpunar released 
a preliminary opinion that represents a major defeat for Uber’s claim 
to be an electronic platform and not a transportation company.33 The 
fact that Uber sets the price for each ride, unlike how prices are set 
in e-Bay and similar platforms, was highlighted, as was the total 
dependence of the drivers on the company—a point that may have 
impact on employment law forums. The key point, however, was that 
the advocate general concluded that Uber provides transportation 
services; using privately owned cars to do so rather than its own 
fleets does not exclude it from the realm of transportation.
Advocate general preliminary decisions are usually confirmed 
by the actual court; if this is indeed the case, the court decision will 
likely have an impact even in jurisdictions outside the European 
Union. As seen earlier in relation to Quebec and British Columbia, 
the Uber issue has become highly politicized in most, if not all, of the 
Canadian jurisdictions that are involved, as well as in other coun-
tries. If an authoritative judicial body such as the European Court of 
Justice confirms the advocate general’s conclusion that Uber is in fact 
mainly a transportation company (because customers pay for rides, 
not for the application, among other reasons), this will be influential, 
especially among lawyers. At the level of popular opinion rather than 
law, the decision may perhaps help to undermine the prestige of the 
hi-tech, information-society, “innovation” discourse that Uber has 
so successfully mobilized to justify its blatant law-breaking. And it 
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is the theme of law-breaking that takes us into the final section of 
this chapter, covering the situation in three major Canadian cities.
VII. Regulatory Capture at the Municipal Level 
As mentioned above, Vancouver and Montreal have seen 
municipal authorities using strong measures against Uber, from 
prohibition to impounding vehicles to large fines; but in both cities 
the regulatory lead has shifted to their respective provincial govern-
ments. The major cities that have been left on their own to address 
the Uber challenge are Ottawa, Toronto, and Edmonton.
Uber started operating illegally in both Edmonton and Calgary 
between 2012 and 2013. Taking the initial regulatory lead—at that 
time no Canadian jurisdiction had a policy on Uber—a Calgary City 
report warned that drivers who regularly drive others for money 
need to get commercial insurance and should also have a commercial 
driver’s licence. Since Uber drivers had neither, the City of Calgary 
obtained a court injunction to stop Uber drivers from working. 
Incidentally, the City of Toronto also tried to get an injunction, in 
the early days, but the Ontario court refused.34 Edmonton seems to 
have followed Calgary’s lead, with commercial driver’s licences and 
proper insurance being made conditions for granting a special non-
taxi licence to Uber. The insurance industry, however, in Alberta as 
in Ontario, took its time devising an appropriate product, and in the 
meantime Uber drivers continued to ply their trade in both main 
Albertan cities. 
Edmonton beat other Canadian cities in devising some mini-
mum regulations—rules falling mainly on drivers.35 A key point 
here is that, as in other Canadian cities, the Edmonton City Council 
was officially designing and passing a bylaw governing vehicles for 
hire in general—though in fact Uber had a monopoly, as far as the 
news coverage reveals. Throughout, it was Uber spokespeople and 
lobbyists who were pushing the city and making claims such as the 
opinion that commercial insurance for their drivers was “unrealistic,” 
as if the taxi industry had not managed to obtain and pay for such 
insurance. Whether similar but less cowboy-like corporations, such 
as Lyft or Hailo, would have made less outrageous comments is of 
course impossible to tell. But the important point here is that in all 
Canadian cities, the regulatory process legalizing application-enabled 
for-hire vehicles took the unusual form of disputes between the city 
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and a single company, not between the city and an industry or even 
an oligopoly.36 
Be that as it may, the corporation is now obliged to pay a $50,000 
annual fee to the city, plus $20,000 to help provide accessible trans-
portation (far less, of course, than it would cost them to comply with 
the rules about accessible vehicles that have long been imposed on 
the taxi industry throughout Canada). And the city gets six cents per 
trip by way of a fee. The rest of the rules fall on drivers: they have to 
obtain commercial driving licences, pay for criminal record checks, 
and prove that their vehicles have had annual inspections. Uber 
customers have to pay a minimum of $3.25, like taxi passengers, but 
Uber can charge whatever it wants over that minimum. In general, 
Uber gives a prospective customer a non-negotiable price as they 
book the ride, and the algorithm by which the price is generated 
is not shared with drivers. Whether per-ride fees being charged by 
cities will come out of the drivers’ share or the corporation’s is not 
specified in the bylaws; one suspects, however, that since Uber has 
continuously moved to increase its profit margin, by upping their 
share of the fare from 20 per cent to 25 per cent or 29 per cent, while 
greatly lowering fares in less competitive markets such as Detroit, it 
will be drivers who end up paying the city fee.
Foreshadowing what would happen later elsewhere, as the 
Edmonton City Council moved to legalize “transportation network 
companies” as a separate, non-taxi category, it simultaneously 
lowered the regulatory requirements that had long governed the 
taxi industry. All taxi driver training was eliminated and English 
proficiency and defensive-driving course requirements were also 
removed. And Edmonton taxi drivers can now work for less money 
than the standard fare because brokerages (not individual drivers) 
are allowed to offer discounts. The harmonization is only in the 
downward direction, however: neither taxi owners nor drivers can 
make up for lost revenue during busy times by charging the “surge 
prices” for which Uber is notorious.
The Alberta insurance uncertainties continued (and as seen 
above, Uber, in Edmonton as elsewhere, was not interested in either 
proactively paying for commercial insurance for their drivers or ask-
ing drivers to obtain proper insurance themselves). The insurance 
issue meant that Uber was not operating legally even after the new 
licensing rules were passed by the city council—thus, Edmonton 
issued 159 tickets to Uber drivers during a six-month period in 2016. 
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Eventually a commercial driving insurance product for Uber drivers 
was developed, and legality ensued. But legalization took place on 
terms highly favourable to the Uber corporation, as just described. 
Taxi drivers, for their part, are no longer trained, which saves them 
time and money but has problematic consequences for the public. 
And the taxi brokerages were “freed” to race Uber drivers to the 
bottom during non-peak times, by discounting fares when demand 
is low.
The Toronto City Council followed a similar approach a short 
time later, in the wake of extremely heated anti-Uber protests by taxi 
drivers, similar to those in Edmonton.37 To make a long and tortuous 
story short,38 the rules eventually passed by council in May 2016 are 
as follows: 
• Uber cars’ basic (minimum) fare was raised from $2.50 to 
$3.25.
• Uber drivers—unlike in Alberta—need only an ordinary, 
non-commercial driver’s licence, although both drivers and 
corporations have to obtain a permit from the city.
• Uber drivers have to pay for criminal record checks.
• Each Uber driver must pay for commercial insurance cover-
age up to $2 million. The company, in comparison, needs only 
$5 million in insurance coverage.
• The company is to pay the city an application fee of $20,000 
(for a business claiming 45,000 rides per year) as well as an 
annual fee of $15 per driver and 30 cents per ride. 
No limits are imposed by the city either on the number of Uber cars 
or on the prices charged. 
As if these conditions did not already presage financial disaster 
for taxi drivers, not to mention continuing exploitation for Uber’s 
own drivers, who cannot increase their fares to compensate for new 
costs such as commercial insurance, the Toronto City Council fol-
lowed Edmonton’s lead in rolling major changes in taxi licensing 
rules into the Uber policy process. The changes affecting taxis are 
as follows:
• Taxi brokerages (not individual drivers) can offer prices that 
differ from the standard fare if rides are booked through 
an application—although one of the largest Toronto taxi 
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brokerages, Beck, has already said they will not attempt 
surge pricing (no doubt to maintain some semblance of 
competitive advantage).
• The seventeen-day compulsory training for taxi drivers is 
eliminated; so are the requirements of a CPR course and 
knowing English.
• Application and licence fees for accessible taxicabs are to 
be waived (a change whose financial implications worried 
city staff, but not council)—with the taxi industry being still 
compelled to offer accessible vehicles, while Uber is not so 
obliged.
• The decades-old policy by which the city had fostered owner-
driven cars and capped the number of “standard” plates 
(which allow plate owners to collect rent from drivers) was 
reversed, eliminating the owner-driven “ambassador” taxi 
licence category altogether.
• Taxis continue to be subject to semi-annual city vehicle 
inspections, whereas Uber cars can obtain certification of 
inspection in any garage, and only once a year.
• Taxis can now stay on the road longer, with maximum 
vehicle age raised from five to seven years. 
Toronto city councillor Gord Perks summarized the city’s policy 
change as follows: “[y]es, there’s a more level playing field between 
the millionaires [taxi plate owners] and the billionaires [Uber], but 
for the consumer, the level playing field goes down. The drivers lose, 
the public lose, the billionaires and the millionaires win.”39 
Finally, the City of Ottawa, which had engaged in aggressive 
bylaw enforcement in the early days of Uber, eventually passed a 
legalization bylaw that is very similar to the Edmonton and Toronto 
ones just discussed.40 A telling detail is that while in Montreal Uber 
has to pay ninety cents, roughly, to the city per ride, in Ottawa the 
per-ride fee is less than eleven cents.
And as in the other cities, Ottawa taxi companies, while unsuc-
cessful in their demand that Uber be subject to the same financial 
and regulatory rules applying to them, obtained some loosening of 
the rules, including greatly lowered prices for both driver and taxi 
plate yearly licence fees. Ottawa’s taxi industry is a near monopoly, 
which no doubt affected the policy process; in Toronto, by contrast, 
Uber operates as a de facto monopoly, but the taxi industry is not 
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unified, with several large brokerages operating alongside a few 
thousand individual operators.
Municipal politicians and staff members who have negative 
views either about the on-demand service economy in general 
or about Uber in particular may at some point attempt to change 
the rules implemented during 2016 in cities including Edmonton, 
Toronto, and Ottawa, so that they are not such blatant examples of 
regulatory capture. But given the “unmodernized” state of munici-
pal business licensing in general,41 mentioned above, what may be 
a much better option is to question whether trying to incorporate 
Uber and similar corporate behemoths into the straitjacket of existing 
rules for municipal business licensing is the best approach. Shifting 
responsibility for this new type of business regulation to a level of 
government that has both more legal powers and more research 
and policy capacity, namely provinces (or even nation-states, as in 
the European story briefly covered above), is more likely to provide 
real solutions. The issue of scale and jurisdiction in regulatory work 
brings us to the conclusions.
VIII. Conclusion: Scale and Jurisdiction in Business 
Regulation 
A comprehensive review of policy options that would not prohibit 
the platform-enabled “on demand service economy” but would seri-
ously regulate it, authored by the Ontario transit authority, Metrolinx, 
helpfully points out that municipalities have long had licensing 
responsibilities in regard to many types of business, but have been 
unable—both for legal reasons, for organizational behaviour reasons, 
and for capacity reasons—to engage in proactive, evidence-based pol-
icy planning. The report’s careful attention to the difference between 
the traditional, backward-looking licensing of local businesses, on 
the one hand, and evidence-based policy covering potential future 
events on the other hand, notes that while the City of Toronto will 
now get data from Uber about Uber cars, “the data will be used for 
licensing purposes; it will not provide the information needed to 
manage an efficient urban mobility system.”42 Carefully worded to 
avoid offending municipal politicians, this remark goes to the heart 
of the issue. A less diplomatic way of putting the problem would be 
to note that licensing hot-dog carts and street vendors and taxis has 
not provided municipalities with the kind of collective experience 
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that would allow them to now begin regulating transnational giants 
that operate without brick-and-mortar store fronts and have top tech 
experts and top public relations experts, paid help that municipal 
corporations could only dream about.
One original suggestion made in the Metrolinx report is worth 
mentioning, because instead of merely complaining about city gov-
ernance habits, it turns the tables and points out that Uber would 
be most useful where it does not operate, that is, in outlying areas 
that are close to cities but are not well served either by transit or by 
taxis. The report suggests that companies such as Uber should be 
encouraged to start operating not in downtown areas already well 
served by public transit as well as taxis but rather in low-density and 
semi-rural areas, where people who do not drive or do not have cars 
have severe mobility limitations.43 
But of course, only a provincial government could use its pow-
ers to demand, perhaps as a condition of operating in certain pre-
ferred markets, that companies also provide service elsewhere—as 
is routinely done through utilities regulation, which is mainly pro-
vincial in Canada and is state-based in the United States. Indeed, the 
semi-rural municipality of Innisfil, north of Toronto, has apparently 
already approached Uber, offering an annual subsidy for a certain 
minimum level of service that would cost the municipality far less 
than operating a bus service, but would meet citizens’ needs.44 It is 
unlikely that given current law, Canadian provinces could redefine 
Uber (and any future competitors that might arise) as what United 
States law calls “common carriers,” a classification that would sub-
ject them to utilities regulations, including mandatory coverage of 
a whole geographic area. But some provincial policy tools could no 
doubt be brought to bear, if there was political will, especially in 
Ontario and Alberta, to stop leaving city councils and city staffs to 
fend for themselves, as is now being done with Airbnb as well as 
Uber.
Provincial governments are of course highly politicized too, 
and do not always proceed on the basis of evidence. But recent his-
tory shows that strong measures to protect farm land, minimize 
sprawl, and ensure “greenbelts” can only come from the province, 
for political, legal, and capacity reasons. In general, provinces have 
not hesitated to seize jurisdiction in regard to urban planning from 
municipalities, through a variety of measures. Agricultural land 
cannot be protected by municipalities competing with one another 
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for development projects and new housing; only by the province. 
And so too, if the issue of taxi and taxi-like transportation were re-
scaled at the level of the province, perhaps more creative and fairer 
policies might evolve.
The policy process is as of this writing stalled in both Quebec 
and British Columbia, for different reasons; but these two prov-
inces have taken some responsibility for governance in regard to 
Uber, and so far these provinces have not seen the blatant regula-
tory capture that Uber legalization has wrought in Edmonton and 
Toronto. Meanwhile, Ontario’s Metrolinx report reminds us that 
the people who could really use a service like Uber may be those 
who have thus far been neglected by the corporation, as well as by 
politicians, because they do not live within the limits of the big cit-
ies that are Uber’s profit centres. Therefore, this is an excellent time 
for Canadians, in city and provincial governments and outside of 
them, to begin thinking seriously about which types of businesses, 
and which types of risk, should still be managed municipally as 
opposed to provincially. 
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CHAPTER V I I
The Sharing Economy and Trade 




T he growth of the sharing economy has attracted increased atten-tion as the disruption of longstanding, well-established market 
sectors such as transportation and hotel accommodation creates new 
opportunities and threatens powerful economic interests. In recent 
years, the sharing economy debate has focused on two companies—
Uber and Airbnb—which have both dramatically reshaped their 
respective business sectors. 
The emergence of Uber and Airbnb as significant marketplace 
competitors is notable not only because they are big businesses, but 
also because of their impact on local businesses. The development 
of those companies on a city-by-city, community-by-community 
basis has ensured that policies and regulation often involve local or 
regional authorities.
Much like the arrival of Walmart in small towns a generation 
ago, the arrival of Uber or Airbnb has proven to be controversial and 
contentious in most communities. Indeed, the perceived threats to 
small businesses—whether the local stores in the days of Walmart 
or local taxi drivers today—remain much the same. The existing 
marketplace—licensed taxi drivers or accredited hotels—typically 
respond with demands that the services cease operations, noting that 
they conduct business without the necessary licensing or regulatory 
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approvals and that despite the consumer benefits, they threaten the 
viability of longstanding businesses.2 
In many respects, the response to online competitors is as old 
as the commercial Internet. For the past two decades, it has been the 
Internet’s never-ending story. Established, successful businesses face 
Internet upstarts who leverage the advantages of a global network 
and new communications technology to offer better prices, more 
choice, or innovative services. 
In the 1990s, it was online retailers such as Amazon who pre-
sented more selection at lower prices than most bookstores could 
offer. In the 2000s, Wikipedia brought the decades-old encyclopedia 
business to an end, online music services provided greater conve-
nience than conventional record stores, Internet telephony technolo-
gies used by companies like Skype changed the rules of international 
voice and video calls. Today, Netflix has challenged conventional 
broadcast models, Craigslist and Huffington Post have challenged 
conventional media, and services such as Uber and Airbnb have 
upended the taxi and hotel worlds.
In these David-versus-Goliath-type battles, the established 
businesses rarely fade away without a fight. Using their remaining 
influence, they often look to laws and regulations that increase 
costs, prohibit activities, restrict consumers, or regulate pricing 
to create barriers for the new entrants.3 There is a danger that the 
public interest is cast aside in favour of rules that hamstring new 
competitors and cost consumers. From copyright reforms that 
blocked online video retransmitter iCraveTV from operating in 
Canada nearly fifteen years ago4 to continued calls for local content 
requirements and fees on online video services such as Netflix,5 
the goal is too often to use law to stop or stall new Internet-enabled 
competition.
For example, Amazon was initially prohibited from operating 
in Canada as opponents cited restrictions on the foreign ownership 
of booksellers. The company proceeded to launch in 2002 without 
a physical presence (using Canada Post for order fulfillment)6 and 
only formally entered the country, over the objection of the Canadian 
Bookseller Association, in 2010.7 Similarly, the Canadian Radio-
television and Telecommunications Commission, Canada’s broadcast 
and telecom regulator, tried to regulate the pricing of Internet tele-
phone services in Canada in 2005 before the Canadian government 
overruled it on the issue.8
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Given that history, the current fights against companies such as 
Uber and Airbnb should come as little surprise. The battles are being 
waged in city halls around the world as the established businesses 
lobby for regulations that would either block the services or require 
price controls to increase costs. While Uber has faced mounting 
legal challenges involving labour and fair business practice issues 
which led to dramatic changes among corporate leadership in June 
2017, the applicability of sector-specific rules and regulations have 
remained murky, with Uber and similar sharing economy companies 
frequently falling through the cracks and avoiding conventional legal 
requirements. 
The question of new regulations is a complex one, but the aim 
of this paper is not to assess the merits of specific regulations or 
even address the perceived need to regulate. Beyond debates about 
the appropriate form of regulation is the question of the right to 
regulate. Regardless of one’s position on the benefits or harms of the 
sharing economy, it seems reasonable to conclude that local, regional, 
and national governments should have the authority to determine 
for themselves and their citizens whether to implement regulatory 
frameworks. 
Yet that right to regulate has been gradually overtaken by 
the expansion of trade agreements that have extended their ambit 
beyond conventional tariff reduction into economic regulation. In 
fact, the initial shift into issues such as intellectual property pro-
tection and trade in services has largely given way to agreements 
that cover virtually every aspect of a modern economy, including 
environmental protections, labour rights, and educational standards. 
This expansion will soon include the sharing economy, with rules 
that will govern key aspects of sharing economy services as the 
agreements make inroads into the digital economy, often before a 
sector is fully developed. In doing so, the regulatory powers cur-
rently vested in national, regional, and local governments to estab-
lish regulations governing this emerging economic powerhouse 
will give way to regulation through trade agreements, with legal, 
policy, and regulatory standards made within the context of global 
trade flows.
This paper examines the intersection between the sharing 
economy and international trade agreements. The result of such inter-
sections is likely to restrict the right to regulate, and disputing the 
wisdom of using closed-door negotiations that typify the negotiating 
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framework for massive trade deals to address an increasingly chal-
lenging policy matter. 
Trade agreements and global trade rules have become a critical 
aspect of the digital economy. Often characterized as “harmoniza-
tion” of rules for aspects of the economy that operate on a global 
platform, the resulting rules run the risk of “Americanization,” with 
the export of standards from the United States (the dominant digital 
economy) to other markets.
The paper assesses the intersection between the sharing econ-
omy and international trade agreements in three parts. Section II 
focuses on recent efforts to regulate Uber and Airbnb, two of the 
leading sharing economy companies. While there are many other 
examples of disruptive sharing economy businesses, the pressure 
to address Uber and Airbnb upon entry into a local market has 
been mirrored around the globe. Drawing on examples from North 
America, Europe, and Asia, the paper highlights how politicians 
and regulators have sought to block, harness, or embolden sharing 
economy businesses by relying on an evolving regulatory toolbox. 
Section III highlights how global trade rules and treaties have 
been used to establish legal frameworks for the digital economy, often 
before the full development of those sectors. The paper focuses on 
two treaty initiatives—the World Intellectual Property Organization’s 
Internet treaties in the 1990s and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement in the 2000s—to demonstrate how incumbent businesses 
frequently use their political and market power to establish rules that 
govern how emerging technologies can be used in the marketplace. 
The development of rules before new businesses and new business 
models can fully develop invariably means that the resulting regu-
lations favour the established players, creating significant barriers 
to entry.
Section IV considers what happens when sharing economy 
regulation intersects with emerging global trade agreements. The 
analysis centres on two agreements: the Trans Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), which was concluded in 2015, and the Trade in Services 
Agreement (TiSA), which is still the subject of ongoing negotiation. 
Moreover, it notes that the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), which was embroiled in a contentious renegotiation pro-
cess that began in the fall of 2017, has identified the digital economy 
as a key area for discussion. These agreements feature (or are likely 
to feature) provisions with direct implications for the regulation of 
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sharing economy services, including restrictions on local regula-
tions, privacy and data transfer rules, and provisions on localization 
requirements.
II. Growth of the Sharing Economy and Emergence 
of Regulatory Demands
Companies such as Uber and Airbnb are less than ten years old, 
yet both (alongside many other sharing economy businesses) have 
had a remarkable disruptive effect on the economy and longstand-
ing regulatory approaches. Uber, based in San Francisco, currently 
operates in 662 cities and eighty-two countries around the world.9 It 
offers several tiers of service, ranging from upscale town cars with 
professional drivers (Uber), to low-cost privately owned “regular 
cars” driven by amateur or part-time drivers (UberX, or UberPOP 
in Europe). Uber XL (oversized vehicles, used for hauling cargo) is 
another subdivision of Uber. While the company is losing money, it 
now generates more than $5 billion in revenue annually.10
Uber is not regulated in the vast majority of cities in which 
it operates, but that is slowly changing. Most regulation occurs at 
the municipal level, although as detailed below, some states and 
provinces have regulated it (often in conjunction with supporting 
municipal legislation). Moreover, the Philippines recently became 
the first country to legislate Uber at the national level. 
The growth of Airbnb is similar to Uber. The company is also 
based in San Francisco, offering a digital platform for short-term 
rentals of private accommodation. Airbnb currently features over 
2 million listings in 34,000 cities and 191 countries. It is a privately 
held company, but estimates suggest that its bookings are valued 
at over $10 billion annually.
Given their popularity and significant revenues, the two com-
panies have been the prime targets for regulation.11 This part of the 
paper examines the regulatory challenges faced by governments at 
all levels in seeking to adapt conventional regulation to the sharing 
economy environment, highlighting the myriad of legal strategies 
that have been adopted around the world.
i. Uber
Uber considers itself a digital service connecting drivers and passen-
gers rather than a transport service. The distinction is critical, since 
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transport services are typically subject to extensive rules on driver 
qualifications, road rules, and insurance requirements.12 Uber and 
similar platforms argue that they are technology companies or plat-
forms that do not themselves provide a transport service but rather 
facilitate the provision of transport services by individual drivers.13 
The European Union’s highest court is set to rule on the issue 
next year.14 The complexity of the issue is illustrated by the court’s 
description of the case, which arises from proposed regulations in 
Spain:
If the service provided by UBER SYSTEMS SPAIN, S.L. were 
not to be considered to be a transport service and were there-
fore considered to fall within the cases covered by Directive 
2006/123, the question arising is whether Article 15 of the 
Law on Unfair competition—concerning the infringement of 
rules governing competitive activity—is contrary to Directive 
2006/123, specifically Article 9 on freedom of establishment and 
authorisation schemes, when the reference to national laws or 
legal provisions is made without taking into account the fact 
that the scheme for obtaining licences, authorisations and per-
mits may not be in any way restrictive or disproportionate, that 
is, it may not unreasonably impede the principle of freedom of 
establishment.
If it is confirmed that Directive 2000/31/EC is applicable to the 
service provided by UBER SYSTEMS SPAIN, S.L., the question 
arising is whether restrictions in one Member State [regarding] 
the freedom to provide the electronic intermediary service from 
another Member State, in the form of making the service subject 
to an authorisation or a licence, or in the form of an injunction 
prohibiting provision of the electronic intermediary service 
based on the application of the national legislation on unfair 
competition, are valid measures that constitute derogations 
from paragraph 2 in accordance with Article 3(4) of Directive 
2000/31/EC.15
At the heart of the regulatory debate is whether Uber is, as it claims, 
operating as a pure technology company, providing a matchmaking 
service to willing participants, or whether it is operating in effect 
as an unlicensed taxi service.16 While the distinction is critical in 
many jurisdictions, being treated as a technology company does not 
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guarantee the ability to operate. For example, Uber is registered in 
Taiwan as a software company and not a taxi service, however the 
government has still not permitted it to operate within the country.17 
Early indications suggest that the court is likely to rule that 
Uber should be viewed as a transportation service. In May 2017, 
the European Court of Justice’s advocate general,  Maciej Szpunar, 
ruled that Uber may be innovative, but it falls within the field of 
transportation.18 If upheld, the ruling would mean that Uber would 
fall under national regulations and would be required to obtain the 
necessary licences and authorizations. The opinion noted the central 
role of Uber in virtually all aspects of the service, including price 
setting and establishing conditions on drivers. In light of its active 
control, the advocate general ruled that it could not be viewed as a 
mere intermediary.
As Uber has grown, so too have efforts to impose regulation 
with numerous jurisdictions employing a wide range of measures.19 
In the United States, twenty-two states passed comprehensive ride-
hailing legislation in 2015 alone.20 Some cities have endeavoured 
to establish equivalent regulations for traditional taxis and Uber 
drivers. For example, regulators in Austin, Texas, insisted that Uber 
drivers (and competitors such as Lyft) be fingerprinted in the same 
manner as taxi drivers. The issue became particularly urgent after 
the police investigated at least seven alleged sexual assaults by ride-
share drivers in 2015. The companies challenged the city measure, 
but lost in a public vote, leading both to halt operations in the city.21 
Safety measures are a common regulatory requirement for 
Uber and similar services.22 The company ceased operations in 
Kansas after the Kansas Transportation Network Company Services Act 
imposed stricter insurance and driver screening requirements. The 
bill requires companies to certify that drivers have comprehensive 
and collision insurance, and requires new drivers to undergo a back-
ground check performed by the Kansas Bureau of Investigation.23 
The city of Eugene, Oregon, sued Uber in March 2015, and went to 
court to stop the company from operating until it met what the city 
described as “minimum safety requirements.”24
Rather than focusing on operational safety rules, some cities 
have passed regulations that challenge Uber’s business model. For 
example, Uber stopped operating in Anchorage, Alaska, after the city 
demanded its drivers accept cash payments, contrary to its credit-
card only approach.25 In 2016, the Indian city of Delhi banned the use 
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of surge pricing, a controversial practice that increases Uber rider 
costs during busy periods.26
Another regulatory approach has been to focus on regulating 
the technology used by Uber, namely smartphone apps. For example, 
in Texas, the Houston City Council took steps to regulate smartphone 
apps that connect drivers with passengers, such as Uber and Lyft.27
Canadian cities have frequently focused their regulatory efforts 
on revenue generation. Uber is active and regulated in five Canadian 
cities: Toronto, Waterloo, Ottawa, Niagara, and Edmonton.28 In 
Niagara and Ottawa, Uber pays a $7,253 annual licensing fee, plus 
11 cents per trip; in Toronto, the company paid a $20,000 upfront 
one-time fee, a $15 per driver annual fee, and 30 cents per trip; in 
Edmonton, it pays $50,000 a year and 6 cents a trip; in Waterloo it also 
pays $50,000 a year, plus 11 cents a trip. 
At the provincial level, the Legislative Assembly of Alberta 
passed Bill 16, the Traffic Safety Amendment Act, 2016, which came into 
force on May 27, 2016.29 One of the major effects is the creation of an 
administrative penalty of a maximum of $50,000 to a transportation 
network company for each day of non-compliance with the legisla-
tion. The province has left the burden of inspection to the companies 
themselves, and the mechanical inspections to the cities. 
In the United States, statewide regulations tend to be more gen-
eral, while municipal regulations are more focused and specific.30 As 
concerns regarding Uber and antitrust have begun to mount, there 
has been some consideration to the applicability of federal antitrust 
rules.31 The Federal Trade Commission is an independent agency 
tasked with promoting consumer protection and eliminating and pre-
venting anticompetitive business practices. By law, the FTC’s power to 
regulate interstate commerce is just as broad as that of Congress. Since 
the 1980s, the FTC has been critical of taxi and limousine commis-
sions for being anti-competitive, and has brought suits against cities. 
In 1984, the FTC brought cases against Minneapolis and New Orleans 
regarding their taxi regulation practices, merely because interstate 
travellers take taxis to and from the airport when they fly across state 
lines. The FTC has yet to become active against companies such as 
Uber, which may be California-based, but operates in multiple states.
American antitrust laws, however, allow states some exceptions 
to adopt anticompetitive business regulations, but these rights do 
not extend to cities. Cities are subject to federal antitrust laws unless 
states pass legislation absolving them. For example, Minneapolis 
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ended up avoiding the 1984 taxi lawsuit by acceding to the FTC 
and permitting more competition. New Orleans, on the other hand, 
succeeded in lobbying the state of Louisiana to authorize its anti-
competitive actions, to the detriment of consumers.32 This raises 
questions of whether city-based regulations could override national 
anti-trust rules.
The city of Philadelphia serves as an interesting case study 
for jurisdictional issues. Since state law overrides local policies, 
Philadelphia faced a blurred line between city and state politics. The 
Philadelphia Parking Authority (PPA) has worked aggressively to 
halt transportation network company (TNC) operations by ticketing 
drivers and impounding cars. The mayor of Philadelphia has no juris-
diction over the PPA because it is a state-chartered agency, and has 
not openly challenged PPA activity around ride-sharing. However, 
the Philadelphia City Council passed a resolution supporting ride-
sharing and urging statewide action to permit TNCs in Philadelphia. 
Elsewhere in Pennsylvania, TNCs may now operate legally thanks to 
a two-year experimental licence recently issued by the state’s Public 
Utilities Commission.33
Washington State law allows municipalities to regulate licens-
ing for taxis and other vehicles, while the state oversees limousines. 
TNC lobbyists are making a push to change Washington law and 
give the state jurisdiction over all vehicle licensing, which would 
provide uniformity across markets.34
While regulation in the United States and Canada has generally 
focused on operational and taxation issues, other countries have tar-
geted the freedom to operate. In the European Union, regulators in the 
Netherlands, Portugal, France, Spain and Germany have taken action 
based on existing legal frameworks that resulted in administrative or 
criminal charges against Uber drivers and management. In response, 
Uber submitted complaints to the European Commission against 
Spanish, German, and French court bans for violation of Article 49 
(right of establishment) and Article 56 (freedom to provide services) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In other countries, 
such as Denmark, legal decisions are still pending.35
Legal actions challenging Uber’s right to operate are not uncom-
mon in Europe with judges targeting both the company and its execu-
tives. For example, in France a judge slapped Uber with an €800,000 
fine for running the “illegal” UberPOP service, using unlicensed 
drivers. It also fined two of the company’s senior executives €50,000.36 
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Similarly, a Dutch court banned UberPOP on the grounds that it ran 
afoul of licensing laws for commercial drivers. Uber is challenging 
that ruling.37
The Philippines was the first country to regulate Uber on 
a national basis.38 Uber has urged other countries to use the 
Philippines’ legislation as a model to create similar nationwide 
legislation.39 The Philippines law provides nationwide regulations 
for app-based transport services. It introduced a new type of clas-
sification called transportation network vehicle service that allows 
TNCs such as Uber to operate within the existing regulatory frame-
work.40 The Philippines’ Uber requirements feature several technical 
requirements including limits on the age of vehicles, inclusion of a 
GPS system, use of sedans, and clearance requirements for drivers. 
The rules also establish citizenship and national ownership require-
ments. All drivers must provide evidence of Filipino citizenship and 
companies offering the services must demonstrate at least 70 per cent 
domestic ownership.41
ii. Airbnb
Airbnb offers a digital platform for short-term rentals of private 
accommodation. Airbnb is not regulated in the vast majority of cities 
in which it operates. Where it is regulated, most regulation occurs at 
the municipal level, although some states or provinces have begun 
to take notice of potential regulatory authority. At the country level, 
both Iceland and Aruba have pursued national regulation. 
The chief anti-Airbnb concern typically focuses on affordable 
housing, as critics argue that Airbnb rentals make it difficult for 
full-time residents to find affordable housing in cities such as Berlin, 
Paris, and Vancouver. Airbnb has faced persistent criticism from 
city officials in Barcelona and Paris over its impact on local housing 
markets.42
The European Commission released a report in 2016 urging 
governments to not ban Airbnb unless it is the last resort.43 The 
commission concluded that banning short-term lets of apartments 
“appears difficult to justify” when limits on the maximum number 
of days that apartments can be rented out would be a more appro-
priate measure.44
In 2014, Airbnb and the city of Amsterdam entered into a part-
nership that was the first of its kind in Europe. The municipality only 
allows residents to rent out their homes for up to sixty days per year, 
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and customers are supposed to pay a tourist tax via Airbnb (enforce-
ment is questionable as Airbnb would have to share data with the 
city). Without this regulation, Airbnb would create an incentive for 
illegal renting with negative consequences for the local residents 
(higher rents, nuisance, and speculation).45
Most Canadian cities have not regulated Airbnb. The only 
jurisdictions that have passed regulations are the Province of Quebec 
and two British Columbia towns, Tofino and Penticton. Quebec’s 
regulations took effect in April 2016. They require the collection of 
lodging taxes (up to 3.5 per cent), and business registration for those 
who rent out accommodations on a full-time basis.46 Violations carry 
fines that range from $500 to $50,000. 
Vancouver has pledged to target properties dedicated to being 
Airbnb rentals with an “empty-homes tax,” which carries a maximum 
fine of $10,000 for anyone who evades the applicable charge.47 It has 
also proposed 
a new business-licence system for short-term rentals through 
websites like Airbnb to deal with “dangerously” low vacancy 
rates. […] [T]he new regulations would allow short-term rent-
als in principal residences that are either owned or rented[,] [b]
ut the proposed changes would make daily or weekly rentals 
illegal in homes that aren’t principal residences or are structures 
like boats or trailers.48 
Current regulations that require a minimum thirty-day rental period 
will be amended to permit short-term rentals.49
Taxation is another concern associated with Airbnb. In 2016, 
the Province of Ontario convinced the company to email hosts in 
the province to urge them to declare their Airbnb-generated income 
for income tax purposes. The company also reminded hosts about 
consumer protection laws and their responsibilities regarding can-
cellations and refunds.50
Some jurisdictions have established legal restrictions on who 
may rent properties using Airbnb. For example, the city of San Luis 
Obispo, California, passed a comprehensive ordinance that requires 
that the dwelling be owner-occupied; owner presence is encouraged 
but not mandated in the ordinance due to difficulties in enforcing 
such a requirement. However, to alleviate neighbourhood concerns, 
the city requires homestay hosts or a “designated responsible party” 
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to be within a fifteen-minute drive of the property and available 
via telephone 24-hours a day, seven days a week, while rentals are 
occurring.51
Some cities have established limits on rentals, including how 
often people can rent space, how many rentals must occur before the 
city collects taxes, and how often hosts must rent their space before 
inspections are required. After a certain number of rentals, the city 
requires inspections to ensure adherence to applicable building 
codes.52
The most restrictive approach is a full ban on the service. The 
State of New York passed an anti-home-sharing law in 2016 that 
threatens to fine New Yorkers up to $7,500, for advertising their home 
on sites like Airbnb. While the law effectively makes Airbnb illegal, 
many properties remain advertised for rent on the platform.
Other cities simply restrict the ability to rent out specific 
properties. In May 2016, Berlin officials implemented one of the 
world’s toughest clampdowns on Airbnb. City officials have prom-
ised to reject 95 per cent of requests by landlords to rent places on 
a short-term basis. City officials have received more than 500 legal 
complaints over the murky provisions of the new law, which were 
challenged by Wimdu, a German Airbnb competitor.53
While most regulation arises at the municipal level, there are 
at least two examples of national legislation. Iceland established 
national rules that limit the right to rent homes for more than ninety 
consecutive days or to generate revenue that exceeds 1 million 
Icelandic krona ($12,000).54 Moreover, permits, including approvals 
from health and fire departments, are required to operate an Airbnb 
rental.55 Airbnb recently signed an agreement with the Aruba gov-
ernment that is said to help “create a framework to allow the Aruba 
Tourism Authority and Airbnb to address the issue of taxes, host 
accommodation standards and regulations and ensure that it is in 
line with Aruba’s tourism policy.”56 
Sharing economy regulation at the national, provincial/state, 
and local levels has emerged as a global issue with a myriad of rules 
and regulations becoming increasingly common. Those rules typi-
cally reflect local policy choices as communities grapple with both 
the benefits and drawbacks of new services that disrupt longstanding 
business models. Yet just as the markets for services such as taxis 
and accommodation have been disrupted by Uber and Airbnb, so 
too are trade agreements disrupting conventional regulatory models 
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by overtaking policy choices that have traditionally been developed 
and implemented by local or regional governments. The power of 
trade agreements to shape digital policy is the subject of section III 
of this paper.
III. How Trade Agreements Can Shape Digital Policy
Trade agreements and international economic treaties are typically 
associated with measures designed to enhance trade through tariff 
reduction. Indeed, for decades trade negotiations were largely pre-
mised on increasing the flow of goods across borders by lowering tar-
iffs applied to imports. While tariff reduction remains an important 
component of many trade deals, newer agreements frequently focus 
on economic regulation such as intellectual property enforcement, 
health regulation, and environmental standards. Trade agreements 
are often a poor place to negotiate these issues, which have tradition-
ally fallen within the purview of international organizations that 
develop consensus-based treaties with broad stakeholder participa-
tion. A fuller examination of emerging treaties such as the TPP and 
TiSA is contained at section IV of this chapter. 
This part examines how trade agreements and global treaties 
can shape digital policy by considering two treaties: the World 
Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO) Internet treaties and 
their inclusion of anti-circumvention rules, as well as the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which contained various 
measures designed to regulate Internet-based providers and activi-
ties. In the case of the WIPO Internet treaties, the anti-circumvention 
rules became firmly entrenched within domestic laws worldwide and 
had a significant impact on many Internet-based businesses. In the 
case of ACTA, the treaty has yet to take effect, but the Internet-related 
provisions have resurfaced in other trade deals. 
Given the early-stage development of the sharing economy and 
the regulations associated with companies such as Uber and Airbnb, 
the experience with the two treaties provides an early warning on 
how established organizations can often shape laws well before 
new entrants have fully developed and therefore hamper domestic 
regulations, as well as potential competitors and their disruptive 
business models.
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i. WIPO and Anti-Circumvention Rules
Since their conclusion in 1996, the World Intellectual Property 
Organization’s Internet treaties—the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 
and WIPO Performances and the Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)—have 
had a transformative impact on the scope of copyright law, creat-
ing what some experts have referred to as “super-copyright”57 or 
“para-copyright.”58 Both treaties feature a broad range of provisions 
targeting digital copyright issues; however, the most controver-
sial provisions mandate the establishment within ratifying states’ 
national law of anti-circumvention provisions that provide “adequate 
legal protection and effective legal measures” against the circumven-
tion of effective technological protection measures.59 
The promise of technological protection measures (TPMs) was 
long touted by movie, music, and software industry associations as 
providing important protections for their products, by using tech-
nology to prevent unauthorized access or use. Despite the support 
for TPMs, many advocates have acknowledged that all TPMs can be 
defeated. For example, in 2000, the Secure Digital Music Initiative 
(SDMI) launched a public challenge to encourage the public to test 
whether it could crack the digital lock system, viewed at the time as 
unbreakable technological protections.60 A team of security research-
ers cracked SDMI with relative ease, confirming the technology 
community’s view that no system is foolproof.61
Given the flawed protection provided by TPMs, supporters of 
technological protections lobbied for additional legal protections 
to support them. Although characterized as copyright protection, 
this layer of legal protection does not address the copying or use of 
copyrighted work. Instead, it focuses on the protection of the TPM 
itself, which in turn attempts to ensure that the content distributor, 
not necessarily the creator or copyright owner, controls how the 
underlying content is accessed and used.
Both the WCT and WPPT contain anti-circumvention provision 
requirements. Article 11 of the WCT provides that
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and 
effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective 
technological measures that are used by authors in connection 
with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne 
Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which 
are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.62 
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Similarly, Article 18 of the WPPT provides that
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection 
and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of 
effective technological measures that are used by performers 
or producers of phonograms in connection with the exercise of 
their rights under this Treaty and that restrict acts, in respect of 
their performances or phonograms, which are not authorized 
by the performers or the producers of phonograms concerned 
or permitted by law.63 
The initial work behind the WIPO Internet treaties began in 1989, 
with work on model provisions for legislation in the field of copy-
right.64 The interplay between law and technology—which later 
would come in the form of anti-circumvention legislation—did 
not start in earnest until December 1994.65 The issue did take hold, 
however, and over the next two years, several committee sessions 
followed by a WIPO Diplomatic Conference, in December 1996, led 
to the agreement on the treaties.66 
The diplomatic conference in December 1996, which ultimately 
resulted in the conclusion of the WIPO Internet treaties, featured 
debate in both the main committee and within the plenary on the 
anti-circumvention provisions. The starting point for the diplomatic 
conference was the United States–backed “Basic Proposal” that 
provided that
(1) Contracting Parties shall make unlawful the importation, 
manufacture or distribution of protection-defeating devices, or 
the offer or performance of any service having the same effect, 
by any person knowing or having reasonable grounds to know 
that the device or service will be used for, or in the course of, 
the exercise of rights provided under this Treaty that is not 
authorized by the rightholder or the law.
(2) Contracting Parties shall provide for appropriate and effec-
tive remedies against the unlawful acts referred to in paragraph 
(1).67
Several countries called for narrowing the scope of the provisions. 
For example, Jamaica noted that “in the view of her Delegation, the 
formulation ‘any of the rights covered by the rights under the Treaty’ 
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was too broad and imprecise and its proposed amendment would not 
contravene the basic intention of the Article.”68 The Australian del-
egation sought to modify the provision to “confine its operations to 
clear cases of intended use for copyright breaches.”69 The Norwegian 
delegation “agreed with those who had proposed narrowing the 
scope of those provisions, for the main reason that such provisions 
should not prevent legitimate use of works, for example, private and 
educational uses, and use of works which had fallen into the public 
domain.”70 The German delegation also “joined those Delegations 
which had considered that the scope of the provisions in question 
should be narrowed.”71 Only three delegations—the United States, 
Columbia, and Hungary—were substantially satisfied with the scope 
of the proposal.
United States law professor Pam Samuelson chronicles what 
followed given the rising opposition to the basic proposal in her 1997 
law review article, “The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO”:
Facing the prospect of little support for the Chairman’s watered-
down version of the U.S. White Paper proposal, the U.S. del-
egation was in the uncomfortable position of trying to find a 
national delegation willing to introduce a compromise provision 
brokered by U.S. industry groups that would simply require 
states to have adequate and effective legal protection against 
circumvention technologies and services. In the end, such a 
delegation was found, and the final treaty embodied this provi-
sion in article 11.72
The compromise position was to adopt the far more ambiguous 
standard: “to provide adequate legal protection and effective legal 
remedies.” Not only does this language not explicitly require a ban 
on the distribution or manufacture of circumvention devices, it does 
not specifically target both access and copy controls. In fact, the record 
makes it readily apparent that the intent of the negotiating parties was 
to provide flexibility to avoid such an outcome. Countries were free 
to implement stricter anti-circumvention provisions consistent with 
the basic proposal (as the United States ultimately did), but consensus 
was reached on the basis of leaving the specific implementation to 
individual countries with far more flexible mandatory requirements.
While that may have been the intent of the treaty provision, its 
aftermath has been far different. As one of the primary supporters 
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of the WIPO Internet treaties, the United States was one of the first 
to attempt to implement the obligations into national law. Several 
implementing bills were tabled before the United States Congress. 
Then Senator (later Attorney General) John Ashcroft introduced the 
Digital Copyright Clarification and Technology Education Act of 1997.73 
Rick Boucher (D-VA9) and Tom Campbell (R-CA15) introduced par-
allel legislation in the House of Representatives as the Digital Era 
Copyright Enhancement Act of 1997.74 Neither bill included provisions 
on anti-circumvention devices. 
The Ashcroft and Boucher bills were abandoned, however, after 
legislation that ultimately led to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) gained congressional momentum. Representative Howard 
Coble introduced what would later become the DMCA with the WIPO 
Treaties Implementation Act.75 During hearings on the bills, United 
States government officials acknowledged that the implementing leg-
islation went beyond WIPO Internet treaty requirements. The United 
States’ chief policy spokesperson and proponent of the DMCA, 
Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and 
Trademarks, Bruce A. Lehman, admitted during his congressional 
testimony that the provisions went beyond the requirements of 
the treaties.76 Lehman stated that the administration’s aim was not 
confined to changing United States law. Rather, it hoped that the 
United States model would be used to convince others to implement 
the WIPO Internet treaties.
That approach remains in place today, with the United States 
the lead proponent of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and 
the TPP (both discussed below) which include anti-circumvention 
provisions designed to narrow the flexibility found in the WIPO 
Internet treaties and provide a model for other countries to follow.77
The history of the anti-circumvention legislation is notable 
because it demonstrates the enormous influence that international 
agreements can have over domestic legislation. Indeed, there is a 
great likelihood of unintended consequences when crafting rules 
before technology and the market have fully developed. In the case of 
anti-circumvention rules, it meant applying regulations to consumer 
products and digital services that simply did not exist at the time 
of treaty negotiations. For sharing economy services that are at an 
early stage of development, the anti-circumvention rule experience 
highlights how global rules may ultimately have a significant impact 
over the future regulatory environment. 
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 ii. ACTA and the Internet
On October 23, 2007, the United States, the European Union, Canada, 
Japan, and a handful of other countries announced plans to negotiate 
the ACTA.78 The behind-the-scenes discussions had apparently been 
ongoing for several years, leading some countries to believe that a 
full agreement could be concluded within a year, to coincide with 
the end of the Bush administration. Few paid much attention, as the 
agreement itself was shrouded in secrecy. ACTA details slowly began 
to emerge, however, including revelations that lobby groups had 
been granted preferential access, the location of various meetings, 
and troubling details about the agreement itself.
As the public pressure mounted, the talks dragged along with 
participating countries increasingly defensive about the secrecy and 
the substance. The agreement was ultimately concluded in 2010—years 
after the initial target—and some of the most troubling provisions were 
abandoned. Yet the final agreement still raised serious concerns, both 
for the way the agreement was concluded as well as for the substance.
When ACTA was formally signed by most participants, in 
October 2011 in Tokyo, Japan, few would have anticipated that less 
than a year later, the treaty would face massive public protests and 
abandonment by leading countries. But with tens of thousands tak-
ing to the streets in Europe in the spring of 2012, ACTA became the 
poster child for secretive, one-sided intellectual property agreements 
that do not reflect the views and hopes of the broader public. By July 
2012, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly against the 
agreement, effectively killing ACTA within the EU.79 
ACTA’s lack of transparency was a consistent source of concern 
throughout the negotiation process. In December 2007, before for-
mal negotiations began, the United States government asked other 
participating countries to agree to a confidentiality agreement. The 
agreement classified all correspondence between ACTA parties as 
“national security” information on the grounds that it is confidential 
“foreign government information.”80 
The lack of transparency throughout the ACTA process eroded 
public confidence in the entire agreement. While ACTA supporters 
pointed to secret releases to European Parliament committees, the 
exclusion of the public from the consultation process bred enor-
mous distrust in the entire agreement.81 The lack of transparency 
highlights one of the major problems with negotiating in secret 
trade agreements that have broad-based implications. The failure to 
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include experts throughout the negotiation process caused signifi-
cant damage to the substance of the agreement, with numerous legal 
concerns as a result. The prospect of replicating similar oversights 
due to the lack of public and expert consultation and participation 
with emerging agreements such as TiSA could lead to unintended 
consequences for sharing economy regulations caught within the 
ambit of the agreement. 
From a substantive perspective, ACTA raised several concerns 
with respect to the expansion of international intellectual property 
laws as it applies to the Internet. For example, the emphasis on sec-
ondary liability, which potentially holds third parties liable for the 
infringing actions of others, represented a significant shift in inter-
national intellectual property law. 
While many countries have codified secondary liability prin-
ciples within their domestic laws, there are relatively few provisions 
aimed at secondary liability in international law. Within ACTA, 
Article 8 on Injunctions applied to both infringers and third parties 
as did Article 12 on Provisional Measures, which can be applied to 
third parties. Both Article 8 and Article 12 apply in a civil enforce-
ment context. 
The Internet provisions within ACTA also target third parties. 
Article 27(2) provided that “each Party’s enforcement procedures shall 
apply to infringement of copyright or related rights over digital net-
works, which may include the unlawful use of means of widespread 
distribution for infringing purposes.”82 In other words, the potential 
liability extends beyond those infringing to those who are seen to 
facilitate infringing activity. In fact, the provision could be applied 
to peer-to-peer networks, blogging platforms, and other technologies 
that facilitate the dissemination of content. 
The ACTA also sought to establish universal rules for the 
response of Internet service providers to allegations of infringe-
ment on their networks. Article 27(4) on Enforcement in the Digital 
Environment, stated that parties “may provide, in accordance with its 
laws and regulations, its competent authorities with the authority to 
order an online service provider to disclose expeditiously to a right 
holder information sufficient to identify a subscriber whose account 
was allegedly used for infringement.” The article on the disclosure 
of subscriber information is broader than the equivalent provision 
in Article 47 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS).83
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ACTA sparked a global discussion on intellectual property 
issues and the optimal balance between privacy and intellectual 
property rights in the digital environment. Its defeat—only Japan 
has ratified the agreement—highlights the risk associated with using 
international trade and treaty negotiations to address complex pub-
lic policy issues in relative secret without public consultation and 
transparency. This is particularly true for issues that touch directly 
on individuals in tangible ways. The risk for sharing economy regu-
lation with services that are both provided and used by millions is 
heightened where rules are established behind closed doors without 
adequate public participation. That approach has been typified by 
agreements such as the TPP, which is further discussed in section IV, 
on future trade agreements and the sharing economy. 
IV. Future Trade Agreements and the Sharing Economy
As the sharing economy continues to grow, it is likely to attract 
increased attention from local, regional, and national regulators. 
While individual communities and countries are free to regulate as 
they see fit, the steady expansion of trade agreements may have a 
significant impact on domestic regulation. The intersection between 
local regulations and trade agreements is best illustrated by two trade 
agreements, each with membership that represents a sizable portion 
of the global economy: the TPP and the TSA. This part also briefly 
discusses NAFTA, which is likely to turn to these issues during a 
forthcoming renegotiation.
i. Trans-Pacific Partnership
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a massive trade agreement that 
covers nearly 40 per cent of world GDP, wrapped up years of nego-
tiation in 2015. The agreement involves twelve countries, the United 
States, Canada, Australia, Mexico, Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, 
Vietnam, Brunei, Japan, Peru, and Chile.84
Donald Trump’s surprise victory in the United States presi-
dential election resulted in an overhaul of its trade policy, including 
the immediate end of support for the TPP and a renewed focus on 
NAFTA. While President Barack Obama held out hope that the TPP 
could be salvaged during the lame-duck session of Congress that 
occurs immediately after the election, his administration was quickly 
forced to concede that the deal had become politically toxic and stood 
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no chance of passage. Since United States ratification was required 
for it to take effect, the original TPP is effectively dead. In its place, 
Japan has led an effort to create TPP11, a slightly modified version of 
the agreement featuring new implementation rules, minus the United 
States. As of November 2017, a final agreement on TPP11 had eluded 
the remaining countries, with Canada leveraging its position as the 
second-largest economy left in the TPP to extract significant conces-
sions on intellectual property, culture, and the auto sector. The original 
digital economy provisions remain largely unchanged in the TPP11.
Notwithstanding its political difficulties, the agreement’s pro-
visions provide a roadmap for future efforts to merge trade policy 
with the digital economy, including sharing economy businesses. 
The TPP’s impact would be felt in two ways: regulatory pre-emption, 
which would restrict the ability for regulators to implement their 
own laws or regulations; and regulatory mandates, which would 
prescribe specific requirements within domestic rules.
The potential for regulatory pre-emption is best illustrated by 
the complex array of regulations for service industries in the TPP. 
Many trade agreements feature obligations to specific service sectors 
based on commitments from negotiating parties. These are relatively 
clear and make it easy for businesses to understand the new rules 
and for governments to identify their regulatory requirements. 
The TPP adopts a much different approach, featuring a series of 
generally applicable restrictions or requirements for services. These 
include national treatment, most favoured nation status, market 
access requirements, and restrictions on local presence requirements. 
These generally applicable conditions apply to all services, unless 
specifically excluded in the agreement or within annexes applicable 
to individual countries.85 
Article 10.3 of the TPP on national treatment provides:86 “Each 
Party shall accord to services and service suppliers of another Party 
treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circum-
stances, to its own services and service suppliers.” As noted above, 
the services chapter also includes a most favoured nation require-
ment in Article 10.4:87 “Each Party shall accord to services and service 
suppliers of another Party treatment no less favourable than that it 
accords, in like circumstances, to services and service suppliers of 
any other Party or a non-Party.”
The effect of these provisions is that countries are required 
to treat service providers—regardless of which country they come 
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from—in an equal manner. When combined with a restriction on 
local presence requirements, regulatory measures for services such 
as Uber already found in some jurisdictions that target foreign opera-
tors would run afoul of the TPP.
These rules are particularly noteworthy within the context of 
local regulations. The TPP excludes existing local government regula-
tion from the scope of the service requirements in Article 10.7 (1)(a)
(iii).88 This also applies to renewals of existing rules and amendments 
“to the extent that the amendment does not decrease the conformity 
of the measure.”89 
While that may grandfather existing rules, local municipalities 
would face restrictions on future sharing economy regulations should 
they further decrease conformity with the obligations. For example, 
if a municipality does not currently feature a local presence require-
ment in taxi regulations, instituting a new presence requirement for 
TNCs could violate the TPP. Similarly, establishing new expensive 
licensing requirements that restrict the likelihood of Uber drivers 
entering the market might violate Article 10.8(5) which stipulates that 
“[e]ach Party shall ensure that any authorisation fee charged by any 
of its competent authorities is reasonable, transparent and does not, 
in itself, restrict the supply of the relevant service.”90 
The issue may be even more pronounced where ride-sharing 
services are also regulated at the provincial, state, or national level. 
For example, the Province of British Columbia has the power to regu-
late Uber91 and similar services through the Passenger Transportation 
Act.92 The province has thus far resisted mounting calls for it to 
act.93 The provincial regulations establish requirements related to 
licensing, safety, inspections, and insurance, and establish the rates 
that may be charged by anyone operating a vehicle who charges or 
collects compensation for transporting passengers.94 Without a broad 
provincial government exclusion, these rules would presumably 
be caught by the TPP. The province has identified why it believes 
it needs to regulate the sector and announced plans for updating 
the regulatory environment, but should the TPP apply, it could 
pre-empt the provincial regulatory power given the absence of an 
exclusion and the difficulty in relying on public policy grounds for 
non-compliant regulations.95
Pre-emption of local regulations is only part of the TPP’s poten-
tial impact on sharing services. Services such as Uber and Airbnb 
rely upon a business model that depends upon open data transfers, 
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with personal data frequently stored or processed offshore. As noted 
above, some jurisdictions have begun to consider regulations that 
would require local storage of data or local presence requirements 
for sharing economy companies. The TPP seeks to address the issue 
by mandating open data transfers and restricting the potential use 
of data localization requirements. These rules benefit cloud-based 
sharing services but run the risk of restricting the ability of countries 
(or local and regional governments) from establishing regulations to 
address consumer concerns regarding their personal information.
For example, data transfer restrictions are a key element of the 
European approach to privacy, which restricts data transfers to those 
countries with laws that meet the “adequacy” standard for protec-
tion. That approach is becoming increasingly popular, particularly 
in light of the Snowden revelations about governmental surveillance 
practices. Several TPP countries, including Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Chile,96 are moving toward data transfer restrictions, as are 
countries such as Brazil and Hong Kong.97
Yet the TPP included a restriction on data transfer limitations. 
Article 14.11 (2) states:98 “Each Party shall allow the cross-border 
transfer of information by electronic means, including personal 
information, when this activity is for the conduct of the business of 
a covered person.” There are similar restrictions with respect to data 
localization. Data localization has emerged as an increasingly popu-
lar legal method for providing some additional assurances about the 
privacy protection for personal information. Although heavily criti-
cized by those who fear that it harms the free flow of information, 
requirements that personal information be stored within the local 
jurisdiction is an unsurprising reaction to concerns about the lost 
privacy protections if the data is stored elsewhere. Data localization 
requirements99 are popping up around the world100 with European 
requirements in countries such as Germany,101 Russia, and Greece; 
Asian requirements in Taiwan, Vietnam, and Malaysia;102 Australian 
requirements for health records, and Latin America requirements in 
Brazil.103 Canada has not been immune to the rules either, with both 
British Columbia and Nova Scotia creating localization requirements 
for government data.104
Despite the momentum toward data localization as a privacy 
protection measure, Article 14.13 of the TPP establishes a restric-
tion on legal requirements to do so:105 “No Party shall require a 
covered person to use or locate computing facilities in that Party’s 
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territory as a condition for conducting business in that territory.” 
This general provision is subject to at least three exceptions. First, 
government services are excluded. Second, there is an exception for 
financial services, which has sparked protest from some members 
of the United States Congress.106 The exclusion is reportedly due to 
demands from the United States Treasury, which wanted to retain 
the right to establish restrictions on financial data flows.107
The third exception is cited by supporters of the TPP as evi-
dence that privacy protections are still a possibility. The exception 
states:108
Nothing in this Article shall prevent a Party from adopting or 
maintaining measures inconsistent with paragraph 2 to achieve 
a legitimate public policy objective, provided that the measure: 
(a) is not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restric-
tion on trade; and 
(b) does not impose restrictions on the use or location of comput-
ing facilities greater than are required to achieve the objective.
When combined with a 1999 World Trade Organization reference to 
privacy,109 the argument is that privacy could be viewed as a legiti-
mate public policy objective and therefore qualify for an exception.
The problem is that the historical record overwhelmingly 
suggests that reliance on this exception is unlikely to succeed. As 
the advocacy group Public Citizen noted in a study on the general 
exception language:110
the exceptions language being negotiated for the TPP is based 
on the same construct used in Article XX of the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS). This is alarming, as the GATT and GATS 
exceptions have only ever been successfully employed to actu-
ally defend a challenged measure in one of 44 attempts. That is, 
the exceptions being negotiated in the TPP would, in fact, not 
provide effective safeguards for domestic policies.
In other words, the exception is illusory since the requirements are 
so complex (each aspect must be met) that countries relying on the 
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exception have failed in forty-three out of forty-four cases. For coun-
tries concerned about the weakened privacy protections, the TPP 
restricts the use of data localization requirements as a remedy just 
as more and more countries are exploring such rules.
The data transfer and data localization regulations function 
much like the WIPO Internet treaty approach to anti-circumvention 
with the establishment of rules that are likely to have long-term conse-
quences for businesses and business models that are at the early stage 
of development. By subscribing to a specific set of legal requirements, 
governments may be eliminating the ability to implement new regula-
tions that respond to public concerns. Indeed, some early regulatory 
responses to sharing services such as Uber and Airbnb have sought 
to implement data localization or residency requirements.
A similar concern arises with respect to the TPP’s restriction 
on the ability to require companies to supply access to source code. 
Article 14.17 (1) states:111 “No Party shall require the transfer of, or 
access to, source code of software owned by a person of another 
Party, as a condition for the import, distribution, sale or use of 
such software, or of products containing such software, in its terri-
tory.” While much of the concern associated with the source code 
regulation has focused on its security implications, it is conceivable 
that countries could introduce source code disclosure requirements 
on sharing economy companies as a mechanism to introduce algo-
rithmic transparency. For example, concerns about discriminatory 
practices for ride-sharing or accommodation rental services that 
avoid servicing some neighbourhoods might be addressed through 
mandated disclosures of the underlying code used to operate the 
service. The TPP would prohibit such provisions.
There is considerable merit to anti-discrimination provisions 
that ensure that all businesses are treated equally with respect to 
regulatory requirements. These provisions could prove enormously 
important for the purposes of sharing economy regulation given 
the likelihood that many service providers will be foreign owned 
and therefore face the prospect of heightened regulation simply by 
virtue of their ownership or residency status. However, the TPP 
provisions extend far beyond ensuring equal treatment. The rules 
within the trade agreement may pre-empt regulation altogether or 
establish restrictions on regulations that are otherwise preferred by 
local, regional, or national governments. This points to a likely future 
clash between trade agreements and sharing economy regulations.
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ii. Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA)
The Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) is a trade agreement cur-
rently being negotiated by many of the world’s largest economies, 
accounting for approximately 70 per cent of the global trade in 
services. Launched in March 2013, participants include the United 
States, European Union, Japan, Canada, and many other developed 
economies. The future of TiSA shares some of the same uncertainties 
as the TPP in light of the change in the United States administration. 
As of November 2017, there had been twenty-one rounds of negotia-
tions, with further negotiations on hold. Unlike the TPP, which is now 
public, the draft text of TiSA remains secret. The only sources of the 
TiSA text come from several leaks posted on Wikileaks.
Given the lack of official text, it is difficult to fully assess the 
impact of TiSA provisions. However, the leaked documents pub-
lished to date point to the prospect of a similar impact as found in 
the TPP. For example, the International Trade Union Confederation 
(ITUC) published a detailed analysis of leaked negotiating texts 
of TiSA on October 20, 2016. According to these documents, “TiSA 
would legally fortify and economically facilitate the operation of 
the ‘platform economy’—a term (also known as the ‘gig economy’ 
or ‘sharing economy’) describing the online, on-demand business 
model of international companies like Uber.”112 
The leaked version of TiSA also includes data localization and 
data transfer provisions that are similar to those found in the TPP. 
The draft article on data transfer provides:
 [CA/TW/CO/JP/MX/US propose: No Party may prevent a ser-
vice supplier of another Party [CO/JP propose: or consumers of 
those suppliers,] [CA/CO/JP/TW/US propose: from transferring, 
[accessing, processing or storing] information, including per-
sonal information, within or outside the Party’s territory, where 
such activity is carried out in connection with the conduct of the 
service supplier’s business.113 
The U.S. has also proposed restrictions on data localization require-
ments. Article 9 states:
No Party may require a service supplier, as a condition for sup-
plying a service or investing in its territory, to: 
a) use computing facilities located in the Party’s territory;
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b) use computer processing or storage services supplied from 
within the Party’s territory; or 
c) otherwise store or process data in its territory.114
The data localization provision would severely restrict regulatory 
efforts on sharing economy companies to retain data within the 
local jurisdiction. 
Concern regarding the TiSA provisions prompted the European 
Parliament to adopt a resolution in February 2016 containing its 
recommendations to the European Commission on the TiSA negotia-
tions. The recommendations included
• ensuring that European citizens personal data flow glob-
ally in full compliance with the data protection and security 
rules in force in Europe; 
• immediately and formally opposing the US proposals on 
movement of information; 
• ensuring that national security clauses are grounded in 
appropriate necessity; 
• comprehensively prohibiting forced data localisation require-
ments in order to prevent geoblocking practices and to 
uphold the principle of open governance of the internet.115
The Parliament’s emphasis on data flows in compliance with 
European data protection rules points to a likely source of conflict 
with TiSA rules aimed at eliminating restrictions on data transfers 
and national data protection rules that depend upon some limitations 
in order to safeguard user privacy.
As an agreement dedicated to increasing trade in services, TiSA 
unsurprisingly features provisions aimed at fostering market access, 
reducing regulatory requirements, and eliminating discriminatory 
domestic provisions. These are laudable goals, yet the implications of 
a broad-based trade services agreement on Internet-based companies 
would be particularly pronounced given the ability to service a global 
market from a single jurisdiction. For sharing economy businesses, 
TiSA could usher in an era of limited regulations and requirements 
for uniform regulatory models across member countries. Such an 
outcome might enhance the commercial potential of those businesses, 
but would also necessarily restrict the ability of local jurisdictions to 
implement their own regulatory solutions. 
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iii. NAFTA
The election of Donald Trump has placed renewed focus on NAFTA, 
with the United States having filed a notice of renegotiation, paving 
the way for talks that commenced in the summer of 2017. The rene-
gotiation involves much more than just a few tweaks, as the Trump 
administration has emphasized that new NAFTA chapters should 
be crafted to reflect the digital economy. The emphasis on digital 
policies foreshadows a new battleground that will have enormous 
implications for the sharing economy, as NAFTA rules are likely to 
have a direct impact on how those entities are regulated.
Some of the digital economy policies, including online contract 
enforcement and consumer protection, should be relatively uncon-
troversial. More contentious, however, will be rules similar to those 
found in the TPP regarding data localization and data transfers, the 
lifeblood of digital sharing economy companies. Data localization 
has become an increasingly popular policy measure as countries 
respond to concerns about United States–based surveillance and the 
subordination of privacy protections for non–United States citizens 
and residents.
In response to the mounting public concerns, leading technol-
ogy companies such as Microsoft, Amazon, and Google have estab-
lished or committed to establish Canadian-based computer server 
facilities that can offer localization of information. These moves fol-
low on the federal government’s 2016 cloud computing strategy that 
prioritizes privacy and security concerns by mandating that certain 
data be stored in Canada. The TPP included restrictions on data local-
ization requirements at the insistence of United States negotiators. 
Those provisions are likely to resurface during the NAFTA talks and 
could have an impact on how companies such as Uber and Airbnb 
conduct their business. For Canadian regulators of sharing economy 
companies, attempts to establish a domestic presence for regulatory 
purposes could face restrictions from NAFTA provisions prohibiting 
data localization requirements.
So too will potential limitations on data transfer restrictions, 
which mandate the free flow of information on networks across bor-
ders. United States Internet companies have been particularly vocal 
about the need to restrict such rules. Those rules are important to 
preserve online freedoms in countries that have a history of crack-
ing down on Internet speech but, in the Canadian context, could 
restrict the ability to establish privacy safeguards. In fact, should the 
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European Union mandate data transfer restrictions, as many experts 
expect, Canada could find itself between a proverbial privacy rock 
and a hard place, with the European Union requiring restrictions 
and NAFTA prohibiting them. These rules could have a significant 
impact on domestic regulations on the sharing economy that may 
restrict data transfers for reasons of privacy or workplace conditions.
V. Conclusion
As the sharing economy continues to grow, the prospect of local, 
regional, and national regulation is likely to grow. Companies such 
as Uber and Airbnb have quickly become multi-billion dollar global 
entities that simultaneously offer new commercial opportunities, 
consumer choice, and market competition. Sharing economy services 
are not without their negative impacts, however, leading to contro-
versy and calls for regulation.
Those regulations include fundamental questions of how best to 
characterize sharing economy businesses such as Uber, the introduc-
tion of safety and licensing requirements designed to create a level 
playing field with incumbent providers, and newly crafted regula-
tions specifically targeting services such as Airbnb. 
Individual communities and countries are typically free to 
regulate as they see fit, yet the steady expansion of trade agreements 
may have a significant impact on domestic regulation. There is 
considerable merit to agreements that open markets. Moreover, anti-
discrimination provisions that ensure that all businesses are treated 
equally with respect to regulatory requirements facilitate global 
commerce on a level playing field. These provisions could prove 
enormously important for the purposes of sharing economy regula-
tion given the likelihood that many service providers will be foreign 
owned and therefore face the prospect of heightened regulation sim-
ply by virtue of their ownership or residency status. However, trade 
agreement rules now extend far beyond ensuring equal treatment, 
potentially pre-empting regulation altogether or establishing restric-
tions on regulations that are otherwise preferred by local, regional, 
or national governments. This points to a likely future clash between 
trade agreements and sharing economy regulations.
This chapter does not advocate for specific regulations for the 
sharing economy. Rather, it maintains that regulators should be 
free to act in the public interest, consistent with local values and 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   251 18-11-08   08:42
 252 LAW AND THE “SHARING ECONOMY”
policies. There is a need to consider the long-term implications of 
trade agreements that undermine the regulatory role of local officials 
by establishing restrictions on future regulatory measures. Public 
debate and comprehensive analysis is particularly challenging given 
the secrecy and lack of transparency associated with many current 
trade negotiations. Looking ahead—whether to TPP11, TiSA, NAFTA, 
or the myriad of regional trade agreements currently under consider-
ation—greater transparency and inclusion of officials from all levels 
of government could help avoid the unintended consequences that 
may come from treaty provisions that lack insight into future direc-
tions of the digital economy.
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CHAPTER V I I I
Should Licence Plate Owners 




[T]he abstractions of law are basically conservative; they tend to 
preserve the status quo, to protect property and those who hold 
it, and to resist innovations of organization or method whether 
these originate from the private or governmental sector.2
As often happens during an evolutionary period, the older, 
vested interests turned to the state for protection against the 
innovative elements within the industry and sought regulation 
that would preserve their traditional monopoly.3
The sharing economy represents a profound change in the way goods and services are exchanged. New technological platforms 
help connect consumers with goods and services providers and pro-
mote better utilization of assets and fuller realization of economic 
rights over resources.4 It is no surprise that the new way of doing 
things threatens vested interests, in the same way that, as famously 
described by Harry Miskimin, organizational innovations in the tex-
tile industry in sixteenth-century England threatened the traditional 
guild structures.5 But history suggests that change is inevitable, even 
if its timing and direction cannot be anticipated fully; and when 
change comes, there are winners and losers. It is the latter who are 
the subject of this chapter. Specifically, do taxi licence owners have 
a right to compensation when their municipally issued licences are 
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devalued as a result of local sanctioning of ride-sharing services such 
as Uber? This chapter argues that no such legal right exists, and while 
there may be compelling arguments to compensate plate owners, 
municipalities may lack the statutory authority to provide compen-
sation under existing law. The chapter proceeds as follows: section 
II provides a broad description of taxi regulations in Canadian cities 
and the recent and ongoing legalization of ride-sharing. The main 
point of the section is to demonstrate that the transition to the new 
system based in the sharing economy is socially desirable overall, but 
comes largely at the expense of taxi plate owners. Section III examines 
the case for compensation. While there are powerful arguments in 
favour of compensation based in equity and efficiency, there is very 
likely no right to compensation as a matter of Canadian law. Section 
IV considers how a scheme of compensation might be implemented. 
As a preliminary matter, there is some question as to the power of 
municipalities to offer compensation to licence holders, which may 
require clarification in their enabling legislation. The bulk of the sec-
tion is dedicated to an assessment of compensation schemes recently 
implemented by several Australian states, which may provide useful 
lessons to policymakers in Canada. Section V concludes.
II. From Municipal Regulation to the Sharing Economy
i. Municipal Regulation of Taxis
Local control of taxis began in American cities in the 1920s. As the 
story goes, regulation came as a direct response to the results of free-
for-all, “cut-throat” competition in flooded transportation markets, 
which resulted in long hours and low wages for drivers, unsafe cars, 
and dearth of third-party liability insurance.6 Local ordinances were 
promulgated to address these problems by implementing licensing 
requirements, limits on the number of local taxis, and regulated 
fares, as campaigned for by professional cab associations, as well as 
safety, service, and insurance standards demanded by consumers.7 
Taxi regulations in Canadian cities were historically driven by the 
same concerns,8 and at least until recent reforms, have exhibited the 
same essential features. Municipal bylaws enabled by provincial 
legislation set licensing requirements for taxicabs and taxi drivers, 
and prescribe the terms under which taxi services may be offered. 
While the details vary across Canadian cities, the bylaws typically 
require taxicabs to meet municipal safety, insurance, and appearance 
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standards; taxi drivers to be trained and accredited;9 and taxi fares 
to be regulated and metered.10 
Controlling the number of local taxis is a central feature of 
municipal regulations.11 Calgary’s system, challenged before and 
described by the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench in 1998 in United 
Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary (City of)12 is rep-
resentative. Only a licensed taxi driver operating a licensed taxicab 
could legally provide a taxi ride in Calgary, but whereas any indi-
vidual who met the prescribed qualifications could obtain a driver’s 
licence, the number of taxi licences issued by the city was capped 
at a number previously set in 1986 by the city’s taxi commission.13
Municipal supply management of taxis (or pharmacies or 
single-family homes for that matter) is premised on the local gov-
ernment’s ability to anticipate demand and set the optimal quotas 
and fares. The evidence of such ability is, however, to the contrary. 
David Seymour observed, in 2009, that in more than one prairie city, 
taxi quotas had remained frozen for significant periods. Saskatoon’s 
numbers had not changed in twenty-two years, and in Winnipeg 
they were largely unchanged since 1947. Calgary adhered to a cap 
imposed twenty-three years earlier, even though the city’s workforce 
had almost doubled since.14 
The strict municipal quota system has also the effect of turning 
taxi licences (referred to sometimes as taxi “plates” or “medallions”; 
the terms are interchangeable) into very desirable government-cre-
ated property.15 Because taxi licences confer an exclusive privilege 
(strictly speaking, an oligopoly) to engage in remunerative point-to-
point transport, which is transferable with very few restrictions, they 
are openly traded at prices disproportionally higher than nominal 
licence fees.16 The best available data on the transfer prices of taxi 
licences in Canadian cities prior to the emergence of ride-sharing 
services is based on a 2007 report commissioned by the City of 
Edmonton.17 Reported transfer prices were as high as $55,000 in 
Edmonton, $185,000 in Ottawa, $280,000 in Winnipeg, and $500,000 in 
Vancouver. More recent newspaper articles cite even higher figures.18 
Further, due to the historical advantages of dispatch booking, taxi-
cabs tend to be affiliated with one of a handful of large local opera-
tors, and in most cities taxi plates are concentrated in the hands of 
powerful operators who own the licences outright, or manage them 
on behalf of non-driver owners.19 As a result, most individuals who 
wish to earn an income as taxi drivers cannot obtain their own taxi 
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licence and are often forced to rent licences at high premiums and 
on unfavourable terms. A 2008 report on working conditions of taxi 
drivers in Toronto noted a great financial strain on drivers, long 
working hours, low morale, and a feeling of resentment against the 
industry and city council. Meanwhile, plate owners and agents have 
been collecting an estimated $30 million annually in rental fees.20 
Studies reveal that the quota or plate/medallion system pro-
duces a net social loss.21 A 1984 staff report by the United States 
Federal Trade Commission concluded that “[r]estrictions on the 
total number of firms and vehicles and on minimum fares waste 
resources and impose a disproportionate burden on low income 
people. Similarly, there is no economic justification for regulations 
that restrict shared-ride, dial-a-ride, and jitney service.”22 In a study 
of Metropolitan Toronto, the cartelization of the taxi industry was 
estimated to reduce consumer surplus by $39.2 million in 1987 alone. 
Whatever economic advantages the system yielded were concen-
trated in the hands of a few, while higher social costs were widely 
dispersed among consumers.23 More recently, in 2014, the Economic 
Regulation Authority of the State of Western Australia modelled the 
costs and benefits of taxi regulations in Perth and concluded that 
while there were benefits to maintaining taxi and driver standards, 
licence number restrictions resulted in a net loss to the public. The 
study estimated the benefit to taxi plate owners at AUD$27.7 million 
($26 million) and to taxi drivers at AUD$4.4 million annually, whereas 
the cost to the public was between AUD$45.7 to AUD$70.7 million in 
higher prices and longer waiting times.24 The net effect of restricting 
the supply of taxis was an annual loss of up to AUD$38.6 million.25
The artificial shortages resulting from taxi quotas become 
evident whenever barriers to entry are removed. In Ireland, the 
deregulation of taxis in 2000 resulted in a trebling of their numbers 
in Dublin.26 Similarly, Uber’s entry into urban centres has increased 
the volume of rides for hire and lowered fares, suggesting that pre-
viously there was unmet demand for point-to-point transportation 
and, further, that the regulated price was too high and the existing 
service inadequate. There may have been periods during which 
taxis stood idle for lack of business, but that could only indicate that 
committing a fixed number of vehicles to round-the-clock taxi use 
is highly inefficient. So is committing private vehicles to full-time 
personal or domestic use. Ride-sharing services attempt to address 
both problems.
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ii. Ride-Sharing and Its Advantages
Uber is the best known, and at the time of writing, the most suc-
cessful ride-sharing service. Since its founding in 2009, it has grown 
to be the world’s largest transportation provider, currently in some 
600 cities in eighty countries. The popularity of transportation net-
work companies such as Uber is attributable to the rapid growth 
of the sharing economy, their efficient business models, and their 
competitive advantage over regulated operators, but above all, the 
superiority of their booking technology. By allowing passengers and 
drivers to match based on an online directory of user experience and 
global positioning service (GPS) technology, ride-sharing companies 
reduce search costs and fares, and create a point-to-point transporta-
tion market much more reflective of supply and demand.27
In lieu of municipal taxi regulations, transportation network 
companies offer standard contractual terms governing the relation-
ship between the company, its partner drivers, and its consumers, 
which serve as private regulations. Under Uber’s standard terms, for 
example, the company grants its partner drivers a private operating 
licence, which is in effect the right to be listed in Uber’s location-
based directory of point-to-point transportation providers.28 Each 
partner driver must meet the company’s standards, including liability 
insurance, vehicle standards, driver’s licensing requirements, and 
more. The company reserves to itself a fixed percentage from each 
fare and the right to set each fare, which it collects directly from 
passengers using its application.29 As opposed to the fixed regu-
lated rates charged by taxi drivers, Uber’s fares vary in response to 
demand and supply in real time (allowing, for example, to attract 
more service providers in peak demand times), and its platform 
matches drivers and consumers depending on mutual interest.
Uber is the largest, but not the only ride-sharing service.30 It still 
enjoys a first-mover advantage due to the recognition of its brand, 
the popularity of its phone application, and its database of driver 
and passenger ratings; but it faces competition from existing services 
such as Lyft and from emerging platforms, such as a new Australian 
company, Mum’s Taxi, which promises to serve female and child pas-
sengers by matching them with female-only driver partners to “pro-
vide safer transport for women and children, and help women who 
are looking for safe and flexible work.”31 The infrastructure require-
ments for ride-sharing services are minimal, the barriers to entry 
relatively low, and the business easy to emulate. Drivers can, and 
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often do, work for more than one service, where available. In such 
an environment, ride-sharing services can be expected to compete 
on multiple fronts, including not only lower fares and commissions 
but also flexible terms of service to respond to the preferences of 
drivers and passengers. This is an important point given that Uber’s 
business models and practices are very much a work in progress and 
given the allegations made against it from time to time for exploiting 
consumers and drivers. Some of these concerns can be addressed by 
labour and employment laws and consumer protection legislation, 
but competition among ride-sharing providers is more likely to 
produce terms of service more favourable to drivers and passengers 
than top-down municipal regulations that dictate every aspect of the 
service, from the number of vehicles to the cost of the ride.
According to one estimate, “[f]or each dollar spent by con-
sumers, about [USD]$1.60 of consumer surplus is generated. Back-
of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the overall consumer 
surplus generated by the UberX service in the United States in 2015 
was [USD]$6.8 billion.”32 Ride-sharing may also produce important 
indirect public benefits. Location- and fare-based matching tends to 
decrease driving distances and times between rides, make better use 
of existing fleets, and reduce the number of cars committed to pri-
vate travel, as well as the amount of urban land devoted to parking. 
Because the use of vehicles is associated with the externalities of car-
bon and air pollution, ride-sharing may also improve environmental 
outcomes. These additional effects have not been fully investigated.33
iii. Ride-Sharing in Canadian Cities
Thirteen Canadian cities in Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec (the list 
continues to grow) currently allow Uber or other transportation 
network companies to operate within their boundaries,34 while prog-
ress has been slower elsewhere.35 The Federal Competition Bureau 
has called on provincial and municipal regulators “to allow the 
forces of competition to shape how the industry will move forward 
[… and to] re-think existing regulations to provide an even playing 
field upon which ride providers can compete.”36 The bureau recom-
mended that taxi regulations be relaxed, and more stringent regula-
tions be imposed on new providers to secure public safety and other 
legitimate policy objectives.37 Local policymakers have responded by 
relaxing licensing requirements and reducing licence fees for taxis 
on the one hand, and on the other hand, regulating ride-sharing 
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services by requiring safety inspections for cars, background checks 
for drivers, and mandatory insurance.38 In the most recent federal 
budget, a sales tax on ride-sharing had been announced.39
The traditional taxi industry has been disrupted by the intro-
duction of ride-sharing, but has not collapsed entirely. Neither have 
those Canadian jurisdictions that opened their doors to Uber abol-
ished altogether their old licensing systems. Taxi plates continue to 
confer a right to engage in a remunerative trade, but this right is no 
longer exclusive. Most municipalities still limit ride-sharing to pre-
arranged rides and allow only taxis to respond to street hails, but 
to the extent that an Uber ride can substitute for a taxi, quotas have 
been rendered irrelevant. As a result, taxi plates retain some por-
tion of their value for now, at least until the future of ride-sharing 
in Canada is settled.
iv. Ride-Sharing’s Losers
Uber’s introduction into Canadian cities was preceded by massive 
lobbying efforts. These campaigns could be explained as attempts 
to secure favourable terms of operation and perhaps to enhance the 
company’s reputation, but are also indicative of the stakes held by 
the incumbent taxi industry, which engaged openly in heavy protest-
ing40 and lobbying41 against ride-sharing. The transition to the shar-
ing economy and the introduction of competition for point-to-point 
transportation services can create not only winners, but losers also.
Some taxi drivers may be made worse off by the opening up 
of local markets to ride-sharing services, but others who choose to 
work for Uber, or one of its competitors, may benefit from greater 
independence and flexibility, higher hourly wages, and more favour-
able terms:
one veteran Toronto cabbie driver called Uber his saviour, allow-
ing him to escape the grind of 12-hour shifts in a rented taxi 
that paid dividends to an absentee plate-holder: “I am no longer 
charged an astronomical price to drive a taxi […] I can take a 
day off – take my kid to his hockey practice and my daughter 
to her after-school activities without the fear of being charged. 
I have a choice.”42
Data from the United States for the years 2009 to 2015 does show 
that in cities where Uber operates the average hourly earnings of 
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taxi drivers fell up to 10 per cent relative to cities where it does not, 
consistent with a decline in the volume of taxi passengers due to 
competition.43 But the data also showed an overall growth in point-to-
point transportation services, including self-employed and salaried 
taxi drivers, and increased hourly earnings for self-employed drivers 
due to their higher capacity utilization.44 Despite a concern about a 
displacement by the sharing economy of traditional service jobs, in 
sum there was “little evidence of adverse impacts on labour market 
outcomes in point-to-point transportation services.”45
There is very limited data on the effect of ride-sharing on the 
Canadian local government. A decline in the number of taxis and 
taxi drivers could deprive the municipality of substantial licensing 
fees, but these would be offset by revenue generated from licensing 
ride-sharing companies and their partner drivers. Municipal licens-
ing departments will be expected to adapt to new regulatory respon-
sibilities, and powerful municipal taxi commissions will eventually 
lose their power to set quotas. For example, following its decision 
to allow ride-sharing services, the City of Toronto created a new 
vehicle-for-hire group within its business licensing and permitting 
group, using staff previously employed in taxicab driver training 
(which is no longer mandated under the city’s changed regulations). 
The restructuring has not resulted to date in significant changes in 
the bureaucracy’s resource requirements.46 The same appears to hold 
for Edmonton’s vehicle-for-hire licensing department.47
The stakeholders who are most likely to be adversely affected 
by deregulation and competition from ride-sharing are the owners 
of taxi licences. The prospect of the introduction of ride-sharing in 
Canadian cities precipitated a sharp decline in taxi licence values. 
According to source data from the City of Toronto, while rental prices 
generally held, taxi plate prices began to plummet in 2012—from 
a peak of $360,000 in September 2012 to an average of $118,235 in 
2014.48 Media reports suggest prices in Edmonton fell from around 
$200,000 in 2013 to $70,000 in 2016.49 Taxi plate transfer prices also fell 
in Ottawa50 and Calgary.51 The reported decline in taxi licence prices 
in Canadian cities where ride-sharing is authorized or expected is 
consistent with the experience in other countries. In Dublin, for 
example, licence values fell within two years after the deregulation 
of the taxi industry in Ireland and the removal of barriers to entry by 
qualified drivers from £90,000 in 2000 to £13,224.52 Similarly, recent 
analysis of data from three American cities (New York City, Chicago, 
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and Philadelphia) concluded that “the number of Uber drivers in the 
market is negatively correlated with the price of a taxi medallion, as 
expected. It is statistically and economically significant; each addi-
tional Uber driver reduces the price of a taxi medallion by [USD]$22 
to [USD]$45.”53
III. The Case for Compensating Taxi Plate Holders
i. Is There a Normative Case for Compensation?
The financial losses incurred by taxi plate owners due to competition 
from ride-sharing companies pose a policy choice dilemma: Should 
those losses be compensated or ignored? This question engages a 
broader concern about the social impact of the sharing economy. A 
prima facie case for compensation can be made on normative grounds 
of economic efficiency and fairness.54 
Louis Kaplow has argued that government assurance of com-
pensation or other relief to private actors negatively affected by 
welfare-enhancing policy changes will encourage those actors to 
invest excessively in reliance on existing regulations. In his view, 
private actors should not presume that regulatory regimes are immu-
table and should anticipate and prepare for regulatory uncertainty 
as they do for uncertainty in the market.55 In contrast, other scholars 
argue that a requirement of compensation is conducive to welfare-
enhancing policymaking.56 A change in policy is socially desirable, 
other things being equal, if it produces overall gain. However, in 
the absence of an ex-ante commitment to compensation (as a matter 
of law or general policy), there is a risk that policymakers might 
disregard the costs of proposed regulations and consider only the 
benefits to the public, the same way a private manufacturer making 
a production decision might disregard the social cost of pollution.57 
A general rule requiring compensation to those adversely affected 
by regulation forces regulators to internalize the costs of their deci-
sions and encourages efficient policy. Suppose, for example, that in 
one city there are 1,000 plate owners and that the new policies under 
consideration would cause each of those licences to be devalued by 
$30,000. The new policies should only be adopted if the sum of their 
benefits is greater than $30 million. (To put this number in context, 
according to Statistics Canada, in the twelve months before October 
2016, ride-sharing services collected $241 million in Canada.58) One 
of the purposes of compensation would be to deter policymakers 
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from proceeding with the changes unless they are prepared to pay 
that amount. However, Quinn and Trebilcock have pointed out that 
because the benefits of regulatory transition are rarely captured in 
full by policymakers (in the case of taxicab and ride-sharing reforms, 
the benefits are largely captured by consumers and ride-sharing 
companies), a compensation requirement is not certain to promote 
cost-benefit analysis and efficient outcomes.59
Another allocative function of compensation is to facilitate 
socially desirable public initiatives. Stakeholders who stand to lose 
from proposed policies, but who are nevertheless assured of compen-
sation, have a smaller incentive to engage in political lobbying efforts 
to stop them. On the other hand, the promise of compensation may 
encourage rent-seeking over eligibility for compensation as well as 
its amount, but the cost of these may be comparatively small given 
the lower stakes. 
It might be argued that in cities where the transition from 
traditional taxi regulations to a new system offering the advan-
tages of the sharing economy has been found already to be in the 
public interest, adopting a policy of compensation will not improve 
efficiency. Compensation cannot incentivize local officials after 
they have made their policy decisions (councils who previously 
voted to legalize ride-sharing may reverse course, but may then be 
required to compensate ride-sharing interests instead), or reverse 
the wasteful expenditures and delays already incurred in the 
course of the political battle over ride-sharing. But a commitment 
to compensation can improve decision-making by municipalities 
still contemplating a transition, and more importantly, by every 
municipality that may consider other policy changes involving 
the sharing economy in the future. It is less clear whether or not 
compensation can facilitate regulatory transition in the future: an 
offer of compensation on the heels of massive political pressure 
may encourage more of the same.
One final economic consideration is what Frank Michelman 
called “settlement costs,”60 which includes the cost of identifying the 
victims of regulation, putting a dollar value on the harms they sus-
tain, and providing them with compensation. Because taxi licences 
are registered with the municipality and must be renewed annually, 
the class of eligible claimants is readily ascertainable. Assessing the 
harm and providing compensation according to some formula should 
be straightforward.
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A different set of arguments in support of compensation relates 
to the distribution of regulatory benefits and burdens. Government 
action that focuses disproportionate regulatory burdens on par-
ticular individuals or groups is inconsistent with societal notions 
of justice and fairness. A policy of compensation provides some 
assurance against such hardships being endured, without unduly 
restraining government from carrying out its objectives. The ride-
sharing reforms generate sizable benefits to consumers, but also to 
the transportation network companies and their drivers—largely at 
the expense of taxi plate owners. This redistribution of benefits is 
ancillary to the purpose of improving point-to-point transportation 
markets, rather than the impetus for the reforms, so compensating 
the losers would not frustrate a public purpose.
Whether compensation is required as a matter of fairness in any 
particular instance may turn on the extent of the harm, the degree 
to which the political interests of the claimants are adequately rep-
resented, the extent and legitimacy of reliance on existing policies, 
and how the entitlement which is to be protected by compensation 
was acquired.61 Two general observations can be made about taxi 
licence plate holders as a group. The first is that they are in no way 
an under-represented constituency deserving of special protection, 
but rather constitute a well-organized and traditionally effective 
municipal lobby.62 The second is that whatever one might think of the 
existing licence system, current plate owners cannot be said to have 
acquired them unjustly. But other generalizations about plate own-
ers should be made with caution, and the cogency of the claims will 
vary depending on the circumstances. The most sympathetic case 
would be the holder of a taxi licence acquired not too long before the 
advent of ride-sharing, to whom the licence is both a primary source 
of income and an investment for retirement, very likely an immigrant 
to Canada.63 To an individual in such circumstances, the devaluation 
of the licence may constitute significant, even catastrophic, economic 
hardship.64 This sentiment was expressed before the Legislative 
Assembly of Western Australia in a debate over the compensation 
previously offered to taxi plate owners by the government: 
This motion is all about treating small business people and 
small investors fairly. Taxi plate owners are often drivers, but, 
in any event, taxi plate owners are generally small business 
people. They have often invested their life savings and are 
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often people from migrant communities who have arrived in 
Australia and used all their savings—often all their families’ 
and extended families’ savings—to invest in a business that, up 
until now, has been regulated and competitors have been unlaw-
ful. That approach to taxis that has now been in place for time 
immemorial has meant that the value of a taxi plate has been 
significant and that people invested on the basis of the existing 
law as it stood. These taxi plate investors have relied upon the 
law in their investment decisions […]. It is a matter of fairness 
how these investors—these people—are treated based upon the 
situation that now exists.65
In contrast, a less sympathetic case would be that of a taxi-plate 
baron who has made a fortune by accumulating licences and rent-
ing them out to drivers. Two arguments for limiting compensation 
can be made in this case. The first is that claimants in this category 
are better able to protect themselves against catastrophic economic 
injury by diversifying their investments. The second is that the 
regulatory risk inherent in the quota system tends to be reflected 
in the premiums that licences command in the market. Simply put, 
allowing plate owners to enjoy excessive rents over a long period 
of time, coupled with full compensation when the monopoly is 
removed, would amount to double-dipping. One way of address-
ing these differences without sacrificing the interest of those most 
likely to be affected the hardest (albeit at the expense of economic 
efficiency) is to set a cap on the number of licences for which com-
pensation is provided.
Once a policy of compensating plate owners is adopted, there is 
the matter of who should fund it. The compensation could be funded 
from general revenues, or from charges levied on the beneficiaries of 
the regulation. The latter policy is more equitable in aligning more 
closely the costs of transition with the benefits, and reduces the 
incentives of special interest groups to lobby for policies that benefit 
them at the expense of other groups or of the public. One obvious 
way to shift the cost of ride-sharing reforms to the beneficiaries is to 
compensate plate owners out of a fund collected from ride-sharing 
passengers and transportation network companies. Whoever bears 
the economic incidence of compensation would depend on relative 
market power. In localities where a single operator such as Uber 
faces no competition, the cost of compensation will be shifted to 
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passengers, whereas in localities with healthy competition, the opera-
tors can be expected to shoulder them.
ii. Do Taxi Plate Owners Have a Legal Right to Compensation?
Are taxi licence holders entitled, as a matter of law, to compensation 
for municipal regulations accommodating ride-sharing? As the follow-
ing analysis suggests, the answer is not entirely straightforward, but 
more than likely negative.66 The question has not yet come before the 
Canadian courts, but has recently been dealt with in the United States. 
In 2016, the Federal Court of Appeals (Seventh Circuit) held in 
Joe Sanfelippo Cabs, Inc v Milwaukee (City of)67 that the repeal of a local 
restriction on the number of taxi permits issued by the defendant did 
not constitute a “taking” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States constitution.68 Judge Richard Posner accepted 
that the taxi permits issued to the plaintiffs were “property,” but rea-
soned that property can take many forms and, in this case, consisted 
of nothing more than the (transferable) right to operate a taxicab in 
the city. Importantly, the taxi permits did not confer on the plaintiffs 
a property right “to be an oligopolist [and] to exclude others from 
operating taxis.”69 Moreover, the former ordinance which provided 
that no further taxi permits be issued by the city gave the plaintiffs 
no guarantee that it would remain in effect indefinitely. In conse-
quence, no property of the plaintiffs was “taken.”70 Judge Posner, an 
avowed proponent of free enterprise, added:
[u]ndoubtedly by freeing up entry into the taxi business the 
new ordinance will reduce the revenues of individual taxicab 
companies; that is simply the normal consequence of replacing 
a cartelized with a competitive market. But the plaintiffs exag-
gerate when they predict ruination for themselves. Buses and 
subways and livery services and other taxi substitutes have not 
destroyed the taxi business; nor has Uber or Lyft or the private 
automobile or for that matter the bicycle. Taxicabs will not go 
the way of the horse and buggy—at least for some time.71
Comparisons to American takings jurisprudence must be tempered 
with caution.72 As Cromwell J.A. (as he then was) emphasized in 
Mariner Real Estate Ltd v Nova Scotia (AG),73 an American court is 
tasked with deciding the constitutional validity of an uncompen-
sated regulatory action, whereas the mandate of a Canadian court 
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is limited to determining whether compensation is required as a 
matter of statutory interpretation. The questions are “fundamentally 
different.”74 Indeed, in the absence of constitutional protection of 
private property, the Canadian jurisprudence has recognized a right 
to compensation only in two categories of cases. First, compensation 
is payable where it is expressly provided in, or can be implied from, 
the statute authorizing the exercise of regulatory powers. Second, 
compensation is payable, in the absence of contrary intention, where 
the exercise of regulatory powers amounts to a de facto expropriation 
of property.75 Neither ground for compensation is likely to be made 
out by taxi plate owners.
The proprietary status of taxi licences in Canada may not be 
completely settled,76 but the courts have recognized that taxi licences 
may be regarded as property in specific contexts: for example, for the 
purpose of division of marital property pursuant to provincial family 
law,77 or for the purpose of personal property security registration 
and bankruptcy proceedings.78 A plain reading of the taxi bylaws in 
several major Canadian cities may suggest that the licences are not 
property. Edmonton’s Vehicles for Hire Bylaw, for example, states that, 
“[e]very licence issued pursuant to this bylaw […] does not confer 
any property rights and remains at all times the sole property of 
the City,”79 and similar provisions appear in the bylaws of Toronto, 
Ottawa, Vancouver, and Calgary. However, the rights conferred by 
a taxi licence are both valuable and transferable,80 qualities often 
described as hallmarks of property.81 In Re Foster,82 the court sum-
marized the relevant authorities as follows:
[w]hat this case law reveals is a tension between the commercial 
reality that licences, like any commodity in restricted supply, 
have a value and may be traded, and the legal impact of the 
legislator’s desire to maintain, in varying degrees, control over 
the industry in question. Where the control is absolute and 
unfettered, no property interest exists even though there is a 
market […] where there is a market and a practical, historical 
assurance of renewal, the licensee has a right akin to a chose in 
action, and hence property […]. It is obvious from all the cases 
that the regulatory framework is a decisive factor.83
In Surdell-Kennedy Taxi Ltd v Surrey (City of),84 local taxi companies 
challenged the city’s decision to issue additional taxi licences and 
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allocate them by way of a public auction. The city relied on its corpo-
rate powers pursuant to the provisions in section 176 of the B.C. Local 
Government Act, “to acquire […] and dispose of […] personal property 
or other property, and any interest or right in or with respect to that 
property [on] any terms and conditions it considers appropriate.”85 
The court followed Re Foster in holding that a taxi licence becomes 
intangible personal property in the hands of the licensee, and 
becomes then capable of being transferred or encumbered (but not 
before it is issued, so section 176 did not apply).
Assuming that municipally issued taxi plates can be regarded 
as private property, the traditional position in Canada is that any 
right to compensation for expropriation or regulation of private 
property must invariably be founded in statute. The rule was first 
stated by the Privy Council in a case involving injurious affection 
to land,86 but remains the starting point in any discussion concern-
ing compensation for regulation.87 The courts, while reluctant to 
recognize a common law right to compensation,88 are prepared, in 
principle, to infer a statutory right to compensation in appropriate 
circumstances, even where it is not provided expressly. For example, 
it is a recognized rule of construction that “unless the words of the 
statute clearly so demand, a statute is not to be construed so as to 
take away the property of a subject without compensation.”89 This 
principle was applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in Manitoba 
Fisheries v R.90 There, pursuant to federal legislation, a government 
monopoly to export freshwater fish was given to a Crown corpora-
tion, effectively putting the long-established plaintiff out of busi-
ness. The court held that the effect of the legislative scheme was to 
acquire the plaintiff’s business goodwill, and insofar as nothing in 
the legislation authorized such a taking without compensation, the 
plaintiff was entitled to compensation.91
Nevertheless, the Canadian courts have resisted extending the 
principles upon which compensation may be founded beyond the 
ruling in Manitoba Fisheries.92 On the contrary, subsequent case law 
interpreted the right to compensation quite narrowly. The rule of 
construction requiring compensation barring clear demonstration of 
opposite intention has been held inapplicable in circumstances where 
the owner’s rights were extinguished, but the government did not 
acquire title to the property in question,93 although it is a plausible 
and arguably the better rule.94 In addition, the judicial standard for 
constructive expropriation is notoriously difficult to meet.95 Under 
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that test, a de facto expropriation entitling the owner to compensation 
(unless expropriation without compensation is expressly authorized) 
requires both an acquisition of a beneficial interest in the property 
or flowing from it, and a removal of all reasonable uses of the prop-
erty.96 Some of the most stringent regulations and restrictions would 
not ordinarily pass this test: as long as some reasonable private use 
is left to the owner, or as long as no interest is acquired by the public 
authority, then no compensation is payable, even if the property is 
rendered worthless.97
In light of this discussion, it is doubtful that municipal bylaws 
sanctioning ride-sharing would give rise to a right to compensation 
to incumbent taxi plate owners for the devaluation of their property. 
Such bylaws, like the repeal of the permit freeze in Joe Sanfelippo 
Cabs Inc,98 and unlike the legislation in Manitoba Fisheries,99 do not 
deprive the licence holders of any of their rights or affect their usage, 
and do not therefore constitute an actual or constructive taking of 
property. Moreover, although provincial legislation could easily 
specifically authorize compensation, none of the enabling statutes 
under which taxi and livery regulations are adopted currently 
authorize compensation expressly, or imply that compensation is 
intended, for licence quota changes or for any acts short of revoking 
licence holder’s rights. 
Doctrinal restrictions on the power of municipalities further 
militate against an implied right to compensation. Municipal coun-
cils are prohibited from ceding, bargaining away, or otherwise 
fettering their legislative powers unless authorized to do so by the 
legislature. Thus, a direct promise to enact, or maintain, or refrain 
from enacting a bylaw is illegal on its face.100 In Pacific National 
Investments Ltd v Victoria (City of), the Supreme Court of Canada held 
that the enabling legislation did not give the municipality an implied 
power to enter into a bargain with a private developer that would 
implicitly guarantee the developer compensation in case of a future 
rezoning of the developer’s lands in exchange for the developer’s 
contribution of public amenities. The majority of the court reasoned 
that such an obligation on the part of the city would constitute an 
indirect fetter of council’s legislative powers.101 Justice LeBel, for the 
majority, expressed skepticism at the notion of “an implication of an 
implication [which] begins to tax the imagination.”102 The dissenting 
opinion was prepared to recognize an implied right to compensation 
on the grounds that the arrangement would otherwise be “contrary 
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to business sense and to all obligations of fairness.”103 The major-
ity’s reasoning would hinder a claim by taxi licence holders for an 
implied right to compensation, and in the absence of corresponding 
contributions by plate owners, the claim would fail even under the 
dissent’s business sense test.104
IV. Compensating Taxi Licence Holders
As the preceding section shows, an argument for compensation 
for private losses occasioned by regulatory changes to facilitate the 
sharing economy can be made on policy grounds of efficiency and 
equity. A commitment to compensation can curtail lobbying and 
promote welfare enhancing reforms and in spreading the costs of 
transition, compensation is consistent with notions of fairness where 
there is no particular reason to let the losses lie. Compensation to taxi 
plate owners, whose economic interests are seriously jeopardized by 
municipal sanctioning of ride-sharing, represents an important test 
case and should be considered in light of the above arguments. As 
it is unlikely that taxi licence holders can establish a legal right to 
compensation before the courts, it is up to policymakers to enable 
and design a compensation scheme that can appropriately account 
for the local effects of regulatory transition on the industry and the 
factors which may affect the merits of any given claim, as well as a 
source of funding for any compensation.
i. Do Municipalities Have the Power to Compensate?
On May 3, 2016, the Toronto City Council directed the executive 
director of the Municipal Licensing and Standards Committee to 
report on the feasibility of establishing a transition fund for taxicab 
plate owners whose “investments have been negatively impacted by 
new market entrants.”105 In the absence of specific authority in their 
enabling legislation, the power of Canadian municipalities to extend 
assistance to taxi licence owners is not clear. In several provinces, 
the legislation expressly prohibits councils from extending direct 
financial assistance to any person or business beyond what is ordi-
narily offered to other ratepayers or inhabitants.106 The Municipal Act 
of Ontario still contains such a prohibition,107 as does the Community 
Charter of British Columbia108 and the Municipal Government Act of 
Nova Scotia.109 Section 82 of the City of Toronto Act provides that 
“the City shall not assist directly or indirectly any manufacturing 
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business or other industrial or commercial enterprise through the 
granting of bonuses for that purpose.”110 
The historic purpose of “anti-bonusing” provisions was to 
restrain municipalities from jeopardizing their financial positions 
by competing for business. None of the cases involving allegations of 
bonusing dealt with an attempt by a council to mitigate the adverse 
impact of its own policies. In addition, although the rule against 
bonusing is still in the books, many of the rules restricting munici-
palities have been abandoned, and a broad and purposive approach 
to the interpretation of enabling legislation has been embraced.111 
In recent decisions, anti-bonusing provisions have been construed 
in light of this approach. For example, in Friends of Lansdowne Inc v 
Ottawa (City of),112 the Court of Appeal held that the Ontario provi-
sion only prohibits the granting of an “obvious advantage or undue 
benefit [which] on the spectrum of benefits, […] falls closer to provid-
ing a party with an unmerited windfall.”113 Arguably this definition 
would preclude a municipality from extending transition relief to 
affected plate owners. Judicial guidance or legislative changes may 
be required to clarify such a power.
ii. Compensation Schemes in Australia
Local policymakers might draw useful lessons from the Australian 
experience with compensation schemes. As in Canada, Australia’s 
taxi industry has been shaken up by competition from transportation 
network companies offering ride-sharing services. Most Australian 
states have moved to regulate sharing and to reform the commer-
cial point-to-point transportation sector. Regulatory and licensing 
requirements for traditional taxis have been relaxed to even the play-
ing field, and only taxis are still permitted to provide hail services. 
Taxi licence values have plummeted, and the governments of several 
of the states have announced or implemented transition assistance, 
including partial compensation for plate owners. Unlike in Canada, 
the taxi industry is not regulated at the local or metropolitan level, 
but by state law.
Taxi licence prices in Sydney, New South Wales, had slumped by 
the end of 2015 to AUD$220,000 from an average of AUD$425,000 four 
years earlier,114 in part due to the issuance of additional licences by 
the authorities, and in part due to ride-sharing. In June 2016, the New 
South Wales government passed the Point to Point Transport (Taxis and 
Hire Vehicles) Act, which provides a single regulatory framework for 
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taxi services and ride-sharing. The Act explicitly provides that no 
compensation is payable by the state as a consequence of the enact-
ment, its operation, or any statement or conduct related to it.115 At the 
same time, the Act provided for regulations to establish transitional 
assistance funds for eligible taxi licence holders. Under these regula-
tions, AUD$20,000 was payable to each holder of one taxi licence and 
AUD$40,000 was payable to each holder of two or more licences.116 
Provisions have been made for additional transition assistance, but 
these have not yet been implemented. Additionally, a small fund has 
been established for business advisory services, to help the taxi and 
hire car industries adapt to the point-to-point transport industry 
reforms. The government plans to introduce a AUD$1 surcharge on 
all trips booked by a taxi or ride-sharing company. 
The government of Victoria announced comprehensive reforms 
to the taxi and ride-sharing industry in August 2016. Metropolitan 
Melbourne licence prices had dropped from about AUD$376,000 
in 2012–13 to AUD$159,000 in 2015–16, and no transfers have been 
recorded after October 2016.117 The government announced a support 
package for taxi and hire-car licence holders. An AUD$50 million 
“fairness fund” was established to assist eligible taxi licence holders 
who were experiencing significant financial hardship as a result of 
the proposed reforms, including a loss of income, significant dif-
ficulty in meeting ongoing debt obligations related to the licence, or 
a lack of available funds to meet financial commitments.118 In addi-
tion, the government said that it will provide transition assistance 
payments to taxi licence holders in the amount of AUD$100,000 for 
the first licence, and up to AUD$50,000 for each additional licence 
up to a total of four licenses for each licence holder.119 Finally, the 
government plans to introduce a universal AUD$2 levy per ride on 
all taxi and ride-sharing trips. The levy will replace annual licence 
fees and will support existing licence holders. 
Queensland had legalized ride-sharing in September 2016, 
although Uber had been operating in Brisbane since 2014. Taxi 
licence prices were worth over AUD$500,000 in 2014 according 
to industry data, but fell sharply in the following year.120 The 
Queensland government approved an industry assistance package 
that offered transitional assistance to eligible licence holders in the 
amount of AUD$20,000 for one taxi licence and AUD$40,000 for two 
or more licences. The assistance was recently enlarged by a further 
AUD$9,000 for a licence holder/operator, and AUD$4,500 for each 
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licence held but not operated, up to ten payments in total. The gov-
ernment has similarly announced a “Hardship Fund” and funding 
for business advice to assist taxi and limousine businesses to adapt 
to the new regulatory framework.121
The government of Western Australia established a “Transition 
Adjustment Assistance Grant” to eligible taxi plate owners in 
metropolitan Perth in the amount of AUD$20,000 for each multi-
purpose taxi plate and AUD$6,000 for each restricted plate, with no 
maximum.122 The transition assistance program under development 
includes a “Hardship Fund” for owners suffering severe financial 
hardship as a direct consequence of industry reforms, and innova-
tion funding administered through the Small Business Development 
Corporation to assist taxi plate owners and lessees to adjust and 
transition their business models was previously announced.123
The government of South Australia, where ride-sharing was 
legalized in July 2016, has also announced an assistance program 
that will offer AUD$30,000 per taxi licence, with no maximum, and 
AUD$50 per week for a maximum of eleven months for lessees of 
taxi licences.124 In contrast, no compensation or other assistance has 
been announced by the governments of Tasmania, which legalized 
ride-sharing in late 2016, or the Australian Capital Territory, where 
ride-sharing was legalized in late 2015. The latter intends to reassess 
its policies in two years, when the effect of industry reforms on taxi 
licence values would be known.
Several features of the above schemes stand out. First, the 
implementation of compensation (and the regulation of point-to-
point transportation) is carried out by state government pursuant 
to primary legislation, which removes any question of vires. Second, 
efficiency concerns provide a weak explanation for the schemes: the 
decision to offer compensation (or not) in each state was taken after 
the reforms had been decided, and no basis for the sum provided has 
been offered; at any rate, the amounts do not correspond to the actual 
losses. Third, the cap on the number of licences for which compensa-
tion is available in some states provides more protection to owner-
operators and small investors than to holders of multiple licences. 
This is consistent with the fairness concerns outlined earlier.125
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V. Conclusion
The technological developments of the sharing economy have thrown 
into question existing business models and regulatory arrangements. 
In Canada, the introduction of ride-sharing exposed a taxi industry 
whose time has passed, resistant to innovation and propped up by 
local regulations that serve taxi plate owners at the expense of the 
public. For the most part, the regulation of ride-sharing shifts the 
focus of government supervision away from market supply and 
demand, and to the enforcement of safety and quality standards. It 
is clearly not the deal the taxicab drivers asked for a century ago. 
But the responsibility of local government is to the public at large. 
Nevertheless, the government, which is responsible for putting in 
place a dysfunctional system, should consider compensating the 
adversely affected by the transition to the new regulatory framework. 
A policy of compensating the losers is fairer and makes for better 
public decisions by encouraging governments to consider the welfare 
implications of regulations.
There are sound arguments against compensating taxi plate 
owners for a devaluation of their licences. For years, many have 
reaped windfall profits at the expense of their passengers and some 
of their drivers. Moreover, licence values already reflect the regula-
tory risk of reliance on existing entitlement. Finally, it is difficult 
to disentangle the effects of regulation from those of technological 
changes and market changes in general. Yet, letting the losses lie will 
inflict ruinous harm on individual plate owners who are at fault for 
nothing more than investing poorly.
Canadian law does not establish a legal right to compensation 
for the effects of regulatory changes generally or for the devalua-
tion of taxi licences specifically, but policymakers can follow the 
Australian example in recognizing the case for compensation and 
other forms of assistance. Compensation schemes should be devised 
to reflect the losses as closely as possible and the differences in 
circumstances between different plate owners. This will a require 
careful study of local markets.
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compensation is not therefore dependent on any acquisition by the state.
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CHAPTER IX
Competition Law and Policy Issues 
in the Sharing Economy
Francesco Ducci1
I. Introduction
What are the main challenges that the sharing economy phe-nomenon poses for competition law and policy? Despite its 
positive role in providing market access for a number of small pro-
viders and enabling innovative ways of offering goods and services, 
the emergence of sharing economy platforms has raised competition 
law concerns, largely related to the fear that this phenomenon may 
enable new forms of anti-competitive conduct and create conditions 
for possible abuses of market power. Emerging case law and evidence 
pertaining to the increasing levels of concentration and market shares 
possessed by dominant sharing economy platforms seem to cor-
roborate these fears, and would appear to suggest a potential need 
for stronger competition law enforcement, or potentially an ad hoc 
approach given the specificities of sharing economy markets.
This chapter offers a contribution to the many legal puzzles 
raised by the sharing economy phenomenon, by providing a per-
spective on the scope of competition law and policy. Various policy 
reports have been published on the regulatory issues raised by the 
sharing economy. The German Competition Authority report,2 for 
instance, in discussing specific controversies related to the phe-
nomenon, examines the need to create a level playing field between 
traditional and new service providers, problems of asymmetric infor-
mation and negative externalities, distinctions between commercial 
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and private suppliers, taxation, employment policy aspects, and 
market concentration. Similarly, the United States Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) report concerning the sharing economy3 discusses 
various regulatory issues, including market power, the role of trust 
mechanisms, privacy, and collection of applicable taxes.
In this chapter, I conduct my analysis within the narrower 
framework of market power, in order to evaluate possible needs for 
regulatory interventions through competition law and economic 
regulation. The goal of my study, rather than providing a comprehen-
sive analysis of possible competition law issues, is to single out and 
identify whether there is anything specific to the sharing economy 
with regard to addressing possible issues of market power, in order to 
evaluate possible novel competition policy implications that emerge 
from this phenomenon, and in order to provide a guiding light for 
emerging competition law issues.
In my view, although the emergence of the sharing economy 
raises a plethora of competition law questions, there is nothing 
specific to the sharing economy as a phenomenon in and of itself. 
On the one hand, the central competition policy questions that are 
likely to emerge in this context, in particular those related to abuse of 
dominance and monopolization, find their source in the emergence 
of the platform model of intermediation in markets characterized by 
two-sided network externalities. However, as I show in this chapter, 
these questions are not unique to the sharing economy. The lessons 
emerging from the growing literature on two-sided markets, together 
with the role of big data in competition policy4 and the possible anti-
competitive issues raised by algorithms,5 offer important insights 
about the role of technology in shaping contemporary competition 
policy. However, these strands of scholarship reflect much broader 
economic and technological transformations in the nature of today’s 
markets, which apply within and beyond the sharing economy 
framework. On the other hand, other competition law questions 
have also emerged as a result of the controversial legal and policy 
issues regarding the nature of work. Although some of these issues 
have been framed in terms of competition law, they should in fact be 
considered from the perspective of other areas of law, in particular 
labour law. To illustrate this point, I use the case of Uber and the 
ongoing price-fixing investigation against the ride-sharing platform 
to demonstrate that no unique competition law issues emerge in the 
sharing economy context. I further suggest that some of the issues 
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that have been framed in terms of competition law should instead 
be framed from the perspective of more appropriate areas of law. 
The roadmap for the chapter is as follows. It starts by defining 
the sharing economy and delineating in greater detail the charac-
teristics of sharing economy markets. The chapter then analyzes the 
specific form of market intermediation that prevails in this context, 
in order to highlight some of the challenges faced by competition 
law and the potential role of alternative regulatory instruments to 
tackle issues of market power in two-sided markets. The chapter then 
shows the complex interconnections between employment issues 
and competition law concerns raised by the emergence of these new 
business models, by analyzing some recent investigations in the taxi 
and ride-sharing industry. The chapter concludes that, although 
the interplay of the predominant platform business model and the 
unsolved nature of work in the sharing economy appear to validate 
the idea that there are sharing-economy-specific concerns about mar-
ket power, there is nothing substantially novel from a competition 
law and policy perspective.
II. Key Characteristics of Sharing Economy Markets 
The success of the sharing economy is based on technologies that 
enable unused or underutilized assets to be turned into productive 
resources, and significantly reduce the transaction costs of matching 
those underused assets to those willing to pay or employ such assets. 
By creating new ways of providing goods and services and spurring 
innovation into existing ones, the sharing economy radically changes 
the conditions of consumption, with goods and services increasingly 
offered to consumers “on demand” and ownership being replaced by 
access to or rental of shared assets.6 Economic activity also drastically 
changes the conditions of supply, with firms organized as platforms 
rather than as centralized hierarchies and the emergence of hybrid 
forms of employment characterized by flexible labour, with contract 
work and micro-entrepreneurship replacing full-time employment.7
Although the scope, nature, and normative implications of 
the sharing economy and its implications for regulators are not 
fully clear,8 the economic impact of the sharing economy is sig-
nificant and growing at a rapid pace. According to a 2015 report 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers, “five key sharing sectors—travel, car 
sharing, finance, staffing, and music and video streaming—have 
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the potential to increase global revenues from roughly $15 billion 
today to around $335 billion by 2025.”9 Airbnb for instance, has now 
more than 50,000 guests per night, has served over 50 million guests 
since it was founded in 2008, and has a market capitalization of well 
over $20 billion.10 Uber “operates in more than 250 cities and as of 
February 2015 was valued $41.2 billion.”11
The growth rate of the sharing economy and its impact on trans-
portation, hospitality, media, and many other sectors has profound 
legal and policy implications, ranging from employment law, tax law, 
privacy, anti-discrimination, consumer safety, and sectoral regula-
tion. For instance, the application of labour standards becomes prob-
lematic when trying to classify platform users as either employees 
or individual contractors, or in attempting to identify the role of the 
platform as simply an enabler of exchange or as a more centralized 
unit controlling the behaviour of its users—hence, carrying liability 
for the activities they help coordinate. Similarly, the data-intensive 
nature of platforms raises complex issues of privacy and data por-
tability. Anti-discrimination and accessibility concerns also emerge 
when platforms operate in regulated sectors, such as transportation 
or hospitality, and can escape specific regulatory requirements for 
providing services that incumbents have to comply with. Such legal 
questions and, more generally, the scope, form, and timeliness of 
regulation for the sharing economy are at the heart of the struggles 
that many legal systems face in dealing with technological change 
in market dynamics. 
The literature on the sharing economy emerging from dispa-
rate fields, including sociology, economics, or more policy-oriented 
reports, does not provide a clear-cut definition on the sharing econ-
omy, which sometimes include terms such as “collaborative consump-
tion,” “peer-to-peer exchange,” or “access-based consumption.”12 For 
the purposes of this chapter, I use the following definition of the 
sharing economy, composed of two necessary but distinct elements: 
(1) specific developments in market design allow for the creation of 
thick, liquid, and safe markets13 for direct exchange between inde-
pendent providers and consumers, where the intermediary serves 
the role of a matchmaking platform among independent providers 
and consumers; and (2) there are specific assets owned by private 
individuals that are not utilized at full capacity, and the owners 
are willing to put these personal assets to professional use, making 
them available to third parties through a platform. This definition 
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excludes non-commercial or non-profit forms of sharing or pure 
business-to-consumer models—where the intermediary is more a 
reseller than a platform—and concentrates on consumer-to-consumer, 
or peer-to-peer type of exchanges intermediated by a platform.14 
As I discuss in greater detail below, most of the central competition 
law and policy questions in the sharing economy are related to the 
emergence of platforms as the prevalent form of intermediation in 
markets that have been labelled as “two-sided” in industrial orga-
nization literature, in particular the winner-take-all dynamic that 
characterizes these markets. 
Original concerns about market power that led to the enactment 
of the Anti-Combines Act in Canada in 1889 and the Sherman Act in 
the United States in 1890 were the results of significant technological 
and economic transformations.15 The call for public intervention to 
correct market imperfections, which resulted in the proliferation of 
competition law regimes around the world, was driven by fears of 
abuses of economic power by big corporations that emerged due to 
advances in telecommunication and transportation technologies and 
the development of capital markets in the nineteenth century.16 In a 
similar way, today’s technological transformations that have given 
rise to the sharing economy, and online platforms more generally, 
raise the issue of how to design competition law rules to tackle pos-
sible anti-competitive conduct enabled by these novel technological 
changes, whether such conduct takes the form of collusion among 
competitors, anti-competitive mergers, or abuse of dominance. There 
are a plethora of these challenges relevant to the sharing economy: 
When can a sharing economy platform facilitate collusion among 
its members, perhaps through its pricing algorithms? What are the 
strategies that dominant platforms can adopt to exclude competi-
tors? How should the emerging possibility of perfect or behavioural 
price discrimination be treated? To what extent are network effects 
a barrier to entry for competitors? What is the impact of big data on 
competition law, particularly regarding merger policy for platforms?
At a general level, the relationship between competition policy 
and the sharing economy is inherently ambiguous. On the one hand, 
sharing economy platforms increase competitive conditions in the 
provision of various services, by allowing small service providers 
with low fixed costs to access a previously unavailable market. On 
the other hand, the problem of market power appears ubiquitous in 
the sharing economy, because many of these markets are dominated 
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by one or a few platforms. It is important to note that, under com-
petition law, a high level of concentration or market power is not 
a problem in itself. However, the current level of concentration in 
many platform markets, including sharing economy platforms, has 
raised legitimate concerns that some form of regulatory intervention 
may soon be needed to deal with dominance in these winner-take-
all markets. This problem has recently been noted even among the 
more conservative schools of antitrust.17
The following section will examine in greater detail how the 
evaluation of the central competition law questions—the existence of 
market power in a given relevant market, the emergence of possible 
forms of anti-competitive conduct, and the best policy tools to deal 
with these concerns—ultimately revolve around the centrality of the 
predominant platform business model of intermediation. In doing 
so, it will highlight how the emergence of platform markets repre-
sents, at the same time, a much broader phenomenon for which the 
policy implications exceed the sharing economy and apply in many 
other two-sided markets, including, among others emphasized in 
the literature, advertising-based media, online search, and payment 
card networks.18 After analyzing some of the legal and economic 
issues that emerge in two-sided markets and the possible anti-
competitive concerns that may be relevant in the sharing economy 
context, the subsequent section will consider the ways in which the 
distinguishing feature of the sharing economy related to the mar-
ketization of private underutilized assets and the resulting unclear 
nature of work have created the arguably mistaken perception that 
novel competition law issues (at the intersection with employment 
law) have emerged in the sharing economy sphere. Using the ongo-
ing price-fixing investigations against Uber in the United States as 
an example, this chapter seeks to demonstrate how these questions 
reflect controversies that are ultimately more pertinent to the prob-
lematic classification of work in the sharing economy, rather than 
substantial or standalone antitrust issues, and should therefore be 
framed as issues of labour law rather than competition law.
III. Competition Law Issues in the Sharing Economy 
Most of the sharing economy is based on a business model whereby 
firms act as matchmakers operating through platforms that connect 
different types of users willing to interact with each other.19 Uber, 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   300 18-11-08   08:42
 Competition Law and Policy Issues in the Sharing Economy 301
for instance, connects passengers and drivers in a similar way that 
Airbnb connects homeowners and guests. This business model 
thrives in the sharing economy but is also predominant in other 
sectors of the economy and has entailed a critical transformation of 
the nature of the firm. 
Markets operated by platforms have been labelled “two-sided 
markets” in industrial economics literature and have increasingly 
drawn the attention of economists, legal scholars and policy mak-
ers.20 Roughly speaking, in economic terms, the key feature of these 
markets is that different user groups with interrelated demand 
match through a platform that exploits indirect network exter-
nalities.21 Usually, network externalities are thought of as the extra 
value that one user of a good or service creates for the other people 
using it. The value of owning a telephone, for example, depends on 
the number of other people also owning one. These are defined as 
direct network effects because they entail within-group effects. In 
the case of platforms, the network effects are also indirect, whereby 
the value for one group of users depends on the presence of another 
distinct group of users that join the platform. For instance, a taxi 
and ride-sharing platform connects drivers and passengers. Unlike 
the telephone network example, the value of joining the platform 
for drivers mostly depends on the number of passengers that also 
join the platform, and vice versa. Users on one side of the market 
care about the number and type of users on the other side, and the 
platform acts as a catalyst enabling a match among different user 
groups that would not otherwise be able to interact. 
Although the presence of a specific user group affects the utility 
of the other group, individual users do not take this cross-market 
effect into account when making a decision to join or use a specific 
platform. The role of the platform is to internalize these indirect 
network externalities in order to enhance the chances of matches 
across users on different sides of the platform. Such intermediaries 
achieve this result by setting a skewed price structure that takes into 
account not only the elasticity of demand and the cost of serving each 
side, but also the externalities that each side creates for the other. As 
a result, pricing in two-sided markets often entail subsidizing one 
side and charging more to the other side. 
The literature on two-sided markets is also connected with 
older literature on the theory of the firm and vertical integration. 
In 1937, Ronald H. Coase argued that the boundaries of the firm are 
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determined by the relative transaction costs of organizing economic 
activity, either through markets and the pricing system or within the 
hierarchy of the firm.22 The economic theory of two-sided markets 
is related to the question of firm structures because platforms blur 
the traditional boundaries between markets and hierarchies and 
enable a new form of intermediation, where the typical make-or-buy 
decision of vertical integration becomes “enable or employ” in the 
context of two-sided intermediaries.23 The latter dichotomy involves 
a preference for contractual relationships between buyers and sellers, 
to which the two-sided intermediary is not a party, but merely an 
enabler of such contractual relationships.24
To be sure, two-sided markets are not a new economic phe-
nomenon. The village market maker, in some sense, is itself an older 
example of a two-sided matchmaker between buyers and sellers. 
What is new about today’s phenomenon is that modern information 
and communication technologies have exponentially scaled up the 
viability and efficiency of the multi-sided platform business model, 
which thrives especially in the online world. As a result, firms can 
have incentives to transform themselves from hierarchical organiza-
tions (directly controlling transactions with customers) into simple 
enablers of exchanges and transactions among users. 
Not only is the two-sidedness of markets not new, but it is 
also not an intrinsic technological feature of specific markets. More 
specifically, it is possible to identify a spectrum of intermediation 
forms, ranging from pure platforms to input suppliers, resellers, 
and vertically integrated organizations. Through the design of their 
contracts, firms can choose to adopt one model or another, with a 
view to specific trade-offs.25 
Nor is the choice of a business model fixed. A firm may start 
as a single-sided intermediary, preferring to be a reseller in order 
to avoid the initial chicken-and-egg problem of balancing demand 
from different sides, and once successfully established, switch to a 
platform model in order to attract third parties to trade directly with 
buyers via the firm’s marketplace. Amazon, for instance, started as 
a reseller of books and then introduced a platform marketplace for 
certain products, enabling third-party sellers to trade directly with 
consumers on its website, thereby maintaining two coexisting busi-
ness models.26 How and why intermediaries make decisions to adopt 
specific business models, or why intermediaries decide to integrate 
with one of their sides, are important policy questions that have 
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implications both for competition law and the future of the sharing 
economy phenomenon.
These market dynamics and trade-offs among different firm 
structures, which at a high level connect back to Coase’s theory of 
the firm, apply to the sharing economy as well. First, there are often 
significant direct and indirect network externalities at play in shar-
ing economy platforms, such as in the case of ride-sharing services 
where the number of drivers increases the value of the platform 
for passengers, and vice versa. Second, a platform usually faces the 
“enable or employ” question when deciding whether to employ pro-
viders directly or allow them to be independent contractors based on 
specific trade-offs.27 Third, platforms can locate themselves along a 
spectrum of centralization and decentralization, with the possibility 
of heterogeneous platform design. For instance, although Uber argues 
that drivers are independent service providers, it nevertheless exerts 
significant control over them, imposing specific requirements, rating 
standards, and pricing. A platform like Airbnb, however, delegates 
much more control to its users on either side. One of the reasons for 
this difference is that Uber offers a relatively homogenous service 
and creates a market for quick on-demand rides, which requires some 
degree of centralization and coordination to ensure rapid availability 
of rides and transactions. That is why, among other things, platforms 
like Uber set prices centrally instead of delegating pricing decisions 
to individual drivers. In contrast, Airbnb offers a service that has 
a much higher level of product heterogeneity and that allows for 
greater delays between requests and offers of supply. Both of these 
elements suggest the desirability of a higher level of delegation to 
users over price and other aspects of the transaction. The choice of 
centralization within a platform is ultimately a trade-off between 
keeping transaction costs low and using information efficiently to 
ensure individual product choice.28 Lastly, the choice of a business 
model is not fixed. This point is important because in the future one 
might witness a fundamental shift away from the sharing economy 
paradigm towards a more centralized and ownership-oriented model.
i. Legal and Economic Issues in Two-Sided Markets
The economic literature on two-sided markets has identified some 
central fallacies that can arise when two-sided platforms are exam-
ined under the lens of traditional one-sided markets.29 These fallacies 
are for the most part associated with the different pricing strategies 
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adopted in two-sided markets, and with the complexities of defining 
the relevant market when multiple user groups are affiliated with a 
platform. With regard to pricing, Julian Wright, for instance, notes 
that an efficient price structure in two-sided markets does not have 
to reflect the relative cost of serving each side in isolation.30 As a 
result, a high price-cost margin does not necessarily indicate mar-
ket power, and a price below marginal cost cannot in itself indicate 
predation.31 Similarly, an increase in competition will not necessarily 
result in more efficient or balanced price structures.32 As a result of 
these characteristics, legal treatment of various practices in two-sided 
markets has shifted from illegality per se, to full-blown rule of reason 
in various countries.33 This literature on two-sided markets has been 
central, for instance, to the regulatory and antitrust investigations 
into payment card networks, and the role of the interchange fees 
charged to merchants for credit card transactions.34
Regarding market definition, there are technical issues associ-
ated with the two-sided nature of a market.35 Questions have been 
raised in the literature as to how many markets should be defined 
in competition law cases—a broad platform market or individual 
markets for each side—in order to take into account the interlinks and 
feedback effects between each group of users. Although market defi-
nition is just a tool, it is a central step of the analysis that can affect 
the finding of market power. A broad market definition would make 
it harder to establish the presence of market power, compared to an 
analysis that defines a separate market for each side of a two-sided 
market and then looks at the feedback effects between each of these 
markets. Similarly, the choice of how to define the market affects the 
scope of possible countervailing efficiencies. Efficiencies are usually 
taken into account only when they arise within the boundaries of the 
relevant market as defined in each individual case. However, because 
of the “waterbed effect” at play between the sides of two-sided mar-
kets, it may be the case that a narrow market definition that focuses 
only on one side of the market could overlook the countervailing 
efficiencies that occur on the other side of a two-sided market.
Beyond these important technical issues in applying competi-
tion law tools in two-sided markets, this literature is also related to 
other strands of research that examine the increasing importance of 
algorithms and big data for competition policy. For instance, recent 
scholarship has identified possible risks of collusion and price-fixing 
through the use of algorithms, which can create new opportunities 
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for anti-competitive conduct.36 A pricing algorithm can either become 
an instrument for collusion, both among platforms and among mem-
bers of the same platform, or a mechanism that, by enhancing market 
transparency, can enable new forms of tacit collusion without the 
presence of any anti-competitive agreements.
The importance of big data also has important implications for 
competition policy in platform markets.37 As noted recently by The 
Economist, “a century ago, the resource in question was oil. Now simi-
lar concerns are being raised by the giants that deal in data, the oil of 
the digital era.”38 Data creates additional network effects that make a 
dominant platform’s position hard to challenge. One of Uber’s advan-
tages, for instance, can be partially attributed to its ownership of the 
biggest pool of data about driver and passenger supply and demand 
for on-demand ride services.39 These interconnected strands of legal 
and economic literature, although still at early stages of research, 
may have significant implications for the sharing economy and raise 
possible issues of market power and anti-competitive conduct.
ii. Possible Anti-Competitive Concerns in the Sharing Economy
From a more structural perspective, the central issue that emerges 
from the two-sided nature of these sharing economy markets is 
likely to be the question of dominance. Due to network effects and 
the aggregation of data, most markets tend to be oligopolistic or 
characterized by a single dominant platform, raising concerns about 
the possible presence of significant barriers to entry and fears of 
potential abuse of market power by dominant incumbents to exclude 
competitors.
 The dilemma of dominance in platform markets, including 
in the sharing economy context, is that there seems to often be a 
natural tendency towards market concentration. This occurs as a 
result of various forms of network externalities, which can be direct 
(among users of the same kind) or indirect (between different users 
on each side of the market), and as a result of the accumulation of 
data. Concentration may also be fostered by increasing returns to 
scale, when platforms have high fixed costs and low variable costs. 
At the same time, there are countervailing forces that can reduce the 
tendency toward market concentration, including congestion exter-
nalities, differentiation among platforms, and the possibility of users 
using multiple platforms.40 The extent of concentration will vary 
depending on the specific characteristics of each individual market, 
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and different policy tools can be adopted to deal with possible abuses 
of market power and concerns over excessive concentration.
One way to approach dominance is to intervene ex-post to pun-
ish specific behaviours that are deemed to be anti-competitive. Major 
concerns of abuse of dominance that can be expected to appear in 
the sharing economy include attempts by dominant platforms to 
artificially increase user barriers and costs of switching to other 
competing platforms; attempts to reduce multi-homing, for example, 
through exclusive contracts; or attempts to leverage monopoly power 
from one market to another through tying and bundling. 
A different and more prophylactic approach is to prevent the 
creation of dominance ex-ante with tighter merger policies. In analyz-
ing the effects of such mergers, the two-sided nature of the market 
and the importance of data aggregation play important roles that can 
be overlooked when viewed through a traditional competition law 
lens. Usually, competition authorities scrutinize the possible effects 
of a proposed merger on price and look for possible efficiencies 
and synergies that are created by the merger.41 When platforms are 
merging, this assessment is further complicated by multiple factors. 
For example, higher prices on one side may lead to lower prices on 
the other side of the market, requiring an assessment of the welfare 
effects on each side of the market. Moreover, additional utility due 
to the aggregation of network externalities in a single platform could 
outweigh the negative effects of a price increase post-merger, even in 
the absence of efficiency gains. This additional utility may play an 
important role in assessing a proposed merger even if price increases 
are possible. Furthermore, aggregation of data may encourage merg-
ers between firms that are competing in different markets, potentially 
escaping competition law scrutiny. Taking fears of excessive market 
concentration seriously requires careful consideration of these kind 
of issues when scrutinizing mergers among platforms. 
A third and more structural policy approach to the issue of 
market power and dominance is economic regulation. In markets 
characterized by network externalities, such as markets charac-
terized by economies of scale, trying to induce more competition 
through the application of competition law may be neither feasible 
nor desirable. This conclusion suggests a different perspective on the 
possibility of dealing with market power ex-ante through economic 
regulation, treating a dominant platform as an essential facility or a 
natural monopoly. This policy option, rather than trying to induce 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   306 18-11-08   08:42
 Competition Law and Policy Issues in the Sharing Economy 307
more competition among platforms, would accept a single platform 
provider as the most efficient market outcome, while also requiring 
a form of public utility regulation of prices and non-discriminatory 
access to the platform to deal with possible abuses of market power. 
As David S. Evans notes, a two-sided market can be considered a 
natural monopoly under certain conditions.42 In particular, this can 
be the case when there are no significant dis-economies of scale on 
the cost side, no congestion effects on the demand side, and homog-
enous consumers on both sides, so that it would not be optimal to 
have differentiated platforms. In such a case, as long as possible dis-
economies of scale in cost do not outweigh the benefits of consolidat-
ing demand, it would be optimal to have a single platform serving 
the entire market. Glen Weyl and Alexander White, for instance, 
argue that the main problem in platform markets can often be one 
of over-fragmentation, and argue that regulation rather than com-
petition law may be the best policy tool to address market power in 
these winner-take-all markets.43 
In sum, the competition law issues that are likely to be central 
in the sharing economy are those that emerge from the growing 
importance of two-sided markets, coupled with possible new anti-
competitive concerns created by algorithms and the increasing 
importance of big data for competition law and policy, in particular 
with regard to issues of abuse of dominance. As will be discussed 
in the next section, the sharing economy adds an additional layer of 
complexity to these issues, as a result of the marketization of private 
underutilized assets, but this additional element does not create 
specific competition law concerns. Rather, it reflects policy questions 
that are only tangential to competition law, which should instead be 
seen through the lenses of more appropriate areas of law.
IV. Regulatory Concerns and the Nature of Work in the Sharing 
Economy
The regulatory issues that have emerged in the sharing economy 
are rooted in the fact that private individuals provide access to their 
own underutilized assets. For example, the problem of asymmetric 
information is exacerbated at one level by the fact that providers of 
services in the sharing economy are not professionals, but more often 
part-time providers without the necessary training, licensing, or legal 
requirements that are usually imposed on the professional provision 
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of services. The use of reviews and online ratings is a mechanism 
of self-regulation implemented by platforms to solve such pervasive 
information asymmetries. In this regard, there are various debates 
as to whether these tools are sufficient to solve consumer protection 
and safety concerns.44 
I believe that there is a need for a balanced approach that 
recognizes the important role of public regulatory intervention to 
complement these self-regulatory mechanisms. On the one hand, the 
success of many sharing economy platforms proves that these self-
regulatory systems have worked relatively well. On the other hand, 
ratings and reviews have shortcomings and must be complemented 
by public regulation. Similarly, problems of negative externalities 
can emerge, such as accidents resulting from unsafe driving or 
unsafe vehicles. Such negative externalities are exacerbated by the 
fact that providers may not have certifications or commercial forms 
of insurance. Non-customers lack contractual relationships with the 
platforms and cannot rely on contracts to shape a platform’s behav-
iour.45 Again, a balanced approach, combining platform mechanisms 
with publicly imposed requirements, appears to be the best policy 
approach, as suggested by the United States FTC report.46 Such an 
approach should include imposing insurance requirements to close 
possible gaps that can result in serious negative externalities. 
In addition to these market failures, the marketization of private 
assets also raises the important question of the characterization of 
work in the sharing economy. This question highlights the critical 
tension between purported forms of micro-entrepreneurship and 
forms of direct and full-time employment. In the taxi industry, for 
instance, the novelty created by the sharing economy phenomenon is 
that any individual with a car can become, in an easy way, a part-time 
taxi driver. On the one hand, the fact that individuals are the owners 
of the key assets and have control of when and how to provide the 
services gives rise to a dynamic where each individual provider may 
appear to be an independent service provider. On the other hand, 
ride-sharing platforms often exert substantial control over these 
independent providers, to the point where they may appear more like 
platform employees than independent contractors. The classification 
of workers in the sharing economy has been challenged in various 
courts around the world. For instance, in the United Kingdom47 and 
in California48 court decisions have concluded that drivers should 
be considered as employees, while in other American states drivers 
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have been classified as independent contractors.49 In other coun-
tries, including Canada, the resolution of this question still remains 
uncertain. Recently, the advocate general of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union held, in a recent reference for a preliminary 
ruling, that Uber drivers do not pursue an autonomous activity that 
is independent of the platform. The advocate general concluded that 
Uber could not be regarded as a mere intermediary between driv-
ers and passengers, because it controlled economically important 
aspects of the transport service, which amounts to the organization 
and management of a comprehensive system for on-demand urban 
transport.50
These doubts about the nature of work in the sharing economy 
have raised puzzling questions at the intersection of competition 
and employment law, where different legal characterizations of 
work have appeared to substantially affect the scope of competition 
law in the sharing economy and possibly raise novel competition 
law issues. This is clearly reflected in Meyer v Kalanick,51 an ongoing 
American price-fixing investigation against Uber’s pricing policies. 
In this case, it appears that classifying drivers in one way may create 
the conditions for certain competition law claims to emerge, while if 
drivers are characterized in another way, this automatically appears 
to negate the possibility for the same claim to arise, even when the 
competitive conditions are the same under each legal classification. 
In particular, Meyer v Kalanick revolves around the claim that 
Uber is illegally colluding with drivers in violation of section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, by controlling the prices of car rides through Uber’s 
pricing algorithm and for fixing price surcharges. If it is accepted that 
Uber does not employ drivers, the allegation goes, independent driv-
ers should compete, among other things, on prices to obtain passen-
gers. However, under this perspective, the central pricing algorithm 
reduces price competition and enables a form of collusion and price-
fixing orchestrated by the platform and the drivers. Uber faces both 
a claim for horizontal price-fixing conspiracy between Uber drivers 
themselves and vertical conspiracy between the platform and drivers.
The challenging questions raised by this price-fixing case lie at 
the heart of the sharing economy business model, because in a hypo-
thetical counterfactual situation, where Uber directly employed driv-
ers, a price-fixing claim would simply be not possible. Competition 
law doctrines have recognized that coordination within a firm is 
necessary, while coordination among firms, except in specific cases, 
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is treated as per se illegal. Whereas the coordination of employees 
is required for the efficient operation of a firm, coordination among 
firms reduces price competition to the detriment of consumers and 
social welfare. In the case of Uber, a different classification of driv-
ers can shift the boundaries of the firm, raising the possibility of a 
competition law claim in the case of independent drivers. In such a 
case, the allegation is that centrally set prices create the possibility of 
price-fixing, since independent drivers would be expected to compete 
on price. But are there valid grounds to advance a competition law 
claim against such a price mechanism, solely based on the classifi-
cation of drivers under different labour law standards? I argue that 
such concerns are the result of unsolved legal questions about the 
nature of work in the sharing economy, and are in fact only tangen-
tially relevant to substantial competition law issues. 
In my view, given the characteristics of this market, a central-
ized price mechanism is necessary to properly organize supply and 
demand of rides in real time. A narrower concern may be raised on 
the basis of the fact that Uber has a stake in how much drivers earn 
(increasing fares also increases Uber’s profits, as a result of the per-
centage taken from drivers). In response to such concerns, however, 
rather than eliminating centralized pricing or requiring drivers to 
set their own prices, an alternative would be to impose on Uber a 
different mechanism for obtaining revenue from drivers. This would 
be a much narrower and well-defined claim. Regardless of whether 
drivers are considered employees or independent contractors, a 
form of centralized pricing is not only necessary, but efficient, and 
the answer regarding possible price-fixing cannot depend on a for-
mal classification of work, when the competitive conditions remain 
unchanged in each scenario. 
Regarding the possible legal characterization of the issues 
underlying Meyer v Kalanick, competition law doctrines have the 
necessary tools to analyze such price-fixing allegations. As for 
horizontal conspiracy, the court could characterize the contractual 
relationships as a “hub-and-spoke” agreement.52 A hub-and-spoke 
arrangement refers to a scenario where an entity at one level of the 
market structure (the hub) coordinates an agreement among competi-
tors at a different level upstream or downstream (the spokes). United 
States v Apple Inc53 is an important recent precedent dealing with hub-
and-spoke agreements. In that case, Apple orchestrated a conspiracy 
among six publishers to enter the e-book market, where Amazon 
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had been the leader since 2009. The business strategy adopted by 
Amazon was to sell at a discount price of $9.99 certain new releases 
and bestsellers (the “loss-leader pricing strategy”) and to distribute 
e-books under a wholesale model. Publishers were reluctant to see the 
e-book market expand, because that would negatively affect both the 
sale of hardcover books and the viability of brick-and-mortar stores, 
and because they were concerned that consumers would become 
accustomed to such low prices. Since publishers perceived that each 
of them, individually, would not be able to force Amazon to change 
its pricing strategy, they saw an opportunity in Apple’s desire to 
enter the e-book market. Apple, aware of these concerns, proposed a 
strategy to the publishers in the form of contractual conditions which 
included the establishment of an agency model and “Most-Favoured-
Nation” (MFN) clauses. Such conditions effectively allowed publish-
ers to impose the agency model on Amazon and other retailers as 
well. If Amazon continued selling e-books for $9.99, publishers were, 
in practice, forced to set the same price for books sold on the iBook-
store. However, the entry of Apple into the e-book market increased 
the bargaining power of publishers vis-à-vis Amazon and allowed 
them to impose an agency model on Amazon, ultimately resulting 
in higher e-book prices. The court found that these vertical agree-
ments with Apple were used to facilitate horizontal collusion among 
publishers, and that this arrangement entailed a per se violation of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
As noted by other commentators, in the case of Uber, there is 
a parallel dynamic in that the platform is accused of orchestrating 
price-fixing among drivers by making use of its pricing algorithm 
that drivers must accept when joining the platform, which results 
in an increase in the price of fares.54 There are many difficulties in 
characterizing Uber’s pricing as a per se illegal horizontal price-
fixing conspiracy. First, as it was explained before, cooperation 
within a single economic entity is generally allowed under compe-
tition law, which does not consider wholly unilateral conduct to be 
illegal.55 However, the claim goes to the heart of Uber’s business 
model, because Uber’s claim that drivers are not employees makes 
this argument unavailable. Second, there must be evidence of an 
agreement or tacit coordination facilitated by the platform, which 
may be inferred from the fact that drivers accept the terms and 
conditions imposed by the platform, although it is unclear whether 
this would suffice to classify the price mechanism as a per se illegal 
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price-fixing agreement. Third, the price mechanism may escape per 
se liability for efficiency reasons under the logic of Broadcast Music 
Inc v Columbia Broadcasting System Inc,56 or be characterized as an 
ancillary restraint.57 In this decision, copyright holders agreed to 
offer a blanket licence by pooling together their copyrights. The 
agreement was not considered price-fixing because the defendants 
had created something new that created pro-competitive efficiencies, 
despite its prima facie resemblance to per se illegal horizontal collu-
sion. Similarly, the ancillary doctrine can exempt certain agreements 
that are ancillary to a lawful agreement. 
Under the alternative rule of reason analysis of vertical conspir-
acy, the negative effects of reduced price competition among drivers 
are balanced against the benefits resulting from centralized pricing. 
The plaintiff must first establish anti-competitive effects. If the plain-
tiff establishes the likelihood of such effects, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to offer pro-competitive justifications. Then, the burden 
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the anti-competitive effects 
outweigh the pro-competitive effects. There are various pro-com-
petitive explanations that can play in favour of Uber’s algorithm,58 
including price predictability, reduced transaction costs for users, 
and increased exploitation of network externalities, based on the fact 
that unrestricted price competition among drivers may drive down 
the price of fares in the short run to the extent that it would be less 
attractive for drivers to join the platform. This, in turn, would also 
reduce the value for consumers using the platform.
In sum, although the Uber case raises intriguing questions, 
from a legal perspective, the dynamics at play in this case are within 
the reach of well-established competition law doctrines. The claim 
of price-fixing appears to be an attack on the specific model and 
classification of work adopted by Uber, rather than a concern about 
collusion per se. In my view, a claim regarding the way prices are 
centrally set by the platform is misguided, to the extent that it focuses 
too broadly on the polar options between centrally set prices versus 
decentralized price competition among drivers. The issue would 
be more precise if it focused on how Uber extracts revenue from 
drivers within a centralized pricing system. Ultimately, the case 
appears to be concerned more with the controversial classification 
of workers adopted by Uber than with competition law, and it would 
be preferable to approach these issues from the perspective of more 
appropriate areas of law.
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V. Conclusion
In evaluating the possible broad competition policy concerns at play 
in the sharing economy, I have identified the following central ele-
ments. First, there are important issues raised by the likely two-sided 
nature of sharing economy markets. The literature on two-sided 
markets has important implications for how to apply competition 
law tools in possible scenarios of collusion, abuse of dominance, and 
mergers when a market is two-sided or multi-sided. Moreover, the 
importance of big data and the role of algorithms in these markets, 
issues that have been recognized in the scholarship as increasingly 
relevant, raise additional questions and challenges for the future 
enforcement of competition policy. These, arguably, are the central 
competition law concerns raised by the sharing economy, in particu-
lar those related to the tendencies of such markets toward concen-
tration and dominance. However, the policy implications emerging 
from this body of literature are not specific to the sharing economy, 
but apply more broadly to markets with two-sided characteristics. 
Second, in the sharing economy there are additional issues 
arising from the fact that private individuals use their underutilized 
assets for professional purposes, which raises the question of whether 
service providers should be considered independent contractors or 
employees of the platform. This characterization of work is the source 
of the many central regulatory problems related to possible market 
failures in the sharing economy, such as asymmetric information 
and negative externalities. However, as far as competition law is 
concerned, I have attempted to show that the controversial nature 
of work does not raise in itself new paradigmatic problems for the 
application of competition law. 
There is arguably a third, more speculative, concern, which is 
related to the possibility of vertical integration and a more radical 
shift away from the sharing economy model itself.59 In fact, it is often 
assumed that sharing economy platforms own the means of connec-
tion across decentralized users without providing, themselves, goods 
or services. However, it is not clear at all that this has to be the case in 
the future, and it is not unlikely that platforms may soon have incen-
tives to fully or partially integrate with one of their sides. Imagine, 
for instance, that Uber or another dominant taxi and ride-sharing 
platform, after establishing itself as the dominant player in the mar-
ket, introduces self-driving cars. By directly providing the driving 
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service, the platform will cease to be a platform and will become 
more like a traditional taxi company, owning significant physical 
assets used to sell a specific service to end customers. Certainly, the 
competitive dynamics would then look very different from what they 
are today. As recognized by the United States FTC report concern-
ing the sharing economy,60 by changing the nature of competitive 
dynamics, possible forms of vertical integration may add additional 
layers of complexity regarding market power and the scope of com-
petition law and policy in the sharing economy. However, it is hard 
to speculate about the future of this phenomenon—which, in many 
regards, is still at its early stages.
In conclusion, the sharing economy raises many challenging 
legal and policy questions. This chapter attempts to provide a com-
petition law perspective on some of these issues by offering a glimpse 
into the complexities behind the evaluation of market power and the 
anti-competitive concerns that are likely to emerge in a context char-
acterized by disruptive innovation, new business models, and unique 
market dynamics. As argued in the chapter, these complexities are, 
however, not unique to the sharing economy. On the contrary, they 
represent broader phenomena that have implications for competi-
tion policy both within the sharing economy context and beyond. 
These issues can become subtler in this context, given the complex 
interplay between competition law issues and other legal concerns, 
but questions raised by complex puzzles, such as the controversial 
nature of work in the sharing economy, should be addressed from the 
standpoint of more appropriate areas of law, rather than competition 
law and policy.
Notes
 1. S.J.D. Candidate, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law. Email: francesco.
ducci@mail.utoronto.ca. The author is grateful to Derek McKee and 
anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts. He also thanks 
the participants to the Sharing Economy Workshop for insightful dis-
cussions on these issues. 
 2. Germany, Monopolkommission, Twenty-First Biennial Report by 
the Monopolies Commission (Chapter V), online: <http://www.
monopolkommission.de/images/HG21/HGXXI_Chapter_V.pdf> 
[Monopolkommission].
 3. US, Federal Trade Commission, The “Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing 
Platforms, Participants & Regulators (A Federal Trade Commission Staff 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   314 18-11-08   08:42
 Competition Law and Policy Issues in the Sharing Economy 315
Report, 2016), online: <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
reports/sharing-economy-issues-facing-platforms-participants-regu-
lators-federal-trade-commission-staff/p151200_ftc_staff_report_on_
the_sharing_economy.pdf> [Federal Trade Commission].
 4. See e.g. Maurice E Stucke & Allen P Grunes, Big Data and Competition 
Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
 5. See Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E Stucke, Virtual Competition: The Promise 
and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2016).
 6. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, The End of Ownership: Personal 
Property in the Digital Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016).
 7. See Geoffrey G Parker, Marshall W Van Alstyne & Sangeet Paul 
Choudary, Platform Revolution: How Networked Markets Are Transforming 
the Economy—And How to Make Them Work for You (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2016). 
 8. See Arun Sundararajan, The Sharing Economy: The End of Employment 
and the Rise of Crowd-Based Capitalism (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
2016); Yochai Benkler, “Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the 
Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production” (2004) 114 
Yale LJ 273; Tom Slee, What’s Yours Is Mine: Against the Sharing Economy 
(New York: OR Books LLC, 2015).
 9. “The Sharing Economy: Consumer Intelligence Series” (2015), online: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers <http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/technology/
publications/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series-the-sharing-
economy.pdf> [“The Sharing Economy”].
 10. “Airbnb Summer Travel Report 2015,” At Airbnb (blog), online: <http://
blog.airbnb.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Airbnb-Summer-Travel-
Report-1.pdf>.
 11. “The Sharing Economy,” supra note 9.
 12. See Cristiano Codagnone & Bertin Martens, “Scoping the Sharing 
Economy: Origins, Definitions, Impact and Regulatory Issues” (2016) 
European Commission Institute for Prospective Technological Studies 
Digital Economy Working Paper No 2016/01.
 13. See Alvin E Roth, Who Gets What – and Why: The New Economics of 
Matchmaking and Market Design (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 
2016).
 14. See Monopolkommission, supra note 2.
 15. See Alfred D Chandler, Jr, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution 
in American Business (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977); 
Michael Trebilcock et al, The Law and Economics of Canadian Competition 
Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003).
 16. See Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   315 18-11-08   08:42
 316 LAW AND THE “SHARING ECONOMY”
 17. See “The University of Chicago Worries About a Lack of Competition,” 
The Economist (12 April 2017), online: <http://www.economist.com/
news/business/21720657-its-economists-used-champion-big-firms-
mood-has-shifted-university-chicago>.
 18. See David S Evans & Richard Schmalensee, “The Antitrust Analysis 
of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses” (2012) Coase-Sandor Institute for 
Law & Economics Working Paper No 623 [Evans & Schmalensee, “The 
Antitrust Analysis”]. 
 19. See David S Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Matchmakers: The New 
Economics of Multisided Platforms (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review 
Press, 2016). 
 20. See Mark Armstrong, “Competition in Two-Sided Markets” (2006) 37:3 
Rand J Econ 668.
 21. See B Caillaud & BM Jullien, “Chicken and Egg: Competition Among 
Intermediation Service Providers” (2003) 34:2 Rand J Econ 309; Jean-
Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, “Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report” 
(2006) 35 Rand J Econ 645.
 22. Ronald H Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4:16 Economica 386.
 23. See Andrei Hagiu & Julian Wright, “Multi-Sided Platforms” (2015) 
Harvard Business School Working Paper No 15-037.
 24. Ibid at 4.
 25. Ibid at 6.
 26. See Andrei Hagiu & Julian Wright, “Marketplace or Reseller?” (2015) 
61:1 Management Science 184.
 27. Ibid. 
 28. See Liran Einav, Chiara Farronato & Jonathan Levin, “Peer-to-Peer 
Markets” (2016) 8 Annu Rev Econ 615.
 29. See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, “Platform Competition in Two-
Sided Markets” (2003) 1:4 J Eur Econ Assoc 990; Evans & Schmalensee, 
“The Antitrust Analysis,” supra note 18; Julian Wright, “One-Sided Logic 
in Two-Sided Markets” (2004) 3:1 Rev Network Econ 44.
 30. Wright, supra note 29 at 47.
 31. See e.g. Trib com Paris, 31 January 2012, Bottin Cartographes c Google Inc. 
& Google France, (2012 15e sem). 
 32. Wright, supra note 29 at 49.
 33. See National Bankcard Corp (NaBANCO) v VISA U.S.A. Inc, 779 F (2d) 
592 (11th Cir 1986); EC, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires (CB) v European 
Commission, [2014] OJ, C 67/13.
 34. See United States v Visa U.S.A. Inc, 163 F Supp (2d) 322 (SDNY 2001); EC, 
MasterCard and Others v European Commission, [2014] OJ, C 382/12. For 
some literature on competition law and regulatory issues in payment 
card network markets, see especially Robert Hunt, “An Introduction 
to the Economics of Payment Card Networks” (2003) Federal Reserve 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   316 18-11-08   08:42
 Competition Law and Policy Issues in the Sharing Economy 317
Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper No 03-10; Jean-Charles Rochet & 
Jean Tirole, “An Economic Analysis of the Determination of Interchange 
Fees in Payment Card Systems” (2003) 2:2 Rev Network Econ 69; Julian 
Wright, “The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment 
Systems” (2004) 52:1 J Ind Econ 1; Richard Schmalensee, “Payment 
Systems and Interchange Fees” (2002) 50:2 J Ind Econ 103; Richard 
Schmalensee & David S Evans, “The Economics of Interchange Fees and 
Their Regulation: An Overview” (2005) MIT Sloan Working Paper No 
4548-05; Alan O Sykes, “Antitrust Issues in Two-Sided Network Markets: 
Lessons from in Re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant 
Discount Antitrust Litigation” (2015) NYU Law and Economics Research 
Paper No 14-45. 
 35. See Lapo Filistrucchi et al, “Market Definition in Two-Sided Markets: 
Theory and Practice” (2014) 10:2 J Comp L & Econ 293.
 36. See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 5; see also “Price-Bots Can Collude 
Against Consumers,” The Economist (6 May 2017), online: <https://www.
economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21721648-trustbusters-
might-have-fight-algorithms-algorithms-price-bots-can-collude>.
 37. See Stucke & Grunes, supra note 4.
 38. “The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data,” 
The Economist (6 May 2017), online: <http://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21721656-data-economy-demands-new-approach-antitrust-rules-
worlds-most-valuable-resource>.
 39 See “Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy,” The Economist (6 May 
2017), online: <https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21721634- 
how-it-shaping-up-data-giving-rise-new-economy>.
 40. See Monopolkommission, supra note 2.
 41. See e.g. section 96 of Canada’s Competition Act (RSC 1985, c C-34), which 
contains an efficiency defence, allowing mergers where the efficien-
cies are greater than, and offset, the anti-competitive effects of the 
merger. The scope of the efficiency defence was discussed in Canada 
(Commissioner of Competition) v Superior Propane Inc, 2003 FCA 53.
 42. David S Evans, “Economics of Vertical Restraints for Multi-Sided 
Platforms” (2013) Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics 
Working Paper No 626 at 9.
 43. Glen Weyl & Alexander White, “Let the Best ‘One’ Win: Policy Lessons 
from the New Economics of Platforms” (2014) Coase-Sandor Institute 
for Law and Economics Research Paper No 709.
 44. See Sundararajan, supra note 8; Benjamin G Edelman & Damien Geradin, 
“Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate 
Companies like Airbnb and Uber?” (2016) 19 Stan Tech L Rev 293.
 45. Edelman & Geradin, supra note 44. 
 46. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 3.
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   317 18-11-08   08:42
 318 LAW AND THE “SHARING ECONOMY”
 47. See Hilary Osborne, “Uber Loses Right to Classify UK Drivers as 
Self-Employed,” The Guardian (28 October 2016), online: <https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/28/uber-uk-tribunal- 
self-employed-status>.
 48. See Mike Isaac & Natasha Singer, “California Says Uber Driver Is 
Employee, Not a Contractor,” The New York Times (17 June 2015), online: 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/business/uber-contests-california-
labor-ruling-that-says-drivers-should-be-employees.html?_r=0>.
 49. See McGillis v Florida (Department of Economic Opportunity) (1 February 
2017), Florida 3D15-2758 (Fla 3d Ct App), online: Third District Court of 
Appeal <http://www.3dca.flcourts.org/Opinions/3D15-2758.pdf>.
 50. Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release, 50/17, “According 
to Advocate General Szpunar, the Uber Electronic Platform, Whilst 
Innovative, Falls Within the Field of Transport: Uber Can Thus be 
Required to Obtain the Necessary Licences and Authorisations Under 
National Law” (11 May 2017), online: CVRIA <https://curia.europa.eu/
jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-05/cp170050en.pdf>.
 51. Meyer v Kalanick (3 October 2016), New York 1:15-cv-09796 (NY Dist 
Ct), online: Justia US Law: <http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district- 
courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2015cv09796/451250/37>.
 52. See e.g. Nicholas Passaro, “How Meyer v. Kalanick Could Determine 
How Uber and the Sharing Economy Fit into Antitrust Doctrine,” Case 
Comment, (2016) Social Science Research Network, online: <https://ssrn.
com/abstract=2880204>.
 53. United States v Apple Inc, 952 F Supp (2d) 638 (SDNY 2013); United States et 
al v Apple Inc et al (30 June 2015), 13-3741-cv at 28-29 (2d Cir 2015), online: 
Justia US Law <http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/
ca2/13-3741/13-3741-2015-06-30.html>. 
 54. See Passaro, supra note 52.
 55. See Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube Corp, 467 US 752 at 768–69 (Sup 
Ct 1984).
 56. Broadcast Music Inc v Columbia Broadcasting System Inc, 441 US 1 at 5 (Sup 
Ct 1979).
 57. See United States v Addyston Pipe & Steel Co, 85 F 271 (6th Cir 1898).
 58. See Passaro, supra note 52.
 59. See Federal Trade Commission, supra note 3.
 60. Ibid at 28.
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   318 18-11-08   08:42
PART V
REGULATING LABOUR
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   319 18-11-08   08:42
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   320 18-11-08   08:42
 Page left blank intentionally
CHAPTER X
The Legal Framework for Digital 
Platform Work: The French Experience
Marie-Cécile Escande-Varniol1
I.  Introduction
1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0 … the digitization of the economy is like a stop-watch, ticking off the seconds in the race to innovation. By 
the time a few experts become familiar with one issue, a brand new 
system is in place. And woe to those with no smartphone or apps, 
no plans to ride-share or have dinner at a stranger’s home, and no 
way to find a plumber at 8:00 p.m., at the lowest possible rates. As 
young people eagerly rush to meet this new, wide-open universe 
head on, their parents feel like they’ve missed the bus, while their 
grandparents have simply stayed home.
And where does the law fit in? Its role is to govern society with 
general, permanent, acceptable rules, known to all. Should it leap 
ahead and strain to answer all the questions these new tools raise, 
at the risk of contradicting itself? Or should it take its time and seek 
a broader perspective? It might make intuitive sense for legislators 
to sit back and reflect and let judges resolve the specific cases that 
come before them. But French law has been swept up in the frenzy 
of digital communication, and only a few years in, we already find 
ourselves with a sufficiently consistent “digital law” to justify pub-
lishing legal encyclopaedia2 and specialized law journals.3 Although 
this area of the law is diffuse, and its enactment has in many cases 
been disorderly, it has nevertheless inserted itself into numerous 
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branches of French and European law, particularly in commercial 
law, tax law, consumer law, and—since August 2016—labour law.
The Université de Sherbrooke has created an opportunity for 
joint reflection on the “sharing economy,” a small planet in this new 
digital universe. The remarks presented here are supplemental, lim-
ited as they are to a consideration of the legal status of digital work-
ers. Many economists and sociologists in particular have predicted 
that the collaborative economy sounds a death knell for salaried 
employment,4 but French scholarly commentary on labour law has 
so far paid little attention to the issue.5 
This universe has its own language—circular economy, shar-
ing economy, social and solidarity economy, collaborative economy, 
service economy—that needs to be decoded if we are to properly 
understand the new realities.6 All these terms express the need for 
societal change felt by their users. To varying degrees, they refer to 
human labour, and the practices they describe all came into being 
before the large-scale development of the digital platforms that are 
now their primary means of deployment. The original model based 
on the sharing of goods and services had altruistic and not-for-profit 
ambitions.7 Wikipedia is a prime example. That model, however, 
failed to take into account the capitalist propensity to seize on oppor-
tunities for financial gain. The societal impact of these new forms 
of consumption has been magnified as a result of digitization, first 
through peer-to-peer networks, then through digital platforms act-
ing as intermediaries between those who offer and those who seek 
goods or services. The “platform economy” is the newest term in the 
lexicon of economic forms,8 and Uber has emerged as its emblematic 
company. 
Of course, the altruistic, interdependent, and volunteer spirit 
that was there at the beginning is still present in the way many of 
these platforms operate. The ones that interest us here, however, are 
those that promise a way to obtain work performed for remunera-
tion. The rapid success of platforms of this type is due in large part 
to their flexibility and low-cost positioning.9 In these days of high 
unemployment in France, many workers see them as opportunities 
for new sources of income.
The Uber platform, established in more than 600 cities in eighty 
countries, has revealed to everyone a new way of working, which 
has caught on worldwide.10 But this tree conceals a forest. In addi-
tion to taxi drivers, even less visible service providers with even 
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fewer protections can be hired through crowdsourcing, opening up 
a new global labour market11 and sparking large-scale competition 
among workers.12 This ultra-flexible job market is the world created 
by TaskRabbit, Mechanical Turk, OpenWork, and other gig providers 
for so-called self-employed workers. 
Should this work be regulated? If so, how? The answer depends 
on the country. In countries where informal work dominates, digital 
platforms might present an opportunity to regulate.13 But in countries 
like France, where tax and social welfare regimes are supported in 
large part by salaried work, informal work is unacceptable because it 
undercuts the social system as a whole and leaves some of the often 
very vulnerable working population without protection.14
Under French law, digital platforms are defined as “Businesses, 
whatever their place of establishment, that connect persons remotely 
by electronic means for the purpose of the sale of a good, the provi-
sion of a service, or the exchange or sharing of a good or service.”15 
The definition is sufficiently broad to include all situations, paid or 
not, involving these platforms. But the fact that the provision appears 
in the Code général des impôts (General Income Tax Code) in a section 
concerning the income generated by intermediary activities reveals 
the economic significance of the phenomenon and the source of 
income it represents.
This definition is repeated in the French Code du travail (Labour 
Code), in provisions dealing with “self-employed workers who, to 
perform their professional activities, use one or more platforms con-
necting persons by electronic means as defined in article 242 bis of 
the Code général des impôts.”
These are the workers that interest us here: those who perform 
remunerated work obtained via platforms that operate for profit. The 
three main participants here are the worker, his or her “customer,” 
and the platform that connected them. In most cases, there is nothing 
new about the work being performed, and the same operation could 
probably take place without the platform. However, only digital plat-
forms have the scope to make this work truly profitable. Their great-
est innovation is their capacity to disseminate information broadly 
and connect people easily through smartphones. That is their main 
difference from traditional classified ads.16
From the perspective of labour law, which we take here, these 
new forms of work prompt us to consider the characterization of the 
relationship and status of the participants. Is the worker a salaried 
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employee? That would presuppose an employment contract between 
the worker, who is easy to identify, and the employer, who is much 
less so. Indeed, most large platforms describe themselves as inter-
mediaries and reject the label of employer, even as they define the 
terms under which the work is to be performed. And the workers, 
for their part, are often self-employed and therefore benefit from 
little protection, despite their heavy economic dependence on the 
platforms that give them work.
This paper seeks to understand the highly disruptive nature 
of this new labour relations model and consider potential solutions 
to this disruption by undertaking a review of labour law from three 
main perspectives: the performance of the work, the workers, and the 
employer/platform. The roots of the Code du travail are in industrial 
legislation, and the protections it offers were forged in that historical 
context, although it has of course evolved significantly since then, 
through both legislation and court rulings. We hope that, by examin-
ing the notion of work as understood by the law and considering the 
notions of worker and employer as defined by labour law, we may 
achieve a better understanding of the protections these new digital 
workers need.
II. Work as Understood by the Law 
As Professor Cyril Wolmark states, it is pointless to seek a definition 
of work in books on the subject of labour law.17 The law understands 
work only through its result or through the activity it denotes and 
the contracts that regulate it. It is not the activity itself that is the 
important thing; the way it is performed is what matters.18 
Labour law, with its much-vaunted protective virtues, applies 
only to subordinate workers, and classifying gig economy workers 
as self-employed therefore deprives them of its protection. Finding 
new protections to ensure that these workers are treated decently 
requires a broader definition of false self-employment. 
Indeed, work itself must be defined,19 given that our interest 
here is work as a human activity, or the performance of labour. But 
any human activity can be characterized as work. The same person 
can be a computer engineer toiling for a company during the week 
and a volunteer lifeguard for the Red Cross on Sundays. Some people 
are professional soccer players, while others are amateurs. The only 
way to distinguish work from a hobby is remuneration.
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Collaborative platforms further muddle the already vague bor-
ders. Some rely on unpaid contributions for specialized tasks that 
were once remunerated. Wikipedia, for example, has established 
itself as a recognized encyclopedia worldwide thanks to volunteer 
contributors, pushing out Encyclopædia Universalis, whose authors 
were paid for their expertise. Other platforms are moving the other 
way, transforming unpaid services—such as driving, having people 
over for dinner, babysitting the neighbour’s children, or sorting 
photographs—into paid services. These activities, traditionally seen 
as unpaid friendly behaviour or mutual assistance, now take place 
on a larger scale thanks to the power of the algorithm and platform 
marketing. The long-distance car sharing service BlaBlaCar costs 
more than hitchhiking, and since it involves cost-sharing, drivers 
benefit by saving the money they would spend if they drove solo. 
Similarly, Airbnb, VizEat, and VoulezVousDiner are transforming 
friendly, unpaid hosting into new jobs. And the list goes on. 
Often, these approaches have many initial charms, their limita-
tions and deficiencies becoming apparent only later. The platforms, 
for example, provide none of the protections available under labour 
law. For indeed, although labour law may not define its own subject 
matter, it still protects workers, takes care of their health, limits the 
number of hours they have to work, imposes mandatory breaks, 
requires a minimum wage, and organizes to defend the collective 
interests of workers, in exchange for the employer’s managerial 
prerogatives. This is the quid pro quo born of industrial legislation, a 
model first strongly challenged by the service industries and today 
threatened with extinction by the digital industries. Platforms, which 
present themselves as nothing more than intermediaries, seem to 
allow parties to set the conditions of the performance themselves in 
an apparent return to individual autonomy of the will. Some of them, 
however, impose very high requirements on the service provider.
Since the late twentieth century, numerous books and reports 
have delved into this “new labour question,”20 seeking a broader 
understanding of this type of work that would accommodate systems 
to protect workers. Protections should cover every type of work, since 
all individuals will potentially have different jobs over the course of 
their lives. In addition to salaried employment, the protections should 
cover domestic work, professional training, different employment 
statuses, and periods of lower employment, among other things. 
French law currently shows signs of such a reckoning: so-called 
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portable rights allow salaried employees to preserve their right to 
continued vocational training throughout their lives, among other 
things.21 However, while there might be progress, it affects salaried 
employees only and does not resolve the major problems facing pre-
carious workers, who are the ones taking on the often poorly paid 
piecework available through collaborative commercial platforms. 
Labour law has become the law governing employment, 
“understood as the totality of the guarantees surrounding salaried 
activity,”22 and it is precisely these guarantees that unsalaried digital 
workers lack. Thus, the question remains: How can all activities be 
taken into account in the creation of a status that guarantees the same 
rights to decent work for all?
The answer probably lies in recognizing the fundamental rights 
of all workers, without distinction according to status. In the sum-
mer of 2015, two French authors published a small book listing fifty 
fundamental principles and rights of workers.23 The labour minister 
would have liked to include these principles in the preamble to the 
labour code, but the French Parliament demurred.24 Labour law 
scholars have also been harsh, criticizing the book for addressing 
the subject of salaried workers only marginally.25 Nevertheless, the 
principles might still serve as a starting point for defining minimum 
rights for all workers, whatever their status, including those who are 
“false self-employed.”
But in a context where human activity is dematerialized, thus 
permitting competition among Mechanical Turks worldwide, another 
gap has appeared between non-relocatable proximity services and 
intellectual services that cannot be dematerialized. States govern the 
labour market only as far as their territory extends. The International 
Labour Organization (ILO), for its part, has been promoting the 
fundamental rights of workers globally for decades and is currently 
reconsidering non-standard work;26 however, it lacks the jurisdiction 
to limit the large-scale social dumping created by these digital plat-
forms on a worldwide scale. Uber has simply revealed an upheaval in 
the world of work arising from a simultaneous decrease in industrial 
labour, an increase in service industry jobs, digitization, and digital 
intermediation. The verb “to uberize” has entered the lexicon of more 
than one language,27 and its definition illustrates the difficulty of 
pinning down the activity it describes. 
Platform work presents a radical challenge to labour rela-
tions as they developed in law throughout the twentieth century. 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   326 18-11-08   08:42
 The Legal Framework for Digital Platform Work: The French Experience 327
Designed to respond to the needs of industry, labour law relies on 
a very concrete reality of that era: the unity of location, time, and 
action. The masses of workers, moving away from rural labour, had 
to be disciplined to follow regular schedules, no matter the weather, 
and to work together towards the same goal (assembly lines, min-
ing, or other types of extraction).28 Orders were given by the boss, 
supervised by the foreman, and performed by the worker within a 
specific time frame. But this harmonious unity has been fractured by 
digitization. Now, nothing is material: orders can be given from the 
other side of the planet; the foreman has ceded way to the consumer 
who supervises and evaluates the worker; and the algorithm gener-
ates an alert, determining payment, reward, or sanction. This new 
model revives piecework, unpredictable salaries, and non-standard 
or informal employment.29
Since long before the current tripartite employment relation-
ship existed, the law has been responding to labour developments. 
Over the course of a century, the salaried worker class expanded to 
encompass service professionals and intellectual workers, leading 
to court decisions in France and elsewhere in Europe adapting the 
application of the law to take these new situations into account.30 
However different things might appear today, at the heart 
of labour relations still remain human beings—workers—who are 
treated differently by the law depending on the legal form of their 
work.
III. Digital Platform Workers: Dependently Self-Employed 
Now that our area of inquiry has been limited to platform work per-
formed with a view to earning financial income, we must consider 
the legal characterization of the employment relationship in these 
circumstances. Under the law, each legal category has a legal effect. 
We must determine whether platform workers truly constitute a 
new category of worker that requires its own new regime or whether 
aspects of the traditional categories still underlie the new working 
methods.
The answers will of course be nuanced and often depend on the 
actual conditions in which the activity is performed. A few people 
have already staked out a specific employment status somewhere 
between salaried employees and self-employed workers,31 to be 
known as “collaborative workers.”32 But challenges to the salaried 
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status began before digital platforms appeared, and reflection on 
“the new faces of subordination” concerns much broader changes in 
labour that have taken place in the post-industrial era.33
Our task is therefore to consider the various employment sta-
tuses that might be used to characterize these new forms of labour.
i. Subordinate Workers? 
Today, in a time of slashers34 and the multiple jobs encouraged by 
so many platforms, it can be useful to recall that the industrial 
labour force grew out of the pluriactivity of rural people looking to 
supplement their income at the factory, and out of the flexibility of 
labour at home. It took some time before subordination, a character-
istic of employment contracts today, became the norm. The French 
Revolution was informed more by the belief in freedom of enterprise 
and the freedom to work than in the work of servitude. 
The 1804 Code civil devoted only two articles to what was then 
referred to as “louage de services” (lease of personal service) and the 
contrasting “louage d’ouvrage” (contract for services).35 In the first 
case, the object of the contract is the person’s performance of the 
work, while in the second it is the product of such work. In a rural 
France, with few industrial workers, this notion found its origin in 
the ancien droit—in the pre-Revolutionary French law inspired by 
Roman law.36 
There is nothing enviable in the position of someone leasing 
the performance of their work. The differences between a labourer 
and a slave are remuneration and a limit on the number of hours 
worked, yet in each case the work is done on another’s orders and 
thus requires the alienation of a part of the worker’s freedom.37 Those 
contrasting definitions of work is still where the line is drawn today 
between employees (travailleurs dependants), who perform work under 
an employment contract, and self-employed workers (travailleurs 
indépendants), who are described as independent and undertake to 
deliver a product under a contract for services. 
In the early twentieth century, the legal characterization of an 
employment contract was the subject of important scholarly debate 
against the backdrop of cautious court decisions. Was the employ-
ment contract defined by economic dependence, or by the relation-
ship of subordination it described? 
In a landmark judgment rendered on July 6, 1931, the Cour de 
Cassation found that 
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the legal condition of workers in relation to the persons for 
whom they work cannot be determined by the economic weak-
ness or dependence of the said workers and cannot arise solely 
from the contract between the parties; the status of employee 
necessarily implies the existence of a legal relationship of sub-
ordination of worker to employer.38 
Since then, this legal relationship of subordination has been the 
test of an employment contract. Discussion on this point has never 
ceased, however, and every once in a while the issue of economic 
dependence reappears as an undercurrent in certain judgments. 
The appeal of the employment contract certainly cannot be 
explained by a desire on the part of a majority of French citizens to 
obey and submit to others. But in the late nineteenth century, the 
laws protecting first labourers and then employees started attract-
ing a large number of workers that continued to grow along with the 
number of laws providing protections, such as access to social insur-
ance, a guaranteed minimum wage, dignified working conditions, 
stronger systems of representation, protections against dismissal, and 
unemployment benefits. This legislation made it possible for wage 
earners to evolve toward a type of salaried employee status. The sub-
ordination imposed in exchange has been circumscribed by labour 
law, which has developed alongside this work performed under a 
special contract, which, in its standard form, has an indefinite term 
and stipulates that the employment is full-time.39 
In addition to rights directly related to working conditions, we 
must also take into account the structure of society that has taken 
shape around this activity and become so entrenched that we now 
speak of a society of salaried workers.40 In France, it is estimated 
that over 85 per cent of the working population is “salaried.”41 Social 
and tax contributions are collected primarily from wages. Thus, the 
welfare state is based on salaried workers, and any innovation that 
calls this system into question is perceived as a threat. This is, of 
course, the case with platform-generated work.
In all industrialized and developing countries, as well as in 
the European Union (EU), the relationship of subordination is an 
identifying feature of employment contracts. Although EU law 
refers the definition of labour relations back to the member States, 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has ruled on the contours of 
this relationship, resulting in contrasting judgments. The European 
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definition of an employment contract also has a legal subordina-
tion requirement,42 but when faced both with the transformation in 
employment and a need to establish a broader spectrum of protective 
employment standards, Europe has broadened the characterization, 
sometimes taking a pragmatic position to ensure that the protective 
standards achieve their purpose.43 
Although the French labour code still does not define the 
employment contract, the case law has developed a definition, in two 
leading cases in particular.44 In 1996, it was decided that
 the relationship of subordination is characterized by the perfor-
mance of work under the authority of an employer who has the 
power to give orders and directives, to control its performance, 
and to sanction breaches by the subordinate; and that work for 
an organized service may be an indication of a relationship of 
subordination when the employer unilaterally determines the 
conditions of performance of the work. 
Then, in 2000, it was determined that 
the existence of an employment relationship does not depend 
on either the will expressed by the parties or the name they give 
to their agreement, but on the actual conditions in which the 
workers’ activities are performed.
The remark from the judgment rendered on December 19, 2000, is of 
particular interest to us here. The case concerned a taxi driver (this 
was before Uber, but things were already moving in that direction) 
who leased his vehicle from a specialized business with which he 
had entered a contract to “lease a car for use as a taxi.” The contract 
was breached, and the driver brought an action before the labour 
division of the Conseil des Prud’hommes demanding that it be 
recharacterized as a contract of employment. The courts hearing 
the merits declined jurisdiction, but the Cour de Cassation quashed 
the appeal judgment on the basis of the interpretation quoted above.
That judgment is far removed from the former article 1134 of 
the Code civil.45 It is pragmatic, leaving little room for the will of the 
parties. The name or characterization of the contract (lease, contract 
of enterprise, contract for professional services) initially agreed upon 
is of no importance in light of the reality of the facts related before 
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the judge. This point should be emphasized here, as this is the jur-
isprudential analysis that will probably make it possible for French 
judges to redefine the contracts of some digital platform workers as 
employment contracts, as certain American and English judges, as 
well as the Chinese authorities, have done.46 This pragmatism reflects 
the attention that judges pay to the economic weakness of one of the 
parties to a contract of successive performance.47 Although the Cour 
de Cassation did not ignore the requirement of a legal relationship 
of subordination, it analyzed the situation of dependence of the 
driver vis-à-vis his lessee, who not only took care of the car, but 
also handled the administrative responsibilities and social security 
declarations in the place of the driver. The financial consideration 
requested by the lessor was such that the driver had to work long 
hours, ultimately for low pay. This situation is identical to Uber driv-
ers and pizza delivery drivers.
It should not be assumed, however, that all currently self-
employed taxi drivers operating via digital platforms can easily 
have their contract of self-employment redefined as an employment 
contract. After the judgment in 2000, many have tried, but outcomes 
are uncertain.48 The analysis of the relationship of subordination 
has been narrowed again, and drivers have to prove the authority 
of direction of the work provider (in this case the lessor) directly 
over the work, not just over the vehicle, if they want the contract 
recharacterized.
As for Uber drivers, the relationship of subordination should 
not be difficult to prove, given the numerous requirements the 
company imposes, which go beyond what a mere intermediary can 
demand, including car choice, dress code, logo display, and, espe-
cially, a compulsory system of remuneration.49 The subordination 
is evident merely in the details from Uber UK contracts remarked 
upon by the English judge in the case referred to above.50 Uber exerts 
constant control through digital devices, smartphones, including 
geotracking, and, above all, the systematic customer ratings on the 
platform. Its authority to discipline is evident in the right it reserves 
to terminate the contract by simply disconnecting the driver in the 
event of poor ratings or a breach of obligations.
It is clear, however, that the full-time employment contract of 
indeterminate duration established by industrial legislation is not 
suitable to the type of work at issue here. The small number of actions 
brought before the courts in France seeking a recharacterization of 
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such contracts seems to indicate that the workers themselves do 
not want to enter into a contract that is essentially defined by legal 
subordination. Requalifying contracts by reshaping the facts is not 
a tenable solution in the long term.
But does that mean that platform workers are self-employed?
ii. Self-Employed Workers? 
Since the end of the twentieth century, self-employment (travail 
indépendant) seems to have caught the wind in its sails, thanks to both 
certain legislative trends and the younger generations—even though 
studies have shown no increased numbers in this type of work.51 
Indeed, self-employed is the status chosen by most digital platform 
workers, and this is the reason the statute enacted on August 8, 2016, 
included special provisions.
The notion of self-employment refers to a legal status of inde-
pendence in opposition to a worker bound by contract to an employer 
to whom obedience is owed. This independence, however, does not 
resolve the inherent problem of the economic dependence of the 
worker. A person who derives income through work by selling either 
the performance of a service or the product of that performance is 
in a state of economic dependence vis-à-vis the person who orders 
the work. While labour law has created a protected status, it is lim-
ited to its field of application, which comprises essentially private-
sector wage-earning employees. The legislature vacillates between 
strengthening these protections and encouraging an exodus from the 
ranks of salaried employees. For the last thirty years, the economic 
dependence of self-employed workers and the autonomy of salaried 
employees have inspired numerous proposals for reform that have 
done more to complicate labour law than to simplify it. For the time 
being, then, workers who are not in a legal relationship of subordi-
nation are independent and therefore self-employed. This binary 
vision of the legal categories explains the contortions on the part of 
the legislator and then judges, as we have seen, to categorize workers 
whose independence is established as salaried employees.52
Unlike other European countries, France has not created an 
intermediate status. Germany, Italy, and Spain have established a 
special status for “dependent self-employment”53 that more or less 
recognizes the status of employee for self-employed workers with 
one main client (that is, representing more than 50 per cent of their 
activity). This status lets these workers benefit from certain rights 
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and protections, although not all labour law protections apply to 
them. However, while these categories might appear attractive, they 
are apparently rarely used, and Italy has even eliminated this “quasi-
employee” status.
In France, as early as 1994, a presumption of unsalaried status 
for workers entered in the business, trade, or commercial agent 
registries or registered with social agencies was added to the first 
articles of the Code du travail. The presumption could be rebutted if 
the worker had proof of a “permanent legal relationship of subordina-
tion” vis-à-vis a client.54 Reflecting political changes, the provision 
was amended on numerous occasions. Today, its equivalent can be 
found in article L. 8221-6 of the Code du travail, in a section on illegal 
work.
All these provisions, whether they recognize a special status 
or require workers to prove their dependence on an exclusive client, 
are ill-suited to digital platform workers, who are often registered 
on several platforms to be sure they get enough work. It bears noting 
that exclusivity clauses, such as those originally in Uber’s contracts, 
have tended to disappear as the number of court sanctions have 
increased.55 
Self-employed workers therefore must be registered and 
declared as merchants, artisans, or commercial agents in accordance 
with the rules for each status, failing which they commit the offence 
of “travail dissimulé par dissimulation d’activité” (concealed work by 
the concealment of paid employment).56 This offence, punishable by 
three years imprisonment and a €45,000 ($68,500) fine, is committed 
when a worker has not met the formal requirements referred to above 
or has failed to make the mandatory declarations to social agencies 
before starting to work.
The provisions directly concern collaborative economy workers. 
Any income they earn through an activity obtained via a platform 
will be characterized as “concealed work” unless they can prove 
that the income is merely a reimbursement of costs (for example, 
BlaBlaCar ride-sharing) or that the platform conducts itself as the 
main client.57 
Since August 2016,58 the groundwork has been laid in the French 
labour code for “the social responsibility of platforms” through the 
recognition of workers’ collective rights, the right to unionize, and 
the right to collective action. The recognition of the freedom of asso-
ciation and the rights to collective action might be essential, but it is 
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in fact nothing more than declarative. As fundamental rights, they 
are recognized for all workers under the French constitution and 
numerous international agreements; France, for example, has ratified 
the fundamental ILO Conventions, the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the European Social Charter. Nevertheless, it is interesting, 
at least symbolically, that the labour code has now recognized a new 
legal category of worker. Platform workers have also formed unions 
and sparked far-reaching social movements. Led by Uber drivers, 
among others, they have demonstrated their capacity to regain their 
collective strength by defending workers.59
Collective bargaining can also sometimes place salaried 
employees and self-employed workers on an equal footing when 
their situations are the same. The European Court of Justice applied 
competition law when ruling on the validity of a collective agree-
ment that favoured setting identical minimum fees for replacement 
workers (in this case orchestra musicians), whether hired as self-
employed workers or employees (ECJ 4 December 2014, C-413/13, 
FNV Kunsten). The court, continuing to see self-employed workers 
as “enterprises,” did not move away from the European definition of 
worker, which essentially presupposes a relationship of subordina-
tion. Nonetheless, it saved the provision in the agreement by propos-
ing the label “false self-employed” for these workers when they are 
under the legal subordination of the client. Thus, the ECJ’s judgment 
was attenuated: although the collective agreement provision submit-
ted to the judges was saved, the social dialogue regarding the fate 
of self-employed workers was not acknowledged, even though their 
status is often more precarious than that of salaried employees. Such 
a recognition would have protected employees from social dumping, 
which represents a danger to everyone, since the growing number 
of self-employed workers can incite competition potentially leading 
to lower salaries and decreased employee benefits.
The trend pushing workers towards new forms of self-employ-
ment preceded the development of digital platforms. Specific regu-
lations have appeared gradually, supported by a political will to 
encourage the development of “auto-enterprises,” an individual 
incorporated status available to self-employed workers. More recent 
protective measures also tend to take “career paths” into account, 
establishing a certain portability of rights. 
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iii. Auto-Entrepreneurs? 
Unlike subordinate work, self-employment can be exercised under 
many statuses, including: artisan, merchant, and professional. These 
statuses are defined by other fields of law, primarily commercial law 
and business law. Beyond labour law considerations, considerable 
differences between these statuses can be identified in their respec-
tive social protection regimes. Self-employed workers cannot claim 
the same rights as employees, and this situation is prejudicial to 
those self-employed workers who are economically dependent, who 
have several clients, and whose situation is often very precarious.
Freedom of enterprise, enshrined in the French constitution, 
allows anyone to start his or her own business. For years, the French 
legislature has encouraged this type of activity, seeing it as a rem-
edy to de-industrialization and mass unemployment. In this spirit, 
the “modernization of the economy” statute60 enacted on August 
4, 2009, established a simplified social and taxation regime for 
self-employed workers with low sales revenue, known as the “auto-
entrepreneur” regime. Since January 1, 2009, it has been available to 
natural persons who create or already own an individual business 
to perform a principal or supplementary commercial activity, either 
artisanal or professional (with some exceptions), if this individual 
business meets the conditions of the micro-enterprise tax regime 
and chooses to operate under a VAT exemption.61 On January 1, 
2016, auto-enterprises became known as micro-enterprises, but the 
regime remained the same. It is not a special legal status, contrary 
to what is often believed because of the rapid development of the 
mechanism, but a regime that simplifies the processes, declarations, 
and burdens related to social security and income tax. It is intended 
for self-employed workers with sales revenue below €82,200 or whose 
income as service providers is below €32,900.
Workers who wish to benefit from this regime must register 
with the chamber of commerce and industry, the directory of trade 
workers and artisans, or, if they are professionals, the URSSAF (the 
organization that collects social contributions). As early as 2010 
there were more than 660,000 workers registered, and by the end of 
2015 there were over one million, three-quarters of whom say they 
would not have launched their own business without this regime.62 
The auto-entrepreneur regime is chosen by 54 per cent of all those 
starting out as self-employed workers. However, while “traditional” 
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self-employed workers earned an average of €3,110 a month in 2012, 
auto-entrepreneurs earned only €450 on average. 
The ease of registering for the auto-entrepreneur regime, which 
can be done online, helps explain its early popularity as well as the 
fact that nearly half of those registered are economically inactive. 
Auto-entrepreneurs often operate multiple businesses (38 per cent) 
or are unemployed and in retraining (28 per cent).
The regime would thus appear to be suitable for digital plat-
form workers, who have similar profiles. And in fact it is the regime 
recommended (if not required) by a certain number of platforms 
(Deliveroo,63 Uber, and the like). In this way, the platforms take 
advantage of the presumption of unsalaried status set out in article 
L 8221-6 of the Code du travail, which a priori protects them from the 
possibility of the contract being characterized as an employment 
contract since the workers are registered as merchants or artisans. 
These workers, however, are in extremely precarious situations 
because they lack a protected status. Their working conditions, 
working hours, workplace health and safety, time off, holidays, and 
the provision and loss of work are neither guaranteed nor protected. 
They fall outside both administrative controls and the jurisdiction 
of the labour tribunals (Conseils de Prud’hommes). 
But then again, the courts have oversight, and they sanction 
those who defraud the auto-entrepreneur regime.64 For example, in 
2009, a training company breached a contract with its teachers and 
then immediately proposed rehiring them as auto-entrepreneurs. 
The Cour de Cassation upheld the decisions on the merits, which 
had recharacterized the situation as an employment contract. The 
action had been brought by URSSAF, since the rate of contribution 
for self-employed workers who pay on their own is lower than that of 
salaried employees, whose contributions are shared by the employers 
and employees.65 
Digital workers’ rights can be protected by the reinterpreta-
tion of labour law based on a new labour relations model, as certain 
official reports have recognized: 
Beyond the traditional definition of salaried work, which 
remains relevant to the vast majority of them, the new forms of 
work taking place outside the salaried realm suggest it would 
be appropriate to consider broadening the notion based on 
new indicators emerging from an economic rather than a legal 
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economic assessment. Thus, much like the Department of Labour 
under the Obama Administration, France must reflect on how 
court rulings on the characterization of salaried employees can 
be modernized. Such an evolution, which could be based on 
broader criteria (the degree of autonomy at work, who decides 
matters of remuneration, the exclusivity of the worker’s services, 
etc.), will make it possible to characterize the worker’s status as 
either salaried or, on the contrary, self-employed (in its generic 
sense).66
Many parties, including the European Commission (EC), also urge 
the recognition of a legal relationship under labour law and protec-
tions for digital workers. However, in the view of the EC, the col-
laborative economy is first and foremost an economic opportunity, 
and hampering the development of the platforms, which it sees as 
potential sources of employment, should not be risked by enacting 
overly restrictive legislation. Thus, for the EC, while worker protec-
tions are necessary, they must be flexible and safe enough to ensure 
the development of these new activities.67 
While the new labour relations model being created through 
digital platforms requires us to reconsider the two pillars of the 
employment relationship—work and the status of the person per-
forming it—its true innovation resides in the establishment of a 
tripartite relationship. The legal characterization of the platform in 
that relationship, however, remains to be determined.
IV. Platform/Intermediary/Employer 
We have now come to the truly innovative aspect of the “sharing 
economy.” What makes digitization possible is the nearly unlimited 
range at which information—in this case, job offers and applica-
tions—can be disseminated. The broader the dissemination, the 
greater the likelihood of a balance between “sharing” and “economy.” 
Dissemination is ensured via digital platforms, which have taken the 
place of traditional advertisers.
The term “platform” entered the lexicon with the arrival of Web 
3.0. Until then, people were more likely to refer to communities, net-
works, hosts, or operators.68 Once beyond the sales and information 
stage, the term was established in response to the rise of intermedia-
tion between various actors. It has since been set down in various 
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legal provisions, to the point where the term “digital platform law” 
has become accepted.69 The EC states, “‘Online platform’ refers to an 
undertaking operating in two- (or multi)-sided markets, which uses 
the Internet to enable interactions between two or more distinct but 
interdependent groups of users so as to generate value for at least one 
of the groups.”70 In France, these platforms are defined not only in 
the general income tax code referred to above but also the consumer 
code.71 But not all platforms operate according to the same model: 
“The ‘platform’ galaxy is populated by various participants. We are 
now in the realm of ‘platform capitalism’ but the contrast between 
participants is so pronounced that its maps have yet to be drawn.”72
The primary characteristic of platforms is their mission of 
intermediation, which leads to two consequences of direct interest 
to us here: their self-proclaimed lack of accountability, and their 
violation of existing regulations and organizational forms. Uber and 
Airbnb are prime examples. Since they do not define themselves as 
a taxi company73 and a hotel company, they do not, in their view, 
have to comply with the obligations incumbent on operators in those 
industries in place all over the world.74 The activities they took on 
were antiquated or outmoded,75 and they have created a new global 
model for consumption, the success of which is based on ease of 
access, new lifestyles, and very competitive prices made possible 
by their refusal to take on industry obligations.76 As a result, entire 
industries (taxi, hotel) have been destabilized. Long subjected to 
demanding regulations, these industries have found themselves 
battling “lawless pirates” who feel entitled to set up business in the 
same industry without following the rules. In response, a new type 
of regulation has begun to emerge, particularly in the service sector 
we are interested in here, seeking to both protect consumers and 
maintain public order.77 
Digital platforms always present themselves as mere inter-
mediaries, but their legal status remains to be clarified.78 Indeed, 
the very term “intermediary” evokes numerous and varied legal 
characterizations. As this discussion is limited to the entities that 
connect workers and customers with one another, it will touch on the 
characterizations of platforms under commercial law and labour law. 
Are they brokers or mandataries? A medium for posting job offers, 
or a way to obtain illegal temporary work?
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i. The Contractual Relationship Between Workers and Online Service 
Platforms
As we have seen, if a platform worker is not a salaried employee 
(which they rarely are), there is a presumption that he or she is a 
self-employed merchant or artisan. In such a case, the platform must 
be considered a provider, mandatary (agent) or broker.79 A cluster of 
contracts is created between the various providers. One is a general 
contract between the platform and the worker for the performance 
of a service, entered into when the worker registers on the platform 
as a driver, host, cook, housecleaner, and the like, depending on the 
platform’s specialization. The worker undertakes to perform the ser-
vice promised by the platform, which in turn undertakes to register 
the provider in its pool and to forward any requests to the worker 
that correspond to the offer given.
At the same time, another general contract is formed with the 
customer, who requests a service, when he or she signs up on the 
smartphone app. This second contract is a kind of subscription allow-
ing access to the service available only to subscribers. It falls under 
the purview of consumer law and the new “duty of loyalty” incum-
bent on platforms under the statute enacted on October 7, 2016.80 
This principle of loyalty applies only to the relationship between the 
business operators and consumers, however, and not that between 
the workers who provide the services. This is regrettable for those 
workers in a position of weakness vis-à-vis the platform.81
Entering into these contracts requires nothing more than a 
single click on the “I agree” or “I accept the general user conditions” 
button. Rarely does anyone, whether provider or customer, read 
the entire contract. Besides, more often than not these contracts are 
illegible, contain contradictions, and incorporate by reference other 
documents that can be accessed only through a hyperlink. 
The work itself is performed the same way, whether the plat-
form connects the worker and the customer through the smart-
phone app or the website. This operation can take various legal 
forms, giving rise to equally diverse legal characterizations. Some 
platforms do no more than connect the parties, allowing them free 
rein to negotiate financial terms and performance. In such cases, 
the platform is indeed a “mere intermediary,” comparable to tradi-
tional advertisers but with the possibility of endless classified ads. 
In other cases, the platform is involved in the formation of the con-
tract for services, and the characterization of the contract becomes 
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much more elusive. When payment for the service is made via the 
platform—which then forwards the fee after having taken its com-
mission off the top—the operation takes place through a network of 
mandates conferred by the parties via their initial contracts. When 
the platform sets the conditions of performance, the chances that 
the contract will be recharacterized as a contract of employment 
become more likely. 
The ability of the customer to choose the worker who performs 
the service can also vary. In the Uber, Deliveroo, and other taxi or 
delivery service models, the client has no choice at all, and the plat-
form decides on the basis of proximity. Human intervention in that 
decision is virtually non-existent; the app’s algorithm ensures the 
service is rendered as quickly as possible. The intuitu personae char-
acter of the relationship between the worker and customer is weak, 
and the customer pays a flat rate set by the platform. In contrast, 
in other models, the platform connects the offer of service and the 
request, giving customers broad leeway in their choice of who will 
perform it. This latter type of contract is the model for professional 
or amateur hotels (Booking and Airbnb), as well as OpenWork and 
other crowdsourcing platforms based on competitive systems. 
Platforms become more involved in the relationships between 
the performer of services and the customer by acting as dispute 
arbitrator for the parties. In the event of a user complaint, platforms 
reserve the right to hold back some or all of the service fee.82 These 
contracts, which their creators define as sui generis, contain clauses 
that are similar from one country to the next and handily ignore 
specific local legal requirements.83 Of course, these requirements are 
only made known after the platform sets up business, when the con-
sumers’ needs or desires make them necessary and entail the reform 
of national laws to accommodate this type of UCO (unidentified 
contractual object). Only then are the contracts subjected to judicial 
review, with varying outcomes for the platforms.84 
ii. Legal Risks for the Platforms
Legal risks are numerous and vary according to the subject of the 
dispute. The major international platforms know this and do not 
hesitate to legally optimize their operations. Uber, for example, set 
up its headquarters in the Netherlands85 and its customer service 
relations in Morocco.86 Legal optimization is pursued essentially for 
tax reasons,87 but also to save on labour costs.
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From the perspective of labour law, a distinction can be drawn 
on the basis of the activity offered. Platforms like Airbnb, which offer 
essentially the enjoyment of a good (lodging), though the lodger does 
provide some personal services (hotel services), are not at much risk 
as they traditionally fall under the framework of business law. In 
contrast, services providing human activities (taxi service, delivery, 
cooking, housecleaning, babysitting, and so on), whether or not the 
type of work is generally regulated, are profoundly affected by the 
systems of platform intermediation operating outside of any legal 
framework.88 Often these activities are performed by workers who, 
like nineteenth-century labourers, have only their hands to live 
by—or to be more precise, have only their smartphones and cars or 
bikes to make a living.
The taxi industry appears to have been the most affected by 
digital platform intermediation. Accordingly, the French legislator 
intervened on December 29, 2016,89 enacting a single statute to cover 
all providers of this service, including digital intermediaries.
Heetch and UberPOP are the platforms that managed to oper-
ate with the greatest degree of deregulation. Both connect non-
professional drivers using their own cars with customers seeking 
cheap transportation. This low-cost system is of course possible 
because the business assumed no tax or social contribution burdens 
whatsoever. Admittedly, as these platforms emphasized in France, 
they gave unemployed people a means of gainful employment, 
and Heetch, which operated only between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., 
argued that it did not engage in unfair competition, focusing as it 
did on trips to the suburbs that were served very little by taxis and 
not at all by public transit. Nevertheless, the fact remains that their 
services were not provided as volunteer activities and could there-
fore be characterized as illegal work. The liability of the platforms 
remained to be established.
Following a court ruling against UberPOP,90 Heetch and its 
directors were found guilty by the Tribunal Correctionnel de Paris 
on March 2, 2017.91 After nearly 1,500 taxi drivers had filed com-
plaints, the company was prosecuted for organizing an illegal 
system connecting customers with persons transporting others for 
remuneration, complicity in the illegal exercise of the taxi profession, 
and misleading business practices. The court upheld all the charges, 
finding that the platform was responsible because the system could 
only work through the platform and that the price it suggested was 
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generally the one customers paid, due to the strong incentives to do 
so provided by the platform itself. The company was ordered to pay 
a €200,000 fine, its directors were fined €10,000 each, and €500,000 
was ordered in compensation for the plaintiffs.
In addition to criminal convictions applicable in respect of any 
type of informally exercised work that tends to evade various laws 
and regulations, platforms must also take into account the specific 
rules of labour law.92 Articles L. 8221-5 and following of the Code du 
travail define concealed work by the concealment of paid employ-
ment, an offence punishable by three years’ imprisonment and a 
€45,000 fine. It takes place when an employer fails to file the proper 
declarations to social agencies, make required social contributions, 
or issue pay slips to its employees. The sanctions are imposed solely 
as a consequence of the relationships under an employment contract, 
once again indicating the importance of the characterization of the 
contract and the consequences of judicial recharacterization. If the 
judge finds that the platform conducted itself as an actual employer 
(direction, control, and discipline of employees), he or she will 
recharacterize the relationship and impose both civil and criminal 
sanctions.93
Having created a new social relationship model without con-
cerning themselves with national laws in any way, digital platforms 
now find themselves in a position of great legal insecurity. And yet, 
though they are responsible for the situation they are now in, they 
have also revealed the public appetite for these new types of relation-
ships. It has therefore become necessary to enact new, suitable, and 
balanced legislation, applicable to everyone.94
iii. What Status for Digital Intermediary Service Platforms? 
In any work undertaken on this subject, two words constantly reap-
pear: transition and disruption. In legal terms, transition is ensured 
by adapting existing solutions to new ways of operating. As for dis-
ruption, the term is as new as the model to which it applies.
The labour law solution so far adopted—that is, the recharacter-
ization of the relationship as an employment contract giving rise to 
compensation—is neither satisfactory nor suitable.95 Aside from the 
fact it can only be imposed after the fact and even then only rarely, 
it also inadequately protects workers, who are often precarious and 
whose numbers continue to grow. Platforms must be held accountable 
and bear obligations similar to those the legislator imposed first on 
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industrial employers and then eventually on all employers, creating 
what we know today as labour law.
French labour law is already well acquainted with a number of 
forms of labour intermediation. One avenue that has already been 
attempted96 is business and employment cooperatives that define 
workers as salaried entrepreneurs.97 Another possibility is the tem-
porary work option. Once again, however, the French legislator has 
intervened, as this new labour relations model represents a threat due 
to its similarity with slavery or at least servitude (lease of a person 
to perform work at the pleasure of the lessor). Very strict legislation 
circumscribes this type of work in France, and breaches are pun-
ished criminally as illegal subcontracting. These provisions might 
be adapted, and the legislator might be inspired to circumscribe the 
activities of the many platforms, but for the moment, in a situation 
of high unemployment, it is easier to encourage the development of 
the platforms than to protect workers. Indeed, this attitude is evident 
all over Europe. The EC is urging its member states to deregulate 
more and more professions and to open themselves up to these 
innovations, in the hopes of encouraging economic recovery.98 But 
this approach seems to ignore the fate of workers, who often have 
to work twice as many hours as salaried employees do and earn no 
more than minimum wage.
With the statute enacted on August 8, 2016,99 France opted to 
legislatively compel the “social accountability of platforms.” Like 
any corporate social responsibility, this is a minimum obligation 
that depends greatly on the goodwill of the platforms. Although the 
legislature has not abandoned the salaried work/self-employed work 
dichotomy, it has included a title in the Code du travail explicitly deal-
ing with self-employed workers using electronic remote connection 
platforms.100 These provisions apply to self-employed workers who, 
for the purpose of exercising their professional activity, use one or 
more electronic remote connection platforms as defined in article 242 
bis of the Code général des impôts (General Income Tax Code).101 That 
provision contemplates enterprises, regardless of their place of busi-
ness, who use electronic means to remotely connect persons with a 
view to the sale of a good, the provision of a service, or the exchange 
or sharing of a good or service, and states that they are required to 
provide, upon each transaction, candid, clear, and transparent infor-
mation regarding the tax and social obligations incumbent on persons 
who use them as intermediaries to carry out commercial transactions.
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Platforms have few obligations.102 The Code du travail does 
provide that, “when a platform determines the characteristics of the 
performance of service or of the good sold and sets its price, that plat-
form bears a social responsibility towards the workers concerned.”103 
This responsibility consists in contributing to workplace accident 
insurance and ensuring workers’ rights to occupational training as 
soon as the service provider achieves a certain level of sales revenue 
via the platform.104 
This recent reform gives rise to two observations. On the one 
hand, the workers concerned are excluded from the application of 
the Code du travail, which can only be seen as regrettable. On the 
other, platforms that until very recently operated entirely outside the 
realm of labour law are now starting to bear some obligations. As the 
Projet pour un autre Code du travail suggests, however, a solution 
that would offer more protection might have included these digital 
workers within an expanded definition of the employment contract.105
Labour law was conceived and built for an industrial society 
exploiting a large and stationary labour force that it wanted to super-
vise and discipline.106 It is now time to rewrite the labour code for the 
twenty-first century, so that it may govern all forms of subordinate 
or autonomous work performed for others and safeguard the social 
rights of workers, whether their work is defined by the performance 
of a service or by the result of such a performance.107
The task before us now remains: the creation and establishment 
of social law that protects digital platforms workers.108
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CHAPTER XI
Uber and the Unmaking and 
Remaking of Taxi Capitalisms: 




From a neoliberal economic perspective, the emergence of new digital technologies portends the possibility of an economic 
revolution, in which there will be greater human freedom and a 
democratization of economic opportunity. Digitally enabled workers 
will transform themselves into micro-entrepreneurs, able to work for 
themselves “whenever they want from any location and at whatever 
level of intensity needed to achieve their desired standard of living.”2 
Of course, there is also recognition that this bright future will not 
be decided by technology alone. Even for the most technological 
utopian, human liberation is not merely an app away, and there is rec-
ognition that other institutional and policy changes are required for 
the emancipatory potential of the platform economy to be unlocked.3 
But it is seen as possible within what Arun Sundararajan, a leading 
sharing economy optimist, calls “crowd-based capitalism.”4
For others, the impact of the platform economy is much darker. 
The title of Steven Hill’s book succinctly encapsulates this perspec-
tive: Raw Deal: How the “Uber Economy” and Runaway Capitalism are 
Screwing American Workers.5 Here the emphasis is on the ways in 
which these platforms are shifting uncertainty and risks onto work-
ers who lack employment security and face a shredded safety net in 
hyper-competitive, globalized labour markets. 
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Woodcut by Philippe Maurais, c. 1995. Reproduced with permission of the 
artist.
On the surface there seems to be a common agreement that 
capitalism is central to understanding the operation of the plat-
form economy and its implications for the workforce, yet neither 
Sundararajan nor Hill actually make capitalism and the social rela-
tions of production central to their analytic framework. Thus, one 
goal of this chapter is to put capitalism at the centre of the analysis, 
drawing on Nick Srnicek’s recent book, Platform Capitalism.6 In doing 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   358 18-11-08   08:42
 Uber and the Unmaking and Remaking of Taxi Capitalisms 359
so, there is a need to recognize that capitalism is not a static system 
operating uniformly over time and space, but rather takes very differ-
ent forms. The debate about the varieties of capitalism draws on this 
insight, but focuses on the political framework within which capital-
ism functions and the extent to which it is embedded in particular 
institutional arrangements.7 The concern here is more focused on the 
inner workings of capitalist regimes of accumulation. In particular, 
this chapter inquires into and seeks to account for the distinct ways 
that workers are subsumed into platform capitalism. 
A second goal is to use this refined political economy frame-
work to place Uber and the taxi industry in historical perspective. As 
we shall see, taxi capitalisms have been made, unmade, and remade 
several times over the past hundred years in response to changing 
technology law, and resistance to these changes by workers and 
segments of capital which shape both law and technology. Using 
Toronto as a case study, this chapter examines the rise of Uber and 
its platform technology in the context of the broader history of taxi 
capitalisms.
II. Theoretical Starting Points
Although Sundararajan titled his book The Sharing Economy, he rec-
ognizes this is a misnomer, since there is actually very little shar-
ing that takes place in the world of the platform economy.8 Rather, 
the so-called sharing economy is dominated by technologically 
facilitated commercial exchanges, and in recognition of this reality 
Sundararajan’s preferred term is “crowd-based capitalism.” As I draw 
on Nick Srnicek’s work, I prefer the term “platform capitalism,” but 
regardless of the adjective used to describe the kind of capitalism 
that exists, it is important in the first instance not to lose sight of the 
analytical significance of its capitalist character. In particular, venture 
capitalists fuel the platform economy, seeking to increase their pri-
vate fortunes by finding new ways of extracting value from socially 
produced wealth. Platforms are digital infrastructures that enable 
individuals and groups to interact and are thus intermediaries. What 
makes them capitalist is that these infrastructures are privately 
owned and operated to extract profits by becoming the ground on 
which transactions take place. Users must pay quasi-monopoly rents 
to access the platform while the platform itself is uniquely positioned 
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to collect data provided by its users, which is then commodified and 
sold to other profit-seeking businesses.9 
The identification of the platform as a vehicle for capitalist 
accumulation, however, only begins the analysis, and here is where 
the adjectives come in. What kind of capitalism does the platform 
produce? A good place to begin this discussion is with Sundararajan’s 
subtitle, The End of Employment and the Rise of Crowd-Based Capitalism. 
This juxtaposition might seem paradoxical at first glance, since capi-
talism has long been associated with the primacy of waged work as 
the mechanism through which capitalists extract surplus value from 
labour. But Sundararajan is not a Marxist, and neither sees his claim 
as paradoxical nor as requiring an explanation of what makes crowd-
based capitalism capitalist. However, he does describe the elements 
of crowd-based capitalism as being market-based, providing greater 
opportunities to more fully deploy assets, and to source labour and 
capital from decentralized crowds. He also describes it as blurring 
the lines between the personal and professional by commercializing 
activities that used to be considered personal, and as blurring the 
lines between fully employed and casual labour, between indepen-
dent and dependent employment, and between work and leisure.10 
This combination of characteristics seems to describe a decen-
tralized market economy in which the lifeworld is pervasively 
commodified and in which labour is seemingly provided on a spot 
market finely tuned to meet ever-shifting demand. What is missing, 
however, are several structural features of capitalism that differenti-
ate it from a simple trading economy. First, there is no recognition 
that underlying capitalism is a particular structure of property and 
class relations in which the means of production are substantially 
owned by a small minority of the population while the majority 
are dependent on their labour in order to survive.11 Second, there 
is no recognition that capitalism is driven by the relentless pursuit 
of profits and expansion. Economic value in capitalism is not gener-
ated by simple exchange but in the ability of capital to extract profits 
from socially produced wealth through relations of domination and 
exploitation. If crowd-based capitalism was a world in which the 
predominant social relation of production was between relatively 
equal, truly independent, property-owning commodity and service 
producers, it would not be capitalist because it would not have a 
capitalist property and class structure.12 
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We will return to a discussion of Uber later, but the evidence 
seems pretty clear that the predominant structure of the platform 
economy does not resemble a world of truly independent commodity/
service producers selling directly to consumers through platform-
mediated transactions, but rather one in which workers are sub-
ordinated to platform enterprises bent on maximizing profits and 
expanding to become dominant players, if not monopolists, in their 
markets. For example, leaving open the question of whether Uber 
drivers are legally employees or not, what is clear is that they are not 
economically independent in any meaningful way, but rather exist 
in a subordinate relation with Uber, a privately held company with a 
valuation estimated to be over $60 billion. This is the underlying real-
ity that motivates Uber drivers to act collectively to redress what they 
perceive to be their domination and exploitation in that relation.13 
So even if Sundararajan does not satisfactorily explain how 
capitalism works in the platform economy, the question is centrally 
important, not just theoretically, but also practically. Platform capi-
talism fits within a larger political economic transformation that has 
seen the decline of the standard employment relationship central to 
the post–World War II era of welfare-state capitalism and the growth 
of precarious work, including own-account self-employment and 
temporary work, associated with the rise of neoliberal capitalist 
formations.14 
This is not to deny that technological change plays a signifi-
cant role in the evolution of capitalism. Marx was acutely attentive 
to the “constant revolutionizing of the instruments of production” 
that was endemic to capitalism, but he did not consider technology 
in isolation. Rather, he was concerned with the way that technology 
revolutionized “relations of production and with them the whole 
relations of society.”15 It was the first industrial revolution that was 
Marx’s primary focus, and in Capital he famously described the pro-
cess by which capitalist relations of production supplanted simple 
commodity production by freeing workers from ownership of the 
means of production, making them “free” to sell their labour as 
rights-bearing individuals to the equally rights-bearing owners of 
capital. He then followed these personae into the factory—the hid-
den abode of production—where the capitalist, having purchased 
the workers’ capacity to work, extracted surplus value by his control 
over the labour process. Thus the wage relation came to be seen as 
the paradigmatic mode of labour exploitation in Marxist theory. 
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However, as Wallace Clement reminds us, pockets of com-
modity production continued in areas such as fishing and farming, 
so the process of proletarianization was never complete.16 But even 
where simple commodity production continued, it was not hived off 
from the capitalist economy, but rather became linked to it in vari-
ous ways that also produced economic domination and exploitation. 
For example, commodity producers retained possession and formal 
ownership of the means of production, but once market exchange 
ceased to be predominantly within integrated local economies, they 
increasingly became tied to and dependent upon capitalist firms to 
acquire necessary inputs (including financing) and to transport, store, 
and sell the outputs of commodity production. As a result, capital 
gained real economic control over commodity producers and with 
that the ability to extract surplus from their efforts. Indeed, as Jairus 
Banaji has demonstrated, historically, capitalism is compatible with 
a wide variety of modes of labour exploitation that may co-exist at 
any particular conjuncture.17 Moreover, as we shall see in the case 
of Uber, the lines between proletarianization and other modes of 
labour exploitation, such as petty commodity production, are not 
always clear in social reality, which opens up space to argue about 
their legal characterization as well. 
Clement also examined the question of the determinants of 
the mode of labour exploitation. When does capital proletarianize 
workers from whom it extracts surplus value directly or leave them 
as dependent commodity producers from whom it extracts surplus 
value indirectly through commercial transactions? Focusing on farm-
ing and fishing, he pointed to the ways capital benefited by retain-
ing dependent commodity production, including a reduction in its 
exposure to risks of nature, elimination of the cost of investment in 
the first stages of production, and lower labour supervision costs.18 
Clement’s Marxist analysis can be connected with and supple-
mented by Coase’s theory of the firm, which asks when firms will 
make (that is, manufacture with its own employees) rather than buy.19 
In a world of zero transaction costs there would be no firms and no 
employment, because there would be no benefit from managing 
(which always has a cost) compared to costless contracting. However, 
in the real world, where transaction costs are endemic at some level, 
firms will form and employees will be hired where the costs of mak-
ing and managing are less than the cost of negotiating contracts. 
These decisions will be significantly affected by technology. For 
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example, where technological developments allowed productivity to 
be enhanced through capital-intensive investments in machinery and 
a refined division of labour, individualized dependent commodity 
production was replaced by proletarianized social labour coordinated 
by capital in factory settings. For Marx, writing in the third quarter 
of the nineteenth century, the factory was the paradigmatic site of the 
hidden abode of production where the capitalist extracted surplus 
labour from the proletarianized worker. Dependent commodity pro-
duction seemed to be destined for the dustbin of history. As a result, 
theorizing about the social relations of production in dependent 
commodity production was relatively uncommon. 
However, the shift from buying to making was never complete 
and, as Rubery and Wilkinson demonstrate, there is no economic law 
dictating that the movement from dependent commodity production 
to factorization will always be in one direction. Looking specifically 
at outwork, they identified a number of factors that interact to shape 
the decision whether to produce in-house or outsource. These include 
the type of technology available, the potential for fragmenting the 
production process, the role of capital-intensive investment, the cost 
of labour supervision, and the avoidance of collective action and legal 
regulation, among others.20
David Weil has also approached this issue through his explora-
tion of the phenomenon of fissuring, which involves once integrated 
lead businesses choosing not to make things themselves but to shift 
the production of goods and services outside the firm to smaller 
businesses through outsourcing, franchising, and supply chains. As a 
result, employment is also shifted outside lead firms and into smaller 
business, which in turn may seek to shift work out to so-called inde-
pendent contractors or “micro-entrepreneurs.” Technological change 
is a significant factor that makes fissuring both feasible and attrac-
tive. “Over the past three decades, it has become far less expensive 
to contract with other organizations—or create new organizational 
forms—to undertake activities that […] alte[r] the calculus of what 
should be done inside or outside enterprise boundaries.”21 Again it 
is important to remember that it is not just technology that drives 
fissuring, but rather it is the drive for profit maximization that leads 
firms to adopt and adapt technology for that purpose.
To the extent that Marxist theory is centred on the paradigm of 
extracting surplus value through employment in the hidden abode of 
the factory, it now faces the challenge of analyzing the new relations 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   363 18-11-08   08:42
 364 LAW AND THE “SHARING ECONOMY”
of production and modes of labour exploitation that are becoming 
prominent features of twenty-first-century capitalist economies. 
Various theorists are beginning to take up this task. A collection of 
essays edited by van der Linden and Roth challenges the theoretical 
centrality of proletarianized wage work and calls for an examination 
of the “extraordinary multiplicity and multifacetedness of the con-
stellations of exploitation” that coexist, including self-employment.22 
Steffen Böhm and Chris Land argue that there is a need to prize 
open, new, hidden abodes of production outside of employment to 
incorporate new sites of value production.23 Finally, Ursula Huws, 
a pioneer in theorizing the implications of cybernetics for capitalist 
development, has explored the question of how enterprises generate 
profit in the digital age. She makes the useful distinction between 
labour that is performed directly for a capitalist employer by a worker 
who is dependent on her or his labour for subsistence (workers whom 
she dubs “inside the knot”—the classic proletariat) and groups that 
she characterizes as being less directly involved in capitalist social 
relations, including people engaged in petty commodity production, 
trade or small-scale rent, groups that she says have been given a new 
lease on life by the Internet. Being less directly involved, however, 
does not translate into being outside capitalist relations of produc-
tion, and so Huws points to the need to specify and analyze these 
relations, including the process of generating profits by rent or trade 
rather than commodity production. For example, she suggests that 
online employment agencies and car-sharing services may be thought 
of as profiting from rent rather than commodity production, but such 
a claim requires close scrutiny of the actual relations between these 
platforms and the workers who use them. Her larger point, however, 
remains valid; we need to think about the ways capitalism operates 
“outside the knot.”24 
The identification of different modes of labour exploitation is 
the first step, but does not end the discussion, because one mode is 
not necessarily preferable to another. We must also take the next step 
and explore and assess the extent of domination and exploitation 
that exists within these relations. A number of factors are likely to 
be influential, including the extent to which laws effectively limit 
workers’ market vulnerabilities or facilitate (or obstruct) their ability 
to act collectively to protect their interests. Then, within the spaces 
available for collective action, there is the question of the forms col-
lective action takes (for example, unions or cooperatives) and their 
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success. More generally, the broader political economic context sets 
the conditions within which laws are enacted and enforced, collective 
action occurs, and capital exercises power. 
With this in mind, we turn to a historical exploration of taxicab 
capitalisms and the social relations of production that characterized 
them through a case study of Toronto. However, one final theoretical 
clarification is necessary. It may seem odd, perhaps, to speak of taxi 
capitalisms as if they were distinct forms of capitalism on the same 
order as, say, liberal market capitalism or welfare-state capitalism. 
That is not the intention. Rather, the discussion of taxi capitalisms 
recognizes that the taxi industry operates within a larger capital-
ist social formation, but also understands that different sectors of 
capitalist industry are organized according to the distinctive tech-
nologies, market structures, regulatory arrangements, and worker 
resistance they experience. The historical account that follows aims 
to elaborate on these distinctive features without losing sight of the 
larger capitalist environment in which they operate. 
III. Taxi Capitalisms Before Uber
i. Taxi Capitalism 1.0: Standard Capitalism and the Standard 
Employment Relation
The history of the taxicab industry and the impact of technological 
change logically should begin with the horse-drawn trade of the 
nineteenth century and the impact of the automobile, but there is 
too little Canadian research for this to be feasible, so the chapter 
begins with the motorized taxi trade dating from the second decade 
of the twentieth century.25 Initially, the cost of entry was high. Motor 
cars were a luxury item affordable by few, and municipal regula-
tions required cabs to have special features which made them more 
expensive than standard cars. Since cruising the streets looking for 
fares was not an efficient way of doing business, taxis depended 
on cabstands and telephone dispatch systems. Cabstands in prime 
locations often operated as private concessions, for which hefty fees 
were charged, and telephone dispatch required the installation of 
call boxes around the city, where drivers could wait for assignments, 
also requiring a significant investment. Another cost was taximeters, 
favoured by some segments of the public and by some owners as a 
means to protect themselves against petty fraud by drivers.
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As a result of the high cost of entry, the trade was initially 
dominated by larger fleet owners who hired drivers as employees 
in the classic, or what I will call “standard capitalist,” mode of pro-
duction.26 Yet despite the hopes of early investors that high entry 
costs would produce an oligopolistic industry structure in which 
quasi-monopoly profits could be extracted, independent operators 
soon found ways into the industry, increasing competition and 
reducing profits. For example, even by 1910, thirty-six automobile 
dealerships and other companies in Winnipeg leased taxis to drivers 
who competed for business with the taxi fleets.27 The involvement of 
these companies also marked an early attempt by rentiers to profit 
from the taxi industry by selling services to those directly involved 
in producing taxi services. 
The nature of the work also did not favour direct management 
of a large labour force, as there was little scope for extracting more 
surplus value by a refined division of mass labour. As well, because 
cab drivers worked alone and were geographically dispersed across 
the city, employers had difficulty exercising a high level of mana-
gerial control and intensifying the labour process. Beyond phone 
systems, significant economies of scale were simply not available. 
Finally, the existing regulatory regime also did not create 
barriers to entry. Older municipal regulations, dating back to the 
horse-drawn trade, required licences, but there was no limit on their 
number, and fees were not particularly high. Rules governed other 
matters such as fare structures and driver behaviour, but none of this 
strongly favoured large taxi fleets over small ones or independent 
operators.28 
For all these reasons, taxi capitalism 1.0 failed to thrive, even 
without significant collective resistance by employee drivers.29
ii. Taxi Capitalism 2.0: Unregulated Petty Commodity/Service 
Production
Conditions for fleet owners worsened in the 1920s and 1930s as the 
cost of entering the business dropped. The growth of the mass-
production auto industry and the increase in real wages during 
the 1920s made car ownership more affordable, and municipalities 
failed to enforce vehicle regulations, allowing less specialized cars 
to operate as taxis. Public taxi stands in some cities replaced or pro-
vided an alternative to private concessions, and taxi driver and cab 
owner licences remained readily available at low cost. In Toronto, 
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for example, the number of taxi driver licences issued annually 
increased from 1,043 in 1921 to 2,009 in 1929, while the number of 
owner licences issued grew from 541 to 1,313 over the same period. 
By 1931, there was only one fleet with more than fifty licensed cabs, 
and fleets with ten or more cars accounted for only about a third 
of the trade. Small fleets with fewer than ten cars comprised about 
a quarter of the trade, while individual owner-operators made up 
the other 40 per cent.30 Finally, in some cities taxi brokers entered 
the field, providing a bundle of services to taxi owners, including 
advertising, a garage, and telephone dispatching, further reducing 
the economies of scale that favoured larger fleets.31 As a result, petty 
commodity/service production came to dominate the industry.32 
iii. Taxi Capitalism 3.0: Regulated Petty Commodity Production
The triumph of petty production, however, did not bring prosperity 
to its participants. As one observer of the highly competitive cab 
business in London, England, commented at the turn of the century, 
“It is a poor man’s industry.”33 This was the case in Canada too, par-
ticularly after the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, which not 
only reduced demand for taxi services but also triggered an increase 
in the number of operators as unemployed workers tried their hand at 
earning an income by driving a cab.34 Cab fares dropped and opera-
tors and drivers struggled to make a living. In Toronto, an Advisory 
Committee on Taxicabs was struck in 1931 and in its 1932 report 
found that “the business is badly overcrowded” and the earnings of 
most drivers “meagre.” Although there was some variation between 
different industry sectors, the report found that drivers typically 
worked about twelve hours a day, six days a week and earned about 
$17 a week, less than the wage of a general labourer. In Montreal in 
1934, it was estimated that both drivers and owner-operators of a 
single cab took home about $13.50 a week.35
The advisory committee was also highly critical of the emerging 
role of rentier capital in the industry. As noted earlier, taxi broker-
ages were formed to sell taxi owners a bundle of services, including 
dispatch. They have not been the subject of much research, so there 
are still unanswered questions, but it seems that, initially, some 
brokerages were created as cooperatives by small fleet owners to 
take advantage of economies of scale. By the early 1930s, however, 
most brokerages were businesses in their own right, selling services 
to industry participants who did not have an ownership stake in the 
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brokerage. The advisory committee was particularly critical of the 
role of these rentier brokerages, finding “that in a great many cases 
cab brokers have conducted their businesses in an irresponsible man-
ner and largely at the expense of the cab owners whom they have 
induced to subscribe to their service.” The committee recommended 
that brokers should be licensed and that licences should only be 
issued to persons who were licensed cab owners.36 
Another avenue for rentier capitalists to profit from the taxi 
industry was through cab leasing, a phenomenon that first appeared 
a decade earlier but that expanded in the 1920s. The advisory com-
mittee explained how it operated. A private company would buy a 
number of inexpensive cars and would then lease a car to a driver 
for one year, with payments made daily. The driver purchased fuel 
from the leasing company and paid for repairs, which were done at 
the company’s garage. The company might also provide telephone 
dispatch services. If the driver lived up to the terms of the contract, 
the driver would obtain title to the car at the end of the year. Taxi 
leasing became more attractive as the Depression deepened because 
it provided unemployed workers without capital an opportunity to 
get into the business, but the advisory committee found that they 
fared poorly. “As far as financial results are concerned, however, 
the real and only beneficiaries have been the companies disposing 
of automobiles.” It proposed to eliminate the practice by requiring 
that owners or their employers operate all cabs. Rentier capitalism 
was not welcome in the industry or, at the very least, the limited 
opportunities to profit from selling services to operators were to be 
hoarded for industry insiders.37
Driver resistance to poor working conditions took a variety of 
forms. In a few instances, employed drivers tried to unionize, but 
Canadian labour law during this period did not compel employers 
to recognize and bargain with unions, so it was a tough slog.38 As 
well, in a depressed industry where profits were hard to generate, 
there were severe limits on what drivers could gain through collec-
tive bargaining, although there were some successes. In 1936, 500 
Montreal taxi drivers, joined by 873 licensed cab owners, struck to 
secure reduced brokerage fees. The city intervened and a commit-
tee was created to address the drivers’ and owners’ concerns.39 In 
1938, 720 members of the Toronto taxi drivers’ local of the Teamsters 
struck against sixty-three taxi companies, demanding union rec-
ognition, a minimum weekly wage, overtime after ten hours, and 
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other improvements. The strike was substantially successful, and 
its terms were extended to the entire industry under the Industrial 
Standards Act. The following year, the union struck again and made 
further gains.40
Drivers also worked with local labour councils to protect work-
ers’ interests when municipal taxi regulations were being consid-
ered.41 However, it was not just taxi drivers who acted collectively; 
the chief players in municipal taxi regulation were associations of 
taxi owners, whose demands included restrictions on entry, rate 
regulation, mandatory meters, tougher vehicle standards, and a 
requirement that brokers be cab owners. The politics of regulation 
were complicated as different segments of the industry formed into 
different associations to represent their distinct interests.42 There is 
no detailed account of how these politics unfolded in Toronto after 
the 1932 report but, like in most North American cities, taxi regula-
tion restricted entry, regulated fares, and limited rentier capital’s 
access to the industry.43 
iv. Taxi Capitalism 4.0: Medallion Capitalism
The intent of the new taxi licensing bylaws was to create a regulated 
regime of owner-operator petty commodity/service production. The 
adoption of a quota on licences (commonly known as the medallion 
system) restricted entry, enabling licence holders to gain an economic 
rent that otherwise would have been dissipated by competition, 
and the restrictions on dispatchers aimed to keep these rents in the 
hands of those directly providing taxi services. Moreover, because 
taxi licences were widely dispersed among small firms and indi-
vidual owner-operators, municipal regulators anticipated that the 
rents would be widely shared. Finally, price regulation protected 
customers against licence holders taking undue advantage of limits 
on competition. However, the regulations also permitted medal-
lion owners to treat their licences as alienable private property that 
its owner could sell, lease, or devise,44 and this paved the way for 
the creation of a different mode of taxicab capitalism, which I have 
dubbed “medallion capitalism.”
We can begin the story of the development of medallion capital-
ism by examining the industry’s evolving social relations of produc-
tion. Under the medallion system, employment in the taxi industry 
initially increased as workers seeking to become taxi drivers could 
not easily obtain a licence and go into business for themselves. For 
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many, the only option was to become an employee of a licence holder, 
who needed additional drivers to keep the car on the road as many 
hours as possible to maximize the revenue the licence produced. 
Since many drivers faced the prospect of remaining employees for 
several years until a medallion became available for purchase, they 
had a greater interest in engaging in collective action to improve 
their terms and conditions. More generally, there was a high level 
of labour militancy at the end of the war, as returning veterans and 
workers generally sought to share in the post-war prosperity and 
have a collective voice in workplace decision-making. The adoption of 
the Wagner Act model of collective bargaining in Canada at the end 
of the war facilitated this desire through an administrative regime 
of compulsory union recognition, coupled with a duty to bargain in 
good faith. 
Although the labour legislation embraced a highly fragmented 
model of enterprise bargaining, taxi unions in Toronto not only man-
aged to organize drivers but also to bargain on a broader basis. For 
example, in the late 1940s, Teamsters Local 488 bargained with the 
Federal Association of Taxi Cab Operators on behalf of 800 drivers 
employed by the association’s forty members and with the Diamond 
Taxi Cab Association on behalf of 300 drivers employed by its mem-
bers. As a result, taxi unions were successful in securing improved 
terms and conditions for drivers. 
As the union pressed for contract improvements in the early 
1950s, medallion owners took steps to end employment in the taxi 
industry. Instead of hiring drivers as employees, medallion owners 
adopted a leasing system in which drivers leased the car on either a 
long- or short-term basis, typically including dispatching services. 
Drivers who rented taxis either paid a percentage of the fares to the 
owner or, more commonly, paid a fixed fee and kept the fares, but 
were responsible for fuel. In part by push and perhaps in part by 
pull (the lure of being independent), the leasing system became so 
widespread that employment virtually disappeared and Local 488 
collapsed.45
A second development that produced and shaped medallion 
capitalism was the departure of owner-operators, the intended ben-
eficiaries of regulated petty commodity/service production, from 
the industry. Driving a cab is hard work, involving long hours, and 
so owner-operators often looked for exit strategies. As the value 
of licences went up, some owner-operators cashed out, sometimes 
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selling their medallions to drivers who replaced them as owner-
operators, but often selling medallions to small fleet owners looking 
to expand their operations. Each medallion that went to a fleet owner 
reduced the number of owner-operators, and the movement was 
largely in one direction. Another exit strategy for owner-operators 
was to retain ownership of the medallion as an income-generating 
asset. In this scenario, medallion operators stopped driving and 
became full-time rentiers by leasing it to other drivers or fleet own-
ers. Often the owner hired an agent to manage the medallion on the 
owner’s behalf. In fact, as we shall see, the use of agents became quite 
widespread. The overall result of this process was that not only did 
the great majority of medallion owners become rentiers but also a 
second layer of rentiers became  interposed between the medallion 
owner and the driver.
A third change in the relations of production involved the 
growing role of taxi associations providing dispatch services. The 
development of radio displaced telephone dispatching and new 
economies of scale became available. Diamond Taxi was typical. It 
was formed after the war by ten small fleet owners who collectively 
operated 200 cars. By 1957, the number of medallions associated with 
the dispatch increased to 410. Diamond Taxi operated as a branded 
fleet with all of its associated taxis painted in the same colours and 
carrying rooftop signs, so that to the customer it would appear that 
Diamond Taxi was a single branded business. Diamond also devel-
oped corporate accounts, which provided a valuable and important 
source of fares at a time when credit card usage was not as wide-
spread as it is today.46 
If these associations (or brokerages, as they came to be known) 
remained cooperatives providing services to their members, they 
would have been a barrier against, rather than an entry for, rentier 
capitalism. However, they became incorporated for-profit businesses 
that provided dispatching and other services to medallion owners 
and lessees who did not have ownership shares in the brokerage. 
This created another layer of rentier capitalism, characterized by 
unequal power relations between the brokerages and the remaining 
owner-operators of single vehicles who contracted for their services. 
The structure and operation of the industry in the early 1990s 
was described in detail in two Ontario Labour Relations Board 
(OLRB) decisions from that period.47 There were about 3,500 cab 
licences in Toronto, half of which were held by an owner having 
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one medallion. The other half were held by about 600 individuals or 
corporations that owned multiple licences. As well, there were 7,000 
licensed drivers who were not medallion owners. However, as we 
noted, some medallion owners, including single owners, were not 
drivers but rather leased out their medallions to another individual 
who operated the vehicle or appointed an agent, typically a principal 
of a brokerage, to manage the medallion on their behalf. 
The largest brokerage at the time was Diamond, which had 299 
associates who collectively owned or leased 605 medallions. Of these, 
248 associates owned or leased a single medallion, while the remain-
ing fifty-one associates owned or leased 357 medallions. Only a small 
number of associates ran ten or more medallions with Diamond, the 
largest associate having thirty-nine.48 Diamond was governed by a 
nine-member board of directors, almost all of whom were associates 
of the brokerage, and was managed by a president and vice-president. 
Although Diamond itself did not own any cabs, the president and 
vice-president acted as designated agents for owners of 173 medal-
lions, giving them control of more than a quarter of the licensed 
vehicles operating under the Diamond banner. Other brokerages had 
different structures, but the OLRB noted there were often personal, 
commercial, or family connections between the larger associates who 
effectively controlled the brokerages. As a result, medallion capitalism 
created opportunities for both rentier capitalists and an increasing 
concentration of ownership and control of medallions.
Under these conditions, there were two principal groups from 
whom profits could be extracted: drivers who rented cars by the 
shift, and owner-operators who either owned or leased a single 
medallion—and both groups organized to resist what they perceived 
to be their exploitation. Initially, owner-operators and drivers were 
concerned with the disciplinary actions of the licensing authority, 
but by the 1960s they increasingly focused on their relationship with 
the brokerages and/or the multiple medallion owners. Access to 
protective employment law and collective bargaining, however, was 
impeded by their designation as self-employed, with little prospect 
of successfully challenging that status.49 
Operating from an industrial pluralist perspective, in 1965 
Professor Harry Arthurs recognized the unfairness of depriving 
economically vulnerable individuals access to industrial citizenship 
to redress unequal power relations, regardless of whether that vul-
nerability was created by the employment relationship or through 
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commercial contracts. He proposed that the law should recognize a 
category of “dependent contractors” who would be given access to 
the collective bargaining regime and specifically identified “taxicab 
operators” as a group that fit this category.50 Arthurs’ article opened 
a conceptual crack in the door to employee status, but it took years 
of struggle by taxi drivers and owner-operators to get through it.51 
Drivers unsuccessfully attempted to unionize on several occa-
sions in the 1960s. In the early 1970s, the Canada Labour Congress 
chartered the Toronto Union of Taxi Employees as a direct local, 
and by 1972 it had 500 members. Efforts to claim coverage under the 
recently enacted Employment Standards Act52 (ESA) failed when a court 
ruled that drivers were not employees, and talk of expanding the 
Act’s coverage in the Ministry of Labour came to naught. However, in 
1975 the Ontario government amended the Labour Relations Act (LRA) 
to include a dependent contractor provision, which gave employment 
status to a person who 
whether or not employed under a contract of employment, and 
whether or not furnishing his own tools, vehicles […] performs 
work or services for another person for compensation […] on 
such terms and conditions that he is in a position of economic 
dependence upon, and under an obligation to perform duties 
for, that person more closely resembling the relationship of an 
employee than that of an independent contractor.53 
No similar provision was added to the ESA at the time or has been 
to this day.
The dependent contractor provision clearly did not make all 
people in unequal economic relations employees. For example, if 
taxi drivers entered into fuel supply contracts with companies in an 
oligopolistic supply industry, the law would not transform them into 
fuel supply company employees simply because of unequal power 
relations and economic dependency. Exploitive relations of produc-
tion in purely rentier capitalism were outside the scope of the law. 
So if all brokerages did was sell taxi drivers dispatch and related 
services, they could successfully argue that this did not create a 
dependent contractor relationship for the purposes of the law, even 
if the taxi brokerages were able to extract value from the labour of 
the rental drivers and owner-operators. 
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However, the relationship between brokers and drivers went 
beyond merely selling dispatch and related services. Taxi broker-
ages were branded businesses selling a product to the public, and 
to build and maintain their goodwill they were driven to impose 
contractual obligations on members and drivers in order to provide a 
more-or-less standardized product and to ensure reasonably prompt 
service. As well, the brokerages needed to prevent drivers from gam-
ing or cheating the dispatch. The first goal was achieved primarily 
by requiring that associates’ vehicles have common colours and 
signs, and be kept clean. As well, drivers were subject to dress and 
behaviour codes, with disciplinary measures available if the rules 
were violated. The provision of prompt service and the prevention 
of gaming required the exercise of managerial controls related to the 
use of the dispatch service, such as prohibitions on booking into an 
area when not in it or while engaged in transporting a passenger or 
parcel, and prohibitions on rejecting or failing to respond promptly 
to a fare offered by the dispatch. These rules were enforced by a 
system of sanctions.54 
These elements of control made it possible to argue that as a 
matter of law taxi drivers were dependent contractors of the dis-
patches, not merely the purchasers of dispatch services. This is not 
the place to delve into a detailed analysis of the complex legal test 
of who is an employee or dependent contractor,55 but it will be help-
ful to look at the organizational and legal complexity that Toronto 
taxi unions faced when they attempted to organize the industry in 
the 1990s. 
Although in the first case, the OLRB rejected a claim by owner-
operators that they were dependent contractors employed by broker-
ages, organizing drives continued, reflecting workers’ widespread 
dissatisfaction with how they were being incorporated into medal-
lion capitalism. Eventually, one case was successful.56 The fight to 
unionize in Toronto was an extended one. The Retail, Wholesale 
and Department Store Union (RWDSU) conducted an extensive 
organizing drive among drivers and individual owner-operators 
associated with nine different brokerages in the early 1990s, eventu-
ally filing simultaneous applications for certification, identifying 
the brokers as the employers. Votes were held and the ballot boxes 
were sealed pending a determination of whether the workers were 
dependent contractors under the LRA. After a careful examination 
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of the operation of the brokerages, the OLRB found that drivers and 
owner-operators 
regularly and consistently derive a substantial portion of their 
income from a single entity which exercises detailed control over 
the performance of their work by means of an elaborate system 
of written or unwritten rules and disciplinary responses which 
effectively penalize anyone failing to meet its standards […].
The board noted that although drivers could opt to work outside the 
dispatch system, “economic pressures substantially limit the exercise 
of those freedoms.” It also recognized that while owner-operators 
were at liberty to change brokers, their freedom was no greater 
than the freedom of employees to change employers, a freedom that 
merely shifted their dependency from one broker to another, but did 
not alter the basic condition of dependency.57
Having been found to be dependent contractors and therefore 
employees under the LRA, the ballot boxes were opened, and in 1993 
the union was certified as the bargaining agent for the drivers and 
owner-operators of three of Toronto’s largest brokerages: Diamond, 
Co-op,  and Metro. Negotiations took place in 1994 but were unsuc-
cessful, and the workers went on strike in August. After three weeks 
of demonstrations and protest, leading to unfair labour practice 
claims and criminal charges, the parties agreed to have outstanding 
issues resolved by arbitration. Part of the problem in negotiations was 
that some of the issues that needed to be resolved related directly 
to the rental and shift fees that associates charged drivers, a matter 
not governed by the brokerages’ rules. To address this problem, the 
union applied to have the members of the brokerage who owned or 
leased more than one medallion declared related employers to force 
them to the bargaining table. 
The arbitration was held before the related employer application 
was heard, but to defend their interests, the association represent-
ing the small fleet owners associated with the brokerages sought to 
intervene. Although the arbitrator denied the fleet owners interve-
nor status, his award, issued in December 1994, identified them as 
parties to the agreement along with the union and the brokerages. 
However, the arbitrator refused to include a provision in the two-
year agreement regarding the rental and licensing fees charged by 
the associates.
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Hearings on the union’s related employer application began in 
1995. Ironically, although the associates previously sought to be rep-
resented in the arbitration proceedings, they now opposed the related 
employer application, presumably to avoid having their fees become 
subject to future collective negotiations. To determine whether the 
associates and the brokers were related employers, the OLRB had to 
consider whether they were carrying on associated activities under 
common control and direction. The board recognized that the funda-
mental goal of the related employer provision was to make collective 
bargaining viable in the face of organizational arrangements that 
fragmented the employer function, a situation that David Weil has 
since popularized as “fissuring.”58 
Based on an extensive analysis of the relationship between the 
brokerages and their associates, the board found a high degree of 
functional integration, such that the drivers were dependent contrac-
tors of both and that there was common control and direction. The 
brokerages exercised control over the associates through the associ-
ates’ dependency on their services, as well as through the brokerages’ 
control over the associates’ drivers, while the associates were found 
to exercise a degree of influence over the brokers, particularly the 
larger fleet owners who were often involved in running the broker-
age. In the result, board found the brokerages and their associates 
to be related employers, and arrangements were made for them to 
be represented in future bargaining.59 
That future was short-lived. The parties managed to negoti-
ate a second collective agreement but could not resolve the issue of 
rental and lease fees, a matter that was vital to the determination of 
compensation for drivers and owner-operators who leased but did 
not own a plate. As a result, by the end of the decade, the union col-
lapsed, and collective bargaining and representation disappeared, a 
victim of the fragmented structure of the Toronto taxi industry and 
the unequal power relations it produced.
The failure of taxi drivers and owner-operators to achieve 
industrial citizenship meant these workers were unable to gain a 
reasonable share of the rents produced by medallion capitalism. 
Instead, these were being captured by the various rentiers.60 A 1998 
task force report found numerous problems in the taxi industry, 
including the fact that transferability allowed absentee ownership 
of medallions, which produced a layer of middlemen. Concerns 
were raised that the structure contributed to “deplorable working 
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conditions,” exacerbated by the redistribution of fare-box revenues 
to non-driving agents, lessees, and owners.61
In an effort to lessen the role of rentier capital in the Toronto 
taxi industry, two key changes were made to the bylaw in 1999 
that aimed to get medallions back into the hand of drivers and 
recreate a regime of regulated petty commodity production. The 
first froze the number of medallions and placed limits on their 
transferability, while the second created a new “Ambassador” 
licence that could only be held by a full-time licensed driver who 
was prohibited from hiring another driver and/or transferring the 
licence in any way.62 
A preliminary report prepared for an industry review in 2012 
found that these changes were partially successful in achieving their 
goal. Ambassador licences did create a new group of owner-operators 
who had higher incomes than shift drivers, although many resented 
the restrictions on their ability to hire drivers or lease the vehicle.63 
Standard licences, however, were not getting back into the hands of 
drivers because owners found various ways to evade the transferabil-
ity restrictions imposed in the bylaw. They had a strong incentive to 
do so as the market value of standard licences was skyrocketing from 
about $80,000 in 1998 to $210,000 in 2011. The final report, issued in 
2014, found that two-thirds of the nearly 3,500 standard taxi licences 
were managed by agents and that the top twenty-seven agents man-
aged 1,113 medallions.64 Despite the reforms, rentier capital retained 
a large place in the industry.
To complete the transformation from medallion capitalism to 
regulated petty commodity production, Toronto would have to move 
more aggressively to decommodify standard taxi licences and get 
them into the hands of drivers, 65 and to retain restrictions on supply. 
Here is where Uber comes into the story.
v. Taxi Capitalism 5.0: Platform Capitalism Uber Style
Uber is commonly referred to as a ride-sharing company and as such 
part of the sharing economy, but Uber drivers no more share their 
cars with passengers than traditional taxi drivers do; they both sell 
a transportation service. Of course human interactions inevitably 
occur in these jointly occupied spaces and pleasant ones enhance the 
quality of the experience for the customer and add exchange value 
for the seller. In fact, many workers, including taxi and Uber driv-
ers, may be required to perform affective labour as part of their jobs, 
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whether for their own protection or to satisfy employer demands, 
obtain high ratings from customers or earn tips, where tipping is 
permitted.66 The transactional context of these “sharing” interactions 
makes it impossible to know whether one is experiencing authentic 
sociality or merely witnessing a good performance, and perhaps as 
consumers we don’t really care.
A somewhat more accurate way to describe Uber is that it is a 
transportation network company that provides intellectual property 
(a computer platform) to connect passengers with drivers who are 
paid by the passenger to transport them from one location to another. 
However, from a consumer perspective, Uber is functionally no 
different than a taxi dispatch service. If I want a taxi, I telephone a 
dispatch (say, Diamond Taxi), which uses its technology to locate a 
driver in its network who is sent to pick me up and drive me to where 
I want to go, for which I pay a fare to the driver. If I want an Uber, I 
use my Uber app, which is a technology that locates a driver in Uber’s 
network who is sent to pick me up and drive me to where I want to 
go, for which I pay a fare through my app. I may prefer Uber to taxi 
dispatch services because the app is cool and easier to use than mak-
ing a phone call and paying the driver myself, or because Ubers arrive 
more promptly or are less expensive, but the service is nonetheless 
functionally equivalent to a taxi dispatch. They even use the same 
technology to transport the passenger—a car.
We will return briefly to the question of the legal characteriza-
tion of Uber, but first we want to look underneath the hood, so to 
speak, at its social relations of production. At one level Uber might 
be characterized as a rentier capitalist selling a dispatch service to 
individual commodity producers, arguably much as like traditional 
taxi dispatch services claim. On that reading, drivers with cars are 
just micro-entrepreneurs using their own labour and means of pro-
duction to sell transportation services to the public. The Uber app is 
merely a software platform that enables Uber drivers to reach that 
public, just as telephone and radio dispatch services enabled tradi-
tional taxi drivers to connect with customers. Like radio dispatchers, 
Uber owns no cars and has no drivers on its payroll. The technology 
is different, but the functional relation between Uber and its drivers 
and radio dispatchers and their drivers is nearly identical. 
To stop there, however, would be to miss what happens beneath 
the surface. Uber does more than simply sell dispatch services to 
drivers. Just like taxi dispatches, it is also a brand and, therefore, 
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is driven to impose additional obligations on its drivers to protect 
the brand by ensuring that certain service standards are met and 
that its network operates efficiently. Of course there are differences 
between brands. Taxi dispatches enhance their brands’ visibility by 
requiring cars to be painted in its colours and to have rooftop signs, 
while Uber prefers to operate with a look more akin to a black car 
service, without identifying signs, but there is nothing fundamentally 
important about this difference.
To achieve its goals of maintaining standards and efficiency, 
Uber exercises considerable control over its drivers. Although Uber 
drivers are not required to book onto the service, once they do, they 
are governed by Uber’s rules. For example, when a fare is offered to a 
driver, the driver has a very limited time to accept. If the driver does 
not respond in time, the fare is offered to another driver. Drivers who 
decline too many trips may be forcibly logged off the app for a period 
of time. The driver and the vehicle must meet quality standards set 
by Uber and are subject to customer reviews after each trip, with 
poor reviews potentially resulting in deactivation.67 These controls 
sound remarkably similar to those imposed by traditional dispatches, 
which complicates Uber’s claim that functionally it is merely a rentier 
capitalist selling digitialized dispatch services to drivers. Moreover, 
it is precisely these kinds of functional controls that make both tra-
ditional dispatches and Uber vulnerable to being legally classified 
the employer of the drivers in its network. Indeed, there is a rash 
of claims being brought by Uber drivers seeking employee status, 
whether for the purposes of collective representation or to gain the 
protection of minimum employment standards, as well as grow-
ing legal academic commentary on whether Uber employees are or 
should be considered employees.68
The argument that from a consumer and a driver point of view 
Uber is functionally a dispatch that operates much along the same 
lines as traditional taxi dispatches, however, does not lead to the 
conclusion that it is a medallion capitalist. To the contrary, Uber has 
disrupted medallion capitalism in a very important way: it operates 
without medallion capital and therefore threatens to destroy medal-
lion capitalism.69 Uber recruits drivers who may not be licensed 
as taxi drivers and, more importantly, who do not own or lease a 
taxi licence. As a result, it bypasses municipal taxi regulation and, 
if it is successful, taxi licences will cease to have either a use or an 
exchange value or, at the very least, that value will be substantially 
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diminished.70 In short, Uber’s major innovation is less a technologi-
cal than a legal one.
The avoidance of taxi regulation has important consequences 
for relations of production in the Uber model. In medallion cap-
italism, relations of production are complex and multilayered. 
Dispatches sell services to medallion owners who in turn rent 
licensed vehicles to drivers directly or through agents. Uber pro-
vides dispatch services directly to owner-operators, thus cutting 
out medallion owners and their agents. There are no intermediary 
rentiers between Uber and the driver.
Whether Uber’s bold evasion of existing taxi regulations suc-
ceeds will depend on the regulators’ response. In North America, this 
will be a municipal decision. Toronto’s new bylaw, which came into 
effect on July 15, 2016, legalized and lightly regulated Uber’s busi-
ness model, while modifying standard taxi regulation by formally 
terminating its attempt to (re)create an owner-operator model. Limits 
on the number of taxi licences remain, but Ambassador licences were 
rolled over into standard licences and limits on the accumulation of 
licences by a single owner were ended.71 It remains to be seen how 
these changes will impact the future of medallion capitalism, but 
even if Uber’s success comes at its expense, it will not be the end 
of taxi capitalism. Rather, we will have a new model of capitalism: 
platform-facilitated petty commodity production by subordinated 
workers. On one level, there will be thousands of so-called micro-
entrepreneurs selling taxi services through the Uber platform, but 
on another Uber drivers will be engaged in a dependent relationship 
characterized by unequal power relations that enable Uber to extract 
profit from their labour and petty capital. 
This dependency and inequality is not only a general charac-
teristic of capitalist relations of production, but takes a specific form 
in platform capitalism. Platforms are likely to be oligopolistic in their 
structure. This is because, to be successful, Uber or other platforms 
must develop both sides of the market in the sense that they need to 
assemble large pools of sellers (drivers) and buyers (riders). Network 
effects play an important role here. The more numerous the users, the 
more valuable the platform becomes for both the users and the plat-
form owner. According to Srnicek, “this generates a cycle whereby 
more users beget more users, which leads to platforms having a 
natural tendency towards monopolisation.”72 As a result, being there 
first has a significant advantage, especially when the dominant player 
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is also heavily capitalized and can lock in its initial advantage by 
subsidizing rides when necessary to keep competitors at bay. Indeed, 
many observers argue that Uber’s ambition, and the condition for its 
long-term success, is to establish itself as an unregulated monopoly 
provider.73 A related feature of platform-facilitated petty commod-
ity production is that unlike earlier versions, which pitted drivers 
against local petty capitalists, here drivers face a heavily capitalized 
global corporation that has the wherewithal to withstand short-term 
losses as well as unmatched resources to lobby government.
Uber’s market power gives it the upper hand with its drivers, 
the petty service providers. As a price maker, Uber sets the fare struc-
ture and then takes a commission. It therefore exercises considerable 
control over what drivers can realistically earn. Since its launch, 
Uber has cut fares, increased its commission from 20 per cent to 25 
per cent and tacked on a $1 safety fee. Uber drivers are using their 
own cars and bear the cost of gas, maintenance, insurance, and car 
depreciation. Although comparisons are not straightforward, one 
analyst estimates that Uber drivers make no more than taxi drivers. 
Not surprisingly, researchers find that Uber drivers consistently 
complain about low income.74 Indeed, Uber drivers in numerous 
jurisdictions have alleged they are making less than the minimum 
wage. As well, Uber’s claim that its drivers enjoy freedom and flex-
ibility has been contradicted by the experience of its drivers. 
[T]he combination of blind passenger acceptance with low mini-
mum fares and the algorithmic determination of surge pricing 
[…] reveal, respectively, how little control Uber drivers have 
over critical aspects of their work and how much control Uber 
has over the labor of its users (drivers).75 
Finally, Uber’s platform technology gives it a level of surveillance 
and managerial control that was impossibly costly for traditional 
taxi brokerages. 
It is not surprising that Uber drivers have resisted what they 
perceive to be their exploitation in the same ways that other workers 
have historically. Indeed, because the relation between drivers and 
Uber is more direct and unmediated by other layers of rentier capital 
than is the case in medallion capitalism, the obstacles to securing 
labour and employment rights may be somewhat reduced. Uber driv-
ers have sought to be declared employees entitled to the protection 
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of employment standards and eligible for unemployment insurance, 
workers’ compensation, and other benefits for which employers must 
make contributions. Many of these claims are still being litigated, but 
there have been some successes, including a decision in England, in 
2016, by an employment tribunal that was scathing in its rejection 
of Uber’s arguments. 
Any organization […] resorting in its documentation to fictions, 
twisted language and even brand new terminology, merits, we 
think, a degree of scepticism.
[I]t seems to us that the Respondents’ general case and the 
written terms on which they rely do not correspond with the 
practical reality. The notion that Uber in London is a mosaic of 
30,000 small businesses linked by a common ‘platform’ is to our 
minds faintly ridiculous.76 
In New York, Uber drivers have been ruled eligible for unemploy-
ment payments and workers’ compensation coverage.77 There is also 
a major class-action lawsuit claiming that Uber has misclassified 
thousands of drivers in California and Massachusetts, depriving 
them of minimum wages and hours of work protections.78
Workers are also seeking to form unions in some locations. In 
New York, the Amalgamated Transit Union collected close to 14,000 
signed union cards from Uber and Lyft drivers, but in order to 
avoid the issue of employee status under the National Labor Relations 
Act, union officials applied to the Taxi and Limousine Commission 
to hold an election.79 The organizing drive occurred after Uber 
attempted to head off unionization by entering into an agreement 
with the Independent Drivers Guild, an organization affiliated with 
the International Association of Machinists, to represent its drivers 
in appeals of de-activations and in meetings with Uber, but without 
any authority to negotiate terms and conditions of employment or 
to strike.80 
It is too early to tell whether Uber drivers in platform-enabled 
petty commodity production will gain the protection of labour and 
employment law and whether, if they do, Uber will find ways to re-
transform taxi capitalism to enable it to operate without having the 
obligations of an employer. The important point for our purposes is 
that to talk sensibly about the future of platform capitalism in the 
taxi industry we must not only recognize that it is capitalist, but 
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also understand the relations of production behind the app and the 
conflicts they generate.
IV. Conclusion
Platform capitalism Uber-style is not the end of taxi capitalism his-
tory. Changes in technology are part of the story, but so too is law 
and resistance. Indeed it is fair to say that the development of taxi 
capitalism is driven by their interactions. Medallion capitalism was 
made possible by law, but the law was a response to the actions of 
drivers and owner-operators unable to make a living in a regime of 
unregulated petty commodity production. The development and 
spread of a new technology, radio dispatching, provided an oppor-
tunity for rentier capitalism to gain a foothold in the industry, but 
medallion capitalism was also shaped by the conflict between drivers 
and dispatches and small fleet owners over how the value produced 
under medallion capitalism would be divided. In order to avoid 
collective bargaining and keep more of the value for themselves, 
dispatches and fleet owners ended employment and turned drivers 
into contractors. When labour law eventually changed to address 
this reality, drivers renewed their efforts to unionize as dependent 
contractors, but were ultimately defeated by the fissured relations 
in the industry. 
Uber has introduced a new technology and created an unme-
diated relation between itself and its drivers, whom it too treats as 
self-employed micro-entrepreneurs. Yet here too law and resistance 
play an important role in shaping taxi capitalism Uber-style. Uber’s 
boldest innovation is its legal claim that it is not subject to existing 
taxi regulation. Taxi regulation is being remade city by city, largely 
with the aim of creating a level playing field for both branches of the 
industry. At the same time, Uber is facing resistance from its drivers 
who seek to retain more of the value they produce through collective 
bargaining and employment law. It remains to be seen whether they 
will succeed and, if they do, how Uber will respond. It is already 
investing heavily in the development of driverless cars, which would 
lead to a new model of capitalism or, perhaps, post-capitalism.81
My argument is not that medallion capitalism is preferable to 
platform capitalism Uber-style. Under either form of taxi capital-
ism, the drivers who perform the work experience domination and 
exploitation. So, while technological change may open up possibilities 
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for transformation, as long as the technology is deployed for the 
purposes of maximizing profits for the benefit of its owners, its 
emancipatory potential is unlikely to be realized. Capitalism is not 
a platform on which a sharing economy can be built.
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CHAPTER XI I
Making Sense of the Public Discourse 




P opular sharing economy platforms, such as Airbnb, have been a frequent focus of public attention in recent years. Much of this 
attention has been driven by the numerous regulation challenges fac-
ing these platforms, either present ones through ongoing litigation, or 
prospective ones, through legislation drafting by governments. The 
media addresses evident legal issues, such as the fact that short-term 
rental laws are circumvented, as in the case of Quebec,2 or the new 
regulations to curb illegal actions.3 These issues speak the loudest, 
as they are immediate or imminent. What is lost, or what might be 
lost, in terms of the labour rights of workers, doesn’t appear as urgent 
an issue. Opinion pieces, among others, have touched on this issue, 
alerting the reader to unsuspected problems appearing through 
the cracks of the bright portrait painted by the platforms. It doesn’t 
appear, however, that labour rights are a central part of the public 
discourse on the sharing economy. What can be gained (for hosts, 
drivers, consumers, and others), rather than what can be lost, seems 
to receive much more attention. “Public discourse” is understood for 
the purposes of this chapter as being mainly constituted of media 
accounts on Airbnb, including news reports, opinion columns, and 
analytic journalism. It is understood as the information and analyses 
presented to the general population about Airbnb, rather than aimed 
at a specific audience such as academia.
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The Airbnb platform will be used as a case study, along with 
its corollary, the traditional hotel industry, to explore the attention 
given to labour rights concerns in the context of a neoliberal era. This 
chapter is concerned with the question: Why aren’t labour rights of 
hotel workers and of Airbnb host an important part of the Airbnb 
conversation? Furthermore, why aren’t the labour rights of these two 
groups of workers addressed concomitantly, as a dependency relation 
can be traced between them? To contextualize the topic, the labour 
rights of workers in the tourist accommodation sector in Canada are 
presented. The acquired labour rights of hotel workers of Quebec are 
used as an example. The labour rights issues facing the hotel industry 
in Canada are also addressed, in order to consider a more holistic 
framing of their labour situation. The restricted labour rights and the 
extended duties of self-employed workers are then described, using 
once more the example of Quebec, considering that Airbnb hosts are 
usually acting under self-employment laws, in the context of this 
province’s current worker statuses, and when declaring their hosting 
activities as an income source for income tax purposes. This charac-
terization of self-employment is used as an example of the ways in 
which a worker loses labour rights protections afforded to workers 
under an employee status, acknowledging that not all Airbnb hosts 
can be, or are, characterized as such.
Next, this chapter is concerned with discerning how the dis-
course about Airbnb is framed regarding labour. This contribution 
draws on the public discourse, using only publicly available sources 
in Canada and the United States. I identify two groups of themes 
emerging from this discourse—freedom and monetization, and 
empowerment and accountability for oneself. I also argue that there 
is a missing connection: that of Airbnb and the labour rights (and 
eventually, right to labour) of workers in the hotel industry.
How do we make sense of this public discourse, from a perspec-
tive critical of the minimal presence of labour rights? I propose that 
this can be accomplished through a theoretical framing from Michel 
Foucault’s The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1978–794 and Wendy Brown’s Undoing the Demos—Neoliberalism’s 
Stealth Revolution5 on neoliberal rationality. Their main arguments 
are presented, followed by a conceptualization of labour within a 
neoliberal governing rationality. The themes that emerged from 
the public discourse on Airbnb and labour are then revisited, 
using the theoretical framework offered by Foucault’s and Brown’s 
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contributions. Deconstructing dominant themes to discern implicit 
assumptions allows for an uncovering of the preponderant logic 
at work. Organizing thoughts within the framework of a theoreti-
cal approach allows for a more concerted voicing of concerns and 
avenues for further reflection. Such concerns and avenues are offered 
as concluding thoughts.
II. The Context of Labour Rights in the Tourist 
Accommodation Sector in Canada
i. Hotel Industry in Canada: Acquired Rights and Current Labour 
Rights Issues
This section addresses the labour rights of workers in the hotel indus-
try who are considered employees, using the context of Quebec law 
as an example. An employee, according to the Act Respecting Labour 
Standards, 
means a person who works for an employer and who is entitled 
to a wage; this word also includes a worker who is a party to a 
contract, under which he or she
i. undertakes to perform specified work for a person within the 
scope and in accordance with the methods and means deter-
mined by that person;
ii. undertakes to furnish, for the carrying out of the contract, 
the material, equipment, raw materials or merchandise chosen 
by that person and to use them in the manner indicated by him 
or her; and
iii. keeps, as remuneration, the amount remaining to him or her 
from the sum he has received in conformity with the contract, 
after deducting the expenses entailed in the performance of 
that contract.6
The Act Respecting Labour Standards applies to employees.7 The Act’s 
Chapter IV, “Labour Standards,” provides numerous labour rights. 
They concern wages,8 hours of work,9 statutory general holidays and 
non-working days with pay,10 annual leave with pay,11 rest periods,12 
absences owing to sickness, an organ or tissue donation for trans-
plant, an accident or a criminal offence,13 family or parental leave 
and absences,14 psychological harassment,15 termination of employ-
ment or layoff,16 and collective dismissal,17 retirement,18 and other 
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miscellaneous provisions. Numerous hotel employees are unionized, 
providing additional labour protections to the ones provided by 
the Act Respecting Labour Standards, such standards being of public 
order.19 The Quebec hotel industry has even been termed a “model 
of solidarity” by a left-wing publication.20
Obviously, even within the context of being under the protec-
tion of the Act Respecting Labour Standards or another provincial 
labour act, there are many labour rights issues facing hotel industry 
workers. For example, the president of the board of directors of the 
Quebec Hotel Association (Association hôtellerie Québec) recently co-
signed an opinion piece in La Presse opposing a minimum wage of $15 
per hour.21 Recently as well, unionized workers from the Pur Hotel, 
in Quebec City, were locked out by their employer, which according 
to a union leader “came out of nowhere,” as negotiations were going 
well.22 The employees responded with a vote overwhelmingly in 
favour of an unlimited general strike.23 A few months before, eleven 
hotels in Montreal and Quebec City declared a one-day strike, mainly 
on grounds related to wages as well as vacation and severance pay.24 
Furthermore, as Chris Schenk demonstrates in the context of the 
hotel industry, “even unionized, full-time employees, successful in 
securing contractual gains in wages, benefits, and working condi-
tions, are vulnerable to precarious employment, partly because of 
their occupational context and income level, and especially in the 
face of unpredictable events.”25
The hotel industry in Canada also employs a significant number 
of temporary foreign workers. In March 2016, the Hotel Association 
of Canada (HAC) applauded “The Honourable MaryAnne Mihychuk, 
Minister of Employment, Workforce Development and Labour for 
recognizing the seasonal nature of the lodging industry and autho-
rizing tourism businesses temporary foreign workers for up to a six 
month period.”26 The HAC has spoken about the industry’s need for 
temporary foreign workers in the recent past, as it “is facing a nation-
wide labour shortage crisis.”27 In the hotel industry, “back jobs,” 
accomplished by workers who do not normally interact directly with 
guests, are largely held by immigrant women.28 Temporary foreign 
workers, nonetheless, are protected under the relevant provincial 
labour and employment laws.29
The Canadian Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) has, 
of course, received its fair share of criticisms, a prominent critique 
being the fact that “precarious employment, unfree labour relations 
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and precarious legal status are actively produced by employers and 
the state and negotiated by workers not as distinct ‘categories,’ but as 
interrelated conditions of labour market participation.”30 The spec-
trum of exploitation sometimes even leads to cases of human traf-
ficking.31 Under the program, workers are tied to a unique employer, 
and it does not automatically lead to permanent resident status or to 
citizenship.32 In June 2016, Minister Mihychuk announced that she 
is “temporarily freezing at current levels the cap on the proportion 
of an employer’s workforce that can consist of low-wage temporary 
foreign workers,” citing the fact that the “program needs to change.”33
ii. Airbnb in Canada: Self-Employed Status and the Example 
of Quebec
Airbnb hosts are not employees of Airbnb; hosts earn money directly 
from their clients (guests) and decide when they are to work and 
when their space is available. (These decisions, of course, are to be 
considered in the context of the pressures within the Airbnb market.) 
They determine the terms of this host-guest relation, as concerns 
house rules, for example. Under the Quebec Act Respecting Labour 
Standards, Airbnb hosts cannot be considered employees, as they do 
not work for a person. They are, in the context of this profit-making 
activity, self-employed workers, or “independent” workers. Therefore, 
the Act Respecting Labour Standards does not apply to them, and they 
thus do not benefit from its standards. Additionally, self-employed 
workers in Quebec must bear numerous costs for which employees 
are exempted, such as for statutory holidays they wish to take as a 
vacation,34 for many public social welfare programs, including the 
Quebec Pension Plan35 and the provincial occupational safety and 
health coverage,36 as well as for other health-related insurances, 
such as dental care.37 Already in 2006, before the rise of the “sharing 
economy,” it was noted that “[t]he contemporary Canadian labour 
force is characterized by an expansion of self-employment.”38
Perhaps this is not an evident problem at the moment when one 
thinks of Airbnb. If hosts do not operate an Airbnb business full-
time, or if they own numerous properties and are thus financially 
secure, the issue doesn’t appear relevant. However, Airbnb is profit-
ing enormously from these hosts, as the mediating platform between 
them and their guests. Furthermore, Airbnb’s continuous expan-
sion could suggest that more hosts will be assuming this function 
full time. Also, interestingly, the San Francisco Chronicle published 
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a study it undertook that shows that “Airbnb had 4,798 properties 
listed in the city. Almost two-thirds––2,984––were entire houses or 
apartments.”39 An article published in Money magazine pointed out 
that this finding “pok[es] holes in airbnb’s [sic] ‘folksy’ argument 
that the vast majority of its hosts are simply small-time ‘home shar-
ers’ who earn a few dollars here and there by occasionally renting 
out a spare room.”40 This is an even more serious cause for concern, 
in terms of the preservation of acquired labour rights, considering 
that Airbnb is expanding its services to “Trips,” a service allowing 
tourists to book tours or similar activities with locals that would not 
be available otherwise.41 Eventually, Airbnb will collect 20 per cent 
of the costs of such services,42 while not offering hosts the labour 
protections offered by an employee status.
III. How Is the Public Discourse on Airbnb and Labour Framed 
in Canada and the United States? 
This chapter is concerned with the potential loss of previously 
acquired labour rights for Airbnb hosts. As this labour force 
increases, are labour rights a serious part of the conversation on 
Airbnb? How is this labour characterized? Even if one of the prem-
ises of this chapter is that labour, indeed, isn’t usually a central part 
of the public discourse on Airbnb, it sometimes is. And this type of 
labour deserves a more significant place within this conversation, 
considering the significance of such work occurring outside of the 
traditional employee/employer relation for which labour law affords 
important labour rights to workers. This is the case when labour 
issues themselves constitute a news event. For example, advanced 
negotiations between Airbnb and the United States–based Service 
Employees International Union have recently taken place, but have 
failed.43 If this agreement had been adopted, Airbnb would have 
encouraged hosts to hire unionized workers and pay them $15 
per hour or more.44 Airbnb also reportedly approached another 
important union in the industry, Unite Here, which rejected the 
possibility of such an agreement.45 This garnered media atten-
tion in popular outlets, such as The Guardian,46 as well as in other, 
alternative ones.47 
In any case, the arguments in this chapter imply that Airbnb 
hosts are indeed engaged in labour.48 This is mentioned because 
it can elude us, when hosting is presented as a side occupation, or 
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when it is presented using testimonials from hosts, stating: “Airbnb 
has brought the world to me. We sit around on my patio, and [guests] 
describe their lives,”49 and when ads for the company state that it 
“strengthens our communities.”50 Arguably, for platforms such as 
Uber (for which work is accomplished in a public space), the recog-
nition of labour as an eessential part of participating in the sharing 
economy hasn’t been an issue. This use of public space is consistent 
with one ofthe most important contributions of feminist theory con-
cerning the pubic/private divide and the devaluation of interest in 
the private sphere, ehere labour, paid and unpaid, is accomplished. 
51 As Naomi Schoenbaum remarks, 
[t]he rise of the sharing economy then challenges the traditional 
sociological division between the “first place”’ which is the 
home, the ˚second place,” which is the workplace, and the “third 
place,” which are communal spaces generally open to the public 
that may or may not be part of the market.52 
Even though she acknowledges that this is not “entirely new or 
unique to the sharing economy,”53 the magnitude of this emerging 
sector “presents challenges for legal regulation and the goals of sex 
equality.”54
Hosting through Airbnb is not the same as hosting relatives or 
other people in your personal networks, nor is it like sharing your 
couch or a room in your home to strangers free of charge through 
platforms such as Couchsurfing.55 Hosts are service providers and 
guests are clients. A portrayal of two Airbnb hosts in a New York 
Times article illustrates this point, when one is quoted as saying that 
“[h]osting on Airbnb wasn’t a choice. It was decided for me,” while 
the other woman portrayed is also “a host out of necessity,” due to 
financial constraints related to the job market.56
How is the public discourse on Airbnb and labour framed, 
using the examples of Canada and the United States? I identify two 
pairs of themes that stand out in the public discourse on Airbnb and 
references made to labour within it. The positive themes of freedom 
and empowerment are often coupled with, for the former, monetiza-
tion, and for the latter, accountability for oneself. Their associated 
themes can be portrayed as positive as well; but also negatively in 
the framework of a critique of neoliberalism. Each pair of themes 
will be revisited in the following section, through a deconstruction 
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using the neoliberal governing rationality critique from Foucault and 
Brown. I end this section with thoughts on how there seems to be a 
missing connection between the labour of the hotel industry workers 
and Airbnb hosts, even though they constitute two major groups of 
workers in the accommodation industry.
i. Freedom and Monetization
Freedom is a value that is used by many to characterize Airbnb, 
presenting engagement with Airbnb as freedom from a desk job, 
financial freedom, freedom to dispose of one’s property, freedom 
from state regulation, or even freedom of speech. “I like my free-
dom,” says a woman whose income is provided solely by the labour 
she accomplishes in the framework of numerous sharing economy 
platforms, portrayed by a New York Times article.57 A Forbes article 
quoted a study revealing that persons “who take advantage of ‘free 
agent’ contractual gigs, ‘choose this workstyle for the freedom, flex-
ibility, and entrepreneurial empowerment they experience with this 
independent approach to work and life.’”58 Airbnb is presented as a 
way to live a dream life characterized by freedom, described in web-
sites, guides, and books with titles such as Portable Bed & Breakfast: 
Empower Your Freedom Lifestyle With Airbnb.59
The promise of financial freedom is also the topic of numer-
ous publications, such as Overnight Success: Achieve Financial Freedom 
Through Airbnb.60 Freedom is furthermore associated with disposing 
freely of property. This was the case, for example, when the governor 
of Arizona signed a bill to prevent localities from banning platforms 
such as Airbnb, which was presented as being “about property 
owners regaining some small measure of freedom.”61 Freedom is 
understood as freedom from illegitimate state regulation, as this 
headline from ABC News in New Orleans makes clear: “City Begins to 
Consider More Freedom for Short-Term Rentals.”62 In Montreal, new 
regulations have been portrayed as “discouraging entrepreneurship” 
and “imposing obstacles on people’s initiatives and who benefit from 
the new technologies”63 [author’s translation]. 
Even freedom of speech is becoming a significant element of the 
public discourse on Airbnb, as legal challenges on such grounds are 
emerging in places such as Anaheim (California),64 New York City,65 
and San Francisco.66 An article in the Los Angeles Times explains the 
logic behind such allegations, stating that
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[t]he lawsuit says the regulation violates constitutional rights to 
free speech and equal protection under the law as well as the 
1996 Communications Decency Act, which prohibits states and 
local jurisdictions from holding Internet platforms liable for 
content created by users of the websites.
The lawsuit also says that the ordinance “will have an imper-
missible chilling effect on speech” because Airbnb won’t know 
which listings are lawful and which are not and therefore will 
have to stop publishing all listings from Anaheim.67
Freedom from having a boss, from imposed schedules, and the like 
also means, however, that a subsistence revenue must come from 
other sources than employment. This usually means being respon-
sible for optimally monetizing one’s own labour, in the form of pro-
duction or services. “Monetization” is another term frequently used 
to describe the opportunity offered by Airbnb. Indeed, it is used on 
the Airbnb website itself as a sort of slogan: “[a]nd with world-class 
customer service and a growing community of users, Airbnb is the 
easiest way for people to monetize their extra space and showcase it 
to an audience of millions.”68
Here as well, websites, guides, and books abound, with titles 
such as Practical Guide on How to Turn Your House Into a Money Making 
Machine: Achieve Financial Security Today.69 Monetizing hobbies and 
homes is celebrated. “[T]he most successful businesspeople simply 
devise a means to monetize what they enjoy doing most,” says an 
article about Airbnb co-founder Nate Blecharczyk.70 “[Airbnb is] a 
great way for people to monetize their most valuable asset, which 
tends to be their home,” the company’s country manager for Canada 
is quoted as saying in a Globe and Mail article.71 A Bloomberg article 
is ironically titled “The Sharing Economy: Monetize Your Life.”72 A 
New York Times opinion piece about Airbnb claims “dead capital” 
is a “problem,” the term meaning “potentially productive assets 
owned by ordinary people who could use them if they could only 
find a way.”73
What is freedom without monetization, after all, in a capitalist 
society? 
ii. Empowerment and Accountability for Oneself 
Another strong association made with Airbnb is entrepreneurship, 
and with that, empowerment. Here too, books abound, with titles 
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like The Airbnb Entrepreneur: How to Earn Big Profits, Even if You Don’t 
Own a Property74 and The Airbnb Expert’s Playbook: Secrets to Making 
Six-Figures as a Rentalpreneur.75
Airbnb itself uses the term “empower” frequently. Headlines 
such as “Airbnb Unveils Expansive Suite of Personalized Tools to 
Empower Hosts”76 or “New Airbnb Partnership Empowers Rural 
Indian Women”77 grace the company’s website. On last year’s 
International Women’s Day, Airbnb published a blog post titled 
“Celebrating and Empowering Women Around the World.”78 It 
stated that 
[w]omen are some of the most avid and adventurous travel-
ers, and the warmest and most hospitable hosts and guides. 
Today, 55 percent of our hosts are women, and the income they 
earn helps with everything from sending their kids to school, 
to living independent lifestyles, to letting them pursue their 
passions.79
I will leave the gender analysis of essentialism to another time and 
place.80 
“People generally know what’s best for them, or at least they 
know better than government regulators. The peer-to-peer economy 
helps them get what they want, faster, cheaper and more efficiently,” 
claims an opinion piece in the Chicago Tribune.81 Independence is 
a key component of the promotion of the “sharing” economy con-
sumers. We would (should) thus be seeking to empower ourselves 
independently in the face of undue state regulation. 
Empowerment, especially when accomplished through entre-
preneurial endeavours, can also have as a corollary accountability 
for oneself, which is not present to the same degree in the context 
of being employed. In the case of Airbnb, Fortune Magazine coined 
the following headline to express the company’s business strategy: 
“Making a business out of not being responsible.”82 
The host is the one assuming the risks, not Airbnb. A contrib-
uting editor to The Nation magazine comments with irony about the 
public message on the sharing economy:
[The sharing economy] sees us all as micro-entrepreneurs 
fending for ourselves in a hostile world. […] Can’t afford a 
place to live while attending grad school? Take a two-bedroom 
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apartment and rent one room out. You may lack health insur-
ance, sick days and a pension plan, but you’re in control.83 
The Airbnb host is accountable for his or herself in the case of any 
changing life circumstances or fork in the road that he or she may 
encounter, such as pregnancy or disability. 
Moreover, Airbnb is not necessarily about making money to 
afford additional luxuries. For example, in the case of Vancouver, 
Airbnb released a report stating that “more than half of the people 
who rent out their homes do so to afford their cost of living.”84 
Airbnb’s “Fast Facts” webpage informs us that “52% [of hosts] are 
moderate to low income” and that “48% of host income is used to 
pay for regular household expenses like rent and groceries.”85 While 
these statistics are presented as a promotion of the help Airbnb is 
offering society, this perspective implicitly accepts the fact that a vast 
number of people cannot afford to subsist while taking part in the 
traditional employed labour force. Indeed, many people are enticed 
into Airbnb hosting because of mortgage debt they cannot afford 
to pay.86 A recent start-up, Loftium, even offers to pay for the down 
payment to buy a house, in exchange for one to three years of renting 
a room on Airbnb, save for eight days at the discretion of the new 
homeowners, and sharing the profits with the company.87 Perhaps 
we are to question the structure creating such precariousness, rather 
than patching the holes with another form of precarious work. I 
argue that this structure is underpinned by the logic of neoliberal-
ism, which will be deconstructed in section IV.
iii. The Missing Connection: Airbnb and Labour Rights 
(and Right to Labour) in the Hotel Industry
The precarious labour situation of many workers in both categories 
is prevalent. Indeed, this might not be so evident in the context of 
Airbnb hosts, whom we might think of as people who own prop-
erty and are thus in a comfortable financial situation; however, the 
high percentage of persons who use this income for basic needs, as 
presented above, tells us otherwise. The labour rights issues of hotel 
industry workers presented above also paint a picture of, although 
not generalized, potentially prevalent labour precariousness. The 
situation can be even more complex when it is considered that Airbnb 
hosts might also be workers in the hotel industry at the same time, 
or that Airbnb hosts might contract with management companies to 
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complete hosting-related tasks such as communication with guests or 
cleaning.88 In the latter case, hotel-room attendants might then also 
provide cleaning services for an Airbnb host, for example.
It appears, though, that the connection is rarely made between 
the labour situations of hotel industry workers and Airbnb hosts. Of 
course, their situations are not comparable. But the rise of Airbnb 
could come to mean that the “low-skilled” hotel industry workers 
experience a right-to-labour situation, especially in the cases where 
they do not themselves have extra space to rent on Airbnb.
IV. Making Sense of the Discourse: Foucault’s Neoliberalism 
and Brown’s Economization of the Individual
Wendy Brown, a professor of political science at UC Berkeley,89 deliv-
ered a sharp critique of neoliberalism and its threat to democracy in 
Undoing the Demos—Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. Its relevancy for 
making sense of the discourse on Airbnb and labour emanates both 
from the fact that Airbnb is coined as participating in the “democratiza-
tion of services,”90 and from the fact that the themes highlighted above, 
frequently used in the public discourse on the platform, can also be con-
sidered as pillars of neoliberalism. Her critique is based on Foucault’s 
conceptualization of neoliberalism in The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at 
the Collège de France, 1978–79. Accordingly, Foucault’s contribution will 
be briefly reviewed before Brown’s work is presented in more detail, 
and applied to the themes of Airbnb and labour, identified above as a 
frame of reference for making sense of the public discourse on the topic.
i. The Main Arguments on Neoliberal Rationality from Michel 
Foucault’s The Birth of Biopolitics and Wendy Brown’s Undoing 
the Demos 
Foucault delivered lectures at the Collège de France in Paris from 
1971–84, and transcripts of his talks are collected in The Birth of 
Biopolitics. He speaks at length of neoliberalism, distinguishing 
between the German form and the American form,91 a distinction 
that will not be maintained for the purposes of this chapter. For 
Foucault, neoliberalism is not a revitalization of forms of liberalism 
from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; rather, it is concerned 
with “whether a market economy can in fact serve as the principle, 
form, and model for a state which, because of its defects, is mis-
trusted by everyone on both the right and the left, for one reason 
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or another.”92 In opposition with liberalism, “[t]he problem of neo-
liberalism is rather how the overall exercise of political power can 
be modeled on the principles of a market economy.”93 Furthermore, 
Foucault identifies “a shift from exchange to competition in the prin-
ciple of the market,” from liberalism to neoliberalism.94 Rather than 
constituting an equal relationship, free exchange is typically associ-
ated with inequality.95 Competition is neither evident nor natural; 
it operates under a formal structure,96 and as such, “[n]eoliberalism 
should not therefore be identified with laissez-faire, but rather with 
permanent vigilance, activity, and intervention.”97 
Foucault also addresses what he considers to be the neoliberal 
conception of unemployment:
[w]hat is to be saved, first of all and above all, is the stability of 
prices [rather than full employment]. Price stability will in fact 
allow, subsequently no doubt, both the maintenance of purchas-
ing power and the existence of a higher level of employment than 
in an unemployment crisis […]. As, I think it was Röpke said, 
what is an unemployed person? […] He is a worker in transit 
between an unprofitable activity and a more profitable activity.98
Foucault observes an “essential epistemological transformation” 
within neoliberal analyses, which he explains in the context of labour: 
[t]he problem of bringing labor back into the field of economic 
analysis is not one of asking about the price of labor, or what it 
produces technically, or what is the value added by labor. The 
fundamental, essential problem […] is how the person who 
works uses the means available to him.99
What a neoliberal society wants of humans “is not the man of 
exchange or man the consumer; he is the man of enterprise and 
production.”100 This being the case, “there is a privileged connec-
tion between a society oriented towards the form of the enterprise 
[…] and a society in which the most important public service is the 
judicial institution,” as more disputes necessitating legal arbitration 
are likely to emerge.101 
Brown builds on Foucault’s neoliberal governing rationality, in 
Undoing the Demos, to argue that neoliberalism not only dominates 
the economic sphere, but also all other social spheres. Therefore,
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neoliberalism is formulated somewhat differently and focuses on 
different deleterious effects. In contrast with an understanding 
of neoliberalism as a set of state policies, a phase of capitalism, 
or an ideology that set loose the market to restore profitability 
for a capitalist class, I join Michel Foucault and others in conceiv-
ing neoliberalism as an order of normative reason that, when 
it becomes ascendant, takes shape as a governing rationality 
extending a specific formulation of economic values, practices, 
and metrics to every dimension of human life.102
In this governing rationality, humans are “homo oeconomicus.”103 
Brown brings this concept further than Foucault. Foucault conceived 
of it as meaning that humans are “driven by interest,” while Brown 
argues that “this subject is so profoundly integrated into and hence 
subordinated to the supervening goal of macro-economic growth that 
its own well-being is easily sacrificed to these larger purposes.”104 As 
such, “market values are crowding out all others.”105
An extended logic of neoliberal governing rationality comes 
to mean that “[r]eversing the liberal formulation in which a free 
market is defined and supervised by the state, […] the state should 
be defined and supervised by the market.”106 Or, in the words of 
Foucault: “[o]ne must govern for the market, rather than because 
of the market.”107 Airbnb imposed on the state the regulation of its 
activities, as they were novel and disruptive. Heated public debates 
arose concerning the shape that such regulations should take, but at 
the end of the day, a significant proportion of them do not prohibit 
Airbnb from existing; they frame how it can exist, as it is considered 
an inevitable market force. 
“Contemporary neoliberalism is unthinkable without 
governance,”108 Brown states. Airbnb’s constant negotiations with 
governments to secure regulations that allow it to maintain its 
activities in different cities resonate with Brown’s description of gov-
ernance, and with how we can conceive of Airbnb’s societal power:
[g]overnance replaces hierarchical, top-down mandates and 
enforcement with horizontal networks of invested stakeholders 
pursuing a common end. And governance replaces “command 
and control” with negotiation and persuasion. Effective gover-
nors create incentives for desired outcomes and negotiate over 
goals, even those that public action is to serve.109
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The role of law in a neoliberal governing rationality is again taken 
further than Foucault by Brown, as “law becomes a medium for dis-
seminating neoliberal rationality beyond the economy, including to 
constitutive elements of democratic life.”110 
Coming back to the fact that Airbnb is often presented as a form 
of democratization, it is interesting to take note of Brown’s words 
in Undoing the Demos’ epilogue: “[a]bove all, no doubt, neoliberal 
rationality has been extremely effective in identifying capitalism 
with democracy.”111
ii. Labour in a Neoliberal Governing Rationality
Brown paints a dark picture for the future of labour within a neolib-
eral governing rationality: 
When everything is capital, labour disappears as a category, as 
does its collective form, class, taking with it the analytical basis 
for alienation, exploitation, and association among laborers.112 
[Therefore,] [a]s capitals, every subject is rendered as entre-
preneurial, no matter how small, impoverished, or without 
resources, and every aspect of human existence is produced as 
an entrepreneurial one.113
This can be understood as the basis of a logic of turning hobbies 
into jobs; this is not to propose that one cannot and should not enjoy 
his or her work, but rather to state that there might be an underly-
ing pressure to monetize time spent on hobbies as to not waste this 
time, or a constant lure to monetize them rather than be satisfied 
with enjoying them. The same can be true about Airbnb; guest rooms 
should not be considered as exclusively for welcoming a relative or 
friend, but rather as possible avenues for monetization of our private 
space. It almost appears as if one should ask themselves: why not 
turn this private space into a monetization avenue? If one’s home 
is conceptualized as capital waiting to be monetized, then indeed a 
shift is operated between seeing labour as being accomplished out-
side of one’s private resting space, to extracting value from capital 
at every turn in a normalized manner.
In this entrepreneurial, competition-driven environment, how 
do labour rights fit in? Harry Arthurs observes the following:
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[b]y widening the gulf and shifting the numerical balance 
between workers still protected by labour law and those who 
are not, it [the rise of non-standard employment] may also have 
contributed to a new political dynamic in which have-not work-
ers acquiesce in or support efforts to strip the haves of their 
advantages.114 
As concerns Airbnb hosts, are we questioning who has access to extra 
space to monetize in the first place, or are we only concerned with 
sustaining a “healthy” competition between the Airbnb market and 
the traditional hotel market? Are we questioning the labour rights 
of Airbnb hosts, or are we only concerned with eschewing regula-
tions that restrict their possibilities of accomplishing their hosting?
iii. Questioning the Themes Emerging from the Public Discourse 
on Airbnb and Labour
The four themes that I have identified as emerging from the public 
discourse on Airbnb and labour can all be presented as positive. 
On the other hand, freedom and empowerment are also sometimes 
deconstructed as illusions, and monetization and accountability for 
oneself are sometimes criticized for their negative societal effects. 
Here, I revisit the four themes using as a theoretical framework 
Brown’s critic of neoliberalism, and necessarily in this context, that 
of Foucault as the underlying basis. The objective is to make sense of 
a public discourse that does not seem to take labour rights issues into 
serious consideration. In associating the themes with neoliberalism, 
and in positing neoliberalism as our current governing rationality, I 
seek to frame the underlying logic of the discourse and its coherency, 
to offer a more solid interpretation of why the public concentrates 
on certain issues and not others. The analyses emanating from the 
deconstruction of the four discourse themes seek to explore how we 
have cast, in a normalized manner, Airbnb labour as outside of the 
sphere of “traditional labour,” the sphere within which labour rights 
have been acquired, under this neoliberal governing rationality.
1. Freedom and Monetization Revisited
In a neoliberal governing rationality, Brown proposes that freedom 
becomes associated with freedom of markets; one is free within the 
constraints of market rationality. Therefore, inequality characterizes 
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this freedom, rather than equality being protected through the rule 
of law.115 As stated above, neoliberalism is not about state non-inter-
vention; it is about state intervention to optimize markets. As such, 
this “order [is] replete with contradiction and disavowal, structuring 
markets it claims to liberate from structure, intensely governing sub-
jects it claims to free from government, strengthening and retasking 
states it claims to abjure.”116 
The language of freedom, borrowed from liberalism, is still 
in high use by neoliberal tenants (“free markets, free counties, free 
men”117), but this would be the “central ruse” of this governing 
rationality. Indeed, 
[s]ubjects, liberated for the pursuit of their own enhancement of 
human capital, emancipated from all concerns with and regula-
tion by the social, the political, the common, or the collective, 
are inserted into the norms and imperatives of market conduct 
and integrated into the purposes of the firm, industry, region, 
nation, or postnational constellation to which their survival is 
tethered.118
Brown’s words tie well with the aforementioned article on Nate 
Blecharczyk titled “Airbnb Co-Founder: Make Money Off Your 
Hobbies,” when she states that “human capital is constrained to self-
invest in ways that contribute to its appreciation or at least prevent 
its depreciation; […] [this includes organizing its] leisure practices 
in value-enhancing ways,”119 blurring the lines between personal 
hobbies and jobs, between the private and the work space. 
In the context of free speech, Brown also addresses this through 
the eyes of a neoliberal governing rationality, which “supplants 
democratic political deliberation and voices with a formulation of 
speech as capital and free speech as an unhindered capital right.”120 
Airbnb is seeking relief from strict regulations of the activities of its 
hosts on such a basis through its legal challenges related to freedom 
of speech provisions. It is seeking to be freed from constraints on 
its profits; many hosts support these actions in order to be free to 
monetize their space under the auspices of Airbnb, which is market- 
rather than state-driven. 
Are Airbnb hosts truly finding freedom, from a schedule, from 
financial constraints, from regulation? After all, hosts are dependent 
on a guest wishing to secure a booking at a precise moment. Hosts 
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are dependent on their pleasantness as hosts and the attractiveness 
of their space in competitive terms in order to monetize it to the 
point of freedom from financial worries, considering the additional 
financial burden of self-employment. Hosts are dependent on Airbnb 
as a platform, which makes some of the most impactful rules, such 
as the percentage it takes on each booking. Therefore, are hosts truly 
freed from potentially oppressive regulation, when Airbnb negotiates 
lenient regulations with governments?
Monetization is also key in the neoliberal project, but it is 
extended to the concept of economization. As such, monetization 
is to be understood in a greater context of economization of all the 
elements constituting social life, sometimes with the help of state 
regulation;121 it can thus also be linked to the lure of monetizing 
everything, but also to applying the “model of the market” to all 
spheres, even those that are not “monetizable.”122 Brown gives the 
example of dating, quoting the manner in which online dating sites 
promote their services as helping one “maximiz[e] return on invest-
ment of affect, not only time and money.”123 Therefore, “both persons 
and states are expected to comport themselves in ways that maximize 
their capital value in the present and enhance their future value.”124 
This gives true meaning to the term “governing rationality,” as we 
are restricted, consciously or not, to thinking within this logic. 
Orly Lobel, writing on the gig economy, states that “[l]eisure 
becomes work, work becomes leisure, socialization turns costly, and 
people price every interaction according to market value.”125 When 
Airbnb is promoted as providing hosts with the pleasure of having 
conversations with people from around the world on one’s own 
patio, thus promoting meaningful engagements with guests as part 
of an optimized hosting labour act, does this not also promote the 
economization of friendship? Being especially friendly, in this case, 
can lead to better ratings on the host’s profile. Moreover, Airbnb 
can also lead to monetizing one’s attractiveness, in the context of 
hosts posting their pictures, or of guests posting theirs, waiting to 
be approved for a cheaper room on Airbnb than can be found in a 
hotel in the surrounding area. This leads to obvious problems, such 
as discrimination based on racialized physical features, which, of 
course, is prohibited in the hotel industry; but in the context of 
Airbnb, it is a free market, after all, and one can pick and choose. This 
was documented in a 2015 study, which proposed that the identity 
of guests not be revealed; however, “Airbnb, a standard-bearer of 
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the so-called sharing economy, has argued forcefully that anonym-
ity is incompatible with building trust between users.”126 This past 
September, Airbnb reacted with a new community commitment, as 
well as a nondiscrimination policy that users must accept.127 Brown 
argues that neoliberal governance, namely, “devolv[es] authority, 
decision making, and the implementation of policies and norms of 
conduct.”128 Are Airbnb’s regulations enough to curb discrimination, 
in a context of competition? Or, is there really just one guideline for 
all others—that of a “free” market?
2. Empowerment and Accountability for Oneself, Revisited
Empowerment, as discussed above, is often associated with entrepre-
neurship in the Airbnb context, or self-employment in general. Brown 
argues that beyond traditionally conceptualized entrepreneurship, 
under a neoliberal governing rationality, we seek “investors” in all 
spheres: 
[w]hether through social medial “followers,” “likes,” and 
“retweets,” through rankings and ratings for every activity 
and domain, […] the pursuit of education, training, leisure, 
reproduction, consumption, and more are increasingly config-
ured as strategic decisions and practices related to enhancing 
the self’s future value.129 
Through Airbnb, are we empowering ourselves through the gamble 
that using this platform will give us more value than could be 
achieved through employment, in a context where competition is the 
name of the game, rather than equal opportunity?
Or, put differently, are the contours and limits of empowerment 
constricted within the governing rationality? Perhaps this helps us 
interpret how so many workers are moving towards “empowering” 
their labour through sharing economy platforms, seemingly oblivi-
ous to the labour rights they might be leaving behind.
Accountability for oneself thus appears central within a neo-
liberal governing rationality. Seeing that society in a competition 
framework is not characterized by equality, but rather is constituted 
of “a market formulation of winners and losers,”130 one must take it 
upon himself or herself to not be a “loser.” As such, “even as we are 
tasked with being responsible for ourselves in a competitive world 
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of other human capitals, insofar as we are human capital for firms 
or states concerned with their own competitive positioning, we have 
no guarantee of security, protection, or even survival.”131 Hosts are 
human capital for Airbnb; the company does not offer any guarantees 
such as those stated above, even as it secures millions of dollars from 
manoeuvring its competitiveness in the accommodation industry, 
while hosts are accomplishing the substantial labour.
Brown argues that we are willing to sacrifice for the greater 
macroeconomic goal.132 Following this argument, is it that we 
“understand” that the economy cannot offer costly labour rights to 
everyone, and thus self-employed workers must pay their due? Brown 
proposes that “bad citizenship” is namely characterized by workers 
that are “lazy consumers of benefits.”133 After all, we are “to become 
[…] responsible self-investor[s] and self-provider[s].”134
If we economize everything, then when are we accomplishing 
labour? How can we displace labour rights to such a context? How 
do we reconcile these rights with the logic of competition, in which 
inequality is naturalized?
Surely, many consumers feel advantaged by using Airbnb and 
do not question labour rights issues. But the fact is that many of 
these same consumers are susceptible to being at the receiving end 
of labour rights losses. This can occur whether they are workers in 
the hotel industry and face a downward pressure on labour rights 
through competition with Airbnb; if they decide to become Airbnb 
hosts themselves, perhaps even quitting their employee job in order 
to do so; or these losses can simply occur through our shifting con-
ception of labour rights in the furtherance of the neoliberal govern-
ing rationality.
V. Conclusion
Resistance initiatives to the adverse effects of the so-called sharing 
economy are certainly emerging. A proposal gaining ground is that 
of a guaranteed basic income for all workers. This would contribute 
to levelling power relations for workers in the sharing economy.135 As 
for financing this idea, well, “[h]ad they [Silicon Valley technology 
companies] paid more taxes, there would probably be less economic 
inequality to grapple with now in the first place.”136 
What might the future of labour rights look like if neolib-
eral rationality is to be consolidated and expanded? In the case 
Law and the “Sharing Economy”.indd   412 18-11-08   08:42
 Making Sense of the Public Discourse on Airbnb and Labour: What about Labour Rights? 413
of Airbnb, the discussion must be tied to one on subordination, 
prevalent in tourism studies. The carefree mindset often accom-
panying leisure tourism can potentially contribute to complicity 
in reproducing existing social subordinations, or in participating 
in subordination practices inherent to the guest-host relationship. 
Gender, racial, and class subordinations can thus be reinforced 
through the attitudes and behaviours of tourists. This is largely 
documented in the cases of practices of sexualisation of tourism 
promotion,137 or of insisting on the exoticism of locals in the con-
text of this promotion.138 Similar reflections are possible concern-
ing labour rights and Airbnb. Do tourists feel accountable for the 
labour rights situation of their Airbnb hosts, or of the hotel industry 
workers, for that matter, or do they feel that this is a national issue 
that they are not a part of? As in any tourism relation, playing the 
“game” of a market mindset, a strategy can be to concentrate on 
the power of the “guest,” the consumer, and his or her awareness 
of national social issues.
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